STEINER LUMBER COMPANY OF SACRAMENTO INC v. Rancho Cordova Builders, Inc., a corporation, William M. Dacy and David M. Sapp, Defendants. (1963)

In our opinion, quoting from 3 Witkin California Procedure, page 2253, we stated (at page 865 of 216 A.C.A., page 279 of 31 Cal.Rptr.): ‘the appellate court is not bound by the trial judge's construction, even though it may be permissible and reasonable * * * and the appellate court will give the writing a different interpretation if this appears more reasonable.’

This statement is in conflict with that part of the opinion of our Supreme Court in Prickett v. Royal Ins. Co., Ltd., 56 Cal.2d 234, at page 237, 14 Cal.Rptr. 675, at page 677, 363 P.2d 907, at page 909, 86 A.L.R.2d 711, where the court (per White, J.) states:

‘An appellate court is not bound by a trial court's interpretation of an uncertain or ambiguous contractual term where the lower court's determination has been made without resort to extrinsic evidence. “[T]here is no issue of fact, and it is the duty of an appellate court to make the final determination court to make the final determination in accordance with the applicable principles of law.” Meyer v. State Board of Equalization, 42 Cal.2d 376, 381, 267 P.2d 257, quoting from Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352, 131 P.2d 825. ‘However, it is also the rule that where no extrinsic evidence has been introduced, the interpretation placed upon the contract by the trial court will be accepted by this court if such interpretation is reasonable, or if the interpretation of the trial court is one of two or more reasonable constructions of the instrument.’ Lundin v. Hallmark Productions, Inc., 161 Cal.App.2d 698, 701, 327 P.2d 166, 168.' (Emphasis supplied).

Our opinion should be and is modified by deletion of the phrase quoted above. However, as we have also held in our original opinion:

‘To this court, as stated above, the interpretation we have given the contract of guaranty is not only more reasonable, it is the only interpretation which gives meaning to the deliberate back-dating of the contract.’

We have not changed our opinion that the interpretation we have given the contract is the only one which can reasonably be given.

With the modification above noted, the petition for rehearing is denied.

PER CURIAM.