PEOPLE v. YEAGER (1960)

This is an appeal from the order granting probation made after appellant had been found guilty of the crime of robbery. At the time the crime was committed appellant was 16 years of age and accordingly was certified to the juvenile court pursuant to the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code. At a hearing before the superior court sitting as a juvenile court to determine whether appellant was a fit subject for consideration under the Juvenile Court Law the following was shown in evidence: On July 4, 1959, appellant, who resides in Marin County, drove to the resort area in Lake County with five other boys and there attended a dance. They had a quantity of beer with them which they drank. While at the dance they stole hub caps from parked automobiles. Appellant and two of his companions left the dance, intending to look at some cabins, but as they drove away they noticed a pedestrian. They stopped and forced him into the car and made him surrender his wallet, from which one of the boys took currency amounting to approximately $90. At this point appellant urged that the money be given back as to retain it would be to commit a felony. This the others refused to do. Then the boys stopped the car and proceeded to administer a vicious beating to their victim whom they left on the road. Before leaving the scene they returned about half of the man's money. Appellant received $8 of the balance.

Concerning his past conduct appellant testified that he had never been arrested previously, although on two occasions he had been questioned by the police. The first incident arose when he was a freshman in high school. Another boy was taking care of a house for its owner. This boy called him up one night, telling him to come over to the house, and they would get the house open; that the owner had a nice Thunderbird car and a nice big bar. Appellant went to the house and he and the other boy took out the Thunderbird and drove it for about one or two hours, after which they returned to the house and drank beer in a fairly large amount. While they were there they engaged in a tussle, during which they went through a plate glass window. Appellant talked to the police about the matter, but no record was made. The second occasion for questioning by the police arose when appellant threw some water balloons at a car, the occupants of which he knew. Appellant further testified he would be a senior in high school the following year, that he had maintained in high school an A minus average, that he intended to study electronic engineering, that he had had no disciplinary problems in school, that he had commenced drinking four or five months previously, although he didn't really care for it. Finally, he said he could not account for his behavior during the commission of the crime for which he was accused, except that he just went out of his head. Appellant's father testified that he considered his son a very responsible boy; that though he worked while going to school, yet he maintained his high grade average; that he had never presented any disciplinary problems to his parents and that he thought his son would stop drinking if he gave his definite word that he would. No further evidence was taken, no report had been made by the probation officer who had, after certification by the justice court, filed the statutorily required petition to have appellant made a ward of the juvenile court. There was at the time of the hearing no probation report available for the court. Appellant was summarily certified back to the justice court where criminal proceedings continued, with the result that he was bound over to the superior court for trial. On his plea of not guilty he was tried to the court sitting without a jury and convicted. Probation was granted and this appeal was taken.

It is the settled policy of the state that proceeded against in the criminal courts proceeded against in the criminal courts until it shall first have been determined by the juvenile court that he is not a fit subject for consideration under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Law. Whatever his crime may have been and however it may have been committed, before the law permits him to be proceeded against further, once it appears that he is under 18 years of age, the criminal proceedings must be suspended, the minor must be certified to the juvenile court and that court, sitting in separate and special session, must determine that he is not a fit subject under the Juvenile Court Law. Until this has been done no further proceeding can be taken in the court from which he was certified or in any criminal court.

It is statutorily required that when the minor is certified to the juvenile court the probation officer of the county must file a petition to have him declared a ward of that court and from the filing of that petition the matter proceeds in the juvenile court as though it had originally been brought there without the beginning of criminal proceedings. The statute requires that the probation officer make a report touching the issue of the minor's suitability for consideration under the Juvenile Court Law. The issues presented for determination in the juvenile court upon such a proceeding clearly contemplate that a thorough investigation shall be made of the youth, his past conduct, his home surroundings and the ability of the parents to control him under the wardship of the court. Section 834 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requires that the court make special findings of fact upon the issue of whether or not the minor is a fit subject for consideration under the Juvenile Court Law and further provides that the findings are to be made ‘after consideration of the report of the probation officer, the prior record of the minor, his character, the type of offense, and such other factors as the court deems relevant’. The juvenile court in this case made no findings at all. Nor did the court make any statement for the record, orally or in writing, that can be considered as a compliance with the requirements of said section 834 that the court ‘make a special finding of fact’ on the issue of the minor's fitness for juvenile court action.

As early as 1930, in the case of In re Edwards, 208 Cal. 725, 731–732, 284 P. 916, 919 in construing Section 9b of the Juvenile Court Act, as the section then stood, which required that before a minor could be taken from the custody of his parents without their consent the court must find them to be incapable of providing proper maintenance, training and education for the minor, the Supreme Court said:

‘An examination of the orders of the juvenile court fails to disclose any finding of said court which brings said minor or his parents within the provisions of this section of the act. Without such a finding the court has no jurisdiction to take a minor who has been made a ward of the court from the custody of its parents. In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 331, 228 P. 467. * * *

‘The only semblance of any finding conforming to the requirements of section 9b of said act is to be found in the order of September 11, 1929, in the form of a recital in the following words, ‘It further appearing to the court that said minor child has no parent or guardian actually exercising proper parental control over it and that such child is in need of such control.’ Assuming that a statement in an order in the form of a recital is sufficient as a finding of the fact recited therein, still we think this so-called finding is insufficient to meet the requirements of section 9b of the act.'

Although in succeeding cases the appellate courts have liberally construed the requirement for findings, appearing in the juvenile court law, the language of section 834 of the code above recited indicated that the Legislature has not intended that criminal proceedings against a minor, once suspended, can be resumed unless the required findings are made and made a matter of record. The requirement is that the court shall make ‘a special finding of fact on this issue.’ The plain statutory mandate must be complied with. The order of remand here under review, unsupported as it was by any findings whatever, could not revest in the criminal courts power to proceed on the complaint or the information charging appellant with robbery.

The order appealed from is reversed. All proceedings taken in the criminal courts from and after the initial certification of appellant to the juvenile court by the justice court are set aside and it is ordered that the juvenile court proceed anew to ascertain whether or not appellant is a fit subject for consideration under the juvenile court law.

VAN DYKE, Presiding Justice.

SCHOTTKY and PEEK, JJ., concur.