IN RE: Charles Denton WATSON on Habeas Corpus. (1976)

INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal by D. J. McCarthy, Superintendent of California Men's Colony at San Luis Obispo, from a superior court order granting respoondent Charles Denton Watson's petitio requesting 285 days credit pursuant to Penal Code section 2900.5 for the time he was incarcerated in Texas fighting his extradition to Calilfornia to face trial for what are commonly known as the TATE-LaBIANCA murders.

This is a case of first impression which involves a substantial and significant question of law.

BACKGROUND OF EVENTS IN CHRONOLOGLCAL ORDER

During the nights of August 9, 1969, and August 10, 1969, the TATE-LaBIANCA murders were committed.

On November 30, 1969, Charles Dention Watson (hereinafter Watson) was arrested in Collin County, McKinney, Texas, as part of the California TATE-LaBIANCA murder investigation. The following day the Los Angeles Police Department obtained a warrant for Watson's arrest for murder, a violation of California Penal Code section 187. The sheriff's office in McKinney was informed of this arrest warrant and of the plans for California agents to arrive the same day to secure Watson's return to California. However, Watson did not voluntarily return to California with the agents but fought extradition.

On December 8, 1969, the California Grand Jury returned an indictment against Watson, along with Charles Manson, Patricia Krenwinkel, Susan Atkins and Linda Kasabian, for the murders of Abigail Folger (Count I); Wojiciech Frykowski (Count II); Steven Parent (Count III); Sharon Polanski (Count IV); Thomas Sebring (Count V) on August 9, 1969, and the murders of Leno LaBiance (Count VI) and Rosemary LaBianca (Count VII) on August 10, 1969, in violation of Penal Code section 187 and for conspiracy to commit the murders alleged in Counts I through VII in violation of section 182.5 of the Penal Code. (See fn. 7, infra.) On the same day the superior court in California issued a bench warrant for Watson's arrest.

On December 12, 1969, the Lieutenant Governor of the State of California, then the Acting Governor, demanded that Watson, a fugitive from justice, be delivered to California agents authorized to return him to California to be dealt with according to law.

On January 5, 1970, the extradition hearing was held and the next day Watson's extradition was granted by the Governor of Texas, who issued his warrant commanding Watson's arrest and his delivery to California agents for his ultimate return to California.

On January 14, 1970, Watson sought to invalidate the Governor's extradition order in a habeas corpus proceeding filed in the 59th District Court of Collin County, Texas. Two days later, he (Watson) requested and was granted a 30-day continuance.

On February 16, 1970, the petition was denied in a written opinion and the extradition order upheld by the Texas court. Watson appealed that decision to the Texas State Court of Criminal Appeals in Austin, Texas.

On May 6, 1970, the Texas state appellate court in Austin affirmed the order remanding Watson to custody for extradition and he made a motion for a rehearing.

On June 24, 1970, Watson's motion for rehearing was overruled without a written opinion and he then applied to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division, for a writ of habeas corpus.

On July 1, 1970, the order denying the petition was signed and entered and Watson then appealed to the United States District Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

On August 31, 1970, the United States District Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit), in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the decision of the District Court.

On September 11, 1970, Watson was extradited from the State of Texas to California and placed under arrest. The next day (September 12, 1970) he was brought before the Los Angeles County Superior Court on the bench warrant where he later pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to the TATE-LaBIANCA murders.

On October 12, 1971, following the guilt phase of the trial (which commenced on August 2, 1971), the jury found Watson guilty of murder in the first degree as to each of the first seven counts (Counts I through VII) and of the conspiracy to commit murder as to Count VIII.

On October 19, 1971, the jury, following the sanity phase of the trial, found Watson sane at the time he committed the murders.

On October 21, 1971, following the penalty phase, the jury fixed the penalty as death as to each of the eight counts.

On November 11, 1971, the trial court denied Watson's motion for a new trial and reduction of charge and sentence and sentenced Watson to death.

On November 15, 1971, Watson filed a notice of appeal.

On February 18, 1972, the California Supreme Court in People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880, held the death penalty was unconstitutional as being cruel or unusual punishment (Justice McComb dissenting).¹

On March 4, 1972, Penal Code section 2900.5 (hereinafter section 2900.5), enacted by the California Legislature in 1971, became effective.

