PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ (1975)

In his petition for rehearing, the Attorney General voices certain concerns, which suggest a misconception of a portion of the language of our opinion. We herewith clarify:

The thirty day requirement of section 1203.2a is triggered by actual confinement in prison for the later offense, not by mere sentence. Thus our opinion is not to be interpreted as suggesting that if a defendant is sentenced to prison on a second offense but released on bail pending appeal, the court which gave him probation on the first offense must commit him to prison within thirty days after acquiring knowledge of the second disposition or lose jurisdiction over him.

In the case at bench the probation officer's report filed in the first case states in part: ‘On May 16, 1974 the defendant appeared in Superior Court on this matter (the second offense), probation was denied, And he was committed to the California Department of Corrections.’ We interpret the italicized words to mean that defendant was actually physically confined in prison. If such were not the case, the probation report would and should contain such contrary information.

Rehearing is denied.

BY THE COURT: