McKINNY v. OXNARD UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES XX (1980)

This is an appeal from the Ventura County Superior Court's denial of appellants' request to enjoin respondent school board from implementing a desegregation plan. Appellants represent a cross section of concerned Oxnard Union High School District (hereafter District) residents. McKinny is the parent of a student who was attending a District school prior to the suit. Bautista and Lewis are parents of students who were preenrolled, incoming freshmen at the time of the suit. Ulmer is a taxpayer within the District. Respondents represent the governing school board charged with the responsibility of determining whether segregation existed within the District and developing and implementing a plan to eliminate any segregation found to exist. Respondents include the Oxnard Union High School District Board of Trustees (hereafter Board), their president, Pinkard, and the superintendent, McEuen.¹

This opinion serves to further interpret Crawford v. Board of Education (1976) 17 Cal.3d 280, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28, and provides clarification of title 5, chapter 7 of the California Administrative Code (hereafter Code).

ISSUES

We address the following issues raised on appeal: (1) Does plan III implemented by respondent have the potential to achieve meaningful progress towards the elimination of segregation found to exist in the district? (2) Did respondent adequately involve the community and consider community input through the phases of segregation identification, plan development and plan implementation to satisfy its duty under Crawford ? On the basis of the second, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further action consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

The District consists of five schools: Oxnard, Camarillo, Channel Islands, Rio Mesa and Hueneme. Pursuant to its responsibilities under Crawford and the Code, respondent set out to identify whether any of its five high schools were segregated. Respondent surveyed the schools to gain data on the racial/ethnic distribution of students, faculty, classified staff and administrators at each school and within the District as a whole. Surveys were also taken of the racial/ethnic distribution of student participation in athletics, extra and cocurricular activities. An inventory of the facilities existent at each school was conducted as well.

In addition, respondent established a 22-member advisory committee composed of administrators, principals, faculty, parents and students. Faculty, parents and student members of the committee were nominated by the principals and approved by respondent. Committee members were given a workbook which contained summaries of the above mentioned surveys and instructions about their advisory role. Advisory committee members were surveyed by respondent on their general attitudes about education in the District. Members were then polled on whether they thought any of the District's schools were segregated with respect to five factors: (1) the racial/ethnic composition of the student body, (2) the racial/ethnic composition of administrators, faculty, and classified staff, (3) the attitudes of the community, administration and teaching staff as to whether each school is a “minority” or “non-minority” school, (4) the quality of the buildings and equipment, and (5) the organization of and racial/ethnic participation of students in extracurricular activities.²

The poll taken of the advisory committee resulted in the following segregation scores:

From these results, respondent and the committee concluded that Oxnard and Channel Island High Schools were segregated, but that Camarillo, Rio Mesa, and Hueneme High Schools were not segregated. No explanation for the conclusion was presented in the record.

Four proposed desegregation plans were included in advisory committee members' workbooks. The proposals were prepared by respondent's staff prior to the identification of any segregated schools. Following their identification of the existence of segregation, the committee took up discussion of an appropriate plan. In short order, proposal III was chosen by a majority of the group.

Proposal III provided for changes in the boundary lines between Oxnard, Channel Islands, Hueneme and Rio Mesa High Schools as the means for combating school segregation within the District. It was to affect only incoming freshmen. Camarillo High School was to be left unaffected by the plan. Of the five factors considered by respondent and the committee, only the racial/ethnic composition of the student bodies at each school would reportedly be affected by proposal III. In this regard, proposal III was projected to change the racial/ethnic composition of students at each school as follows:³

Upon the advisory committee's decision to recommend respondent's proposal III, respondent proceeded to comply with its notice obligation under the Code. Respondent set the date for a public hearing approximately one month hence. It then printed a notice in local newspapers and, in addition, sent a notice to parents of students who were already attending District high schools. Included in the notice were the five general factors used by the advisory committee in scoring the schools for segregation (fn. 2 supra), a summary of proposal III, and the date, time and place of a public hearing to be held regarding proposal III. Parents of incoming freshmen, the group of students which would be affected by the implementation of proposal III, were not sent a notice, although respondent had in its possession the names and addresses of the affected group of students which it gained during preregistration of students.