Section 2900.5, in pertinent part, provides:

‘(a) In all feolony convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody in any city, county, or city and county jail, all daus of custody of the defendant from the date of arrest to the date on which the serving of the sentence imposed commences, . . ., shall be credited upon his sentence, . . .

‘(b) For the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to charges arising from the same criminal act or acts for which the defendant has been convicted.

‘(c) This section shall be applicable only to those persons who are delivered into the custody of the Director of Correctons on or after the effective date of this section.'2

On August 6, 1973, the superior court vacated Watson's death sentence and sentenced him ‘. . . to State Prison for life, in each count, and that the sentences in Counts 2 through 8 inclusive are merged into and shall run CONCURRENTLY with the sentence imposed in Count 1. The defendant is allowed no credit for time served pursuant to Section 2900.5 Penal Code. . . .’ (Emphasis added.)

On May 23, 1974, the California Supreme Court in In re Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542, 114 Cal.Rptr. 97, 522 P.2d 657 (Justices Clark and McComb dissenting) held that the Legislature improperly provided in section 2900.5, subdivision (c), that the credit for prior custody was to operate prospectively only from its effective date of March 4, 1972, and held the credit provision was also to be applied retroactively.³

On October 15, 1974, the California Men's Colony denied Watson's request for presentence jail time credit for the 285 days he was confined in Texas fighting extradition. Watson had relied on section 2900.5 and In re Kapperman, supra, as authority for the credit and the California Men's Colony concluded they did not apply to his situation.

On October 29, 1974, Watson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County requesting 285 days credit for the time he spent in Texas jail which was opposed by appellant.

On January 21, 1976, Watson's petition for 285 days presentence jail time in Texas custody was granted by the superior court.

This appeal followed.

ISSUE

The sole issue on appeal is whether or not section 2900.5 entitles a defendant in a criminal case to credit on a California State Prison sentence for the time he was in custody in another state while fighting extradition to California to face the charges upon which he was ultimately convicted and for which he was sentenced to state prison in California.

Appellant Men's Colony contends the superior court improperly granted Watson credit for the time (285 days) he was in Texas fighting extradition to California arguing that section 2900.5 does not apply because during that period of time Watson was a ‘fugitive from justice’ and the Legislature did not intend that section 2900.5 benefit fugitives from justice; that the denial of credit would not deprive Watson of any constitutionally guaranteed right; and that Watson by resisting extradition eluded the custody of California, lengthened his stay in another jurisdiction and willfully delayed his trial.

Watson urges he is entitled to the credit for the same reasons the superior court granted his petition for the credit. The superior court reasoned that the granting of the 285 day credit was proper pursuant to section 2900.5 in that Watson's custody in Texas was reasonably attributable to the crime for which he was ultimately convicted in California citing the case of In re Miller (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1049, 116 Cal.Rptr. 624, and Watson should not be divested of his presentence credit time for having exercised his constitutionally sanctioned right to challenge his extradition to California.

DISCUSSION

We summarily reject the superior court's reasoning that Watson would be ‘penalized’ for exercising his constitutionally sanctioned right to resist extradition. We hold to deny Watson credit for the time he was in custody in Texas fighting extradition to California would not deprive him of any right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. (See Pernell v. Rose (6 Cir. 1973) 486 F.2d 301, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985, 94 S.Ct. 1581, 39 L.Ed.2d 882.)⁴ His stay in Texas jails was willfully self-induced by his efforts to completely evade arrest and prosecution in California to answer for the multiple TATE-LaBIANCA murders of which he was ultimately convicted.

Furthermore, the superior court's reliance on In re Miller, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d 1046, 116 Cal.Rptr. 624, is misplaced since that case did not address the issue at bench. There, the court merely found that ‘[t]he time spent by Miller in the El Paso jail in the wholly unrelated federal proceeding was not attributable in any way to the Los Angeles robbery charge. . . .’ and held section 2900.5 did not extend credit for the 23 days served in Texas and claimed by Miller.

