PEOPLE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. GEANETOS (1978)

Petitioner (hereinafter the State) seeks a writ of mandate ordering the Superior Court of Placer County to vacate its order relieving real party Patricia Geanetos of the 100-day claim filing requirement of Government Code section 945.4.¹ We grant the writ.

On December 19, 1975, Patricia was driving an automobile² on State Route 65 near City Corporation Yard Road in the City of Roseville, and collided with the rear of another vehicle stopped in the roadway (apparently for a left turn). She suffered serious physical injury (no mental injury) and was hospitalized for approximately two months. She then convalesced further with her sister for approximately two months, during which time she received a copy of the investigating police officer's traffic collision report. The report indicated that the accident occurred on State Route 65, a state highway. She knew the road where the accident occurred was public property, but did not feel that there was anything “wrong” with it.

In early September 1976, some nine months following the accident, she contacted an attorney (who is unidentified in the record) because she had received an “intimidating” letter dated September 7, 1976, from an attorney representing the other driver and was concerned about being sued. She told him about the accident, gave him a copy of the traffic collision report and the September 7 letter, and asked him what to do. She specifically asked him “What [[[[can he the other driver] do to me and/or what can I do to him.” His advice was “Nothing.”

She contacted a second attorney, Joseph Snyder, in late October 1976, because she was still concerned about being sued. She again related the facts of the accident, and gave him a copy of the traffic collision report and the letter. Apparently Snyder informed her he would look into the matter and communicate further with her. Her next contact with Snyder was on December 10, 1976. He then advised her for the first time of a potential claim against the State of California, the County of Placer, and the City of Roseville; he referred her to Boccardo, Lull, Niland & Bell, a law firm, which filed an application for leave to present a late claim with the three public entities on December 17, 1976, two days short of a year after the accident. The application stated that the reason for the delay in presenting the claim was “mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect provided for in Government Code, Section 911.6 ․”

In a declaration in support of the application, Patricia stated: “On December 10, 1976, after preliminary investigation, Mr. Snyder informed me of the possibility of suing a public entity for negligent design of the road where my accident occurred. He also informed me of the 100-day limit for filing claims against public entities in the State of California. [¶] I was not aware that a public entity was involved in this accident until my conversation with Mr. Snyder. I was also unaware of the cause of action against the public entity for negligent design of the highway․ [¶] My incapacity and ignorance of the cause of action against the public entity accounted for my failure to file a claim in the 100-day filing period.”

Nothing more was presented to justify the delay, except that there was also attached to the application a declaration of Joseph P. McMonigle (an attorney for Patricia) asserting simply that he is associated with Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland & Bell, that Joseph Snyder referred the case to his office on December 10, 1976, and that “we had no knowledge of this cause of action until December 13, 1976.”

On May 24, 1977, after the application was denied by the three public entities (the last on January 18, 1977), Patricia filed in respondent court an unverified petition for relief from the claim requirements of section 945.4, pursuant to section 946.6, subdivision (a). The petition incorporated by reference the application for leave to file a late claim and alleged that the “application to respondents' governing board was made within a reasonable time after accrual of the cause of action, as is more particularly shown by the Declaration of Joseph P. McMonigle.” The only other noteworthy matter brought to the trial court's attention (no evidentiary hearing was held), was through a declaration of Earl C. Notestine (filed as a part of the State's opposition to the petition), Safety Engineer of the State's Department of Transportation and responsible for the investigation of all claims filed against the Department in Placer County; he asserted that the State had no knowledge or record of the accident until the late claim application was filed and that in May 1976 the road was resurfaced and any physical evidence at the scene would have been destroyed.³

I

Section 911.2 requires that a claim relating to personal injury must be presented to a public entity within 100 days following accrual of the cause of action. When such a claim has not been timely presented, section 911.4 permits written application to the public entity for leave to file a late claim. And if the public entity denies such an application, section 946.6 authorizes a petition to the Superior Court for relief from the filing requirement, such relief to be granted “if the court finds that the application … under section 911.4 was made within a reasonable time not to exceed [one year after the accrual of the cause of action] … and that .. the failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect ․” (Emphasis added.) Correlatively, section 911.4 requires that “[t]he application shall be presented to the public entity … within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action ․” (Emphasis added.)

