Public Guardian of Santa Barbara County, Petitioner and Respondent, v. K.L., Objector and Appellant. (2026)

Persons subject to a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code ¹ , § 5000 et seq.; LPS Act) may be confined and deprived of their rights to vote, drive, enter contracts, and make decisions about their treatment. Because of this potential loss of liberty, proposed conservatees are entitled to a unanimous jury verdict on whether they are gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. As we held in Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 384–385, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 689 (Heather W.), trial courts must advise proposed conservatees of their jury trial right in civil commitment proceedings.

In the absence of substantial evidence that a proposed conservatee lacks capacity to waive jury or that counsel or the trial court advised them of their jury trial right, we hold that a written citation simply informing a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial is inadequate to waive jury. But automatic reversal is not required if the record affirmatively shows that a proposed conservatee's jury waiver is knowing and intelligent based on the totality of the circumstances.

K.L. appeals from an order under the LPS Act declaring her gravely disabled and appointing the Santa Barbara County Public Guardian (Public Guardian) as her conservator. We reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In October 2025, the Public Guardian filed an LPS Act petition to be appointed K.L.’s conservator due to K.L.’s psychotic, posttraumatic, and major depressive disorders. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) The trial court issued a written citation for the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS) conservatorship, personally served on K.L.

K.L. appeared remotely at the December 2025 pretrial hearing. K.L.’s attorney stated K.L. “objects and wants a Zoom court trial as soon as possible.” Counsel did not explicitly waive her client's right to a jury trial. Nor did counsel indicate that she had explained to K.L. that she had a right to a jury trial, discussed the mechanics of a jury trial, or explained the differences between a jury trial and a court trial. Counsel also did not indicate that K.L. lacked capacity to waive jury.

The trial court did not inform K.L. of her right to a jury trial, and did not take K.L.’s personal jury waiver. Nor did the court explain the mechanics of a jury trial or explain how a jury trial differed from a court trial.

The trial court subsequently held a court trial on the petition. After hearing testimony from various witnesses, including K.L., the trial court granted the petition. The court found K.L. gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) It appointed the Public Guardian as conservator of K.L.’s person and estate for one year, found the least restrictive facility for K.L. was a locked psychiatric facility, and prohibited K.L. from possessing firearms, operating a motor vehicle, and refusing medical treatment relating to her grave disability.

DISCUSSION

The LPS Act

The LPS Act governs the involuntary treatment of the “gravely disabled” in California so that they may receive individualized treatment, supervision, and placement. (§§ 5350, 5350.1; Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 139, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 424, 225 P.3d 554.) A person is “gravely disabled” if “as a result of a mental health disorder, a severe substance abuse use disorder, or a co-occurring mental health disorder and a severe substance use disorder, is unable to provide for their basic personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, personal safety, or necessary medical care.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).)

“When a treatment professional determines a person is gravely disabled and unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily, the county's public guardian may petition to establish a conservatorship. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5352; see Conservatorship of K.P. [(2021) 11 Cal.5th 695,] 708–709, 280 Cal.Rptr.3d 298, 489 P.3d 296.) If the matter proceeds to trial and the person is found gravely disabled, the court appoints a conservator (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350), imposes ‘disabilities’ as needed (id., § 5357), and determines an appropriate treatment placement (id., § 5358). (See Conservatorship of K.P., at pp. 709–710, 280 Cal.Rptr.3d 298, 489 P.3d 296.) A conservatorship terminates after one year but may be extended for additional one-year terms upon petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5361.)” (Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1095–1096, 293 Cal.Rptr.3d 93, 508 P.3d 1099 (Eric B.).)

A finding of grave disability must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235, 152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1 (Roulet) [“The due process clause of the California Constitution requires that proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict be applied to conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act”].)

K.L.’s right to a jury trial

K.L. contends the trial court committed reversible error because it did not advise her of her right to a jury trial and obtain her personal waiver. We agree reversal is warranted here.

We review K.L.’s claims de novo. (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 424, 225 P.3d 554; Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 904, 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 710 (C.O.).)

A “ ‘civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty ․’ (Addington v. Texas [(1979)] 441 U.S. [418,] 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323; see [People v.] Blackburn [(2015)] 61 Cal.4th [1113,] 1119, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 458, 354 P.3d 268.) ‘In addition to physical restraint, “[t]he gravely disabled person for whom a conservatorship has been established faces the loss of many other liberties ․” ’ ([Conservatorship of] Ben C. [(2007)] 40 Cal.4th [529,] 540, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 856, 150 P.3d 738.) Apart from their possible confinement, conservatees may lose the rights to drive, vote, enter contracts, and make decisions about their treatment. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5357.) Because of the potential for such a significant loss of liberty, conservatorship cases are governed by many of the same procedural protections that apply in criminal trials. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350, subd. (d)(1); Ben C., at p. 541, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 856, 150 P.3d 738; but see Ben C., at p. 538, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 856, 150 P.3d 738.)” (Eric B., supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 1103–1104, 293 Cal.Rptr.3d 93, 508 P.3d 1099.)