Miller was in custody of the federal authorities in an El Paso, Texas, jail on an assault charge. Miller did not resist extradition to California to face a California robbery charge. Here, Watson did not voluntarily return to California to face the TATE-LaBIANCA murder charges but for 285 days strenuously attempted to avoid extradition.

The only case to date granting credit under section 2900.5 for time spent out-of-state is In re Jordan (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 155, 123 Cal.Rptr. 268. However, it is clearly distinguishable in that the court did not discuss the out-of-state aspect of the case, but merely the fact that that petitioner was in federal custody for the same offense for which he was later convicted in the state court. Petitioner Jordan received credit for the time he had spent in a federal medical center located in Missouri since he had been deprived of his liberty because of his incompetency which was ‘beyond his control.’ (Id., p. 158, 123 Cal.Rptr. 268.) Here, in contrast, Watson himself was responsible for his being out-of-state and a fugitive from justice, rendering In re Jordan inapplicable.

We therefore focus on section 2900.5, subdivisions (a) and (b), in order to ascertain, applying well recognized rules of statutory construction, whether or not the Legislature intended that a convicted felon serving time in a California state prison be given credit toward his prison sentence for the time he spent in an out-of-state jail while he fought extradition to California to face prosecution for the charges upon which he was ultimately convicted and sentenced in California.

Section 2900.5 speaks in terms of giving credit for time ‘in custody in any city, county, or city and county jail . . . where the custody to be credited is attributable to charges arising from the same criminal act or acts for which the defendant has been convicted.’

‘[I]f possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose. [Citation.] Such purpose will not be sacrificed to a literal construction of any part of the act. . . .’ (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672, 676; see also, Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224; Cossack v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 726, 732–733, 114 Cal.Rptr. 460, 523 P.2d 260; Eckl v. Davis (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 831, 848–849, 124 Cal.Rptr. 685; People v. Taylor (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 513, 531, 120 Cal.Rptr. 762; Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 95, 105–106, 102 Cal.Rptr. 692; Beirut Universal Bank v. Superior Court (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 832, 841–842, 74 Cal.Rptr. 333.)

Applying the above rule to the instant case, a literal construction of the words ‘in custody in any . . . jail’ would encompass the world at large including, as here, the time Watson spent in an out-of-state (Texas) jail while fighting extradition to California. On the other hand if the Legislature did not intent to include out-of-state time ‘in custody’ by ‘fugitives from justice’ fighting extradition, that purpose will not be sacrificed to the literal construction described above. (See also Alford v. Pierno (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 688, 104 Cal.Rptr. 110.)

In our quest to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of section 2900.5 it ‘[s]hould be interpreted so as to produce a result that is reasonable. (Ivens v. Simon (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 177, 181, 27 Cal.Rptr. 801.) If two constructions are possible, that which leads to the more reasonable result should be adopted. (In re Kernan (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 488, 491, 51 Cal.Rptr. 515.)’ (Alford v. Pierno, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at p. 688, 104 Cal.Rptr. at p. 114.)

We ‘[m]ust look to the context of the law, and where uncertainty exists, consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation, (Ivens v. Simon, supra, 212 Cal.App.2d 177, 181, 27 Cal.Rptr. 801)’ and ‘take into account matters such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction. (Estate of Jacobs (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 152, 155, 142 P.2d 454.)’ (Alford v. Pierno, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at p. 688, 104 Cal.Rptr. at p. 114; see also People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248, 273, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481.)

Moreover, we must give consideration to other statutes in pari materia (People v. Navarro, supra, 7 Cal.3d at 273, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481) and “. . . to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.' . . .' (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal., supra, 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672, 675; People v. Taylor, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d 513, 531, 120 Cal.Rptr. 762.)

Generally speaking section 2900.5 pertains to total time a convicted felon must serve in state prison. We must, therefore, necessarily examine Penal Code section 3064 (hereinafter section 3064) which also pertains to and is a part of that same subject matter.

Section 3064 provides:

‘From and after the suspension or revocation of the parole of any prisoner and until his return to custody he shall be deemed an escape and fugitive from justice and no part of the time during which he is an escape and fugitive from justice shall be part of his term.’ (Added by Stats. 1941, c. 106, p. 1114, § 15.) (Emphasis added.)

