GRIGGS v. HEDBERG (1975)

OPINION

Petitioner is the Superintendent of the California Institution for Men at Chino, California. In three habeas corpus proceedings he seeks a writ of mandate or prohibition to compel the San Bernardino Superior Court to quash its orders to show cause and to dismiss the petitions for habeas corpus on the ground that the San Bernardino Superior Court is not the court having territorial jurisdiction.

In issuing the alternative writ we have determined that petitioner has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal.3d 536, 543, 96 Cal.Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13; Brown v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.3d 509, 515, 96 Cal.Rptr. 584, 487 P.2d 1224; Ford v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.App.3d 338, 340, 109 Cal.Rptr. 844.)

Facts

Real parties in interest are three convicted felons who filed petitions for habeas corpus in the San Bernardino Superior Court. Each on the date his petition was filed was incarcerated at the California Institution for Men at Chino. The gravamen of the petitions for habeas corpus are as follows: Ramirez asserted that he had been denied access to lawbooks and other legal materials while in confinement at the segregation unit at Chino; Hedberg asserted that he should be serving a concurrent federal sentence in federal prison and sought a transfer to federal prison; Cisneros asserted that his records incorrectly contained a notation that he was convicted of arson in 1962 and that such incorrect information makes him ineligible for assignment to a prison camp.

In all three cases, on April 11, 1975, the San Bernardino Superior Court issued orders to show cause directed to petitioner herein Bertram S. Griggs as Superintendent of the California Institution for Men at Chino. In the interim between the filing of each petition for habeas corpus and the issuance of an order to show cause on April 11, 1975, each real party in interest was, in the normal course of administration, transferred to a penal institution outside the County of San Bernardino. Ramirez was transferred to Soledad in Monterey County; Hedberg was transferred to Folsom in Sacramento County; and Cisneros was transferred to Tehachapi in Kern County.

In each case petitioner made a motion to quash the order to show cause on the ground that, at the time the order to show cause issued, the habeas corpus petitioner was no longer confined in San Bernardino County. In each case the habeas corpus petitioner made a motion that the San Bernardino Superior Court transfer the habeas corpus matter to the superior court of the county in which each habeas corpus petitioner was now confined. The court denied the motions to quash the orders to show cause. The court did not rule, however, on the motions to transfer. Subsequently, on or about June 4, 1975, real party Ramirez filed in the San Bernardino Superior Court a motion to dismiss his petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the petition was moot. On the same date real party Hedberg filed a motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he no longer desired the relief requested. In the meantime, on May 30, 1975, we issued an alternative writ of prohibition and/or mandamus, and the San Bernardino Superior Court has taken no formal action on the motions to dismiss by Ramirez and Hedberg.

Petitioner Griggs takes the position that since each of the habeas corpus petitioners were transferred to penal institutions outside the County of San Bernardino in the ordinary course of penal administration prior to the issuance of orders to show cause by the San Bernardino Superior Court, the San Bernardino Superior Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to issue orders to show cause and abused its discretion in refusing to quash the orders to show cause issued on the habeas corpus petitions. In the return to the alternative writ of prohibition and/or mandamus issued by us, real parties in interest take the position that as to Ramirez and Hedberg the matters are moot and habeas corpus is no longer desired. Real party Cisneros concedes that the San Bernardino Superior Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to issue an order to show cause but contends that the San Bernardino Superior Court has the power to and ought to transfer the petition for habeas corpus to the Superior Court having territorial jurisdiction, the Kern County Superior Court.

Discussion and Disposition

Territorial Jurisdiction

Prior to the 1966 revision of the California Constitution, it was clear that a superior court could issue a writ of habeas corpus only with respect to a person confined within the territorial limits of the particular county. Article VI, section 5, of the California Constitution then provided in pertinent part: ‘. . . [S]uperior courts . . . shall have power to issue writs of . . . habeas corpus on petition by or on behalf of any person in actual custody, in their respective counties.’ (Emphasis added.) The case law interpreting this constitutional provision was clear: ‘A superior court has power to issue a writ of habeas corpus only on a petition by or on behalf of a person in custody within the county . . ..’ (People v. Clinton, 243 Cal.App.2d 284, 287, 52 Cal.Rptr. 221, 223.) Although the present applicable constitutional and statutory provisions are not as clear, we have concluded that the rule stated in Clinton, supra, remains unchanged.

