SAN FRANCISCO LABOR COUNCIL v. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (1978)

We granted rehearing to reexamine the important constitutional questions presented on appeal and to clarify our reasoning upholding the facial validity of the challenged legislative enactment.^[FN1] In so doing, we affirm our conclusion that Education Code section 92611^[FN2] does not on its face conflict with the provisions of article IX, section 9, of the state Constitution.^[FN3]

Appellants filed a petition^[FN4] seeking to mandate the Regents of the University of California (hereafter Regents) to comply with the statutory requirements that consideration be given to local general prevailing rates of wages for laborers, workmen and mechanics employed on an hourly or per diem basis in fixing minimum salary limits for the University's comparable employees. Upon demurrer, it was stipulated that the only issue to be determined was the constitutionality of the statute. In sustaining the Regents' general demurrer without leave to amend, the trial court found the statute unconstitutional “by reason of Article IX, Section 9, of the State Constitution.” Following entry of a judgment of dismissal, this appeal ensued.

The sole issue thus presented is whether section 92611 is in fatal conflict with article IX, section 9, of the California Constitution.

Relying principally upon the holding in Tolman v. Underhill (1952) 39 Cal.2d 708, 249 P.2d 280, appellants contend that as a law enacted under the general police power of the Legislature pertaining to a matter of statewide concern, the regulation of minimum salaries paid to University-employed laborers, workmen, and mechanics is constitutionally permissible and does not intrude upon the “full powers of organization and government” exclusively reserved to the Regents (Cal.Const., art. IX, s 9, subd. (a)) nor improperly interfere “in the administration of its (University's) affairs” (art. IX, s 9, subd. (f)).

Regents flatly refute that contention arguing that section 92611 represents neither a valid exercise of the police power nor a matter of general statewide concern which prevails over the exclusive regental authority to govern the University, including the authority to independently establish wage rates for its nonacademic employees. Our analysis reveals no inherent infirmity in the statute nor any patent conflict with article IX, section 9; accordingly, a general demurrer on such ground may not be sustained.

We undertake that analysis by initially reviewing basic principles of law relevant to our discussion.

I. It is axiomatic that legislation designed to promote the public interest and general welfare constitutes a valid exercise of the police power which, in the absence of arbitrariness or lack of any rational relationship to its objective, will be upheld. (See Clemons v. Los Angeles (1950) 36 Cal.2d 95, 222 P.2d 439; Sandstrom v. Cal. Horse Racing Board (1948) 31 Cal.2d 401, 189 P.2d 17; Lees v. Bay Area Air etc. Control Dist. (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 850, 48 Cal.Rptr. 295.) Claims of constitutional infirmity must be clearly demonstrated in order to overcome an underlying presumption of validity. (See State Board of Education v. Levit (1959) 52 Cal.2d 441, 452, 343 P.2d 8; Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal.2d 693, 696, 329 P.2d 5; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Constitutional Law, s 43, p. 3281; see generally 13 Cal.Jur.3d, Constitutional Law, s 72, pp. 135-136.) It is likewise well recognized that the legislative power may be validly exercised in the interest of the general welfare to reasonably regulate the field of labor relations and standards. (Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 631, 12 Cal.Rptr. 671, 361 P.2d 247; Bautista v. Jones (1944) 25 Cal.2d 746, 749, 155 P.2d 343; In re Mark (1936) 6 Cal.2d 516, 521, 58 P.2d 913; Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman (1936) 5 Cal.2d 446, 459-460, 55 P.2d 177 (aff'd. 299 U.S. 198, 57 S.Ct. 147, 81 L.Ed. 122); see also Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 293-295, 32 Cal.Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158; San Leandro Police Officers Ass'n v. City of San Leandro (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 553, 127 Cal.Rptr. 856.)

But it is likewise settled law that within the realm of activities concerning academic and student affairs and internal organizational matters, the Regents, pursuant to the authority conferred by article IX, section 9, possess sole and exclusive rule-making powers governing the University. (Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. (1934) 219 Cal. 663, 28 P.2d 355 (aff'd. 293 U.S. 245, 55 S.Ct. 197, 79 L.Ed. 343) (prescribe academic course content and student requirements); Amluxen v. Regents of University of California (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 27, 125 Cal.Rptr. 497 (promulgate staff personnel policy); Searle v. Regents of University of California (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 448, 100 Cal.Rptr. 194 (appoint faculty members); Cal. State Employees' Ass'n v. Regents of University of California (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 667, 73 Cal.Rptr. 449 (establish payroll deduction policy); Ishimatsu v. Regents of the University of California (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 854, 72 Cal.Rptr. 756 (adjudicate personnel grievances); Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 (maintain campus order); Wall v. Board of Regents, U.C. (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 698, 102 P.2d 533 (determine qualifications of academic instructors).)

