CORY v. SHIERLOH (1980)

Plaintiff appeals from the judgment after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendant without leave to amend. Finding ourselves in full agreement with the trial judge (Warren K. Taylor), we hereby adopt his sound and well-reasoned opinion as our own.

“I

“This case arises out of an automobile accident in which the plaintiff suffered personal injury. The defendants are the West Plainfield Fire Protection District, which leased a building to several minors including defendant Shierloh, for the purpose of giving a party. This party was attended by many minors, including plaintiff, who paid entrance fees and were given access to large quantities of alcohol. Defendants Riley's Liquor and Farmer's Market are alleged to be the suppliers of this liquor. Plaintiff became intoxicated at the party, and, while attempting to drive home, lost control of his vehicle and sustained physical injury.

“Plaintiff alleges nine causes of action in the complaint. Four of these are directed at defendant Shierloh: Three counts of negligence and one count of nuisance.

“II

“The Fourth, Sixth and Seventh causes of action are based on negligence theories and will be considered together. The fourth cause of action alleges that the minor defendants so negligently operated the leased premises as to result in plaintiff's intoxication and subsequent injuries. The sixth cause of action alleges that the minor defendants sold alcohol to plaintiff without a license in violation of Business and Professions Code s 23300, resulting in plaintiff's injuries. The seventh cause of action is based on common law negligence and alleges that the defendant minors furnished plaintiff, an obviously intoxicated person, with alcohol knowing that he would be driving shortly thereafter. Regardless of the nature of these three theories, each requires that the defendant's act be the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Neither the negligent management of the premises, the serving of alcohol without a license, or the furnishing alcohol to an intoxicated minor were the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. By legislative mandate the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, not the furnishing of such beverages by itself or in the management of one's property. Civil Code s 1714, Business and Professions Code s 25602.

“A legislative mandate prevails against a constitutional challenge so long as the legislation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. City of New Orleans v. Dukes (1976) 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511; San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16. Civil Code s 1714 and Business & Professions Code s 25602 provides a rational means of shifting the burden of increased insurance premiums from the general public to the individual motorist who drinks and drives. The state has a legitimate interest in deterring the pervasive problem of drunk driving and such legislation is a rational method of doing so. The Court will honor the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of these statutes and will not infringe on the legislative power to enact regulations for the public welfare.

“The demurrer to the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action is sustained without leave to amend on the ground that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

“III

“The fifth cause of action alleges that the defendants' use of the premises for the sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages, in violation of the licensing statutes, created a private nuisance which resulted in plaintiff's injuries.

“Civil Code s 1714(a) provides:

“ ‘Every one is responsible . . . for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property . . . .’

“The Court believes the acts complained of fall within the provisions of this section. The exceptions, which specify that one who provides alcohol is not liable for damages resulting from the consumption of such beverages, are applicable to them too.

“The demurrer to the fifth cause of action also is sustained without leave to amend on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendant Shierloh.”

The judgment is affirmed.

PARAS, Associate Justice.

REGAN, Acting P. J., and EVANS, J., concur.