In the case of In re Pearce (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 399, 400–402, 115 Cal.Rptr. 222, the court referring to section 3064 found that a California state prisoner who had spent 15 months in an Alabama jail due to his suspended parole was not entitled to credit for those 15 months during which he resisted extradition because ‘[d]uring the pendency of Pearce's extradition proceedings of California had neither his custody nor power to return him to custody . . .’ (Id., p. 401, 115 Cal.Rptr. at p. 224.) The court Therefore held that Pearce was an ‘escapee and fugitive’ and ‘[n]ot entitled to credit on [the] California prison terms for the time served in Alabama's jails while resisting extradition. . . .’ (Id., p. 402, 115 Cal.Rptr. at p. 224.)

Thus, in the case of In re Pearce, supra, it was because petitioner Pearce was an ‘escapee and fugitive’ that he was not entitled to credit for that time. (Id., pp. 401–402, 115 Cal.Rptr. 222; Pen.Code, § 3064.)

Here, by a parity of reasoning if Watson, while in Texas fighting extradition to California, was a ‘fugitive from justice’, section 2900.5 must be construed in light of section 3064 in such a manner as to ‘harmonize’ and thus give effect to the legislative intent and purpose of both section 2900.5 and section 3064 as they relate to fugitives from justice.

We conclude that Watson at all times while in custody in Texas fighting extradition was a ‘fugitive from justice.'⁵

The record is clear that Watson was in California at the time of the TATE-LaBIANCA murders and left California and went to Texas. From the date Watson was arrested in Texas on November 30, 1969, until returned to California on September 11, 1970, he had knowledge he was wanted in connection with the TATE-LaBIANCA murders. The purpose of his strenuous resistance to extradition was to avoid arrest and prosecution for the murders in California of which he was ultimately convicted. Watson, therefore, during the period he was in custody in Texas was a fugitive from California justice.

Having concluded that Watson was a fugitive from justice while in custody in Texas, we further conclude that the California Legislature did not intend that ‘fugitive from justice’ benefit from section 2900.5. By analogy to the policy behind section 3064 which denies fugitive parolees credit on their terms, the granting of presentence credit to fugitives would act to encourage flight from the jurisdiction because there would be nothing to lose by fleeing and if apprehended in another state continue to avoid answering to the charges by resisting extradition.⁶

Hypothetically speaking, if Watson had escaped from prison after conviction and sentencing and fled to Texas and for 285 days resisted extradition to California to be returned to prison, he would not be entitled to the 285 days credit on his prison term as specifically provided by the Legislature in section 3064 and as construed by In re Pearce, supra.

A fortiori, it does not appear reasonable that the Legislature intended that section 2900.5 should operate to afford him (Watson) credit merely because his flight from California justice and attempts to avoid extradition in Texas occurred prior to his prosecution, conviction and sentencing. In either event he would be a fugitive from justice and it is logical that his total prison term should be undiminished by the time he expended in out-of-state custody seeking to avoid answering for his crimes in California.

Moreover, by a parity of reasoning with section 3064 and In re Pearce, supra, while Watson was incarcerated in Texas, he was not in the custody of California authorities nor did California authorities have the power to return him to California. Since Watson was not ‘in custody’ as that term was interpreted in the section 3064 situation and in In re Pearce, supra, we conclude the same interpretation in the context of section 2900.5 is reasonable.

Furthermore, in a real sense, the time Watson was in custody in Texas resisting extradition to California was not ‘attributable to charges arising from’ the TATE-LaBIANCE murders within the meaning of section 2900.5.

‘The right of a state [here California] to demand the extradition . . . by another state [here Texas] of a person [here Watson] who has committed an offense against its laws and has thereafter fled to the other state is founded on, and controlled by, the Constitution of the United States and effectuating federal statutes . . .’ (35 C.J.S. Extradition § 2, p. 381; see also In re Tenner (1942) 20 Cal.2d 670, 128 P.2d 338.) Such ‘Proceedings for interstate extradition . . . are sui generis and constitute an executive function. . . .’ (35 C.J.S. Extradition § 2, p. 381) and ‘The motive, purpose, or reason which induced the departure of the accused person from the demanding state is immaterial . . .’ (35 C.J.S. Extradition § 10 p. 394; In re Murdock (1936) 5 Cal.2d 644, 55 P.2d 843.)