Five days prior to the public hearing, appellants brought suit to prevent the public hearing from occurring. Their claim was based upon respondent's inadequate notice to affected parents, respondent's failure to gain sufficient community input to identify the existence of segregation, and respondent's failure to formulate an appropriate response to the segregation found to exist. Appellants' request for a temporary injunction was denied and their request for a permanent injunction to prevent implementation of proposal III was continued beyond the date of the public hearing by the trial court.

At the public hearing, a regularly scheduled school board meeting, a short period was devoted to proposal III. Following the brief discussion, respondent voted to implement proposal III. Prior to making its decision final, however, respondent returned proposal III to the advisory committee for reconsideration. Two additional proposals were submitted to the advisory committee, during its reconsideration of proposal III, by appellant McKinny acting in his position as a member of the committee. The advisory committee voted to reaffirm proposal III. Proposal III, hereinafter referred to as “Plan III” was made official and implemented by respondent for the 1979-80 school year. Later, before the trial court, appellants' request for a permanent injunction was denied. Plan III is presently in operation within the District.

I. Meaningful Progress

The first issue we address is whether Plan III promises to achieve meaningful progress toward eliminating segregation found to exist in respondent's District. This mandate comes to us from Crawford v. Board of Education, supra, 17 Cal.3d 280, 306-307, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28.

Whether a desegregation plan promises to achieve meaningful progress in the elimination of segregated schools must be determined with reference to the particular character of the segregation found to exist within the school district. Crawford presents to governing boards and to the judiciary a general description of that which is to be eliminated: “segregated schools, i. e., schools in which the minority student enrollment is so disproportionate as realistically to isolate minority students from other students and thus deprive minority students of an integrated educational experience.” (Id. at p. 303, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28. Italics in original.) But Crawford also explains that “ ‘(w)hat is or is not a segregated school will necessarily depend on the facts of each particular case. In addition to the racial and ethnic composition of a school's student body, other factors, such as the racial and ethnic composition of faculty and staff (,) and the community and administration attitudes toward the school, must be taken into consideration.’ ” (Id. at p. 304, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28, quoting Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo. (1973) 413 U.S. 189, 196, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2691, 37 L.Ed.2d 548.) Thus, if a reviewing court is to properly assess whether a school board's desegregation plan promises to achieve meaningful progress, it must possess a clear understanding of the particular mix of factors which characterizes the segregation in fact existent within a school district. Given a clear understanding of the problem identified by the school board, the court may assess whether a plan under review promises to make sufficient and timely progress relative to the problem identified to satisfy the meaningful progress requirement.

In the instant case, we hold that respondent has failed to particularize the segregation it found to exist sufficiently to enable the court to determine whether Plan III promises to make meaningful progress towards the elimination of that evil. Because the court is precluded from performing its duty of reviewing this case, we hold respondent's failure to particularize the nature of segregation existent within the District to be reversible error.

The court has access to two sources within the record from which to gain an understanding of the character of segregation existent within the District: the statistical survey summaries conducted by respondent and the cumulative segregation scorecard indicative of the advisory committee's attitude about which District schools were segregated. Both information sources are inadequate for review of whether Plan III promises to achieve meaningful progress. The survey summaries are incomplete; they do not include surveys rating the quality of facilities at each school, nor, more critically, summarizing the attitudes of community members, administrators, faculty, parents and even students on whether segregation exists in the District and the nature of that segregation. Where four out of five schools in the District have racially mixed student enrollments which do not exceed a 70/30 ratio, subjective information on the integrative or segregative quality of the education takes on a heightened importance in comparison with the percentage composition statistics. Respondent's survey of the advisory committee, composed of a maximum of 22 persons at any one time, does not fulfill its obligation to survey the attitudes of those within the District community.

The other source of information on the localized character of segregation within the District, presently before the court, is the advisory committee's cumulative segregation scorecard. By viewing how committee members scored the five schools on each of five factors (fn. 2, supra), in theory the court could gain a rough idea of which segregation factors existed at each school and the degree, measured in votes, to which they were present. We reject this alternative for two reasons. First, the advisory committee voted without having access to summaries of community attitudes toward segregation and without knowledge of the quality of facilities at each school. Therefore, its votes on these items would only be indicative of their own views. This is an arbitrary result which in light of the societal impact of segregation and a desegregation plan we cannot accept. Second, we cannot accept the scorecard as the basis for respondent's identification of segregation at Oxnard and Channel Islands high schools because of the obscure portrayal of the segregation problem the scorecard provides. The scorecard was designed, in effect, to obtain a cumulative segregation score. An arbitrary line is drawn, and on the basis of the cumulative scores, Oxnard and Channel Islands high schools emerge as the segregated schools and are confirmed as such by the advisory committee.

