PEOPLE SKELLY v. CITY OF GLENDALE (1952)

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant holding valid proceedings annexing certain districts in the Crescenta Valley to the corporate city of Glendale.

Facts:

i. On Saturday, November 10, 1951, defendant city council ordered special annexation elections to be held on Tuesday, December 11, 1951.

ii. Notice of the special elections was first published on Thursday, November 15, 1951, in the Crescenta Valley Ledger. The notice was again published on Thursday, November 22, 1951, Thursday, November 29, 1951, and the final publication occurred on Thursday, December 6, 1951.

iii. The elections were held on the date previously set, Tuesday, December, 11, 1951, and the annexation was carried by a close vote in each of the three districts.

iv. Formal proceedings for the annexation were completed on January 28, 1952, and leave to sue having been granted by the Attorney General, the present action in quo warranto was commenced on February 4, 1952.

Question: Was the publication of the official notice of the three annexation proceedings made in compliance with the provision of the Government Code, Section 35123?

Yes. Section 35123 of the Government Code reads as follows:

‘Publication or posting notice of election. The city legislative body shall cause notice of the election to be published at least once a week for the four weeks prior to the election, in a newspaper of general circulation, printed and published outside the city, but in the county in which the territory is situated, or if there is none, by posting it at least four weeks next preceding the election in three public places within the territory.’

The notices of the three elections were published in a weekly newspaper of general circulation published in an area not in the City of Glendale but within the county of Los Angeles, and actually within the annexation district. The notices were published on the four Thursdays, November 15, 22, 29, and December 6, 1951, next preceding the elections held on Tuesday, December 11, 1951.

The notices were thus published once in each of the four consecutive weeks prior to the elections, whether those weeks be considered as calendar weeks running from Sunday through Saturday, or whether they be considered as periods of seven days each next preceding the elections on Tuesday, December 11, 1951. Nothing more is required by section 35123 of the Government Code.

Plaintiff's contention that ‘a required publication for four weeks has been consistently construed to mean that 28 days must elapse between the date of first publication and the event concerning which notice is being given,’ has application to code provisions similar to section 413 of the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein language is used providing that publication shall be ‘at least once each calendar week’ and ‘must not be less than two months,’ and do not have application to wording such as is used in section 35123 of the Government Code.

Language almost identical with that in this section was construed by the Supreme Court of California in City of Lindsay v. Mack (1911), 160 Cal. 647, 117 P. 924, wherein it was held that publication similar to that which took place in the instant case was a sufficient compliance with the statute. Such decision is controlling here. (Cf. Fostler v. City of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 263, 264, 176 P. 138; County of Sonoma v. Sanborn, 1 Cal.App.2d 26, 32, 36 P.2d 419.

County of Los Angeles v. Payne (1927), 82 Cal.App. 210, 255 P. 281 and Reclamation District No. 765 v. McPhee (190), 13 Cal.App. 382, 109 P. 1106, 1107, are not here in point for the reason that neither of the cases dealt with a statutory requirement for publication of notice of election. Both involved the publication of notices of hearings on petitions for the formation of a district which notices were required in order to give jurisdiction to the Board of Supervisors to hear the petitions. In addition the statute involved in Reclamation District No. 765 v. McPhee, supra, provided for publication ‘for four weeks next preceding the hearing’ and did not state, as in the instant case, that the publication should be once a week.

In view of the ruling of our Supreme Court which is directly in point no useful purpose would be served by further discussion of cases cited by plaintiff.

Affirmed.

McCOMB, Justice.

MOORE, P. J., and FOX, J., concur.