FULLERTON JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION (1981)

OPINION

The State Board of Education (State Board) approved a plan (the Plan) to create Yorba Linda Unified School District, and authorized an election.

Plaintiff Fullerton Joint Union High School District (Fullerton HSD) petitioned for a writ of mandate to prevent the election. The trial court upheld some portions of the State Board's action, but ruled that other portions of the decision were invalid and issued a writ of mandate prohibiting defendants from conducting an election.

Defendant State Board appeals, contending that its decision complied with statutory standards. More specifically, defendant State Board argues that (1) the Plan does not promote racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination, (2) the Plan does not interfere with the quality of Fullerton HSD's education program, (3) the election could properly be restricted to the territory of the proposed district, and (4) the State Board was not required to file an environmental impact report (EIR).

Plaintiff Fullerton HSD also appeals, contending that the State Board's decision did not comply with statutory requirements and that the trial court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in upholding certain aspects of the decision. Fullerton HSD argues that the Plan does not meet statutory criteria in that (1) the new district will not have adequate enrollment, (2) the new district will not have adequate financial ability, and (3) the Plan does not provide for an equitable division of the property.

FACTS

1. Geography

Yorba Linda Elementary School District (Yorba Linda Elementary) is completely surrounded by two unified school districts: Brea-Olinda Unified School District to the north, and Placentia Unified School District to the west, south and east.

The territory covered by Yorba Linda Elementary is also a part of Fullerton Joint Union High School District, but because the territory is surrounded by two other districts, it is not contiguous to the remainder of Fullerton HSD. Because there is no high school in the Yorba Linda portion of Fullerton HSD, high school age students in the Yorba Linda area must attend high school in east Fullerton. Approximately 1,200 Yorba Linda high school students must be bused five to seven miles, across a portion of Placentia Unified School District, to Troy High School, the nearest high school in the Fullerton HSD system.

2. The Plan

The isolation of the Yorba Linda portion of Fullerton HSD from the remainder of the district created a number of problems. High school students had to make a lengthy round trip each day to and from school. In addition, the distance imposed burdens on students who wanted to participate in extracurricular activities. The community of Yorba Linda was also developing its own unique character, maintaining a semi-rural atmosphere which differed from the atmosphere in the main part of the district.

In view of these facts, the County Committee prepared a Plan to create a Yorba Linda Unified School District. In effect, the Yorba Linda portion of Fullerton HSD would “secede” and become unified with Yorba Linda Elementary. (A “unified school district” is one which offers courses in grades kindergarten through 12. Yorba Linda Elementary only serves grades kindergarten through eight, and Fullerton serves grades nine through twelve.)

Section 4200 of the Education Code^FN1 requires that a school reorganization plan must substantially meet the following conditions: (a) The new districts will have adequate enrollment; (b) the new districts will be adequate in terms of financial ability; (c) the new districts will each have a substantial community identity; (d) the proposal will result in an equitable division of property and facilities of the original district; and (e) the formation of the new district will not promote racial or ethnic discrimination or segregation.

The Plan set forth discussion and findings on each of the five requirements, concluding that all statutory requirements were met. In addition, the County Committee recommended that the election be held in the area proposed for unification only (Yorba Linda), and not throughout the entire Fullerton HSD.

3. State Board Action

The County Committee submitted the Plan to the State Board for approval. The State Board must be satisfied that the statutory requirements of section 4200 are met, and it must also review the propriety of the County Committee's designation of the territory in which the election will be held.

To assist the State Board, the State Department of Education (Department) submitted a report which analyzed each of the statutory conditions and found that they had been substantially met. The Department also found that it was proper to limit the election to the Yorba Linda area. Accordingly, the Department recommended that the State Board approve the Plan.

The State Board conducted a hearing on the proposed Plan. Initially, the State Board failed to approve the Plan and moved to reconsider the Plan at the next meeting. In addition, the State Board asked for more information on the racial/ethnic issue.

The State Board held a second hearing at its next meeting. After further discussion and consideration of new information on the racial/ethnic issue, the State Board unanimously voted to approve the Plan. This paved the way for the election which would be held in the Yorba Linda territory only.

4. Trial Court Action

Fullerton HSD, which opposed the unification proposal, filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court, contending that the Plan did not meet the statutory criteria and that the election was improperly restricted to the Yorba Linda territory.

The trial court ruled that the Plan substantially met the requirements of adequate enrollment, adequate financial ability, community identity, and equitable division of the property. However, the trial court held that the State Board had abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously because (1) the Plan did tend to promote racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination; (2) the Plan would interfere with the quality of the educational program offered by Fullerton HSD; (3) for a variety of reasons, the voters of the entire Fullerton HSD should vote on the Plan, and their exclusion from the election violated their fundamental right to vote; and (4) the State Board should have issued an Environmental Impact Report under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).

DISCUSSION

1. Nature and Scope of Trial Court Proceedings and Scope of Review on Appeal

Although the parties initially agree that the action in the trial court was a traditional mandate proceeding pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and not an administrative mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, it is apparent that they do not agree on the scope of the trial court proceeding or on the applicable scope of review on appeal to this court. Because the nature of the review in this case determines the result, it is necessary to establish both the proper scope of the trial court proceeding and the scope of our review of that action.

Subject only to constitutional limitations, the Legislature has plenary power over the formation, dissolution or change of boundaries of school districts. (Cal.Const., art. IX, s 5; Worthington School Dist. v. Eureka School Dist. (1916) 173 Cal. 154, 159 P. 437; 29 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 82 (1957).)