A conclusion that a school is segregated may emerge based upon at least two different combinations of factors: for example-when a single factor (major factor) is so pervasive, such as when a school is composed almost entirely of minority students thereby precluding an integrated educational experience for those students, but no other factors, such as the quality of facilities, are indicative of segregation; or when no single factor is such as to constitute segregation, but several such factors combine to compel a conclusion that segregation exists. Hence, it is apparent that what underlies a school board's conclusion that segregation exists varies from case to case, even though each school board may consider the same set of general factors in arriving at its conclusions. A mere recitation of the general factors considered by respondent offer no insight to a reviewing court as to the basis for respondent's conclusion. Respondent's cumulative scorecard and its statement of its criteria leave us with no way of ascertaining how “major” or “minor” factors coalesced to support its segregation conclusion. It is this insufficient particularization of the segregation identified by respondent which prevents us from determining whether a change in the ratio of minority students and white students from 60/40 to 59/41 at Oxnard High School and from 67/33 to 66/34 at Channel Islands High School is meaningful progress. For the same reason, we cannot determine the more specific question raised, whether meaningful progress toward the elimination of segregation at Oxnard and Channel Islands High Schools can be accomplished without involving Camarillo High School.

To comply with its legal duty in assessing whether the prospect of a desegregation plan is meaningful progress towards the elimination of school segregation, the reviewing court must have detailed information in the form of objective statistical summaries and in the form of subjective community attitude surveys. Further, the court must have from the governing board criteria or explanation of findings which embrace a localized, normative perception of the goal to be achieved-an integrated educational experience. Unable to gain a sufficient understanding of the character of the segregation found to exist in respondent's District, or, for that matter, the specific criteria used to determine whether segregation existed in the first place, we have no choice but to remand this case back to the lower court.

II. Community Input

Under this heading, we review some of the steps taken by respondents in the process of identifying the existence of segregation and developing an appropriate plan. We find that respondent was derelict in its utilization of community input. More specifically, we find that respondent committed error with regard to the segregation criteria it published and sent to parents, with regard to its interpretation of the word “enrolled” in defining which parents were to be sent notice directly, and with regard to the inattention it accorded to community views and input throughout the desegregation process.

In Crawford, the court said: “In the absence of an easy, uniform solution to the desegregation problem, plans developed and implemented by local school boards, working with community leaders and affected citizens, hold the most promising hope for the attainment of integrated public schools in our state.” (Crawford v. Board of Education, supra, 17 Cal.3d 280, 286, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28.) The importance of community input to the desegregation process is further evidenced by the inclusion within Crawford of “ ‘community and administration attitudes toward the school,’ ” as a primary factor for a governing board to consider when identifying segregation. (Id. at p. 304, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28, quoting from Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., supra, 413 U.S. 189, 196, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2691, 37 L.Ed.2d 548). California Administrative Code, title 5, chapter 7, section 96, requires a governing board to involve parents, teachers, students and other community representatives in all stages of identifying the need for a plan and in the development and implementation of such plans. If the solicitation and integration of community input into the desegregation process does not in itself constitute an integral step which a school board is required to take, such actions by a governing board certainly establish an environment within which its desegregation plan holds the best opportunity to achieve meaningful progress towards the alleviation of segregation.

A. Section 98, subdivision (b)-Notice of Criteria

A requisite to community involvement in the desegregation process is notice to the community. Section 98 of the Code specifies what information a governing board must include within the published notice and the notice to parents. Subdivision (b)(1) of section 98 requires that the notice include the criteria used by the board to determine those schools where, in the preliminary judgment of the governing board, segregation is found to exist and those schools where, in the preliminary judgment of the governing board, segregation of minority students does not exist. The ostensible purpose behind this subdivision is to subject the specific criteria and reasoning which formed the basis of the board's segregation determination to public scrutiny. The criteria elicited and publicized would then form the basis for community/board discussion, and upon serious consideration of community input, possible modification of the criteria and/or the segregation judgment. The phrase, “in the preliminary judgment of the governing board,” and the requirement that the criteria upon which the board based its findings that segregation did or did not exist be specified, demands a finding by the court that clear and particularized criteria or explanation of a governing board's rationale is required. In the notice it published and sent to parents, respondent attempted to satisfy subdivision (b)(1) by reiterating the five general factors from Crawford and the Code. (Fn. 2, supra ). Respondent's failure to particularize how in the separate cases of segregated schools and nonsegregated schools these factors compelled its findings, precluded independent community review (just as it did judicial review) and, hence, mitigated against any useful community input on the subject of whether the schools were segregated, and, if so, in what way. Having violated the purpose of section 98, subdivision (b), respondent is in error.

