PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS (1980)

We decide in this case, by analogy to the California Supreme Court's decisions in People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92 and People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874, that an individual confined for narcotic addiction at the California Rehabilitation Center (hereafter CRC) does not accrue good time/work time credits to be offset against a future period of custody in prison.

Appellant Andrew Williams pled guilty to second degree burglary (Pen.Code, ss 459, 461) and receipt of stolen property (Pen.Code, s 496), crimes he committed in late 1976 and early 1977. On June 7, 1977, on the basis of medical reports establishing his addiction to narcotics the superior court committed him to CRC for treatment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051. This confinement lasted only 204 days, ending in early 1978 with what the parties refer to as Williams' parole.¹

Several months after his release he was arrested on a new burglary charge and was kept in local custody from April 30, 1978 to October 27, 1978, at which time he was tried and sentenced for the 1978 burglary and was physically removed to state prison. Only then,² apparently, did the director of CRC determine that Williams was unfit for further treatment by CRC.³ On February 9, 1979, Williams was removed from state prison and brought to county jail so he could appear in the superior court for sentencing on the two 1976-1977 charges. He was sentenced to state prison for indeterminate terms to run concurrently with each other as well as with the sentence imposed for the 1978 burglary.

Williams was given credit against his imprisonment for the 204 days he actually spent at CRC. He was not given any conduct credits for that period, however. Had he spent those 204 days in a state prison he would have been eligible for an additional 102 days of good time/work time credits under Penal Code section 2931. Williams contends that this disparity contravenes the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.⁴

In People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92, one of the questions before the Court was whether the appellant, a convicted felon, committed for treatment as a Mentally Disordered Sex Offender (hereafter MDSO) (Welf. & Inst.Code, s 6300 et seq.) was entitled to have his or her treatment period reduced by the same “good behavior and participation credits” that his prison sentence would have been reduced by under section 2931. Since differing periods of confinement for identical conduct were being imposed, the court recognized that the patient's liberty, a fundamental interest, had been restricted unequally, and required that the state prove a compelling interest in permitting the disparity.⁵ Pointing to several ways in which good time/work time is inappropriate in the MDSO setting, the court held that the disparity was justifiable. (25 Cal.3d at 234-235, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92.)

Williams' position, as he points out, is not identical to that which confronted the court in Saffell. Unlike Williams, the appellant in Saffell was not seeking parity between his state prison sentence and the sentences of similarly situated state prisoners; he was seeking only to shorten his MDSO confinement. The potential merit of this distinction, however, evaporated with the publication of People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874. There, a felon initially committed as an MDSO had subsequently been found unamenable to treatment and was sentenced to prison without receiving good time/work time for his MDSO stay. The court, however, did not note the new context. Instead, it summarily held that Saffell precluded the need for further discussion. (26 Cal.3d at 505, 165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874.) Sage thus effectively undermines Williams' basic argument here.

The only question that remains is whether good time/work time credits are apposite in the CRC setting though inapposite in the MDSO setting. Given that the Supreme Court, on the basis of the “essential parallelism of the two statutory schemes” has held the two programs indistinguishable in other contexts (People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 641, 139 Cal.Rptr. 594, 601, 566 P.2d 228, 235), a negative answer to that question would appear inevitable. Williams presses no other conclusion upon us.

The basic point made by the Court in Saffell was that prison incarceration and MDSO confinement cannot readily be compared. MDSO confinement is for “ ‘treatment, not punishment’ (citations)” and is only to be imposed where the individual might benefit. (25 Cal.3d at 229, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92.) Moreover, inasmuch as providing medical attention to mental disorders that produce criminal acts is “ ‘potentially a positive, far reaching and humanitarian approach to penal reform’ (citation)” the state has a compelling interest in providing such treatment. (Id. at 229, 230, 157 Cal.Rptr. at 900, 599 P.2d at 95.)