In Hughes v. Ewing (1892) 93 Cal. 414, 417, 28 P. 1067, the California Supreme Court said, “The power to change the boundaries of the (school) district, as well as to define them in the first instance, is of legislative origin, and, whether exercised immediately by the legislature or mediately by a board of supervisors the local legislature is, whenever exercised, a legislative act.” (See also Antelope Valley etc. District v. McClellan (1921) 55 Cal.App. 244, 247, 203 P. 147.) Similarly, the exercise by the State Board of Education of the authority to approve proposals for the formation of unified school districts pursuant to the legislative directive of Education Code sections 4200-4419 is a “quasi-legislative” decision.

The fact that the Legislature prescribed specific statutory guidelines for the exercise of the State Board's discretion does not convert the Board's action into a quasi-judicial determination as Fullerton HSD contends. A similar argument was rejected in Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824, 834, 27 Cal.Rptr. 19, 377 P.2d 83, where the Supreme Court pointed out that even a legislative requirement that hearings be held before promulgation of an administrative regulation does not make the decision “quasi-judicial.” The court stated, “The contention fails because, in the first instance, the distinction between the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial decision contemplates the function performed rather than the area of performance; the breadth or narrowness of the discretion cannot control.” (For marshaling of cases and in-depth discussion of the characterization of a decision as quasi-legislative, see Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water District (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 271, 278-281, 69 Cal.Rptr. 889.) We conclude that in approving a proposal for the reorganization of a school district, the Board was performing a quasi-legislative function.

In reviewing such quasi-legislative decisions, the trial court does not inquire whether, if it had power to act in the first instance, it would have taken the action taken by the administrative agency. The court does not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body, but is limited to determining whether the decision of the agency was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, contrary to established public policy or unlawfully or procedurally unfair. (Brock v. Superior Court (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 594, 605-607, 241 P.2d 283.)

Commenting on the soundness of this rule in a case involving regulations formulated by the Department of Employment, the California Supreme Court stated, “We confront a situation here which graphically illustrates the wisdom of the general rule that the court should not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency which acts in a quasi-legislative capacity. All of the parties to this litigation recognize the intricate and technical nature of the subject matter as well as the expertise and full technical knowledge which its administration requires. It would be presumptuous of a court to claim such skill; it will not, therefore, superimpose its own policy judgment upon the agency in the absence of an arbitrary and capricious decision.” (Pitts v. Perluss, supra, 58 Cal.2d 824, 832, 27 Cal.Rptr. 19, 377 P.2d 83.)

So it is in the field of school district organization. The State Board of Education is charged by section 4200 with the authority to promulgate the very regulations necessary to implement the legislation providing for school district reorganization. Surely it would be presumptuous for a court to claim such skill and expertise in the field of school district organization and school financing that it should substitute its policy judgment for that of the Board, absent a showing that the Board has acted arbitrarily, capriciously or without evidentiary support.

Having concluded that the action in the trial court was a traditional mandate proceeding reviewing a quasi-legislative determination in which the trial court was limited to determining whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, contrary to established public policy or unlawfully or procedurally unfair, it is necessary to define the limits of appellate review of the trial court's determinations.

Because the ultimate questions addressed by the trial court are essentially questions of law, the conclusions of the trial court are not binding on this court. As Justice Kaufman, speaking for this court, stated in Lewin v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 368, 387, 146 Cal.Rptr. 892, “There might be foundational matters of fact with respect to which the trial court's findings would be conclusive on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. However, the ultimate questions, whether the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, contrary to established public policy or unlawful or procedurally unfair, are essentially questions of law. With respect to these questions the trial and appellate courts perform essentially the same function, and the conclusions of the trial court are not conclusive on appeal. (Citations.)” (Fn. omitted.)

Having these principles in mind, we examine the action of the State Board.

2. Compliance with Section 4200

Section 4200 provides as follows:

“It is the intent and purpose of the Legislature that the procedures prescribed by the provisions of this chapter and Article 2 (commencing with Section 4240) of this chapter be utilized primarily for the formation of unified school districts, and that this form of organization be ultimately adopted throughout the state. It is the further intent of the Legislature that in exercising the authority to approve master plans and plans and recommendations developed at the local level, the State Board of Education consider the boundaries of existing high school districts as the minimum geographical base for the organization of individual unified school districts, to be deviated from only in exceptional situations. The State Board of Education may approve proposals for the formation of districts based upon the division of the territory of existing high school districts, provided that the board has determined, with respect to the proposal and the resulting new districts that the following conditions are substantially met:

“(a) That the new districts will be adequate in terms of number of pupils enrolled.

“(b) That the new districts will be adequate in terms of financial ability. For purposes of determining financial ability, consideration shall be given to revenue limits per pupil, assessed valuation per pupil, and tax rates. The board may give such consideration as it deems appropriate to federal funds received by a school district under the act of Congress entitled ‘An act to provide financial assistance for local educational agencies in areas affected by federal activities, and for other purposes,’ approved September 30, 1950 (Public Law 874 81st Congress) or under any similar act of Congress.

“(c) That the new districts are each organized on the basis of a substantial community identity.

“(d) That the proposal will result in an equitable division of property and facilities of the original district.

“(e) That the proposal and the formation of the new districts will not promote racial or ethnic discrimination or segregation. The State Board of Education may secure the advice and assistance of any other public agencies concerned with intergroup relationships for purposes of making determinations under this subdivision.

“The State Board of Education may waive the criteria specified in subdivisions (a) through (e) of this section and may approve a proposal for the formation of two or more unified school districts from the territory of a high school district if the board determines the circumstances with respect to the proposals provide an exceptional situation sufficient to justify approval of the proposals.

“The State Board of Education shall adopt rules and regulations to carry out the intent of this section.”

