IN RE: DARREN T. (1981)

Darren T., a minor, appeals from the order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602) by reason of his having committed a robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). He contends that “[b]ecause the court relied upon impermissible factors to commit the minor to CYA, and because there is no appropriate evidence on the record to suggest camp placement is unsuitable, the disposition must be reversed as an abuse of discretion.”

The facts underlying appellant's commitment are not challenged. On February 22, 1980, between 2:30 and 3:00 a. m., appellant, feigning illness, approached Fernando Preciado and offered him five dollars to drive appellant to 338 West First Street in the San Pedro area, where he claimed to reside.¹ Preciado declined the money but did take appellant to the specified address. Appellant there exited Preciado's pickup and, bending over and holding his stomach, walked quickly away. A group of approximately six males, most of whom were youths, surrounded Preciado's truck before he could drive away and began to harass him.

Two to three minutes later appellant returned carrying a rifle which he pointed at Preciado. When Preciado balked at appellant's demand for money one of the other individuals in the group produced a pistol. Appellant then handed the rifle to another of his confederates, who was 35 to 40 years old, and removed approximately $240 from Preciado's pocket. Appellant and his cohorts thereafter departed together.

At appellant's disposition hearing on April 17, 1980, the court indicated it had read and considered the probation report and was inclined to follow the recommendation set forth therein. This report revealed that appellant, who was nearly 17 years old, had had numerous contacts with police, which his mother attributed to his “ten[dency] to run with the wrong crowd.” Nonetheless, prior to the present disposition, he had been placed only on informal supervision at age 11, following an arrest for burglary (Pen.Code, § 459), and home on probation at age 14, after he was found to have threatened and abused a teacher (Ed.Code, § 13560).² In addition, the record indicates appellant admitted the truth of an amended petition, filed subsequent to the present one, alleging he had unlawfully fought or challenged another person to fight in a public place (Pen.Code, § 415, subd. (1)).

The deputy probation officer noted appellant would be accepted into either the camp or California Youth Authority programs.³ He recommended, however, the Youth Authority because camp would not “provide the kind of secure and structured setting that [the] minor needs.”

Concurring with this recommendation, the court rejected the argument by appellant's trial counsel in favor of a camp placement, declaring, “I am going to find this young man has the mental capacity and physical attributes to benefit by programs of both remedial education and job/school training programs we have at the California Youth Authority ․”

While it is true that appellant previously had not been confined in a closed setting, such as a county operated camp, the evidence supporting his immediate commitment to a facility operated by the California Youth Authority was substantial. (In re Clarence B. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 676, 682, 112 Cal.Rptr. 474.) Contrary to a premise underlying all appellant's arguments, the court's characterization of his latest offense as a “well-planned, sophisticated robbery” does not demonstrate that the sole basis for the court's decision as to disposition was the seriousness of the offense itself. On the contrary, the quoted comment was clearly directed to the character of the perpetrator of the wrong, not the wrong, per se, since it is the person who commits a crime, who “plans” it, and who is “sophisticated.”

Similarly, the court's express finding that appellant would probably benefit from a Youth Authority commitment necessarily carried with it a determination that a so-called “lesser” alternative disposition⁴ would not be suitable. Of course, the factors that justify such a commitment are not limited to those expressly enunciated by the court. (In re John H. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 18, 27, 145 Cal.Rptr. 357, 577 P.2d 177.)

As a strictly legal proposition, we recognize, as did the court in In re Michael R. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 327, 337, footnote 7, 140 Cal.Rptr. 716, that a minor might theoretically be confined within either a Youth Authority or county facility for a period corresponding to the maximum term of imprisonment imposable upon an adult convicted of the same offense (In re James A. (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 332, 339, 161 Cal.Rptr. 588), or until the ward reaches a certain age (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 607). As a practical matter, however, the Los Angeles County camp program is usually of but one year's duration with approximately six months of camp treatment followed by approximately six months of supervision in the community. (L.A. County Probation Department Juvenile Manual, ch. 406.08, p. 5.) If, after taking such realities into account, the court is convinced a camp commitment probably would not benefit a particular minor, it should, consistent with juvenile court law policies promoting rehabilitation and treatment (In re Aline D., supra, 14 Cal.3d 557, 567, 121 Cal.Rptr. 816, 536 P.2d 65), reject such a disposition.

As the court noted in In re Michael R., supra, footnote 7, 140 Cal.Rptr. 716 there “[n]one of the parties at the hearing or on appeal … claimed that the [referee's reference to the need for long-term incarceration was a reference to] the amount of time needed for the minor's rehabilitation or that a camp disposition would not suffice because of the time needed for such treatment.” (Emphasis added.) Manifestly, where long-term confinement is required for such a purpose, to require an aging minor to repeat, again and again, the same six month camp program without hope of release, would have not only a deadening effect upon him but would be extremely contraproductive for the other youths passing through the program as it is designed to function.

The order under review is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.  Appellant actually resided at 1245 West 25th Street.

2.  Under the subsequently reorganized Education Code, the applicable section is now 44812.

3.  The Harbor placement specialist had rejected appellant for placement.

4.  While on the hierarchy of potential dispositions a Youth Authority commitment represents the ultimate resource available (In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557, 564, 121 Cal.Rptr. 816, 536 P.2d 65), it is important to bear in mind that not all Youth Authority facilities are “youth prisons.” The Authority operates both camps and schools that are quite similar to those operated by the counties, although, presumably, the persons there confined will be of a more “mature” nature.Simply by way of example, the Fred C. Nelles School operated by the Youth Authority and located in Whittier “… is a training school for young men ranging in age from 13 through 16 years of age committed by the juvenile courts of Southern California. Emphasis is on academic programming and prevocational training. The entire population is involved in a Behavioral Modification program using the principles of operant learning through contingency management. Wards and staff enter into contracts which are used to develop alternatives to delinquent behavior. Successful completion of a behavioral contract results in progress toward stated treatment objectives and release on parole. [¶] The location in a metropolitan area provides the opportunity for community involvement and off-campus activities which gives the ward experience he might not have had otherwise. [¶] Severe, chronic runaways are not placed at Nelles as physical security is a problem due to the urban location. Large severely aggressive wards will not be assigned to Fred C. Nelles School.” (Cal. Youth Authority, A Guide to Treatment Programs, Oct. 1977, p. 11.)

ROTH, Presiding Justice.

FLEMING and COMPTON, JJ., concur.