B. Section 98, subdivision (a) “enrolled”

Section 98, subdivision (a), requires that the governing school board “notify parents of all students enrolled in the district in the method commonly used to communicate with parents and in the primary language of the student.” We believe the purpose of requiring direct notice to parents of enrolled students, in addition to published notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is to apprise parents of children who will be affected of the board's segregation findings and any desegregation proposals so the parents may protect the interests of their children. Crawford specifically mentions that the most promising hope for the attainment of integrated public schools lies with “plans developed and implemented by local school boards, working with community leaders and affected citizens.” (Crawford v. Board of Education, supra, 17 Cal.3d 280, 286, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28. Italics added.) In the instant case, respondent sent notice to parents of students already attending its schools. Respondent had in its possession the names and addresses of incoming freshmen who had preregistered to attend the Oxnard Unified High School District. Despite the fact that respondent's proposal III would only affect incoming freshmen and that it was certainly feasible for respondent to send notices to the parents of the affected students, respondent did not do so. The trial court's finding that “enrolled” means “in attendance,” based upon the customary interpretation of “enrolled,” violates the intent of the drafters of section 98, subdivision (a), when sending notice to parents of children who may be affected if feasible. Hence, we find that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the word “enrolled.”

C. Utilization of Community Input in the Desegregation Process

Crawford makes it clear that school boards are constitutionally responsible for the segregated condition of the public schools. (Id. at p. 294, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28.) This conclusion is derived from a recognition of a governing board's pervasive control over and continuing responsibility for both the daily decisions and the long range plans which in fact determine the racial and ethnic attendance patterns of its districts' schools. (Id. at p. 294, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28.) On the basis of this reasoning, Crawford fixes singular responsibility for taking reasonably feasible steps toward alleviating segregation squarely upon the governing board. (Id. at pp. 294, 305-306, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28.) Despite its responsibility to eliminate segregation, a governing board must nevertheless seriously consider the community's attitude toward whether segregation exists within a district. Furthermore, desegregation plans which stand the best chance of achieving meaningful progress toward the elimination of segregation are those developed and implemented under the auspices of community scrutiny and with community input.

In reviewing respondent's interaction with the Oxnard community, which we define to include parents of affected students, administrators, faculty, students and interested members of the community, we note significant shortcomings in respondent's utilization of community input. Community members should be given the opportunity to challenge the governing board's criteria and to offer constructive suggestions on how segregation is to be identified. Respondent's application of its criteria to the factual situation present within the District must also be laid open to public scrutiny and input. Respondent's use of the 22-member advisory committee cannot substitute for the community input which we believe to be necessary.

Proposal III had been developed by respondent's staff prior to any segregation judgment and without recourse to community input. At the public hearing, community members scarcely had a chance to critique the proposal or to suggest alternatives during the 30 minutes devoted to the segregation issue and the desegregation proposal. Additional hearings, work sessions, or the solicitation of written comments would have facilitated valuable community participation. Respondent board cannot divorce itself from its responsibility by abiding by the recommendations of an advisory committee. A governing school board must facilitate, seriously consider, and integrate as it deems appropriate, community input at each stage of the desegregation process. We believe respondent's failure to conform to this fundamental requirement constituted error.

III. Remand

Alleviation of the effects of segregation is the essence of the Crawford mandate. Our review of the actions taken by respondent board has therefore focused upon the degree to which these steps hold the promise of achieving the elimination of segregation found to exist in the school district. We recognize respondent's steps, culminating in the implementation of a plan, but it is the effects of those steps with which we are most concerned. The purpose of the remedial instructions we have formulated is to provide the court with the information necessary to arrive at such a judgment.