One such right is a conservatee's right to a unanimous jury verdict on the issue of grave disability. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1); Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 230, 235, 152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1.) Probate Code section 1828, subdivision (a)(6) states “the court shall inform the proposed conservatee of all of the following: [¶] ․ [¶] The proposed conservatee has the right ․ to have the matter of the establishment of the conservatorship tried by jury.” A trial court's failure to advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial is statutory error. (Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 384, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 689; C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 909, 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 710; § 5350, subd. (d)(1).)

“[T]he trial court must obtain a personal waiver of a jury trial from the conservatee, even when the conservatee expresses no preference for a jury trial. Absent such a waiver, the court must accord the conservatee a jury trial unless the court finds the conservatee lacks the capacity to make such a decision.” (Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 381, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 689.)

“[A] person's waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in LPS civil commitment proceedings must be knowingly and voluntarily made.” (K.R. v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 133, 143, 295 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [collecting authority].) The failure to obtain a knowing and intelligent jury trial waiver “denies the defendant [or proposed conservatee] his or her statutory right to a jury trial on the entire cause in a civil commitment proceeding.” (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1132, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 458, 354 P.3d 268 [jury trial waivers required in proceedings involving offenders with mental health disorders]; see also People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 251, 354 P.3d 148 (Tran) [jury trial waivers required in involuntary commitment proceedings where a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI)]; Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 (Kevin A.) [LPS Act shares same purposes as MDO and NGI commitment schemes].)

Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the failure to obtain a valid jury trial waiver “defies ordinary harmless error analysis” (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 458, 354 P.3d 268) and is a “ ‘miscarriage of justice’ within the meaning of California Constitution, article VI, section 13,” requiring reversal. (Id. at pp. 1132–1133, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 458, 354 P.3d 268; Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1169, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 251, 354 P.3d 148 [invalid jury waiver in commitment proceeding “is not susceptible to ordinary harmless error analysis and automatically requires reversal”].)

In the criminal jury waiver context, our Supreme Court has also emphasized that “ ‘knowing and intelligent’ ” means “ ‘ “ ‘ “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th at p. 151, 166, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 396 P.3d 424 (Sivongxxay).) In determining whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent, “we examine ‘the totality of the circumstances’ unique to each case.” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753, 297 Cal.Rptr.3d 16, 514 P.3d 811.)

In Sivongxxay, our Supreme Court recommended that trial courts advise criminal defendants of the “basic mechanics of a jury trial” including that “(1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt or innocence.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 396 P.3d 424.) Sivongxxay confirmed that no “specific method for determining whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial” is required. (Id. at p. 167, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 396 P.3d 424.)

In Heather W., we concluded the trial court's error in failing to advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial was not harmless and required reversal. (Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384–385, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 689.) There, the trial court “advised Heather W. of her right to testify, but did not advise her that she had a right to a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 381, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 689.) We emphasized that “the right to a jury trial to contest an LPS conservatorship is a right guaranteed by the California Constitution.” (Id. at p. 383.) Heather W. is silent as to whether the proposed conservatee was informed by her attorney that she had a right to a jury trial. (Id. at p. 381, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 689.)

Here, as in Heather W., the record does not indicate that counsel advised K.L. of her right to a jury trial. Nor did the trial court advise K.L. of this right. Nor does the record indicate whether K.L.’s counsel explained the mechanics of a jury trial, including a unanimous finding on grave disability, that a jury is comprised of 12 people from the community, the right to participate in jury selection, and that in a court trial, a judge alone would decide whether K.L. was gravely disabled. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 396 P.3d 424.) Indeed, there is no evidence that K.L. understood what it meant to have a right to a jury trial.

Instead, the record reflects that in December 2025, K.L.’s attorney stated her client objected to a conservatorship and wanted “a Zoom court trial.” Neither K.L. nor her attorney explicitly waived K.L.’s right to a jury trial. There was no mention of K.L.’s right to a jury trial, let alone K.L.’s waiver of that right, during the proceedings. Thus, there is no indication that K.L. was informed she was entitled to a unanimous jury verdict on whether she was gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. Because K.L. was not properly advised, we cannot conclude she acquiesced in the waiver of her jury trial right because she later proceeded with a court trial. And because K.L. was not previously subjected to an LPS conservatorship, such that she could appreciate the distinction between a jury and court trial, we cannot surmise that she knowingly and intelligently relinquished her jury trial right here.

