IN RE: BLOCH'S ESTATE. (1952)

The question for decision is whether an instrument which was admitted to probate as the holographic will of the decedent Helene I. Bloch was signed by the decedent or whether her name in her own handwriting found only in the exordium clause of the instrument was used merely to identify property owned by her and not as her signature.

In this case two unsealed envelopes, each containing government bonds—one with bonds of the face value of $8,000; the other with bonds of the face value of over $5,000 were found in decedent's safety deposit box. On the outside of each of the envelopes there was language in the handwriting of the decedent. Both envelopes set forth in the handwriting of the decedent identical dates, i. e., ‘8/24/48,’ preceding the language written thereon by decedent. The petitioner—respondent herein—a sister of the decedent, presented both envelopes for probate as the last will of the decedent on the theory that the language on the outside of the two documents, taken together, represented a testamentary disposition on the part of the decedent. The court found that the writing endorsed on both of these two envelopes did not represent the last will and testament of decedent, but that the language on the envelope—front and back—known in the record as Exhibit 1 was, in and of itself, a testamentary disposition in that its language was all in the handwriting of the decedent including the date, i. e., 8/24/48, and that the name of the decedent, likewise in the handwriting of decedent, found in Exhibit 1 was the operative signature of decedent, even though it appeared only in the exordium and not at the end of the will. Accordingly, the court admitted Exhibit 1 as the last will and testament of decedent, but found that Exhibit 2 was not a part thereof and that standing alone it did not represent the last will of the decedent in whole or in part. Neither side here challenges the finding of the court as to Exhibit 2, but appellant does contend that Exhibit 1, taken alone, is not the last will and testament of decedent, because, as he contends, there is no operative signature and that the name of the decedent, in the handwriting of decedent, as set forth in Exhibit 1 was used for the purpose merely of identifying the bonds owned by decedent and not as an operative signature of a character to create a testamentary disposition.

Combining the language on each side of the envelope Exhibit 1 we find it reads as follows:

‘8/24/48

In case of my death these are to be distributed to the following children for their education (divided equally)

Babette Freshman

Carolyn Freshman

Barbara Ann Freshman

Gary Lee Goldberg

Susan Linda Goldberg

Judy Brown

Stephen Brown

Julius J. Bloch shall not receive a dower right or be allowed to contest my wishes in any court in the United States. Julius J. Bloch did not give me any part over of these monies Same was saved prior (before) my marriage and invested likewise. During my marriage Julius J. Bloch did not contribute to my support. I paid my own expenses throughout our marriage. Therefore he is not to receive one cent of my estate. During our marriage Julius J. Bloch, husband, was such only in name. When he had funds or made profits he squandered all on his selfish desires gambling—also thruout this marriage I continually aided financially his many adventures & all ending with losses. Therefore I fear he does not participate'

Aside from the two exhibits no evidence was offered bearing on the question whether the name ‘Helene I. Bloch’ found in the exordium was or was not intended as an operative or executing signature. Accordingly, we are not bound by the trial court's finding where, as here, it is based solely upon the terms of the written document without the aid of any extrinsic evidence, In re Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 131 P.2d 825. In short merely a question of law is presented.

We think that the name ‘Helene I. Bloch’ in the handwriting of decedent, in view of its location was used merely to state the total of the bonds she owned and was not intended by her as her operative signature. In re Estate of Manchester, 174 Cal. 417, 163 P. 358, L.R.A.1917D, 629; In re Estate of Hurley, 178 Cal. 713, 174 P. 669; In re Estate of Bernard, 197 Cal. 36, 239 P. 404. If we assume that the language which follows is intended as a testamentary disposition in whole or in part of the estate owned by decedent, there is nevertheless no signature to the will. We are unable to infer from the language of the document taken as a whole that the decedent assumed or contemplated that a signature was unnecessary or that she intended that her name as written should not only identify the extent of her ownership of the bonds but act as well as her operative signature. Moreover, as we view it the document does not represent a completed will, but at most a will partially completed.

It is of some significance that Exhibit 2 which contained a direction that the proceeds of an insurance policy should ‘be used for burial expenses completely’ contained at the end of the document the signature of the decedent. If decedent intended this exhibit as a continuation of Exhibit 1 it is then apparent that she did not intend that her name as found in that exhibit should operate as a signature. We think that such is the inference that must be drawn even though Exhibit 2 may not be incorporated in Exhibit 1 for want of proper legal incorporation.

The views we have expressed are abundantly sustained by the cases. It is unnecessary to do more than refer to one of them.

In Re Estate of Manchester, 174 Cal. 417, 163 P. 358, 359, L.R.A.1917D, 629, the document which the supreme court held had been erroneously admitted as a holographic will for want of an operative signature read as follows: “I, Matilda Manchester, leave and bequeath all my estate & effects” (naming the legatees). The document concludes with the words “Whereunto I hereby set my hand this fourteenth day of January, 1914.” The name of the decedent appeared nowhere else in the document. The court in the course of its opinion said:

‘* * * The name written at another place than the end of the document, and not for the purpose of authenticating it and indicating its completion, but merely to identify the person who is making the will, cannot be deemed to be a name ‘signed’ to the document, unless that word is given a meaning entirely different from that which it is generally understood to have * * * The Civil Code itself provides that words ‘are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language.’ Civ.Code, § 13. If this be done, a document in which the name of the person making it appears only in the beginning thereof, and by way of recital to designate that person as the maker, in the manner above shown, cannot be said to have been signed by the maker. * * *

“For the purpose of determining whether a will has been properly executed, the intention of the testator in executing it is entitled to no consideration. For that purpose the court can consider only the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the statute, and whether the will as presented shows a compliance with the statute.' * * *

‘* * * The act of signing is essential. An intention proven by other means will not serve the purpose.’ (Italics supplied.)

If, as the case above holds, the recital of the name of the person in the document there involved was merely to designate that person as the maker then likewise in the instant case it must be said that the designation of the name of the person was merely to show ownership of the bonds and nothing else.

The judgment is reversed with instructions to the trial court to deny probate to Exhibit 1.

HANSON, Justice pro tem.

DORAN, Acting P. J., and DRAPEAU, J., concur.