In approving the Plan, the State Board held that all five criteria had been substantially met. The trial court ruled that the last condition, i. e., that the Plan must not promote racial segregation, was not met.

Both sides appeal, the State Board contending that the Plan does not promote racial segregation, and Fullerton HSD contending that the conditions of adequate enrollment, financial ability and equitable division of the property were not met. Thus we are called upon to determine whether the State Board's decision that the Plan complied with the requirements of section 4200 was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support or contrary to established public policy or unlawfully or procedurally unfair.

a. Specific Findings

Preliminarily, plaintiff Fullerton HSD argues that the State Board action was invalid because the State Board did not make a specific finding that the formation of the proposed Yorba Linda Unified School District was an “exceptional situation” within the meaning of section 4200, and because the State Board did not specifically state how the Plan substantially complied with the conditions enumerated in section 4200, subdivisions (a)-(e).

Plaintiff relies on Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, the administrative mandamus provision, which impliedly requires the administrative agency in adjudicatory decisions to make some findings “to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order.” (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515, 113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12.) However, as heretofore stated, in approving the Plan, the State Board was exercising a “quasi-legislative” function reviewable by traditional mandamus. (Code Civ.Proc., s 1085.) The decision approving the Plan to create Yorba Linda Unified School District was not an adjudicatory decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given and evidence required to be taken. Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 and cases dealing with such adjudicatory hearings are inapplicable. Furthermore, even where findings are required, the administrative agency is not required to make formal findings as would be required in a court of law. An administrative agency may adopt the findings prepared by another body. (Carmel Valley View, Ltd. v. Board of Supervisors, (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 817, 823, 130 Cal.Rptr. 249.) The State Board in effect adopted the findings of the County Committee as contained in the proposed Plan.^FN2 These findings are fully adequate to allow meaningful judicial review of the quasi-legislative action of the State Board for the purpose of determining whether the action was arbitrary, capricious or without evidentiary support.

b. Adequate Enrollment

Fullerton HSD contends that the State Board acted arbitrarily in finding that the proposed Yorba Linda Unified School District would be adequate in terms of number of pupils enrolled.

Section 4200, subdivision (a) does not itself specify what is meant by “adequate in terms of number of pupils enrolled.” Pursuant to statutory mandate, the State Board adopted regulations to serve as guidelines for determining whether a proposal complies with section 4200. The regulations are contained in California Administrative Code, title 5, sections 18570 to 18574. It should be emphasized that these administrative regulations are simply guidelines for the County Committee in the development of a plan. They do not diminish the State Board's authority to waive the criteria specified in subdivisions (a) through (e) of section 4200, if the State Board determines the circumstances present an exceptional situation sufficient to justify approval of the proposal. The Administrative Code specifically preserves this authority. Section 18573, subdivision (c) provides that:

“(c) The Board may waive the criteria specified in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(5) of this section and may approve a petition or proposal if the Board determines circumstances with respect to the petition or proposal provide an exceptional situation to justify approval.”

California Administrative Code, title 5, section 18573, subdivision (b)(1) states that each proposed school district will, at the time the proposal becomes effective, be adequate if it substantially complies with the following enrollment standards:

The Plan stated that attendance during the 1976-1977 school year was 2,511 in grades K-8, and 1,200 in grades 9-12, for a total of 3,711. Fullerton HSD objects to the 3,711 figure because it refers to enrollment figures at the time the Plan was approved and not at the time the proposal becomes effective. In this case, the Plan was scheduled to become effective on July 1, 1979. Consequently, Fullerton HSD argues, the Plan must show that the proposed Yorba Linda Unified School District would have an enrollment of 5,000 in 1979-1980. The Plan makes no reference to 1979-1980 enrollment figures. The evidence of projected enrollment for 1979-1980 is that enrollment will be approximately 2,050 in grades K-8 and approximately 1,050 in grades 9-12, for a total enrollment of 3,100. Fullerton HSD urges that 3,100 is not substantial compliance with the guideline of 5,000.

The Yorba Linda portion of Fullerton HSD is geographically isolated from the rest of the high school district. Yorba Linda Elementary is an island surrounded by two other unified school districts. The evidence indicates that the area of Yorba Linda included in the unification proposal is a semi-rural area, and that there is not likely to be further substantial development in the area.

The number of high school students living in the area, a projected 1979-1980 enrollment of 1,050, is not unreasonably low compared to the figure recommended for high school districts, 1,500. The projected enrollment for elementary school age children, 2,050, is lower in proportion to the recommended enrollment for elementary school districts of 3,500. However, the State Board may well have determined, in the exercise of its discretion, that the relatively low elementary school enrollment should not deprive the Yorba Linda area residents of the right to form a unified school district, because Yorba Linda Elementary, although somewhat under-enrolled, already existed as a separate district and since the additional high school population was reasonably close to the figure recommended for high school district enrollment. In view of the special geographic and community factors and in view of the fact that the relatively low enrollment is primarily due to the pre-existing elementary school district, we cannot say that the State Board acted arbitrarily in finding that the projected enrollment substantially met the guidelines for adequate enrollment.^FN3

c. Financial Ability

At the time the Plan was approved, California Administrative Code, title 5, section 18573, subdivision (b)(2) provided that “Each district affected will be adequate in terms of financial ability if either the revenue limit per unit of average daily attendance of the proposed district does not vary from the revenue limit per unit of average daily attendance or the assessed valuation per unit of average daily attendance in all of the affected districts by more than 15%.”^[FN4]

Fullerton HSD argues that both the proposed revenue limit per ADA and the assessed valuation per ADA for Yorba Linda Unified School District vary by more than 15 percent from those for Fullerton HSD. The Plan shows that the assessed value per ADA varies by 29.42 percent. The Plan also shows that the revenue limit per ADA deviates by only 5.27 percent, but Fullerton HSD argues that incorrect figures were used to arrive at that conclusion. Fullerton HSD is correct. It was inaccurate to determine the deviation of Yorba Linda Unified School District's revenue limit from the average revenue limit of Fullerton HSD and the elementary school districts within its boundaries.