Thus a court does not relieve a potential plaintiff of the claim requirements of section 945.4 as a matter of course; he must first demonstrate two essentials by a preponderance of the evidence (Shaddox v. Melcher (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 598, 601, 76 Cal.Rptr. 80); first, that the section 911.4 application was presented within a reasonable time, and second, that the failure to file a timely claim was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise of excusable neglect. (Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 474, 58 Cal.Rptr. 249, 426 P.2d 753.)⁴

II

The trial court's order, in its entirety, reads as follows: “The petition for an order relieving petitioner from the provisions of Government Code section 945.4 is granted on the grounds of excusable neglect inasmuch as petitioner was unaware of the cause of action against the public entities for negligent design of the highway and hence of the 100-day limit for filing claims.⁵ [¶] Counsel for petitioner is directed to prepare a formal order.” There is no other explanatory statement, nor any finding.

As above noted, two conditions must exist before relief can be granted under section 946.6. As shown by its order, the trial court addressed only the neglect condition and ignored the reasonable time condition. On that basis alone the decision was erroneous and must be reversed. Furthermore, this record cannot in any event support a finding that the section 946.6 application was filed within a reasonable time; therefore we shall direct the trial court to deny the petition.

When the statute states that the application for relief must have been filed within a reasonable time not to exceed one year, it necessarily contemplates two independent time periods. The first is the reasonable time; the second is the one year, the outside limit (beyond which a court may not grant relief from the filing requirement no matter how reasonable the time might otherwise be). The two are not synonymous, for had they been so intended they would not have both been stated, the one-year designation being sufficient to encompass both. The reasonable time limitation therefore means something other than one year, and of necessity something less than one year, unless facts exist which make the full year nonetheless reasonable.

In this case the only way the facts presented to the trial court would support a finding that the application to the public entity was made within a reasonable time is by interpreting the two conditions as synonymous.⁶ All that petitioner demonstrated to explain the delay was that until December 10, 1976, nine days short of the anniversary date of the accrual of the cause of action, she was “[unaware] that a public entity was involved” or that she had a “cause of action against the public entity for negligent design of the highway.” This lack of knowledge, standing alone, is insufficient. (Cf. Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 475, 58 Cal.Rptr. 249, 426 P.2d 753; Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 315, 321, 114 Cal.Rptr. 171; Martin v. City of Madera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 80-81, 70 Cal.Rptr. 908.) It is nothing more than an academic utterance of the obvious; it does not undertake to explain what Patricia or her attorneys did, or what was done by others to her or to them, or what other circumstances made it reasonable to defer a decision to apply for relief until 355 days after the injury. There is only bootstrap reasoning, that Patricia and her attorneys did not know of the potential cause against the state until December 10, 1976, therefore it was reasonable for them not to proceed with an application for relief until then. “It is not the purpose of remedial statutes to grant relief from defaults which are the result of inexcusable neglect of parties or their attorneys in the performance of the latter's obligations to their clients.” (Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 478, 58 Cal.Rptr. at p. 255, 426 P.2d at p. 759.)

To satisfy the reasonable time condition, Patricia had to show that her inaction between March 28, 1976 (when the 100 days expired) and December 17, 1976 was reasonable. (See Viles v. State of California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 31, 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818; cf. Outdoor Imports, Inc. v. Stanoff (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 518, 523, 86 Cal.Rptr. 593.) She made no such effort. The allegedly defective condition maintained by the public entity was at all times available for inspection; yet not until December 10, for no indicated reason, was a determination made that a cause of action against the public entity might exist. (See Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 477-478, 58 Cal.Rptr. 249, 426 P.2d 753.)