Good time/work time credits, held the court, do not necessarily further that compelling interest. First, good time/work time is a particular and uniform kind of “carrot or stick” that may not be appropriate in the treatment of mental disorders. Second, acceptable behavior is effectively achieved by the threat of returning the patient to prison. Third, it is not clear that MDSO facilities have the “rehabilitative” programs upon which participation credit is based. Fourth, the denial of conduct credit would demand a procedural complexity beyond the ken of hospital administration. Fifth, since MDSO commitments are essentially for an indefinite period of time, a system of finite reductions would be inapposite. (25 Cal.3d at 234, 157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92.) Elsewhere in the Saffell opinion, the court also emphasized that a term of commitment does not have the same meaning in the prison and MDSO settings: contrary to the forms and lengths governing determinate prison sentences “the MDSO legislative scheme permits maximum flexibility” including the possibility of outpatient care. Indeed, a recent study of the MDSO program had concluded: “On the whole, the availability of the program appeared to ameliorate the harshness of criminal conviction upon a large number of sex offenders. Offenders committed to the program tended to spend significantly less time institutionalized than did similar offenders sentenced to imprisonment. This suggests that many sex offenders spent less time institutionalized under less oppressive circumstances than would have been the case had the program not been in existence . . . ‘ (citation).” (25 Cal.3d at 231, 157 Cal.Rptr. at 902, 599 P.2d at 96.)

All or virtually all of the foregoing points have their corollary in the CRC setting. To begin with, the purpose of a CRC confinement is comparable to that of an MDSO confinement and therefore constitutes no less a compelling state interest. Welfare and Institutions Code section 3000 states in part “that such treatment shall be carried out for nonpunitive purposes not only for the protection of the addict, or person in imminent danger of addiction, against himself, but also for the prevention of contamination of others and the protection of the public.”⁶ To fulfill that purpose the Legislature has built into the CRC program, just as with the MDSO program, its own system of rewards and punishments that would render good time/work time credits redundant and inappropriate. For example, the Legislature has indicated outpatient care as a highly desirable method of treatment. Section 3000 states in part: “It is the further intent of the Legislature that persons committed to this program who show signs of progress after an initial or subsequent periods of treatment and observation be given reasonable opportunities to demonstrate ability to abstain from the use of narcotics under close supervision in outpatient status outside of the rehabilitation center provided for in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 3300) of this division.” Thus, section 3151 begins: “After an initial period of observation and treatment, and subject to the rules and policies established by the Director of Corrections, whenever a person committed under Article 2 or Article 3 of this chapter has recovered from his addiction or imminent danger of addiction to such an extent that, in the opinion of the Director of Corrections, release in an outpatient status is warranted, the director shall certify such fact to the authority. If the director has not so certified within the preceding 12 months, in the anniversary month of the commitment of any person committed under this chapter his case shall automatically be referred to the authority for consideration of the advisability of release in outpatient status.” If the director of CRC and the Narcotic Addict Evaluation Authority certify that an individual on outpatient status has abstained from the use of narcotics for two consecutive years the authority may have the superior court discharge the person as a patient and the superior court may dismiss the criminal charges as well. (Section 3200.) If, on the other hand, the CRC patient proves himself or herself, by “excessive criminality or . . . other relevant” behavior “not a fit subject for confinement or treatment in such narcotic detention, treatment and rehabilitation facility” the director of CRC is instructed to “return the person to the court in which the case originated for such further proceedings on the criminal charges as that court may deem warranted.” (Section 3053.)

Thus the CRC program is hardly without its own carrot and stick.

In addition, the CRC program is similar to the MDSO program in that the commitment to CRC is essentially indefinite and not amenable to finite reductions for conduct credits.⁷ It is also not clear how an individual would earn participation credits; Williams has alleged no participation. No relevant differences between the two programs have been pointed out. We therefore conclude that the trial court was correct in disallowing conduct credits for the 204 days Williams spent in CRC confinement.

Several other matters pertaining to presentence credits are before us. First, the trial court would not award custody credits (Pen.Code, s 2900.5, subd. (a)) to Williams for the period he was held in local custody from April 30, 1978 to October 27, 1978, on the ground that the same period had been credited against the sentence for the 1978 burglary. The Attorney General concedes that this was error under the statutory scheme since the custody period was “attributable” not only to the proceedings pertaining to the 1978 burglary but was “attributable” as well to the fact that CRC, which still had jurisdiction over Williams with respect to his 1976-1977 offenses, had placed a “parole violation hold” on him after his arrest for the 1978 offense.⁸ A single period of custody is creditable in multiple proceedings if it was properly “attributable” to each such proceeding and if concurrent sentences are imposed with regard to those proceedings. (See In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 156, 151 Cal.Rptr. 649, 588 P.2d 789; People v. Washington (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 568, 572, 145 Cal.Rptr. 654.) Thus Williams is entitled to an additional 181 days of custody credit.