The deviation of the proposed Yorba Linda Unified School district revenue limit from the Fullerton HSD revenue limit is 17.19 percent.⁵ However, this variation substantially complies with the regulation guidelines.

Fullerton HSD further contends that the Plan is financially inadequate because it does not specify a revenue limit as part of the proposal which complies with the requirements of section 4364.

Section 4364 essentially provides that the proposal for reorganization must specify a proposed revenue limit for the new district. The proposed revenue limit must be at least equal to the sum of (1) the revenue limit of the new district for the year prior to the fiscal year in which the reorganization becomes effective for all purposes (i. e., 1978-1979, the year before the reorganization becomes effective for all purposes), and (2) the revenue limit per unit of average daily attendance required to equal the amount of the difference between the average certificated and the average classified salary of each of the component districts or any portion of a district during the school year prior to that in which the district becomes effective for all purposes and the highest average certificated and highest average classified salary of any component district included in the proposal multiplied by the number of employees in each category less the number of employees in each category of the district having the highest average salaries.

Fullerton HSD complains that the Plan fails to make any provision for the revenue limit of the proposed district. To the contrary, the Plan proposes that the revenue limit for the new district be $1,439.35. This is the revenue limit calculated for 1978-1979, the year prior to the year the new district proposal becomes effective for all purposes. The proposal meets the requirements of section 4364.

d. Division of Property

The Plan proposes to appraise all real property, improvements, personal property and funds of Fullerton HSD and to divide the value of all such property on the basis of ADA ratio between the Yorba Linda portion and the remnant portion of Fullerton HSD. The Plan provides that the real property and improvements shall remain in that portion of the district in which they are located, but that a monetary credit would be given to a portion of the district if the property located in that portion of the district was less than its proportional share based on ADA ratio. The Plan further provides that bonded indebtedness of Fullerton HSD be divided according to ADA ratio. The Plan also provides that one district may choose to accept a greater portion of the bonded indebtedness to offset charges against that district for an imbalance in real property, improvements or personal property received by that district.

Fullerton HSD complains that the Plan proposes an inequitable distribution of property.

Fullerton HSD points out that section 4123 and section 39420 specify that real property shall remain the property of the district in which it is located. (See also s 35512.4.) However, sections 4370 and 35512.4 authorize the County Committee in drawing up the proposal for division of the property and funds to consider “the value and location of the school property.” That phrase would be meaningless if the County Committee could not take account of the real property, improvements, and personalty. Moreover, section 4200 mandates an equitable division of the property and facilities of Fullerton HSD. If sections 4123 and 39420 were read to preclude any consideration of the value of the real property, the State Board would necessarily fail in its attempt to divide the property equitably.

Yorba Linda Unified School District, under the interpretation urged by Fullerton HSD, would receive the one parcel of land owned by Fullerton HSD located in the Yorba Linda area and a 7.8 percent share of funds. All other real property, all the improvements, and all the personal property of the district would remain with Fullerton HSD. Such a distribution would be manifestly inequitable.

The State Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the Plan's provision to divide the values of the property, even though the property itself remains in the portion of the district where it is located.

As to the bonded indebtedness, the Plan provides that one portion of the district may opt to accept a greater share of the bonded indebtedness than its proportional share in order to offset the amount owed, if any, on account of the division of the value of the other assets. Fullerton HSD contends that this provision voids the entire proposal because the voters in the remnant portion of Fullerton HSD did not vote to increase the bonded indebtedness, thereby violating article XVI, section 18, of the California Constitution, which provides in pertinent part as follows: “No county, city, town, township, board of education, or school district, shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof, voting at an election to be held for that purpose, ”

The answer to this argument is that the total amount of bonded indebtedness has already been voted on by the qualified voters of Fullerton HSD. By a change of boundaries of a school district, the district does not lose its identity or cease to be the same legal entity it was before. (Hughes v. Ewing, supra, 93 Cal. 414, 419, 28 P. 1067, see also Bates v. Gregory (1891) 89 Cal. 387, 395, 26 P. 891.) In any event the Plan does not require that such a non-pro rata distribution be made. Fullerton HSD is free to accept its proportional share of the bonded indebtedness only.

Finally, Fullerton HSD argues that the Plan does not provide for an equitable division of the property because the distribution of a cash equivalent to Yorba Linda for Yorba Linda's proportional share of the real property and improvements would financially impoverish Fullerton HSD.

Yorba Linda's proportional share of the property (7.8 percent based on ADA ratios) is estimated at $4 million. Fullerton HSD argues that, even if it assumed all the bonded indebtedness and gave Yorba Linda all the personal property, the balance owed to Yorba Linda would wipe out its liquid assets.

The Plan does not specify that Fullerton HSD must pay the full amount on July 1, 1979. The parties are free to make arrangements for payment without bankrupting Fullerton HSD. While it might be necessary for Fullerton HSD to undergo some financial belt-tightening, the division of property would be inequitable if Yorba Linda received less than its proportional share of the assets of the district. The division of property was equitable.

e. Racial or Ethnic Segregation or Discrimination

The trial court ruled that the State Board decision to approve the Plan was arbitrary and capricious in that the Plan would promote racial and ethnic segregation and discrimination by removing an area of primarily white students from an area that is increasingly becoming integrated.