In the constitutional revision of 1966, article VI, section 5 of the Constitution became article VI, section 10 which provides: ‘The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. . . .’ One legal writer concluded from the change in constitutional language that the concept of territorial jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings had been abrogated. (See Judicial Council of California, 1971 Annual Report, 22, 54.) We think this view is mistaken.

Whatever may be the origins and history of the doctrine of territorial jurisdiction, the doctrine continues to serve two important purposes. One is to shorten the travel distance and minimize the danger and expense involved in bringing the habeas corpus petitioner before the court. (See Pen.Code, §§ 1481, 1482.) A second is the avoidance of rampant forum shopping which would result from the elimination of the rule of territorial jurisdiction.

Penal Code, section 1508 provides in pertinent part: ‘(c) A writ of habeas corpus issued by a superior court or a judge thereof may be made returnable before the issuing judge or his court.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Keeping in mind the two purposes served by the rule of territorial jurisdiction, the provision of Penal Code, section 1508 that a superior court may only make a writ of habeas corpus returnable before that court, logically indicates that the writ should not issue except as to persons confined within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing superior court.¹ Understandably, the decisions since the 1966 constitutional revision have uniformly indicated, albeit without articulating much of the underlying reasoning, that the doctrine of territorial jurisdiction still applies. (See In re Cortez, 6 Cal.3d 78, 88, 98 Cal.Rptr. 307, 490 P.2d 819; In re Crow, 4 Cal.3d 613, 624, 94 Cal.Rptr. 254, 483 P.2d 1206; People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal.3d 89, 95, fn. 2, 89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993; In re Montgomery, 2 Cal.3d 863, 868–869, fn. 4, 87 Cal.Rptr. 695, 471 P.2d 15; In re Haro, 71 Cal.2d 1021, 1024–1025 and fn. 1, 80 Cal.Rptr. 588, 458 P.2d 500; In re Caffey, 68 Cal.2d 762, 765, fn. 3, 69 Cal.Rptr. 93, 441 P.2d 933; People v. Brady, 30 Cal.App.3d 81, 88, fn. 1, 105 Cal.Rptr. 280; People v. Gonzalez, 7 Cal.App.3d 163, 166, 86 Cal.Rptr. 512; cf. In re Rinegold, 13 Cal.App.3d 723, 725, fn. 1, 92 Cal.Rptr. 18; People v. Buccheri, 2 Cal.App.3d 842, 845, 83 Cal.Rptr. 221; also see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1973 Supp.) § 792, pp. 606–607). We conclude that the doctrine of territorial jurisdiction still obtains.

Event upon Which Jurisdiction Attaches

Having concluded that the doctrine of territorial jurisdiction applies, the next question is at what point in the habeas corpus process the habeas corpus petitioner must be confined within the territorial jurisdiction of the court from which habeas corpus is sought. The Attorney General asserts that the crucial time or event is the time at which the court issues and serves the writ (see Pen.Code, §§ 1476, 1477, 1478; Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 816, pp. 785–786) or the order to show cause² is issued and served (see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 821, p. 788.) Real parties in interest do not contest the Attorney General's assertion. Although no decided case or authority has been cited or found directly on point, we are persuaded that the Attorney General is correct.

The petition for habeas corpus is only an application requesting the court to exercise its jurisdiction. (See Pen.Code, § 1474.) If the petition does not state facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the petition for habeas corpus may be denied without more. (See In re Crow, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 624, 94 Cal.Rptr. 254, 483 P.2d 1206.) The return required by issuance and service of the writ or an order to show cause (see Pen.Code, § 1480) is analogous to the complaint in a civil proceeding; the traverse or answer (see Pen.Code, § 1484) is analogous to the answer in a civil proceeding. (In re Saunders, 2 Cal.3d 1033, 1047, 88 Cal.Rptr. 633, 472, P.2d 921; Witkin Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 825, p. 790.) Manifestly, the crucial act of the court in assuming jurisdiction is the issuance of the writ or an order to show cause and the service thereof upon the person or agency having custody of the habeas corpus petitioner. We conclude it is at this point in the habeas corpus process that the habeas corpus petitioner must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court from which habeas corpus is sought. In the proceeding at bench the orders to show cause were issued on April 11, 1975. By that time all three real parties in interest had been transferred to penal facilities outside the County of San Bernardino.³ We conclude, therefore, that the motions of Superintendent Griggs to quash the orders to show cause issued on April 11, 1975 should have been granted.⁴