The lapse in time which has occurred since the initiation by respondent of the entire desegregation process and the fact that Plan III is presently in its second year of operation complicates the formulation of a remedy, but in no way precludes it. It is necessary to gain clear understanding of the present state of the school district; hence, the question-does segregation now exist and if so what is its particular character? If respondent finds that segregation exists within its district, the next question follows-has and does Plan III promise to achieve meaningful progress towards the elimination of segregation within the District?⁴

Towards the end of attaining the information necessary to answer these crucial questions, the trial court is to order respondents to follow the process of identifying segregated schools under section 93 of the Code, in a manner consistent with this opinion. In particular, it will be necessary for the court to require: (a) Updated information on the race/ethnic composition, at each school, of students, including incoming freshmen, faculty, classified staff and administrators; (b) a summary of the community's attitude toward whether segregation exists within the District, including the names of schools where it is said to exist, and the particular character and magnitude of the segregation factor; (c) an explanation of the quality of facilities at each school, including a recitation of the general factors considered and the particular findings which support respondents' conclusion; and (d) the names of schools where segregation was found to exist and where segregation did not exist, including the detailed criteria which formed the basis for respondents' conclusions and an explanation of its findings.

The response of the community to both the criteria and their application to the factual data should be properly solicited and integrated into respondents' conclusion. Notice of governing board action and the basis for such action must be sent to parents of all students affected or to be affected if their addresses are known or easily ascertainable, as through a timely preregistration procedure. Its detailed criteria and an explanation of its application of the criteria to the factual situation should be included in the governing board's notice.

The trial court is directed to issue an order requiring respondent to comply with the mandates herein expressed within a reasonable time, i. e., within a period of eight weeks prior to the end of the 1980-1981 Oxnard Union High School District year. Plan III shall remain in effect, within the dimensions of this case, until such time as the trial court has an opportunity to consider the findings duly made by respondent and makes further directions. The cause is remanded for action in accordance with this decision.

Reversed with directions.

FOOTNOTES

1.  Hereinafter respondents will be referred to in the singular or as “the Board.”

2.  The five factors which advisory committee members considered in scoring each school were taken from the California Administrative Code, title 5, chapter 7, section 93, subdivision (b), which interpreted Crawford v. Board of Education, supra, 17 Cal.3d 280, 303-304, 130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28. This subdivision reads as follows:“(b) In determining which schools have, have not, or are in danger of having racial and ethnic segregation of minority students under subsection (a), the governing board shall consider at least the following factors:“(1) The racial and ethnic composition of each school in the district by numbers and percentages, including changes which have occurred in the racial and ethnic composition of each school in the preceding five years, as compared with such data for the district as a whole. The governing board may determine that a school is segregated when the minority composition of such school exceeds a specified percentage, exceeds a specified percentage in excess of the percentage of that minority in the district, or may utilize other criteria.“(2) Data on the racial and ethnic composition of the administrative, certificated and classified staff at each school.“(3) The attitudes of the community, administration and staff as to whether each school is a ”minority“ or ”non-minority“ school.“(4) The quality of the buildings and equipment.“(5) The organization of, and participation in, extracurricular activities.”

3.  Indicated on the chart are the projected racial/ethnic student body compositions for the 1979-1980 school year, without any plan; the projected racial/ethnic student body composition for the 1979-1980 school year, upon implementation of proposal III, the disparity between the projected percentage of minority students and white students, and the change in the disparity between minorities and whites to be caused by proposal III for the 1979-1980 school year.C1-4PROJECTED EFFECT OF PROPOSAL III C2NO PLANC3PROPOSAL IIIL4CHANGE INHIGH SCHOOLC2M/W*C3M/W*L4DISPARITY (IMPACT)Hueneme47.78/52.2250.79/49.21     (4.44)*     (1.58)*2.86% Rio Mesa35.83/64.1738.49/61.51     (28.34)     (23.02)5.32% Oxnard60.26/39.7458.96/41.042.60%     (20.52)     (17.92) Channel Islands66.79/33.2165.88/34.11     (33.58)     (31.77)1.81% CamarilloCamarillo14.08/85.9214.08/85.920.00%     (71.84)     (71.84)FN*M: Percentage Minority StudentsFN*W: Percentage White StudentsFN*( ): 1M-W9, Disparity between percentage of minority white students.

4.  We note that the total effect of Plan III will be known within four years after its implementation date, upon finalization of the projected enrollment statistics for the incoming freshman class of the 1982-1983 school year. This does not require waiting for such proof.

STEPHENS, Associate Justice.

KAUS, P. J., and HASTINGS, J., concur.