Extradition proceedings do not go into the guilt or innocence of the fugitive. (In re Harper (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 446, 62 P.2d 390.) ‘[T]he authorities go no further than to hold that inquiry may be made into the question of fact as to whether the accused was within the territory of the state when he is alleged to have committed the offense charged against him. . . .’ (In re Thurber (1918) 37 Cal.App. 571, 572, 174 P. 112.)

Here, Watson could have waived extradition and avoided the 285 days of custody in Texas. The Texas custody was ‘attributable’ to Watson's own actions in fighting ‘extradition’ which is controlled by the United States Constitution and federal statutes and not California Penal Code sections 187 and 182.5, violation of which he was ultimately convicted and sentenced to state prison.

CONCLUSION

We conclude for the reasons above stated that the Legislature did not intend the credit benefits of section 2900.5 to apply to time served in custody by fugitives from justice while out-of-state fighting extradition to California. We therefore hold the court below erred in granting Watson's petition for credit of 285 days he was in custody in the State of Texas fighting extradition to California to face trial for the TATE-LaBIANCA murders for which he was ultimately convicted and sentenced to state prison.

DISPOSITION

The judgment (order granting 285 days credit for time in Texas custody) is reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior court with orders for the trial court to vacate its order granting 285 days credit and enter an order denying Watson's petition.⁷

I dissent. In my view, neither a sense of outrage at the gravity of Watson's crime nor a feeling of indignation concerning our Supreme Court's invalidation of the death penalty in Anderson justifies a court in rewriting Penal Code section 2900.5.

The pertinent statute requires that a defendant be credited with prejudgment time spent in incarceration where: (1) he spends the time in ‘any city, county, or city and county jail’ (subd. (a)); and (2) ‘the custody . . . is attributable to charges arising from the same criminal act or acts for which the defendant has been convicted’ (subd. (b)). The section applies although the place of incarceration is not an institution controlled by the State of California or one of its political subdivisions. (In re Jordan (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 155, 123 Cal.Rptr. 268.)

Here Watson was incarcerated in a Texas institution for 285 days and the incarceration was directly attributable to charges arising from the same criminal acts which resulted in his conviction. The facts unequivocally meet the test of the statute. I do not believe that under the guise of ‘reasonableness' of construction of plain language we are permitted to rewrite what the Legislature has prescribed. What is ‘reasonable’ to the John Birch Society is not necessarily what is ‘reasonable’ to the A.C.L.U. What is ‘reasonable’ to one or the other is by no means necessarily ‘reasonable’ in the abstract, to the mainstream, or to the enacting Legislature.

I therefore would affirm the order of the superior court, while leaving to the Legislature consideration of the wisdom of possible modification of Penal Code section 2900.5 to cover the situation of persons incarcerated while resisting extradition.

FOOTNOTES

1.  The California Supreme Court's Anderson decision abolished the death penalty on the grounds that punishment must be exercised within the limits of the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”; that public acceptance is relevant but not controlling; that legislative acts were not controlling indices of contemporary civilized standards of decency; that it was dehumanizing to the defendant to have the sentence of death over his head during the lengthy judicial and administrative procedures; and that the death penalty is neither swift nor certain.In Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, the majority of United States Supreme Court Justices (5 to 4) held that capital punishment under the statutes in the cases before the court constituted cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. The views were widely fragmented. Of the five judge majority—three (Justices Douglas, Stewart and White) based their decision on what they considered to be the episodic and capricious applications of capital punishment because of the discretion allowed to juries, a theory which apparently recognized capital punishment constitutionally permissible if mandated by legislation for certain cases; two of the majority's (Justices Brennan and Marshall) basic position was that capital punishment was degrading, contrary to the moral sentiment of our day which the conscience of the nation should not tolerate. The four judges who dissented (Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist) were of the view there was nothing either in the language of the Eighth Amendment or history or precedent to support the view that the Legislature cannot impose capital punishment and that whatever might be the moral predilections of the judges on this question it was not their business to convert them into constitutional imperatives.Since then many states have enacted new capital punishment statutes including California in an effort to meet what they perceive as the majority's objections to such statutes. Cases under the new death penalty statutes are now reaching the United States Supreme Court for decision.Following the Anderson and Furman decisions the death penalty was restored in California, having been approved 52 to 12 in the Assembly, 27 to 12 in the Senate, and by a 2 to 1 vote by Californians at the polls.California's new ‘Death Penalty Bill’ became effective January 1, 1974. It amends present Penal Code sections 190, 209, 219 and 4500. It replaces the present section 190.1 and adds new sections 190.1, 190.2, 190.3 and 190.5 to the Penal Code.