Authority to Transfer Petition for Habeas Corpus

The question remains what disposition the San Bernardino Superior Court should make of the habeas corpus petitions. Real parties Ramirez and Hedberg have moved to dismiss their respective petitions, and, presumably, the court will grant their respective motions to dismiss. In the Cisneros matter, however, there is still pending a motion to transfer the petition to Kern County Superior Court. Citing neither case nor statutory authority, Cisneros asserts that the San Bernardino Superior Court must have the authority to transfer his habeas corpus petition, because such procedure seems sensible. The Attorney General—in his traverse indicates that petitioner Griggs has no objection to such a transfer provided the transferee court is free to act upon the petition de novo and is not bound by any preliminary determination made by the transferor court. (Cf. Pen.Code, § 1508, ante, at p. 586; but cf. In re Caffey, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 765, fn. 3, 69 Cal.Rptr. 93, 441 P.2d 933; In re Haro, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1025–1026, 80 Cal.Rptr. 588, 458 P.2d 500.)

Commencing with the seminal case of In re Caffey, supra, 68 Cal.2d 762, 69 Cal.Rptr. 93, 441 P.2d 933, there are numerous cases recognizing the power of the superior court having territorial jurisdiction to transfer a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the sentencing superior court where problems involving sentencing are presented. (See In re Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 88, 98 Cal.Rptr. 307, 490 P.2d 819; In re Crow, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 624, 94 Cal.Rptr. 254, 483 P.2d 1206; People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 95, fn. 2, 89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993; In re Haro, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1024–1025 and fn. 1, 80 Cal.Rptr. 588, 458 P.2d 500; Pope v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App.3d 644, 647–648, 88 Cal.Rptr. 488; see also Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1973 Supp.) § 792, pp. 606–607.) In In re Crow, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 624, fn. 11, 94 Cal.Rptr. 254, 483 P.2d 1206, the California Supreme Court expressly reserved for future decision the question in what other situations the transfer of a petition for habeas corpus would be appropriate. In Pope v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d at pp. 647–648, 88 Cal.Rptr. 488, 490 the Court of Appeal for the First District stated: ‘We note, too, that authority for such transfer is limited. While it is authorized in cases which require resentencing or review of the facts of a prior sentencing procedure [citation omitted], the transfer power of a superior court is limited to such situations [citation omitted]. To permit such transfers in all challenges to parole revocation would create intolerable confusion and friction among the superior courts of 57 counties. . . .’ (But cf. In re Montgomery, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 868–869, fn. 4, 87 Cal.Rptr. 695, 471 P.2d 15.)

These cases are not controlling since they deal with transfers of habeas corpus petitions from the superior court having territorial jurisdiction to a superior court not having territorial jurisdiction. In the proceeding at bench we are faced with the possibility of a transfer from a superior court not having territorial jurisdiction to a superior court having territorial jurisdiction, just the opposite of the cited cases.

Closely read, however, the leading case, In re Caffey, supra, 68 Cal.2d 762, 69 Cal.Rptr. 93, 441 P.2d 933, is instructive. In support of the power of the superior court having territorial jurisdiction to transfer the petition for writ of habeas corpus to the sentencing superior court, the court in Caffey purported to place some reliance on In re Woods, 64 Cal.2d 3, 48 Cal.Rptr. 689, 409 P.2d 913, In re Luce, 64 Cal.2d 11, 48 Cal.Rptr. 694, 409 P.2d 918 and In re Tucker, 64 Cal.2d 15, 48 Cal.Rptr. 697, 409 P.2d 921. (68 Cal.2d at p. 765, text and fn. 3, 69 Cal.Rptr. 93, 441 P.2d 933.) We have studied these opinions and, with all due respect to the Caffey court, we do not find the cited cases germane. In all three cases the California Supreme Court remanded the matter to the sentencing superior courts for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in the opinion. There was no transfer except in the broadest sense of that term and there was certainly no transfer between courts of coordinate jurisdiction. Moreover, article VI, section 5 of the California Constitution then provided as Penal Code, section 1508 now provides, that a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Supreme Court or a judge thereof may be made returnable before the issuing judge or his court, before any Court of Appeal or any justice thereof or before any superior court or judge thereof. The only other California authority relied on by the Caffey court was Code of Civil Procedure, section 397, subdivision 1, a change of venue statute.⁵ Indeed, the Caffey court referred to the transfer of the habeas corpus petition as a venue change. (68 Cal.2d at p. 765, fn. 3, 69 Cal.Rptr. 93, 441 P.2d 933.)