Although there was evidence before the State Board to show that the trend in the remnant portion of Fullerton HSD was toward greater ethnic diversity, whereas the Yorba Linda portion would remain relatively stable, there was also evidence before the State Board which showed that the percentage of various racial groups in the school population of the Yorba Linda area did not substantially differ from percentages in the district at large.^FN6 Further, the State Board had before it the supplemental report from the State Department of Education which it requested for the second hearing. This report included a report on racial/ethnic factors by the Office of Intergroup Relations which set forth the trends in the ethnic distribution of all component districts of the Fullerton HSD and component elementary school districts for the years 1971, 1973 and 1976. The report stated that “(o)verall there does not appear to be any significant trend in growth or decrease among minority racial and ethnic groups in the Yorba Linda area.” In summary, the report concluded, “Due primarily to minimal racial and ethnic diversity in the area and in the affected districts, and only slight differences in the ethnic composition that would result from unification or annexation, the Office of Intergroup relations continues to believe that the proposal should be judged on adequacy of criteria other than promotion of segregation or discrimination.”

The State Board was fully aware of the trends in the two areas of the district and could better evaluate the effect of the trends than either this court or the trial court. In view of the fact that the deviation from the ethnic distribution between Yorba Linda and Fullerton HSD is not very great and in view of Yorba Linda's special geographical situation and stable ethnic mix, the State Board did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that the Plan substantially meets the requirement that it not promote racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination.

3. The Provisions for Arbitration of Property Disputes

The Plan provides that: “In any disagreement regarding the equitable distribution of property and funds, until all funds have been satisfactorily distributed, the Orange County Committee on School District Organization shall serve as the final arbitrator ”

Fullerton HSD contends that the Education Code does not authorize the County Committee to act as arbitrator in cases of disputes arising over the division of the property.

Sections 4200 and 4370 give the County Committee Broad authority to approve the proposals for the formation of districts including a plan for an equitable division of property. As the above analysis has demonstrated, the Plan as approved by the State Board does provide for an equitable division of property. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that disputes between districts will arise during the implementation of any plan. It is clearly not the function of the Plan to provide for the specific distribution of every paper clip. Therefore, although the statutes do not specifically authorize the County Committee to serve as arbitrator of disputes arising in connection with carrying out the division of property, such arbitration provision establishes a reasonable method for resolving disputes and assuring that the equitable property division mandated by section 4200 will be accomplished. The State Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving that method of dispute resolution.

4. Effect on Quality and Caliber of Fullerton Program

California Administrative Code, title 5, section 18574, provides that “In discharging its responsibility to review and act upon the merits of each proposal or petition for the organization or reorganization of school districts, it is the intent of the Board to use its authority to effect district organization or reorganization that will provide for the maximum in equal educational opportunity for children.”

Fullerton HSD argues that the Plan will substantially interfere with the quality and caliber of its academic program. Fullerton HSD presented evidence before the State Board that the withdrawal of the Yorba Linda students from Troy High School would result in the elimination of several courses of instruction at Troy High School, would hamper programs for the handicapped and mentally retarded, and would result in overstaffing in the bilingual and affirmative action programs. In addition, Fullerton HSD argues that the Plan would have a serious adverse impact on Fullerton HSD's financial resources, and consequently on its ability to provide a quality educational program.

Any reorganization is likely to have some disruptive impact. The State Board was well within its discretion in balancing the adverse impact of the reorganization on the Fullerton HSD against the adverse impact on Yorba Linda of maintaining the present system. These are matters within the expertise of the Department of Education and the State Board and we cannot say as a matter of law that the proposed Plan is an unreasonable way to maximize equal educational opportunity. In view of the legislative mandate favoring the formation of unified school districts throughout the state (s 4200), the State Board did not use its authority arbitrarily or capriciously in determining that the creation of a Yorba Linda Unified School District would maximize educational opportunity.

5. Election Area

Section 4375 authorizes the County Committee to determine whether the reorganization election shall be held throughout both affected districts, or only within the area subject to the unification proposal.

The trial court determined that section 4375 violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it deprives the voters in the remnant portion of Fullerton HSD of their fundamental right to vote. Fullerton HSD argues, and the trial court held, that the voters of the entire Fullerton HSD were substantially affected by the proposal in terms of financial impact, racial/ethnic balance in the area, and quality of the educational program.

It is clear that almost any reorganization would have an effect on the financial condition of the district or districts involved, and would also inevitably have an effect on the educational program. Do these inevitable effects necessarily call into play the fundamental right to vote of all the voters in the district? Plaintiff assumes that they do, and then, relying on the strict scrutiny test which is applicable where such a fundamental right is involved, argues that there is no compelling state interest to justify the classification.

It is now well established that where the fundamental right to vote is involved in an equal protection attack on election legislation, the “strict scrutiny,” rather than the “rational basis” standard must be applied in examining the election procedures. (Gould v. Grubb (1975) 14 Cal.3d 661, 670, 122 Cal.Rptr. 377, 536 P.2d 1337.) In Gould v. Grubb, the State Supreme Court struck down state and local election procedures which provided priority ballot listing for incumbents. The court found that the fundamental right to vote was involved because the classification scheme imposed a “very ‘real and appreciable impact’ on the equality, fairness and integrity of the electoral process.” The evidence revealed that the election practices gave a substantial advantage to the candidates in top ballot positions, thereby diluting the weight of the vote of all electors who cast their ballots for a candidate not included within the favored class. The court reviewed the reapportionment cases commencing with Gray v. Sanders (1963) 372 U.S. 368, 379, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821, wherein the United States Supreme Court held that “(A)ll who participate in (an) election are to have an equal vote ” and concluded that the incumbent first classification scheme which substantially dilutes the weight of votes of some of the qualified voters must be subjected to the “strict scrutiny” standard. Finding no compelling state purpose, the procedure was held to be violative of the equal protection clause of both our state and federal Constitutions.