2.  Section 2900.5 was enacted to modify section 2900, which provides that in the case of felonies, the term of imprisonment begins ‘to run only upon the actual delivery of the defendant into the custody of the Director of Corrections.’ Before section 2900.5 was enacted, a person could be convicted, sentenced and awaiting transportation to the prison and still only be serving ‘dead time.’ Section 2900.5 ended ‘dead time’ by crediting presentence time towards a prisoner's ultimate sentence. (People v. Williams (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 720, 723, 125 Cal.Rptr. 901.)

3.  The California Supreme Court in In re Kapperman, supra, held Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (c), invalid under California Constitution, article I, sections 11, 21, requiring uniform operation of laws and proscribing special privileges, and under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, 14th Amendment. However, it did not invalidate the entire statute but only subdivision (c) resulting in extending the statutory benefits retroactively to include California's entire prison population.

4.  In Pernell v. Rose, supra, prison Warden Rose had refused to give credit for time Pernell spent in custody in Ohio while awaiting extradition prior to trial in Tennessee on a sentence imposed on Pernell in a Tennessee court following his conviction for second degree murder. After exhausting his state remedies in Tennessee Pernell sought relief by way of habeas corpus in the United States District Court which held that the refusal of Tennessee to give credit on a subsequent sentence imposed by a jury in a Tennessee court for time spent in Ohio while awaiting extradition prior to trial in Tennessee did not deprive petitioner of any right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Pernell appealed to the United States Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 18, 1974.

5.  A ‘fugitive’ has been defined as ‘One who flees; always used in law with the implication of a flight, evasion, or escape from some duty or penalty or from the consequences of a misdeed.’ (Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968) p. 800.)A ‘fugitive from justice’ has been defined as ‘A person who, having committed a crime, flees from jurisdiction of court where crime was committed or departs from his usual place of abode and conceals himself within the district. [Citations.] [¶] To be regarded as a ‘fugitive from justice,’ it is not necessary that one shall have left the state for the very purpose of avoiding prosecution; it being sufficient that, having committed there an act constituting a crime, he afterwards has departed from its jurisdiction, and when sought to be prosecuted is found in another state. [Citations.]' (Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968) p. 800.)A ‘fugitive from justice’ is defined in Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3rd rev., vol. 2, 1914) p. 1321, as ‘One who, having committed a crime, flees from the jurisdiction within which it was committed, to escape punishment.’In Estate of Scott (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 590, 310 P.2d 46 (involving L. Ewing Scott who was convicted of murdering his wife on circumstantial evndence, her body never having been found), the court said at page 592, 310 P.2d at page 48: ‘One who, with knowledge that he is being sought pursuant to court process in a criminal action, absents himself or flees is a fugitive from justice. (Tobin v. Casaus, 128 Cal.App.2d 588, 592, 275 P.2d 792, 49 A.L.R.2d 1419.) The fact that he may be innocent does not change his fugitive status. (In re Thurber, 37 Cal.App. 571, 572, 174 P. 112.)’ (See also 21 Cal.Jur.2d Extradition, §§ 16, 17, 18.)

6.  Another example of the policy that one should not benefit from being a fugitive from justice can be found in People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 460, 105 Cal.Rptr. 305, 503 P.2d 1313. In Vickers, the California Supreme Court held that the procedures set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, are inapplicable to the absconding parolee or probationer while he remains at liberty and unavailable to the authorities because one who flees should not profit by his wrongdoing. (People v. Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 460, 105 Cal.Rptr. 305, 503 P.2d 1313; People v. Hawkins (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 958, 965–966, 119 Cal.Rptr. 54; People v. Ham (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 288, 294, 118 Cal.Rptr. 591; People v. Dale (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 191, 194, 112 Cal.Rptr. 93.)