II. In its benchmark decision in Tolman v. Underhill, supra, 39 Cal.2d 708, 249 P.2d 280, the California Supreme Court squarely confronted the issue of legislative supremacy in matters of statewide concern over conflicting University regulations. In invalidating a Regent-imposed loyalty oath requirement for University employees under general laws requiring a similar oath by All state employees, the court established the following rule: “It is well settled, however, that laws passed by the Legislature under its general police power will prevail over regulations made by the regents with regard to matters which are not exclusively university affairs. (Citations.) There can be no question that the loyalty of teachers at the university is not merely a matter involving the internal affairs of that institution but is a subject of general statewide concern.” (Id. at p. 712, 249 P.2d at p. 282; see also Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 533, 536, 131 Cal.Rptr. 228, 551 P.2d 844; City Street Imp. Co. v. Regents (1908) 153 Cal. 776, 96 P. 801; Estate of Royer (1899) 123 Cal. 614, 624, 56 P. 461; Wallace v. Regents of the University of California (1925) 75 Cal.App. 274, 242 P. 892.

In enacting section 92611 (and companion section 89517), the Legislature established a comprehensive statewide scheme assuring minimum wage parity for all state-employed laborers, workmen and mechanics compensated on an hourly or daily basis. (Cf. Gov. Code, s 18853; Lab. Code, s 1770 et seq.) With the singular objective of including a specific, and hitherto omitted, class of University employees within that broad statutory scheme providing a uniform standard regulating minimum prevailing wage rates payable to the same class of state employees in general, the Legislature unequivocally expressed an intention to consider the subject matter of such state employees' salaries as one of statewide importance.^[FN5] While, as correctly contended by the Regents, such legislatively declared purpose is not binding upon the courts (Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 62-63, 81 Cal.Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137; Coulter v. Pool (1921) 187 Cal. 181, 185-196, 201 P. 120), the intent expressed in enacting general laws is nevertheless entitled to great weight and, in certain cases, the factors upon which the Legislature relied in determining the subject matter to be of statewide concern may be of like persuasion to the reviewing court. (See Bishop v. City of San Jose, supra, at p. 63, 81 Cal.Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137.)

Moreover, in interpreting a statutory enactment, we must indulge in all reasonable intendments whenever possible in order to carry out the purpose of the law. (City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld (1970) 3 Cal.3d 239, 248, 90 Cal.Rptr. 8, 474 P.2d 976; Alford v. Pierno (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 688, 104 Cal.Rptr. 110.) In discharging that duty, we must construe the statute in light of the entire statutory system of which it forms a part in a manner achieving harmony among all of the related parts. (People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 40, 127 Cal.Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322.)

Clearly, the public interest in the establishment of a uniform minimum wage standard to be considered in fixing salary levels for the identified class is of sufficient importance to justify legislative regulation as a matter of statewide concern. (Cf. Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 60 Cal.2d 276, 32 Cal.Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158.) Accordingly, we conclude that the enactment of section 92611 as a matter of statewide concern was a valid exercise of the legislative power. But inasmuch as the statute is directed to a separate, “equal and coordinate” branch of state government (see Horowitz, The Autonomy of the University of California Under the State Constitution (1977) 25 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 23, 27 (hereafter Horowitz )), our inquiry must proceed further.

III. As the Regents correctly argue, the crucial and remaining issue to be resolved is whether the statute nevertheless concerns a matter falling within the Regents' exclusive power of governance. (Horowitz, at p. 29.) Tolman instructs that a valid exercise of the police power will prevail over regental regulations only in regard to matters which are not “exclusively university affairs.” (Tolman v. Underhill, supra, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712, 249 P.2d 280.) When the subject matter dealt with clearly falls within the ambit of authority exclusively granted to the Regents, the reasonable exercise of that power may not be successfully challenged. (See, e. g., Amluxen v. Regents of University of California, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d 27, 125 Cal.Rptr. 497; Cal. State Employees' Ass'n v. Regents of University of California, supra, 267 Cal.App.2d 667, 73 Cal.Rptr. 449; Ishimatsu v. Regents of the University of California, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d 854, 72 Cal.Rptr. 756.)