The Public Guardian contends the trial court's failure to advise K.L. of her right to a jury trial is subject to a harmless error review under C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 917–919, 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, wherein the court applied the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243 (Watson) (an error is harmless unless it is “reasonably probable” the outcome would have been different in the absence of the error). Based on the citation served on K.L. stating she had a right to a jury trial and counsel's statement that K.L. wanted “a Zoom court trial as soon as possible,” the Public Guardian contends the failure to advise K.L. and secure her personal jury waiver is harmless. We are not persuaded.

In C.O., the proposed conservatee was previously subjected to an LPS conservatorship, the public guardian petitioned for reappointment, and counsel informed C.O. of the right to a jury trial. (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 901, 908.) C.O. held that a trial court's failure to personally advise the proposed conservatee of a jury trial right does not, standing alone, warrant automatic reversal, emphasizing that such error is harmless “ ‘if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances,’ ” that the “ ‘waiver was knowing and voluntary.’ ” (Id. at p. 918, 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 710.)

C.O. is distinguishable because the record “affirmatively demonstrate[d]” the proposed conservatee “was informed of his right to a jury trial.” (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 919, 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 710.) In C.O., there was substantial evidence the proposed conservatee's waiver was knowing and intelligent, including the citation mailed to him, counsel having explained the right to a jury trial, his presence at the hearing when counsel waived jury, and communications about how the conservatee “wished to proceed.” (Id. at pp. 918–919, 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 710.) Thus, our colleagues in the Sixth District were “left solely with the error that the trial court did not personally advise [the proposed conservatee] of his jury trial right.” (Id. at p. 919, 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 710.) C.O. concluded the error was harmless under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 299 P.2d 243, because the record “affirmatively” demonstrated the proposed conservatee “was informed of his right to a jury trial, both in writing and by his counsel.” (C.O., at p. 919, 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 710.) But that is not the situation here.

The record here is silent as to whether counsel informed K.L. of her right to a jury trial, including the mechanics of a jury trial and her right to a unanimous jury verdict on grave disability. Without this information, we cannot conclude that the citation was sufficient for K.L. to knowingly and intelligently waive her constitutional right to a jury trial. (See Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1170, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 251, 354 P.3d 148 [“the requirement of an affirmative showing means that no waiver may be presumed from a silent record” (italics omitted)]; Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 383, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 689.) The citation's advisement that K.L. had a “right to a jury trial if you wish” is insufficient to waive jury without, at a minimum, being advised of the right to a unanimous jury verdict on the issue of grave disability. (Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 235, 152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1.)

Our colleagues in Division Four of the First District recently examined a conservatorship case with facts similar to C.O. (coincidentally involving a proposed conservatee with the same initials) and held that a proposed conservatee's jury trial waiver communicated through counsel is permissible under the LPS Act. (Conservatorship of C.O. (Aug. 3, 2026, A174646) ––– Cal.App.5th ––––, ––– Cal.Rptr.3d ––––, [2026 WL 2236818 at p. *5].) We do not disagree with this proposition. A proposed conservatee's waiver of their jury trial right made through counsel is permissible if the record affirmatively shows the waiver is knowing and intelligent based on the totality of the circumstances. In C.O., the proposed conservatee had previously been subjected to a conservatorship, counsel indicated on the record that they had discussed C.O.’s “rights to have a jury or judge trial,” and the conservatee indicated they wanted a “judge trial.” (Id. at ––––, ––– Cal.Rptr.3d at ––––, 2026 WL 2236818, at p. *2.) None of these facts are present here.

Trial courts must inform proposed conservatees of their right to a jury trial. (Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384–385, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 689; Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6).) Given the significant liberty interests at stake, “the critical issue here is [the proposed conservatee's] fundamental right to decide who hears the evidence to make that [grave disability] finding—a judge or a jury.” (Heather W., at p. 384, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 689.) But automatic reversal is not warranted if the totality of the circumstances indicates a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to jury.

We conclude the trial court's failure to advise K.L. of her right to a jury trial here is reversible error. And because the Public Guardian does not contend there was evidence that K.L. lacked capacity to waive jury in December 2025, we do not remand for a capacity determination. (Kevin A., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 237.)

DISPOSITION

The order granting the LPS conservatorship petition is reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur: CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J.