PEOPLE v. PUTALLEZ (2026)

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant Joseph Kent Putallez entered a no contest plea to theft of an elder or dependent adult by a caregiver, and the trial court placed him on two years’ formal probation. Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that one of the probation conditions impermissibly delegates judicial authority to nonjudicial officers. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Sonoma County District Attorney charged defendant with felony theft of a dependent adult (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (d); count 1), felony theft of a dependent adult by a caretaker (id., § 368, subd. (e); count 2), and grand theft of personal property (id., § 487, subd. (a); count 3).

Defendant represented himself. The parties reached a plea agreement, under which defendant pleaded no contest to count 2 in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges, dismissal of charges in two other criminal matters, 24 months of formal probation, and a five-year protective order.

A “Sonoma County Felony Presentence Report” (probation report) documented that, following a recent assessment pursuant to section 1368, defendant received a psychiatric diagnosis of “ ‘ “Other Specified Personality Disorder with Narcissistic and Paranoid Traits.” ’ ” It was also noted that defendant had “[l]ikely substance abuse issues.” (Italics omitted.) The probation report recommended, among other things, that defendant participate in “programs of assistance or counselling, drugs, cognitive behavioral, as directed by the Probation Officer.”

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on 24 months of formal probation with terms including that he was “to participate [in] and complete programs of assistance and counselling as directed by probation, specifically involving drug, psychological or psychiatric and cognitive behavioral therapies.” Regarding this probation condition, the court addressed defendant, “And, Mr. Putallez, the reason I list those is those are specific areas that I believe there's a potential connection between you and help that probation may be able to provide you.” Defendant responded, “I am in assistance with them and—.” The court said, “Very good,” and continued describing terms of probation, then ordered restitution and fees, checking with defendant that he “would be able to afford those fines and fees.”

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the probation condition that he “participate [in] and complete programs of assistance and counselling as directed by probation, specifically involving drug, psychological or psychiatric and cognitive behavioral therapies” impermissibly delegates judicial authority to nonjudicial officers.

As a preliminary matter, we note that defendant did not object to this probation condition with the trial court. Accordingly, we consider his contention only to the extent he claims a facial constitutional violation. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888–889 [appellate claim that a probation condition was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad was not forfeited by failure to object below where the facial challenge was “a pure question of law”].)¹

A trial court has broad discretion to set conditions of probation “as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done ․ and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j); People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 302 (Penoli).)

“[A] court may dictate the basic policy of a condition of probation, leaving specification of details to the probation officer.” (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 919.) “However, the court's order cannot be entirely open-ended.” (People v. O'Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358–1359 (O'Neil).) This is because, “[u]nder the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3), judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers.” (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902 (Smith).) “[I]t is the court's duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer,” although a “probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court's probation conditions.” (Ibid., italics added.)

Defendant argues the probation condition at issue “delegates unfettered and impermissibly [sic] judicial authority to the probation officer.” We disagree. The trial court here properly determined “the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer” (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 902), by specifying the areas the required treatment must address, “drug, psychological or psychiatric, and cognitive behavioral.” The court explained to defendant, “the reason I list those is those are specific areas that I believe there's a potential connection between you and help that probation may be able to provide you.” This probation condition is not entirely open-ended. It was within the court's authority to leave the “details ․ necessary to implement the terms of probation” to the probation officer. (O'Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1358–1359.)

For his position, defendant relies on Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 897, but his reliance is misplaced. The challenged condition in Smith required the probationer “ ‘to participate in any treatment/therapy/counseling program, including residential, as directed by the probation officer.’ ” (Id. at p. 902, italics added.) The Court of Appeal concluded that delegating to the probation officer the discretion to decide whether to require a residential program was an improper delegation of judicial authority because a residential program—in contrast to outpatient treatment—may require confinement, separation from family and friends, and inability to maintain a job. “Given the significant liberty interests at stake, a court—not a probation officer—must make the decision to require a defendant to attend residential treatment.” (Id. at p. 903.)

The probation condition in this case has no such infirmity. The probation officer is not authorized to require residential treatment. The probation officer is tasked with selecting appropriate programs “involving drug, psychological or psychiatric and cognitive behavioral therapies.” This is not problematic. “The trial court is poorly equipped to micromanage selection of a program, both because it lacks the ability to remain apprised of currently available programs and, more fundamentally, because entry into a particular program may depend on mercurial questions of timing and availability.” (Penoli, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.)

In short, we conclude the trial court, in ordering the challenged probation condition, properly “dictate[d] the basic policy” of the condition, “leaving specification of details to the probation officer.” (In re Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note here that we are not persuaded by the Attorney General's argument that defendant's appellate claim is “an attack on the requirement that he undergo drug treatment at the probation department's discretion—and thus [an attack] on the validity of his plea,” which would require a certificate of probable cause. The written plea agreement provided for “inpatient/outpatient treatment for drugs as directed by probation.” But the challenged probation condition is broader than this agreed-to term. The trial court ordered categories of treatment in addition to drug treatment, that is, “psychological or psychiatric and cognitive behavioral therapies” to address defendant's mental health issues. Because the challenged probation condition was not an express term of the parties’ negotiated disposition, we do not find that defendant's appeal requires a certificate of probable cause.

Miller, J.

WE CONCUR: Richman, Acting P. J. Desautels, J.