TRUMMER v. << (1963)

In this petition for habeas corpus petitioner principally challenges the constitutionality of Penal Code sections 6400–6555 (added by Stats.1961, ch. 850) relating to commitment and corrective treatment of narcotic addicts and the creation of the California Rehabilitation Center. That portion of the attack by petitioner's counsel which is not a diatribe against the Director of Corrections is aimed at section 6451 which provides that upon conviction of a crime in a superior court, if the judge ascertains that defendant is, or in imminent danger of becoming, addicted to the use of narcotics, the court shall adjourn the proceedings or suspend imposition of sentence, conduct a hearing and upon finding that defendant is addicted or in imminent danger of addiction commit him to the custody of the Director of Corrections for involuntary treatment.

The constitutional grounds urged by petitioner are that detention in state prisons and the treatment and rehabilitation for narcotic addiction as provided by these and following sections constitute cruel and inhuman punishment; that the terms of the act are unreasonable and arbitrary and deprive petitioner of due process and equal protection of the law. Petitioner cites and relies upon Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, which held unconstitutional that portion of section 11721 of the California Health and Safety Code which provides for punishment of a person addicted to narcotics (but NOT the portion punishing for use thereof).

Substantially the same arguments were urged and disposed of adversely to petitioner's contentions here in In re De La O recently decided by the California Supreme Court (February 14, 1963), reported in 59 A.C. 140, 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793, reference to which is made in lieu of repetition or summarization in this opinion.

Petitioner also contends (by amendment) that he is no longer an addict and therefore should be released from the conditions of probation. The petition contains a broad allegation that ‘petitioner is not presently and has not been for a long time a narcotic addict or addicted to the use of narcotics.’ These generalizations are answered in the return filed by the Attorney General.

Petitioner has moved that his return be stricken since it is not verified. It is not required to be. (Penal Code sec. 1480, par. 5.) The motion must be denied.

The return includes as exhibits copies of petitioner's record. This shows a long history of petitioner's addiction to narcotics brought on by dosages of medicines containing narcotics. He had been committed to De Witt State Hospital as an addict in April, 1961, and released July 7, 1961 ‘on indefinite leave.’ Within 40 days thereafter he altered a prescription for narcotics in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11715. He was apprehended, charged, and he pleaded guilty. The court, pursuant to Penal Code section 6451, suspended the criminal proceedings and, after a hearing, determined that petitioner was a narcotic addict. He was ordered to be committed to the Director of Corrections. First sent to the Medical Facility at Vacaville for two days, he was transferred for treatment to Chino State Institution for Men and later to the Correctional Institution at Tehachapi. On August 22, 1962, he was released on parole and he has been on parole ever since.

The record shows that petitioner has been cooperative and has responded well to the conditions of the parole, which include periodical submission to Nalline tests. He has been aided by an understanding wife, relatives and friends. He is gainfully employed. His physical condition has improved. So far as one may judge from the documentary record, and as of the date of latest reports contained therein, petitioner's case history would seem eloquently to argue the merits of the plan of rehabilitation encompassed by the code.

No evidentiary matter is submitted on behalf of petitioner, contradicting or questioning any of the foregoing. For factual contentions he relies solely upon the broad generalization stated above. These are insufficient, under the circumstances described, to justify the issuance of the writ. (In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 209 P.2d 793.)

Penal Code section 6520 provides a minimum period of probation of three years for narcotic addicts. The Director of Corrections, therefore, could not release petitioner from probation should he wish to do so.

Emphasized in studies of the problem of rehabilitation of narcotic addicts has been the demonstrable fact that there is no known immediate cure; that abstinence over a considerable period of time is all important. The court in In re De La O discusses the fixing of minimum periods of control (p. 152 of 59 A.C., p. 497 of 28 Cal.Rptr., p. 801 of 378 P.2d) and says:

‘* * * Once it is conceded that some minimum period of confinement of the narcotics addict is constitutionally permissible, the precise length of that period is largely a matter for the reasonable judgment of the Legislature.’

Although this statement is made in connection with minimum periods of confinement, the reasoning equally applies to the question of the power to fix by statute a minimum period of probation.

No other contentions made by petitioner require comment.

The motion to strike the return is denied; the order to show cause and staying further proceedings is discharged; and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

PIERCE, Presiding Justice.

SCHOTTKY and FRIEDMAN, JJ., concur.