But we cannot conceive in what manner section 92611 may be said to impermissibly encroach upon an exclusive University function.^[FN6] The statutory formula accomplishes a limited though important objective: that in exercising its undisputed power to fix salaries for certain “staff” personnel, the Regents consider local “prevailing rates of wages . . . and other relevant factors” (s 92611) in establishing a minimum salary level based upon the prevailing rate ascertained by the Regents. (Cf. Walker v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 55 Cal.2d 626, 635, 12 Cal.Rptr. 671, 361 P.2d 247.) The imposition of such a reasonable restriction, in order to advance a uniform statewide standard for similar classes of state employees, constitutes neither a wrongful incursion into the exclusive domain of the University nor an unreasonable impairment of the independent regental power to determine wage conditions of employment for its nonacademic personnel. To suggest that the Legislature is powerless to regulate minimum salary standards for state employees merely by virtue of an inelastic definition of “internal affairs,” is demonstrably unsound and would result in an interpretation of the constitutional proviso neither necessary nor essential to the independent functioning of the University. In the final analysis, whether the regulation as applied unreasonably infringes upon internal affairs of the University so as to materially interfere with its ability to effectively allocate its resources or to implement policy decisions central to its function as an independent public institution (see Horowitz, at p. 38), can be shown only in a proven factual context.^[FN7]

Thus, we limit our holding to a determination that section 92611, as enacted, presents no conflict on its face with the provisions of article IX, section 9, of the state Constitution. The trial court prejudicially erred in sustaining a general demurrer on that sole ground. In view of our decision, it is unnecessary to reach the remaining issue presented on appeal.

The request to take judicial notice is denied. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

FOOTNOTES

1.  Originally, we had generally concluded that the Legislature in enacting the questioned statute had preempted the subject field of regulation as a matter of statewide concern without infringement upon the constitutional powers of self-government exclusively vested in the Regents. We are persuaded by the more thorough and enlightening analysis developed in the petition for rehearing that the significant implications of the language of our initial determination necessitate a reappraisal and restatement of the basic principles involved and of the underlying reasoning. In performing such reexamination, we limit our holding to the precise grounds involved and the narrow issue presented.

2.  The substantive provision originally enacted as section 23562 (Stats. 1975, ch. 1218, s 1, p. 3080), was repealed and reenacted as section 92611 as part of the reorganization of the Education Code (see Stats. 1976, ch. 1010, s 2, operative April 30, 1977) during the pendency of this appeal.Section 92611 provides as follows:“The minimum and maximum salary limits for laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed on an hourly or per diem basis need not be uniform throughout the state, but the regents shall ascertain, as to each such position, the general prevailing rate of such wages in the various localities of the state.“In fixing such minimum and maximum salary limits within the various localities of the state, the regents shall take into account the prevailing rates of wages in the localities in which the employee is to work and other relevant factors, and shall not fix the minimum salary limits below the general prevailing rate so ascertained for the various localities.”Section 24216 (now s 89517), containing similar requirements applicable to the Trustees of the California State University and Colleges, was enacted by the same general legislation.

3.  Article IX, section 9, of the California Constitution provides in pertinent part:“The University of California shall constitute a public trust, to be administered by the existing corporation known as ‘The Regents of the University of California,’ with full powers of organization and government, subject only to such legislative control as may be necessary to insure the security of its funds and compliance with the terms of the endowments of the university and such competitive bidding procedures as may be made applicable to the university by statute for the letting of construction contracts, sales of real property, and purchasing of materials, goods, and services. . . .” (Subd. (a).)“. . . The university shall be entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its regents and in the administration of its affairs. . . .” (Subd. (f).)

4.  The petition was filed as a representative class action by several bay area trade councils in behalf of their labor organization affiliates representing employees employed by the University at one or more of its facilities located in northern California, together with six individual building trades employees of the University on behalf of all other similarly situated employees.

5.  This declaration is clearly articulated in section 3 of the enabling legislation as follows:“The Legislature finds and declares that the salary of state employees who are laborers, workmen, and mechanics and who are employed on an hourly or daily basis is a matter of statewide concern.“Section 18853 of the Government Code currently requires the State Personnel Board to fix minimum salary limits for laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by the hour or day, which limits are not to fall below the prevailing rate paid in the locality in which the work is to be performed.“This act will establish the same principle for employees of the University of California and the California State University and Colleges. It is thus the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to establish a comprehensive statewide scheme applicable to all state employees who are laborers, workmen, or mechanics paid on an hourly or daily basis.” (Stats. 1975, ch. 1218, pp. 3080-3081; emphasis added.)

6.  Horowitz borrows the phrase “ ‘functions essential to (the) separate and independent existence’ of the University” to describe the scope of the powers delegated to the Regents with respect to University affairs. (At pp. 36-37; cf. National League of Cities v. Usery (1976) 426 U.S. 833, 845, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245.)

7.  We decline to take judicial notice of the extensive statistical data filed in conjunction with the petition for rehearing. (See Evid.Code, s 459.) Those matters relevant to the issues ultimately framed in the pleadings can best be considered during trial.

RACANELLI, Presiding Justice.

ELKINGTON and LOW,[FN*] JJ., concur.