Applying the Caffey technique to the question confronting us, we observe Code of Civil Procedure, section 396 which provides in pertinent part: ‘If an action or proceeding is commenced in a court which lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, . . . if there is a court of this state which has such jurisdiction, the action or proceeding shall not be dismissed . . . but shall, on the application of either party, or on the court's own motion, be transferred to a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter . . ..’

As real party Cisneros indicates, recognition of the power of a superior court lacking territorial jurisdiction to transfer a habeas corpus proceeding to the superior court having territorial jurisdiction appears to be a sensible procedure. We perceive only two complications that would perhaps suggest a contrary rule, and one of those can be avoided by making the exercise of the power to transfer discretionary with the transferring court. The first complication is that, when the habeas corpus petitioner is transferred from one penal institution to another, his immediate custodian will change, and, accordingly, the information contained in item 1 of the Form for Petitions for Release from or Modification of Custody approved by the Judicial Council of California (see Cal.Rules of Court, rule 56.5; approved form CR–100.0) [name of person or persons having custody] will be incorrect. This problem could be avoided by requiring the habeas corpus petitioner in state prison to name as the person having his custody the Director of Corrections. Failing that, it would seem to impose no great burden on the petitioner or the court to amend that portion of the petition to name the new immediate custodian.

The second complication we can foresee is that in some cases the transfer of the habeas corpus petitioner to a different penal institution will render the petition for habeas corpus moot. A typical example of such case is the Ramirez petition for habeas corpus. Ramirez' complaint was that he had been denied access to lawbooks and other legal materials while in confinement at the segregation unit at Chino. His transfer to Soledad rendered moot his complaint about the facilities at the California Institution for Men at Chino.

The possibility that the transfer of the habeas corpus petitioner will render the petition for habeas corpus moot indicates that the transfer of the petition for habeas corpus by the court in which it was filed to the court having territorial jurisdiction should not be mandatory. Upon learning that the habeas corpus petitioner has been transferred to a penal institution outside the county, the superior court in which the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed should determine whether the petition is thereby rendered moot. If so, the court in which the petition was filed should dismiss the petition on that basis. Additionally, if the superior court in which the petition for habeas corpus is filed determines that the petition does not state facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the court should deny the petition either on that ground or on the ground that the court lacks territorial jurisdiction or both. If the court in which the petition for habeas corpus is filed determines that a prima facie case for relief has been stated and that the matter has not been mooted by the transfer of petitioner to a penal institution outside the county, the petition should be transferred to the superior court having territorial jurisdiction. If the court finds that no prima facie case for relief has been made out or that the petition has been rendered moot by the transfer of the petitioner, the petition should be either denied or dismissed as appears appropriate.

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue to the San Bernardino Superior Court commanding that court to vacate its orders denying petitioner's motions to quash the orders to show cause issued by the court on April 11, 1975, in In re Ramirez, Superior Court No. 164405; In re Hedberg, Superior Court No. 163865; and In re Cisneros, Superior Court No. 164886 and to render an order in each of said cases granting petitioner's motion to quash the order to show cause and further commanding said court to render its orders transferring, denying or dismissing the petition for habeas corpus in each case consistent with the views herein expressed.

FOOTNOTES

1.  The content of Penal Code, section 1508, was ultimately derived from former California Constitution, article VI, sections 4, 4b and 5.

2.  For a discussion of the development of the order to show cause procedure see In re Hochberg, 2 Cal.3d 870, 873–874, fn. 2, 87 Cal.Rptr. 681, 471 P.2d 1.

3.  It is important to note that there is not the slightest indication in the record before us that real parties in interest were transferred to avoid the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction by the San Bernardino Superior Court. Each real party in interest was transferred in the normal course of penal administration. Nor is it contended that any transfer of a habeas corpus petitioner after the superior court has assumed jurisdiction could serve to defeat the jurisdiction of the court from which habeas corpus was sought.

4.  Real parties do not contest the motion-to-quash procedure employed by petitioner Griggs, and the facts are not in dispute. Should the problem arise in the future, however, the former custodian should, in connection with his motion to quash, file a return in compliance with Penal Code, section 1480, subdivision 4, which provides: ‘If the person upon whom the writ is served had the party in his power or custody, or under his restraint, at any time prior or subsequent to the date of the writ of habeas corpus, but has transferred such custody or restraint to another, the return must state particularly to whom, at what time and place, for what cause, and by what authority such transfer took place.

5.  Code of Civil Procedure, section 397 reads: ‘The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following cases:‘1. When the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court; . . ..’

KAUFMAN, Associate Justice.

GARDNER, P. J., and KERRIGAN, J., concur.