7.  Here, Watson literally slaughtered seven (7) innocent human beings.The case of People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 132 Cal.Rptr. 265, in conjunction with the superior court file in the instant case, which we ordered up pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 12(a), substantially reflect the following:On the night of the TATE massacre (August 9, 1969) Watson went to the Tate residence with three female confederates armed with 3 knives and a hand gun.After he (Watson) had cut the telephone wires into the house the first victim, a young man driving a car, Steve Parent, happened upon the scene. Parent begged Watson not to use the gun saying: ‘Please don't hurt me. I won't say anything.’ Watson killed Parent by pumping 5 shots into his body.Watson then cut a screen, entered the house and let his female accomplices in through the door. The other four victims in the house, Sharon Tate, Abigail Folger, Jay Sebring and Wojiciech Frykowski, were awakened and rounded up. Watson said: ‘I am the devil here to do the devil's work.’Sebring said: ‘Can't you see she [Sharon Tate] is pregnant, let her sit down.’ Watson ordered all to lie down on their stomachs. Sebring did not follow the orders and Watson shot him once fatally and stabbed him in the back. Sebring had a total of 7 stab wounds and one fatal gunshot wound when found.Watson and his confederates then put a rope around the necks of Sharon Tate and Abigail Folger and strung the rope over a rafter in the room. Sharon Tate asked: ‘What are you going to do to us?’ Watson replied: ‘You are all going to die.’ They all pleaded for their lives.Victim Frykowski ran to the door ‘screaming bloody murder, yelling for his life, for somebody to come and help him.’ Watson hit him with the gun breaking it and stabbed him. When Frykowski was found, he had 51 stab wounds with 13 lacerations on his scalp apparently inflicted with a blunt instrument and 2 gunshot wounds.Sharon Tate pleaded for mercy and struggled saying to Watson: ‘Please let me go. All I want to do is have my baby.’ She was stabbed to death. Her body contained 16 stab wounds when found.Abigail Folger struggled until she was exhausted and then said: ‘I give up, take me.’ She was stabbed to death, suffering 28 stab wounds.On the night of the LaBIANCA butchery (August 10, 1969), Charles Manson went to the LaBianca residence with Watson and female confederates. Manson apparently went in the house and tied up the two victims, Rosemary LaBianca and Leno LaBianca, and then came out and sent Watson and the others in to kill their victims.Rosemary LaBianca was found with her hands tied with an electric cord and an electric cord was wound about her neck and there was a pillowcase over her head. She had been stabbed 41 times.Leno LaBianaca was found with his hands tied behind his back with a leather thong and a blood-soaked pillowcase covered his face. He had the tines of a carving fork fully imbedded in his stomach and a knife was protruding from his neck. He had been stabbed 13 times and there were 14 puncture wounds on his body apparently made by the tines of the carving fork.Watson was fairly tried and justly convicted by a jury of seven counts of murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder and was sentenced to death on each count. He escaped the death penalty by reason of the Anderson and Furman decisions. Having his sentence reduced from death to life imprisonment, his eight counts of life imprisonment were merged into a single life sentence which renders him eligible for consideration for parole after seven years (Pen.Code, § 3046), i. e. in 1978. He now seeks to further reduce his prison time by another 285 days pursuant to section 2900.5.Another cardinal rule of statutory construction is that statutes must be construed in a manner “‘[t]hat will lead to a wise policy rather than to mischief or absurdity.’ (45 Cal.Jur.2d 625–626.) . . .” (Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., supra, 26 Cal.App.3d 95, 105, 102 Cal.Rptr. 692, 698.) Here, under the specific facts of the case at bench, to grant Watson such credit pursuant to section 2900.5 would not only ignore the legislative intent but would be a legalistic absurdity and lead to an unwise policy.

HANSON, Associate Justice.

WOOD, P. J., concurs.