In Gould v. Grubb, as in the reapportionment cases, there was no issue with respect to who the qualified voters were. Thus, the central question that calls into play the equal protection issue, i. e., whether the voters were similarly situated with respect to the subject matter of the legislation, was not in issue. The question was whether the effect of the legislation created unequal burdens so as to have substantial impact upon the vote. In the present case the threshold question is whether the creation of the Yorba Linda Unified School District has sufficient impact upon the residents of the remnant portion of Fullerton HSD to cause them to be similarly situated to the residents of the proposed Yorba Linda district.

More helpful in examining this question are the cases examining election laws which provide for the exclusion of certain residents from the election process. In Kramer v. Union Free School District (1969) 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583, the Supreme Court examined a New York statute which provided that in certain school districts residents of the district, who were otherwise eligible to vote in state and federal elections, were permitted to vote in school district elections only if they (1) owned taxable real property within the district, or (2) were parents of children enrolled in the local schools. Since the classification permitted some resident citizens to participate and excluded others from participation, the court applied the strict scrutiny standard and found the statute invalid. (See also Cipriano v. City of Houma (1969) 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647; and City of Phoenix, Arizona v. Kolodziejski (1970) 399 U.S. 204, 90 S.Ct. 1990, 26 L.Ed.2d 523.)

In all of these cases the “special interests” of property owners of parents of school children were held insufficient to justify denying the ballot to other otherwise qualified residents within the district. However, in Kramer the court left open the question whether the state in some circumstances might limit the exercise of the franchise to those “primarily interested in school affairs.” The court said, “(A)ssuming, arguendo, that New York legitimately might limit the franchise in these school district elections to those ‘primarily interested in school affairs,’ close scrutiny of the classifications demonstrates that they do not accomplish this purpose with sufficient precision to justify denying appellant the franchise.” (Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, 395 U.S. 621, 632, 89 S.Ct. at 1892.)

In the present case the statutory procedure has provided a method whereby the qualification to vote in the election has been limited to those primarily interested in the school affairs of the new district. Unlike the situation in Kramer, the franchise is not denied to otherwise eligible voters residing within the district affected by the unification election. All residents of the new district who are otherwise eligible to vote will be permitted to vote under the procedure approved by the Board. Persons residing outside of the newly proposed district do not have the same interest in the affairs of that district and are not similarly situated to the residents of the district.

A school district reorganization such as is proposed has some financial and educational effects upon the existing district in that it removes a portion of the wealth of the school district and a proportionate number of children to be educated by the remnant district. This will likely require some restructuring of the educational program of the remnant district. However, these effects are secondary to the purpose of the election; that is, how the school districts are to be organized. The question whether the Yorba Linda area should be unified into a single unified district fundamentally affects the Yorba Linda area voters. The interest of the voters in the remnant portion of Fullerton HSD in the question whether the Yorba Linda area should form a unified school district is tangential. The voters in the remnant portion of Fullerton HSD do not have a substantial interest in the election.

Yet, if the voters of the entire Fullerton HSD were permitted to vote on the issue of whether Yorba Linda should form a unified school district, that bloc of voters could, for reasons quite apart from the question of unification, effectively prevent Yorba Linda voters from making their own determination on the issue and could completely frustrate the will of the Yorba Linda voters.

We conclude that an election for approval of a school unification plan does not involve the fundamental right to vote of persons not residing within the proposed district.

Therefore, the validity of the determination that only electors in the Yorba Linda area are entitled to vote on the unification plan is properly decided on the basis of whether the determination bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. (See Simi Valley Recreation & Park Dist. v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 648, 679, 124 Cal.Rptr. 635.)

In view of the stated policy of the law favoring the unification of school districts (s 4200), there is clearly a rational relationship between this statutory purpose and the decision to limit the election to the Yorba Linda voters.

6. Environmental Impact Report

The trial court ruled that the Plan constituted a “project” within the meaning of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub.Resources Code, s 21000 et seq.) and that the State Board should therefore have filed an environmental impact report (EIR).

Defendant State Board argues that it was not the lead agency responsible for approving or carrying out the “project.” If, as the State Board argues, the County Committee was the lead agency, then Fullerton HSD's claim on that cause of action is barred by the 180-day statute of limitations (Pub.Resources Code, s 21167.) While the County Committee is responsible for formulating the Plan, it seems clear that the State Board is the public agency with primary responsibility for approving the Plan, in the sense that it is the State Board's ultimate approval of the Plan which places the issue before the voters. Fullerton HSD brought its action within 180 days after the State Board approved the Plan. The statute does not bar this cause of action.

However, we have concluded that the trial court was in error in declaring the State Board action invalid for failure to file an EIR. A decision to hold a unification election is not an activity governed by CEQA. California Administrative Code, title 14, section 15037 defines the scope of the term “project” for purposes of CEQA.

The section provides in pertinent part as follows:

“(a) Project means the whole of an action, which has a potential for resulting in a physical change in the environment, directly or ultimately, that is any of the following:

“(1) An activity directly undertaken by any public agency including but not limited to public works construction and related activities, clearing or grading of land, improvements to existing public structures, enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances, and the adoption and amendment of local General Plans or elements thereof pursuant to Government Code Sections 65100-65700.

“

“(3) An activity involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.

“(b) Project does not include:

“

“(4) The submittal of proposals to a vote of the people of the State or of a particular community.

“(c) The term ‘project’ refers to the activity which is being approved and which may be subject to several discretionary approvals by governmental agencies. The term ‘project’ does not mean each separate governmental approval.”

