GROGAN v. COMRIE (1980)

Defendant Director of Public Social Services for Los Angeles County appeals from the summary judgment entered by the trial court through which the said court permanently enjoined the defendant from enforcing or implementing certain sections of the Program Interpretation Handbook (handbook) of the Department of Public Social Services of the County of Los Angeles and from doing certain other things.   We reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the superior court with directions which are set out hereinafter.

 The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program is one provided by state statute (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 11200 et seq.) ¹ as a part of a federally approved plan which is administered pursuant to federal as well as state law.  (Ogdon v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 192, 198, 113 Cal.Rptr. 206, 520 P.2d 1022;  In re Marriage of Simmons (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 205, 208, fn. 4, 139 Cal.Rptr. 832.)   The program is funded in Los Angeles County by federal, state and county funds.   The statewide program is supervised by the State Department of Social Services (department) (§ 10054;  see § 10062) which is authorized to make “rules and regulations  ․ ․ ․  for the administration of aid to families with dependent children.   Such rules and regulations shall be binding upon the  ․ ․ ․  counties.”  (§ 11209.)   Each county's role in the administration of the AFDC program was spelled out in Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 693–694, 94 Cal.Rptr. 421, 427, 484 P.2d 93, 99, when the court said:

“․ ․ ․  eligibility standards for AFDC are to be determined at the state level, and  ․ ․ ․  counties have the purely ministerial duty of carrying out those decisions.   Section 11207 provides:  ‘Every county shall grant aid to any child eligible therefor,  ․ ․ ․ .’  [Italics in opinion.]  Section 11250 sets forth eligibility standards, providing that aid ‘shall be granted  ․ ․ ․  subject to the regulations of the department, to families with related children under the age of 18 years, except as provided in Section 11253, in need thereof because they have been deprived of parental support or care due to:  [causes not at issue here]  ․ ․ ․ .’  [Italics in opinion.]  (Fn. omitted.)

“Section 11209, considered with section 11250, makes it clear that eligibility is to be determined solely by statute and departmental regulations issued at the state level :  ‘The department shall:  (a) make rules and regulations for the proper maintenance and care of needy children;  (b) make rules and regulations for the administration of aid to families with dependent children.   Such rules and regulations shall be binding upon the institutions and counties  ․ ․ ․ .’  [Italics in opinion.]  As stated in Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L.A., 27 Cal.2d 81, 85 [162 P.2d 630, 633], it is ‘the mandatory duty of the county to furnish aid according to the plan  ․ ․ ․  laid down by the applicable provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code.’ ”

In the administration of the AFDC program the county simply is the agent of the state.  (Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 905–907, 141 Cal.Rptr. 133, 569 P.2d 727.)

Pursuant to his authority the director of the department has issued regulations concerning eligibility of persons, including aliens, to participate in the AFDC program, and has given directions concerning the manner in which their applications for assistance will be treated.   These regulations are published in the Eligibility and Assistance Standards Manual of the State Department of Social Services (EAS Manual).   In turn, the defendant periodically has issued to social service workers in Los Angeles County (county workers) “DPSS manual letters” (letters) which are published in the handbook which is the subject of trial court's injunction.   The letters offer interpretations of regulations which appear in the EAS Manual and directions concerning procedure to be used by county workers in processing claims and other matters.   Included among the directions are those which describe information which county workers are to elicit from aliens and those aliens to whom applications for assistance are to be refused.   Obviously instructions in these letters must be in conformity with the regulations set out in the EAS Manual.

Plaintiff is a taxpayer who complains that letter No. 243 renders ineligible for AFDC assistance certain alien applicants who qualify for assistance under EAS Manual Section 42–433, and that adoption and enforcement of the said letter therefore constitute an illegal expenditure.²  After defendant answered the complaint, plaintiff made a motion for summary judgment;  a hearing was held thereon and the court issued a summary judgment enjoining defendant from enforcing certain sections of the handbook.   This appeal comes from that judgment.

