IN RE: ERNEST CLAUDE S. (1980)

A juvenile court referee found that appellant possessed marijuana for purposes of sale. (Health & Saf.Code, § 11359.) A judge of the juvenile court denied appellant's application for a rehearing. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 252.) Appellant was placed home on probation.

The sole issue on appeal relates to the time limit within which the judge acted upon the application for rehearing. Welfare and Institutions Code section 252 provides in pertinent part: “If an application for rehearing is not granted, denied, or extended within 20 days following the date of its receipt, it shall be deemed … granted. However, the court, for good cause, may extend such period beyond 20 days, but not in any event beyond 45 days, following the date of receipt of the application, at which time the application for rehearing shall be deemed granted unless it is … denied within such period.” (See In re Edgar M., 14 Cal.3d 727, 732 & fn. 4, 122 Cal.Rptr. 574, 577-578, 537 P.2d 406, 409-410.) In this case the court acted within the 20-day period to extend the time for ruling on the application, and denied the application within the 45-day limit. Appellant argues, however, that good cause for the extension of time was not shown, and that therefore the application for rehearing must be deemed granted.

The referee sustained the petition on June 1, 1979, and the application for rehearing was timely filed on June 8. The 20-day period therefore would have expired on June 28. The reporter's transcript was due to be filed on June 22.

On June 22 the reporter filed an affidavit requesting an extension of time in which to file the transcript. She certified “I am unable to complete the reporter's transcript in the above-entitled case on the due date for the following reasons: I am involved in the preparation of twelve appeal transcripts at the present time which are also juvenile matters, and I will need several days to complete the transcription of this matter which will consist of approximately 100 pages.” She requested until July 6 to complete and file the transcript.

Acting upon this request, the judge extended the time for the reporter to file the transcript and extended the time during which the application for rehearing could be considered. The court's order provided:

“Upon reading and considering the foregoing request, and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby ordered that the time for filing the reporter's transcript in the above-entitled case be and the same is hereby extended to and including the date of: 7-6-79

It appearing that good cause exists for extending the period during which the application for rehearing may be considered, it is further ordered that said time be extended to, but not in any event beyond 45 days following the date of receipt of the application for rehearing.

[Signed] “Richard P. Byrne

“Judge of the Juvenile Court”

Thus the court extended the period during which the application for rehearing could be considered to include, if necessary, the permissible 45 days (which would be July 23).

The reporter filed the transcript on July 20. A judge read the transcript and denied the application for rehearing on the same day, within the 45-day period.

Arguing that the record does not show good cause for the extension of time, appellant relies upon In re Danny T., 22 Cal.3d 918, 150 Cal.Rptr. 916, 557 P.2d 712; In re Freddie R., 96 Cal.App.3d 829, 158 Cal.Rptr. 260; and In re Michael C., 98 Cal.App.3d 117, 159 Cal.Rptr. 306. None of these cases compels reversal herein.

In Danny T., the application for rehearing was denied beyond the 20-day limit without any order extending time ever having been filed. The Supreme Court held that the juvenile court judge must act within the 20-day period to extend the time beyond 20 days, and must state the reasons for finding good cause. (22 Cal.3d at pp. 921-922, 150 Cal.Rptr. 916, 587 P.2d 712.) In Freddie R., the judge acted within the 20-day period to extend the time to 45 days, but the record contained no showing whatsoever of the cause for the extension. (96 Cal.App.3d at pp. 831-832, 158 Cal.Rptr. 260.) In Michael C., the judge acted within 20 days to extend the time, citing the reason that the transcripts “were not to be ‘due and available for review.”’ (98 Cal.App.3d at p. 121, 159 Cal.Rptr. at p. 308.) The Court of Appeal reversed because there was “no indication in the record of any extraordinary circumstances which necessitated an 18-day delay in filing of the transcripts.” (98 Cal.App.3d at p. 123, 159 Cal.Rptr. 306, fn. omitted.)

The present record is far more complete than in any of the above cases. Here the reporter's affidavit specifies the exact reason for the reporter's inability to complete the transcript: She had 12 other juvenile transcripts to prepare, and the instant transcript would be approximately 100 pages. Thus the reporter was not placing other matters above the high priority for speedy disposition of juvenile cases. (Cf. In re Danny T., supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 921, 150 Cal.Rptr. 916, 587 P.2d 712; In re Michael C., supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 123, 159 Cal.Rptr. 306.)

Here, too, the judge made a finding of good cause for extension of time and adequately stated his reasons. The court's order is incorporated on the second page of the reporter's two-page affidavit. It recites that the court had read and considered “the foregoing request” and that good cause appears for an extension.

Finally, appellant relies upon certain dictum in Danny T. Although Danny T. was a case in which the reporter's transcript was filed well within the 20-day period, and the record reflected no reason whatsoever why the judge did not act upon the application for 6 days, the Supreme Court, in a footnote, stated: “It is doubtful in any event that a delay in preparing transcripts should constitute ‘good cause’ for extending the time that a minor must wait, possibly in custody, before a referee's order is finally reviewed by a judge.” (In re Danny T., supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 921, fn. 3, 150 Cal.Rptr. at p. 917, 587 P.2d at p. 713.)¹

It would be unreasonable to conclude that, in a case where transcripts were timely filed and thus the record did not squarely present the issue, the Supreme Court intended to establish an absolute rule that delay in the preparation of transcripts can never constitute good cause for an extension of time. In re Michael C., supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at pages 122-123 and footnote 7, 159 Cal.Rptr. 306, does not so interpret Danny T. Here, the reason for delay was a backlog of 12 other juvenile cases entitled to just as much priority as appellant's. If the reason for delay is an extremely heavy load of cases on the juvenile courts and juvenile court reporters, it would be absurd to adopt an interpretation of section 252 which compels the granting of unmeritorious rehearings as a matter of law, thus doubling the caseload, which is the very cause of the problem.

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.  In the instant case appellant was never detained. He remained in the home of his mother, both before and after adjudication, and even the disposition order of June 25, 1979, was for placement home on probation.

ASHBY, Associate Justice.

KAUS, P. J., and HASTINGS, J., concur. Hearing denied; MOSK, J., dissenting.