PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS (1980)

Appellant was charged by information with a violation of Penal Code section 187, murder. He was further charged with using a handgun in the commission of that offense. (Pen.Code, ss 12022.5, 1203.06.) A jury acquitted appellant of murder, finding him guilty of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The use allegation was found to be true.

Appellant raises a single issue on appeal: that the court erred in limiting his voir dire of prospective jurors concerning their ability and willingness to apply certain principles of law relevant to the defense of self-defense. Appellant contends that the limitation was erroneous for two reasons: First, that appellant was entitled to proffer those questions in order to determine whether a challenge for cause was justified; second, that such questioning was necessary to facilitate the intelligent exercise of his peremptory challenges.

At the beginning of the voir dire, the court received assurances from the panel that they would follow the court's instructions on the law regardless of their personal opinions. During his voir dire, defense counsel attempted to state the principles of self-defense and to question jurors concerning them. Specifically, counsel sought to ask the prospective jurors whether: “they would follow the court's instruction if he instructed that he (a criminal defendant) has the right not to retreat and use force as is necessary to resist an aggressor.” The court barred such questioning, stating that it would be improper for counsel to go into specific doctrines of law. Defense counsel was permitted to ask prospective jurors whether they would follow the court's instructions on self-defense, whether or not they agreed with them. The jury was subsequently instructed on the law of self-defense, including the no-retreat and reasonable force doctrines.

1. Challenges for Cause

The primary purpose of voir dire of a jury panel is the selection of a fair and impartial jury. (Pen.Code, s 1078; Kelly v. Trans Globe Travel Bureau, Inc. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 195, 203, 131 Cal.Rptr. 488.) Questions on voir dire must be limited to matters which might disclose a basis for a challenge for cause. (People v. Crowe (1973) 8 Cal.3d 815, 821, 106 Cal.Rptr. 369, 506 P.2d 193; People v. Edwards (1912) 163 Cal. 752, 754-756, 127 P. 58; Kelly v. Trans Globe Travel Bureau, Inc., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 195, 203, 131 Cal.Rptr. 488.) Counsel's right to voir dire is confined to a “reasonable examination” of prospective jurors. (Pen.Code, s 1078; People v. Crowe, supra, 8 Cal.3d 815, 823, 106 Cal.Rptr. 369, 506 P.2d 193; People v. Soltero (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 423, 428, 146 Cal.Rptr. 457.) Moreover, it is not the function of voir dire examination to educate the jury panel to the particular facts of the case, to compel the jurors to commit themselves to vote a particular way, to prejudice the jury for or against a particular party, to argue the case, to indoctrinate the jury, or to instruct the jury in matters of law. (People v. Crowe, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 824, 106 Cal.Rptr. 369, 506 P.2d 193; People v. Soltero, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 428, 146 Cal.Rptr. 457; Rousseau v. West Coast House Movers (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 878, 882, 64 Cal.Rptr. 655.)

Appellant contends that defense counsel's purpose in requesting the proposed question was not to instruct the jury, but rather to ascertain whether jurors would follow relevant principles of law, should they be instructed in them. “Reasonable examination” by counsel may include questioning prospective jurors as to their willingness to apply general principles of law. (People v. Love (1960) 53 Cal.2d 843, 852, fn. 1, 3 Cal.Rptr. 665, 350 P.2d 705; People v. Parker (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 86, 98, 44 Cal.Rptr. 900.) Counsel, however, does not have a right to interrogate prospective jurors as to their understanding of, or willingness to apply, particular rules of law which counsel, at the time of voir dire, can only assume will be applicable to the case as developed at trial. (People v. De La Plane (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 223, 253, 151 Cal.Rptr. 843; People v. Soltero, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at pp. 428-429, 146 Cal.Rptr. 457; People v. Orchard (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 568, 576, 95 Cal.Rptr. 66; People v. Modell (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 724, 732, 300 P.2d 204.) It is presumed that jurors will be adequately informed as to the applicable law by the instructions of the court. (People v. Love, supra, 53 Cal.2d 843, 852, 3 Cal.Rptr. 665, 350 P.2d 705.)

Appellant's counsel was permitted to ask prospective jurors whether they would apply the court's instructions on self-defense, and the jury subsequently was instructed on the elements of self-defense. The trial court was not required to allow more detailed interrogation and hence properly restricted counsel to a “reasonable examination” of prospective jurors.

2. Peremptory Challenges

Appellant urges us to reject the long-standing rule in California that voir dire aimed at facilitating the exercise of peremptory challenges is improper. (People v. Crowe, supra, 8 Cal.3d 815, 824, 106 Cal.Rptr. 369, 506 P.2d 193; People v. Ferlin (1928) 203 Cal. 587, 598, 265 P. 230; People v. Edwards, supra, 163 Cal. 752, 755-756, 127 P. 58; People v. Hamilton (1882) 62 Cal. 377, 383; People v. De La Plane, supra, 88 Cal.App.3d 223, 253, 151 Cal.Rptr. 843; People v. Pedersen (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 987, 991, 150 Cal.Rptr. 577.)

The California Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this rule in People v. Crowe, supra, 8 Cal.3d 815, 824, 106 Cal.Rptr. 369, 506 P.2d 193. Appellant contends that because the Legislature subsequently amended Penal Code section 1078 to afford counsel the opportunity to conduct voir dire personally, thereby invalidating the procedure approved in Crowe, the court's delineation of the scope of voir dire in Crowe similarly is no longer controlling. The Legislature, however, left unchanged the provision in the statute that voir dire examination must be reasonable, and thus Crowe remains the controlling authority regarding limitations upon the purpose and content of voir dire. Accordingly, appellant was not entitled to question prospective jurors for the purpose of laying a foundation for the exercise of peremptory challenges.

The judgment is affirmed.

FEINBERG, Associate Justice.

WHITE, P. J., and SCOTT, J., concur.