The complaint does not name the director of the state department and he is not otherwise joined.   However, to determine this case without his appearance would result in each of those situations described in Code of Civil Procedure section 389(a)(2)(i) and (ii), as we discuss below.³

 The director has such an interest in the subject of this litigation that its disposition in his absence as a practical matter may impair or impede his ability to administer the AFDC program properly in Los Angeles County.   The director is the officer in the state ultimately charged with the duties, on one hand, of granting AFDC assistance to all persons who are entitled and, on the other hand, with withholding public funds from those who do not qualify, which duties he discharges through the county directors in the state.   Section 10605 provides that:  “If the director believes that a county is substantially failing to comply with any provision of this code or any regulation  ․ ․ ․ .” he shall inform the director and Board of Supervisors of such failure and if the county does not comply or provide reasonable assurances that it will comply he may institute and maintain proceedings (described in the Section) to insure the county's compliance.   However, here the defendant put into evidence that:  “․ ․ ․  [t]he State conducts ongoing quality control reviews, regularly participates in meetings and conferences, is privy to all written instructions and is, therefore, fully cognizant of Los Angeles County's implementation of EAS Chapter 42–400.   The State has copies of DPSS' current Handbook material interpreting the EAS residence regulations but has not invoked the provisions of W&IC 10605 against Los Angeles County.  ․ ․ ․”   In absence of evidence that the director has taken action against the defendant to bring the handbook into compliance with the EAS Manual, it is proper to infer that he believes that the handbook's provisions, including those which restrict qualification of aliens and whose enforcement is enjoined, are consistent with the EAS Manual.   Absence of the director as a practical matter deprives him of the opportunity to present his apparent position that those sections of the handbook whose enforcement the trial court enjoined are proper.   He should have this opportunity, as Code of Civil Procedure 389(a)(i) permits.

Further, the judgment leaves the defendant subject to substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations which may be created by (at least arguable) inconsistencies between various sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code and the EAS Manual.   The judgment paragraphs 1a and 1d enjoin defendant's enforcement of handbook Sections 42–430 IIa and 42–430 IV Blc.⁴  These sections instruct county workers to deny to an alien applicant the opportunity to execute a certificate of eligibility if the applicant has revealed orally or by documents that in fact he is not eligible.⁵  Defendant now argues that said handbook sections are proper for they are consistent with the EAS Manual sections on which they are based, and they well may be.   This creates the very dilemma the defendant faces.

EAS Manual Section 42–433.31 provides:  “Every alien claiming eligible alien status as defined in Section 42–431 shall be required to present documentation of that status, if available, as follows  ․ ․ ․ .” (a description of the forms applicable to the various types of an alien's legal presence here follows).   Only if the alien is unable to produce the described documentation is he permitted to execute a certificate declaring that he is in the county legally and entitled to stay indefinitely or that he is not under an order of deportation or that he is married to a person not under an order for deportation.  (Secs. 42–433.32 and .321).   However, the EAS Manual makes the alien's opportunity to execute a certificate only discretionary in the county worker, for EAS Manual Section 42–433.1 provides:

“Every applicant and recipient shall provide all information necessary to determine his citizenship or alien status.  ․ ․ ․   Any applicant or recipient who refuses to cooperate in the verification of his status is not eligible.   (See Sections 40–105, 40–157.3 and 42–433.1.)”

But these EAS Manual sections very well may not be consistent with the statutory scheme.   Section 11104 provides inter alia:

“Any alien who is otherwise qualified for aid shall be eligible to receive public assistance if he certifies under penalty of perjury that to the best of his knowledge he is in the country legally and is entitled to remain indefinitely, or if he certifies that he is not under order for deportation, or if he certifies that he is married to an individual not under order for deportation.

“Such certification by the alien shall, upon receipt, be forwarded to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service for verification.   Aid shall continue pending such verification.”

Thus, section 11104 seems to direct that assistance will be given to an alien who is otherwise qualified merely on his execution of one of three types of certificate described in the statute and that the assistance will continue pending verification of the applicant's statements.⁶  Nothing in that statute speaks of the alien's duty to produce documents for inspection by the county worker or of the county workers' discretion to refuse to offer the alien a certificate form if the worker determines that the alien is not cooperative during the interview;  to the contrary, county workers' intrusive questions beyond those necessary to require compliance with section 11104 are prohibited by statute, for section 10500 provides inter alia:

“Every person administering aid under any public assistance program shall conduct himself with courtesy, consideration, and respect toward applicants for and recipients of aid under that program, and shall endeavor at all times to perform his duties  ․ ․ ․  without attempting to elicit any information not necessary to carry out the provisions of law applicable to the program  ․ ․ ․ .”

Demand for documents or searching oral inquiry can lead to production of papers or statements by an alien which themselves defeat the alien's eligibility.   Section 11104 may seek to avoid this very risk by its provisions for establishment of eligibility by execution of a certificate.⁷  Thus, the aforementioned state regulations themselves may be inconsistent with section 11104.⁸  The judgment makes no mention of the EAS Manual or regulations published therein, but it obviously puts the defendant in the dilemma of obeying the court's injunction without regard to those state regulations from which the enjoined handbook instructions seemed to spring or now applying those regulations which continue to give county workers considerable discretion.   This dilemma should be resolved by resort to Code of Civil Procedure section 389(a)(ii).