Under the exemption provided in section 15037(b)(4), the decision to hold an election on the unification proposal is not a “project” within the meaning of CEQA. However, Fullerton argues that the effect of the California Supreme Court decision in Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 278, 118 Cal.Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017, is to limit the exemptions provided in the guidelines to exempt only the ministerial action of calling the election.

If that were the case the effect would be to nullify the exemption altogether since the ministerial action of calling an election could not under any circumstances constitute a “project” as otherwise defined in section 15037. However, a careful reading of the opinion in Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com. does not permit the interpretation suggested by the district.

In Bozung the Supreme Court considered the application of CEQA to a Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) approval of the annexation of property located in an unincorporated area of Ventura County by the City of Camarillo. The court held that LAFCO approval in that case did constitute a “project” within CEQA. The court stated:

“Applying the letter and the spirit of sections 21000 and 21001 of CEQA and the particular criteria set forth in the Guidelines to the case at hand, ( ) (we think it is) clear (and) beyond doubt that the LAFCO approval of the annexation of 677 acres involved in this case may have a significant effect on the environment. First and foremost, we point out that we are not dealing with an abstract problem. Again, this case does not involve as the tone of some of defendants' argument suggest the question whether any LAFCO approval of any annexation to any city may have a significant effect on the environment. This is not the case of a rancher who feels that his cattle would chew their cuds more contentedly in an incorporated pasture. No one makes any bones about the fact that the impetus for the Bell Ranch annexation is Kaiser's desire to subdivide 677 acres of agricultural land, a project apparently destined to go nowhere in the near future as long as the ranch remains under county jurisdiction. The city's and Kaiser's application to LAFCO shows that this agricultural land is proposed to be used for ‘residential, commercial and recreational’ purposes. Planning was completed, preliminary conferences with city agencies had progressed ‘sufficiently’ and development in the near future was anticipated. In answer to the question whether the proposed annexation would result in urban growth, the city answered: ‘Urban growth will take place in designated areas and only within the annexation.’

“It therefore seems idle to argue that the particular project here involved may not culminate in physical change to the environment.” (Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 13 Cal.3d 263, 281, 118 Cal.Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017, fns. omitted.)

By contrast the State Board approval of the unification Plan in this case does deal with an abstract problem. The approval of the Plan does not have the potential for resulting in a physical change in the environment either directly or indirectly. The Plan does not involve any proposed change in the physical world. Every portion of the territory “affected” by the Plan is already within the boundaries of a school district and will be within the boundaries of a school district if the Plan is approved by the electorate. Any change in the land use is purely speculative since the Plan itself does not provide for any change.

The distinction between the Bozung situation and the present case may be illustrated by reference to the case of Simi Valley Recreation & Park Dist. v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 51 Cal.App.3d 648, 124 Cal.Rptr. 635. In Simi Valley, the question was whether LAFCO proceedings initiating an election on a proposed detachment of an undeveloped area from a recreation and park district was a “project” within the scope of CEQA. The court, holding that CEQA did not apply to the detachment proceedings there involved, distinguished Bozung as follows:

“The decision (in Bozung ) does not make every LAFCO approval a project subject to CEQA; nor does it make every LAFCO approval of local agency boundary changes, the time of which may coincide with intended development, such a project. It dealt only with the situation where LAFCO approval was a necessary step in the development and in effect constituted an entitlement for use for such development.

“The detachment proceedings in this case constituted activities of both LAFCO and of respondent Board. However, no facts alleged or otherwise shown suggest that the availability of the property in the detached area for development in any respect depends upon the detachment

“The evaluation process contemplated by CEQA relates to the effect of proposed changes in the physical world which a public agency is about to either make, authorize or fund, not to every change of organization or personnel which may affect future determinations relating to the environment. The determinations of respondent LAFCO and of respondent Board were in the latter category and were not ‘projects' which they proposed to carry out.” (Simi Valley Recreation & Park Dist. v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 51 Cal.App.3d 648, 665-666, 124 Cal.Rptr. 635, emphasis added.)

Unlike the Bozung situation, the unification proceedings in this case, even if approved by the electorate, will not constitute an “entitlement for use.” The availability of the property within the boundaries of the new unified district for school purposes does not depend upon the unification proceedings since it is already included within a school district, and the Plan contains no proposal for such development. Any ultimate environmental effect of the unification proposal is purely speculative and is not an “activity” which is being approved by the approval of the Plan. We conclude that the State Board decision to hold an election on the unification proposal is not a “project” within the meaning of CEQA. The State Board was not required to file an EIR.

7. Vague or Ambiguous Provisions

Fullerton HSD argues that the trial court correctly determined that the State Board's decision to approve the Plan was arbitrary and capricious because of numerous alleged ambiguities, uncertainties and misleading statements in the proposal. We have examined the provisions alleged to be vague, ambiguous or misleading and conclude that there are no misleading statements and no ambiguities or uncertainties of any substantial character. The mere recitation of the alleged ambiguities is sufficient to demonstrate the insubstantiality of the claim. They are:

(1) The provision that real property and improvements shall be appraised at “current market value” is alleged to be ambiguous because the Plan does not specify the method for establishing current market value. The argument seems to be that because appraisers might interpret the term differently and thus reach different valuations, the term is not sufficiently precise. If the fact that appraisers may arrive at vastly different amounts in valuing property is to be used as a criteria, then there is no language that would satisfy. To be sure the term “fair market value” is a more established legal concept. However, the term “fair market value” is not required to be used in order to bring that concept into play. Neither the federal nor state Constitution use the term. Nevertheless, fair market value has become accepted as a proper standard for determining the “just compensation” to be awarded for the taking or damaging of private property pursuant to constitutional mandate. Where, as here, the plan for the equitable division of property provides for valuation based on current market values, it is nit picking to suggest that the meaning is unclear.