However, the trial court awarded 47 days of custody credit to which Williams was not entitled. These were days Williams spent in county jail from February 9, 1979 to March 27, 1979, during which time he was already serving his state prison sentence for the 1978 burglary. He was returned to county jail from state prison only to await sentencing on the 1976-1977 offenses. In In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 155, 151 Cal.Rptr. 649, 588 P.2d 789, the Supreme Court concluded that such a period of custody is “attributable” only to the state prison term. “Section 2900.5 does not authorize credit where the pending proceeding has no effect whatever upon a defendant's liberty.” (Id. at 156, 151 Cal.Rptr. at 652, 588 P.2d at 792.)

Finally, Williams is eligible for good time/work time credits based on the additional presentence custody credits to which we have held him entitled. (People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 507, 165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874.) While computation of such credits is to be handled administratively (People v. Sage (as modified) (1980) 27 Cal.3d 144a, 144b), we call to the attention of the Department of Corrections that in awarding the few conduct credits it believed Williams eligible for, the trial court appears to have relied on a formula of one day of credit for every six days of confinement. Applying the equal protection analysis of the principal Sage opinion, supra, Williams is entitled to the same credit formula available to individuals sentenced to county jail by Penal Code section 4019, subdivisions (b) and (c). The latter provide for a deduction of two days for every six day “period in which a prisoner is committed to a (local) facility” by which it is meant that an individual sentenced to county jail need only serve four days of every six to which he or she is sentenced. This is the equivalent of awarding one day of conduct credit for every two days of confinement. Since presentence detainees such as Williams have no sentence of commitment to a local facility, the only appropriate reference is a formula based on days of confinement.

To recapitulate, Williams is not entitled to conduct credit for his period of confinement at CRC, nor is he entitled to custody credit for the 47-day period served in local detention between February 9, 1979 and March 27, 1979. He is entitled to custody credit for the 181 days he was confined on a parole violation hold between April 30, 1978 and October 27, 1978. Where appropriate, conduct credits shall be awarded using a formula of one day of credit for every two days of presentence confinement.

The order sentencing appellant is reversed insofar as it awards custody credit for the period served in local detention beginning February 9, 1979, and insofar as it unequivocally denies conduct credit for the period during which appellant was confined on a parole violation hold. The order is affirmed in all other respects. The Department of Corrections is directed to amend appellant's commitment record to conform with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

1.  Welfare and Institutions Code section 3200 suggests that Williams had been confined for too little time to have been truly paroled. However, he was eligible for release to outpatient care. (s 3151.)

2.  This was consistent with the Legislature's subsequent amendment of section 3053 (in September of 1979), providing that a person convicted of a crime while still a CRC patient is automatically terminated from CRC. (1979 Stats., c. 604, p. 2037 s 1.)

3.  Prior to the date on which the instant case was submitted, the California Supreme Court held that due process requires that a CRC patient have an opportunity to respond to a proposal to exclude him from further treatment before the superior court reviews the exclusion decision for abuse of discretion (People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 275, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622). There is no Ramirez issue before us.

4.  There is no contention, nor could there be after People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 504-505, 165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874that section 2931 contemplates credits for a non-prison confinement such as CRC.

5.  That the compelling state interest test was applied to this as well as an earlier question in Saffell was clarified by People v. Sage, supra, 26 Cal.3d at 505, 165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874.

6.  While the Supreme Court has not shied away from recognizing the punitive aspects of a CRC confinement (In re Bye (1974) 12 Cal.3d 96, 102, 115 Cal.Rptr. 382, 524 P.2d 854), it recently afforded due process protections on the basis of the individual's interest in continued treatment. (People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 272-275, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622; see also In re Werden (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 79, 142 Cal.Rptr. 622; People v. Gray (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 18, 139 Cal.Rptr. 805.)

7.  A person must be discharged from the program after seven years unless a period of complete success is predicted whereupon a three-year extension may be granted. (Section 3201.)

8.  Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (b), provides:For the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted. Credit shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed.

DEARMAN,* Associate Justice. FN* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

WHITE, P. J., and SCOTT, J., concur.