The evidence reveals that in Los Angeles County an average of 349 applications from aliens are denied each month because of the applicant's statement of illegal status, refusal to make a statement or because of evidence of his temporary status.   These claims, if honored, would result in additional AFDC assistance payments in Los Angeles County of approximately $1,400,000 annually, of which nearly $214,200 would be a direct county obligation.   In addition, defendant asserts that the federal government refuses to participate in payments to illegal aliens and that if the defendant were to make improper payments which include federal funds, the county would be required to make reimbursement for the erroneously made payments;  this would approximate $$$$700,000 of the estimated $1,400,000 which would be a further direct obligation of the county.   Obviously, the judgment eventually made in this action will have a significant effect not only on the procedures followed in administering the AFDC program in Los Angeles County, but upon the cost thereof.

The court may order joinder on its own motion.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 389) as it now does in ordering that the director be joined as a party defendant.

The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings in accordance with the directions herein.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

1.   All references hereinafter are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless indicated otherwise.

2.   The various letters are given section numbers in the handbook.   As a portion of a letter is revised by a later issued letter, the handbook integrates material by subject matter from the remaining unrevised portion of each letter with the revision.   Portions of letter 243 were revised by letter 276.   Thus, handbook section 42–430, et seq., CITIZENSHIP AND ALIENAGE is made up of materials from both letters 243 and 276.   In the summary judgment argument to the trial court material from the handbook was considered without reference to its letter genesis;  hence, the trial court's judgment referred to handbook sections and not simply to the letter which plaintiff pleaded.

3.   Code of Civil Procedure section 389(a) reads:“(a) A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.   If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.”

4.   The judgment describes the latter section as 430 Blc inadvertently omitting the “IV” portion of its section number.

5.   These sections read:42–430 II.a.“II.  Interpretative Material“a. An alien claiming eligibility through the criteria in 42–431.2 may complete the application process and the WR–6.   Aliens who do not meet these criteria are not eligible for assistance.“NOTE:  Each alien shall make a verbal statement regarding his status before proceeding with the application process.   If an alien makes statements which indicate that he does not meet the above criteria (e. g., he was admitted on a temporary basis, on a student visa, or 72-hour border crossing pass;  or is here illegally;  or was admitted as a member of the diplomatic corps) aid for that person shall be denied.   He may not sign the WR–6.   A person whose temporary visa has expired is considered illegal.”42–430 IV B.“B. AFDC Intake EW“1. For each applicant and each person for whom aid is requested, determine:“․ ․ ․ .“c. Whether a person is an alien who is not entitled to complete the WR–6 or to receive aid as an alien under EAS Section 42–431.2.   Such persons include:“(1) Aliens who state that they are in the country illegally (i. e., entered without benefit of INS papers or entered on a temporary visa or time-limited parole which has now expired.)“(2) Aliens who entered the country for purposes temporary in nature;  on visitor's visa, border-crossing pass, diplomatic visa, student visa or time-limited parole;  whose period of admission has not expired.“(3) Aliens who refuse to make any statement regarding their legal residence status, including those who state only that they are not under order for deportation.“Aid for all of the above persons, and for the family if there are no eligible children, is to be denied.   They are not eligible to sign the WR–6 [or complete the application process.]”(The evidence indicated that the bracketed phrase was deleted by the defendant before this action was filed.)

6.   The simplicity of the qualification is illustrated by the court's comments in Harrington v. Obledo (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 705, 713, 140 Cal.Rptr. 294, 299 when it said:“․ ․ ․  Section 11104 is, however, quite specific:  a certificate that the recipient is not under an order for deportation entitles him or her to aid pending ‘negative’ verification from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.  ․ ․ ․”

7.   Section 11104 elsewhere provides the alternative for certain alien applicants of presenting affidavits from neighbors.

8.   EAS Manual provisions are not in issue and have not been commented upon by counsel (except that plaintiff observes that the trial court's judgment appears to have been made invalid by one portion of Sec. 42–433.3).   Therefore our speculations concerning the compliance of various EAS Manual sections with section 11104 are to be construed as no more than our recognition of possible issues.

THOMAS,* Associate Justice. FN* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

STEPHENS, Acting P. J., and HASTINGS, J., concur.