(2) The provision that real property, improvements, bonded indebtedness and undistributed reserves will be distributed “on the basis of the average daily attendance ratio,” is alleged to be indefinite and uncertain for the reason that the Plan does not specify who establishes the ratio or when it is to be determined. Since “average daily attendance” is the basis for state funding, it is a well defined term, and determining this ratio in the two districts is simply a matter of mathematical computation. Absent provision in the Plan specifying a different date, it would also seem clear that the determination should be made at the time the plan goes into effect, assuming it is approved by the voters.

(3) The provision that permits Fullerton HSD to transfer a greater portion of personal property, bonded indebtedness, reserves to Yorba Linda “because of an imbalance in real property” is attacked on the ground that the Plan does not define “imbalance.” This “ambiguity” may be resolved by resort to the dictionary. This is precisely the kind of hair splitting that made it necessary for the Plan to include a provision for arbitration of disputes by the County Committee.

(4) The Plan's method for distribution of personal property is alleged to be ambiguous and uncertain for the reason that it does not specify what is included in a “category” and what constitutes an “item” for purposes of the inventory of personal property. As many courts before us have observed, few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, and the practical necessities of discharging the business of government limit the specificity with which legislation can be drafted. Consequently, reasonableness not absolute certainty in draftsmanship, is required. (See Boyce Motor Lines v. United States (1952) 342 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S.Ct. 329, 330, 96 L.Ed. 367.) In our view, the language used in the proposed unification Plan as approved by the State Board meets the standard of reasonableness.

(5) Finally, it is claimed that the provisions pertaining to the distribution of Fullerton HSD funds, other than bonded indebtedness, are ambiguous and uncertain on account of the phrase “shall be handled in accordance with existing law.” It is argued that this phrase is misleading because it suggests that the statute provides for the division, whereas, the statute (s 4370) actually permits the County Committee to provide for the division.

After providing for the equitable distribution of property as heretofore discussed, the Plan provides that, “Funds and monies specifically provided for in the Education Code, including, but not limited to, student body funds, shall be handled in accordance with existing law.” We assume it is this provision which is attacked as being ambiguous. Certainly the first portion is clear; if there are any funds for which specific provision is made in the Education Code, then such law prevails. Plaintiff's quarrel appears to be with the fact that there is no specific Education Code provision for the division of student body funds when the new district is created pursuant to section 4200 et seq. There is a specific provision for the division of student body funds when a new district is formed under Education Code sections 35510-35520. Section 35512.5 provides as follows:

“The State Board of Education, if it approves a petition under this chapter, shall provide that, if the boundaries of a school district are relocated under this chapter, so that a portion of the students will not be residents of the school district thereafter maintaining a school previously attended by the students, and if there is in the school an organized student body, the property, funds, and obligations of the student body shall be divided as determined by the board, except that the share shall not exceed an amount equal to the ratio which the number of students leaving the school bears to the total number of students enrolled. The ownership of the property, funds, and obligations, which is the proportionate share of each segment of the student body, shall be transferred to the student body of the school or schools in which the students are first enrolled during the school year next succeeding the reorganization. Funds from devises, bequests, or gifts made to the organized student body of a school shall remain the property of the organized student body of that school and shall not be divided.”

Plaintiff is correct that this provision does not apply to the present proposal. However, in view of the fact that the section provides for the same ratio distribution as is provided in the Plan for the distribution of the personal property of the district, the section does provide guidance to the County Committee in its capacity as arbitrator in the event a dispute arises. Under these circumstances, the Board's action in approving the Plan with this minor ambiguity cannot be said to be arbitrary and unreasonable.

We conclude that there are no uncertainties or ambiguities contained in the Plan that are of sufficient substantiality to render the Plan arbitrary or unreasonable. There are no statements or references that are likely to mislead the voters.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons heretofore stated, the judgment granting the writ of mandate is reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.  All code references shall be to the Education Code, unless otherwise indicated. Education Code references shall be to the section numbers of the reorganized code.

2.  The State Board did not at first find the County Committee's findings on the racial segregation issue fully adequate. But the State Board received further evidence on the racial segregation issue, after which it adopted the Plan. On this issue it may be said that the State Board adopted the findings contained in the Plan and in the addendum report of the State Department of Education.

3.  The California Administrative Code, title 5, section 18573, subdivision (b)(1) has since been amended to provide lower figures as guidelines for adequate enrollment, e. g., 901 for elementary districts, 301 for high school districts, and 1,501 for unified districts. These revised figures suggest that previous guidelines were found to be unreasonably high.

4.  Section 18573, subdivision (b)(2) has since been amended to read:“(2) Each district affected will be adequate in terms of financial ability if:“(A) The revenue limit per unit of average daily attendance of the proposed district does not vary from the revenue limit per unit of average daily attendance in all of the affected districts by more than 15%, or“(B) The proposal does not increase costs to the State for the affected territory by more than 10%.”

5.  Fullerton HSD revenue limit $ $1,407. Proposed Yorba Linda Unified School District revenue limit $ $1,165.

6.   ($4,322,439 total revenue            in area-     $3,711 ADA= $1,164.76 proposed district            revenue limit.) $1,407 - $1,165 = $242  $242 = 17.19% of $1,407.C1-6Ethnic Distribution 1976-1977 AmericanIndianBlackOrientalSpanishOther YorbaLinda0%2%1.1%5.3%91.6%FullertonHSD1%4%1.2%9.0%84.8%

MORRIS, Associate Justice.

KAUFMAN, Acting P. J., and McDANIEL, J., concur.