As a matter of law the application to the public entity was not filed within a reasonable time and the trial court would have abused its discretion had it so found. We are mindful of the liberal interpretation to be accorded section 946.6. (See Viles v. State of California, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 31, 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818.) But we cannot blind ourselves to its express limitations. These cannot be nullified by an interpretation which would dispense with a need for justification of a prolonged delay.

Let a writ issue directing the trial court to set aside its order granting relief and to deny the application.

I dissent.

“What is an excusable mistake or ignorance of the law is mainly factual and no reliable test is available.” (Garcia v. Gallo (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 658, 668, 1 Cal.Rptr. 539, 545.) The California Supreme Court in Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, at page 476, 58 Cal.Rptr. 249, at page 254, 426 P.2d 753, at page 758, notes that “The issue of which mistakes of law constitute excusable neglect presents a fact question; …” It explains that the difference between a mistake of law and ignorance of law is only one of degree. “In such cases all factors involved must be considered to determine whether relief should be granted or denied.” (Ibid.); citing Security Truck Line v. City of Monterey (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 441, 256 P.2d 366, 257 P.2d 755. The statutes, Government Code sections 945.4 and 946.6 must, of course, be read with those judicial explanations in mind.

Here, the trial court made a factual determination that a layperson's failure to know that she had a cause of action against the state was arguably excusable. Such a determination may not be overturned without a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. The special policy inherent in this rule was discussed by this court in Syzemore v. County of Sacramento (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 517, 127 Cal.Rptr. 741. The court there stated (at p. 524, 127 Cal.Rptr. at p. 745): “Statutes such as Government Code section 946.6 are designed to prevent the claim statutes from serving as a trap for laymen, unlearned in the law, ignorant of the claim requirement and, as here, unaware of the existence of a tenable cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) Not only must there be clear abuse of discretion before we reverse, but reviewing courts generally scan grants of relief less strictly than denials so that wherever possible the case will be heard on the merits. (Viles v. State of California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 29, 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818.) Here, there was no abuse.

The key to the reasonableness requirement is the balancing of the state's interests and that of the plaintiff. The purpose of the claims statute is to “give the governmental entity notice and an opportunity to investigate and settle meritorious claims without litigation ․” (Viles v. State of California, supra, at p. 32, 56 Cal.Rptr. at p. 671, 423 P.2d at p. 823.) But this purpose succumbs to the plaintiff's interest in presenting the case on its merits, unless after becoming aware of the cause of action and the time filing requirement plaintiff needlessly dawdles. Yet even some delay is acceptable if a reasonable person would have delayed for that time or there is no prejudice to the state by the delay. In Viles, the court observes that “having failed to establish prejudice, the state cannot be harmed by the delay.” (Id. at p. 32, 56 Cal.Rptr. at p. 672, 423 P.2d at p. 824.) Here, the trial court found no prejudice to the state.

I would deny the writ.

FOOTNOTES

1.  Unless otherwise indicated, section references henceforth are to the Government Code.

2.  Our recitation of facts is taken from the material before the trial court at the time of its ruling; it includes a deposition of Patricia.

3.  The purpose of the Notestine declaration was to establish prejudice (§ 946.6, subd. (c)).

4.  For the sake of literary convenience we shall henceforth refer to the first as the “reasonable time condition” and the second as the “neglect condition.”

5.  In ruling upon the neglect condition, it is elementary that the trial court is concerned only with the first 100 days following accrual of the cause of action. What a claimant did or did not do thereafter cannot affect the question of failure to file a timely claim; such later conduct affects only the secondary inquiry, i.e., the reasonable time condition.

6.  This is precisely what the dissent proposes to do. In pursuit of an emotionally motivated result the dissenter scrupulously avoids any discussion or analysis of the statute's language, relying instead upon such platitudes as “trap for laymen,” “trial on the merits,” and “lack of prejudice.”

PARAS, Acting Presiding Justice.

EVANS, J., concurs. REYNOSO, Associate Justice, dissenting.