SIEDLETZ v. GRIFFITH (1940)

This is an appeal from a judgment quieting title in the defendant Myrtle Griffith to two placer mining claims in Sierra county. The appeal is presented on the judgment roll alone. The only question to be determined on this appeal is whether the judgment is supported by the findings.

The complaint is couched in three counts. The first count alleges that plaintiff is the owner of the “Gold Blossom” quartz mining claim in Sierra county. The second count alleges that on November 1, 1937, the defendants entered upon and took possession of the “Gold Blossom” claim, without plaintiff's consent, and extracted therefrom and appropriated to their own use minerals of the value of $10,000. The third count alleges that on September 5, 1935, the plaintiff leased said “Gold Blossom” claim to the defendants for the purpose of mining a portion of the claim; that pursuant to the terms of the lease the defendants made certain improvements on the property and supplied machinery, tools and equipment for conducting the placer mining enterprise, which, by the terms of the lease, became the property of the plaintiff for failure to remove them from the premises within sixty days from the termination of the lease; that the lease provided that for breach of any of its covenants, at the option of the lessor, it could be terminated after thirty days' notice; that the defendants did breach the terms of their lease, and were given notice of the termination thereof and thereby forfeited said lease, together with title to the improvements, tools, machinery and quartz extracted from the mining property. The prayer of the complaint asked for a decree quieting title in plaintiff to the “Gold Blossom” mining claim and machinery and for damages in the sum of $10,000 as the value of the mineral extracted from the claim.

The defendants joined in an answer and cross-complaint which denies each and all of the material allegations of the complaint. They specifically deny that plaintiff was the owner of “Gold Blossom” quartz claim. It is admitted the defendants entered into the alleged lease of the mining claim as a result of false and fraudulent representations made by the defendant that he was the owner thereof, but that they soon thereafter discovered he was not the owner of the claim and upon the contrary that the lease was void and that on May 1, 1936, they therefore repudiated the lease; that on July 1, 1925, the mining claim was sold and conveyed to the state of California pursuant to law for delinquent taxes; that defendants never entered upon or extracted quartz from the mining property claimed by the plaintiff, and upon the contrary that they are the owners of two mining claims in that vicinity known as “Lady Esther” and “Bonnie Brae”. The answer and cross-complaint asked for a decree quieting title in defendants to the quartz mining claims and that plaintiff be determined to have no right, title or interest therein and that she take nothing by her complaint.

In the answer to the cross-complaint it is alleged that defendants' quartz mining claims “Lady Esther” and “Bonnie Brae” were wrongfully located and recorded over and upon the plaintiff's said “Gold Blossom” claim in which they have no right, title or interest.

At the trial oral and documentary evidence was adduced in behalf of respective parties. The chief issues were the ownership of the respective claims and the alleged fraud of the plaintiff in procuring from the defendants the lease of the “Gold Blossom” claim on September 5, 1935. The court adopted findings against the plaintiff, determining that on and prior to July 1, 1931, of the Sierra Syndicate, a common-law trust organization, of which one William G. Dean was at all times an agent and trustee, owned the Gold Blossom quartz mining claim involved in this action; that on the last-mentioned date the said Dean contrary to his said trust, purported to relocate said claim in the name of the plaintiff Ray Siedletz, which attempted relocation was void; that on June 1, 1936, the defendant Myrtle Griffith legally located and became the owner of the two placer claims, “Lady Esther” and “Bonnie Brae”, described in the cross-complaint. As conclusions of law the court found that William G. Dean's attempt to relocate the “Gold Blossom” claim in the name of the plaintiff was void, and that Myrtle Griffith is the owner and entitled to a decree quieting title in her to the two quartz claims, “Lady Esther” and “Bonnie Brae”. A decree was accordingly rendered and entered quieting title to the two claims last mentioned in the defendant Myrtle Griffith and determining that the plaintiff has no right, title or interest therein. From that decree the plaintiff has appealed.

This is an appeal upon the judgment roll only. No bill of exceptions was presented or settled. No notice for the preparation or filing of a transcript of evidence under the provisions of section 953a of the Code of Civil Procedure was given. No evidence which was adduced at the trial is properly before this court. The record contains a number of exhibits which were received in evidence, but they are no part of the judgment roll. Sec. 670, Code Civ.Proc. The exhibits were not a part of the pleadings. No evidence introduced upon the trial by exhibits or otherwise are a part of the judgment roll, and the clerk had no authority to certify such exhibits. Woods v. Berry, 105 Cal.App. 90, 286 P. 1073; 2 Cal.Jur. 519, sec. 258. We must therefore assume the findings of the court are adequately supported by the evidence. The only question which we may determine on this appeal is whether the judgment is supported by the findings.

Since the court found that on and prior to July 1, 1931, the Sierra Syndicate, of which William G. Dean was the agent and trustee, was the owner of the “Gold Blossom” claim, in support of the judgment and in the absence of the testimony adduced at the trial, we must assume the record adequately shows that Dean, as the agent and trustee of the Sierra Syndicate had no authority to relocate that claim in behalf of the plaintiff or anyone, except the company which he represented, and that his attempted relocation was therefore contrary to his trust and void. It follows that plaintiff took no title to the claim by the ineffectual and void action of Dean, and that the plaintiff's purported lease of the property to the defendants was also void. In this suit to quiet title the plaintiff must prevail on the strength of his own title and not on any weakness of the defendants' title.

The defendants and cross-complainants in this case were not estopped from denying the title of plaintiff on account of the alleged relationship of landlord and tenant growing out of the lease of the premises. It was alleged in the cross-complaint that the lease was procured by the fraud of the plaintiff. That alleged fraud was an issue at the trial. The court did not specifically find that the lease was procured by fraud, but it did find that Dean's attempted relocation of the claim in behalf of the plaintiff was void, and it follows that if a finding on the issue of fraud, with respect to the execution of the lease, had been adopted, in support of the judgment the court would have necessarily determined that issue against the plaintiff. A multitude of authorities hold that an appellant is not prejudiced by a failure to find upon issues which would necessarily be adverse to him. Kramer v. Sanguinetti, 33 Cal.App.2d 303, 311, 91 P.2d 604.

It is uniformly held that fraud or misrepresentation on the part of a landlord which induces a tenant to enter into a lease of property relieves the tenant of the general rule estopping him from denying the title of the landlord. Kearney Investment Co. v. Golden Gate Ferry Co., 198 Cal. 560, 563, 246 P. 322; 15 Cal.Jur. 654, sec. 62; 2 A.L.R. 359, note; 16 R.C.L. 658, sec. 145. This exception to the general rule that a tenant may not dispute the title of his landlord is based on the principle that the lease is a contract, and the relationship grows out of the terms of the contract, and that when the contract is void because it is procured by fraud, the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist and the alleged tenant is therefore not estopped from denying the lessor's title.

Moreover, it is the rule in California and other jurisdictions that when a landlord not only seeks possession of the real property, but also attempts to quiet title thereto as against the tenant, the latter is not estopped from denying the landlord's title, but he may, under such circumstances, set up and establish any superior title which he may have afterward acquired. Hambey v. Wise, 181 Cal. 286, 184 P. 9; Collier v. Johnson, 79 Cal.App. 322, 325, 249 P. 217; San Juan Gold Co. v. San Juan Ridge Mutual Water Ass'n, 34 Cal.App.2d 159, 168, 93 P.2d 582; 35 C.J. 1233, sec. 575; 89 A.L.R. 1299, note. In the present case the respondents were not estopped from denying plaintiff's title to the mining claims.

The judgment is adequately supported by the findings, and it is, therefore, affirmed.

Mr. Justice THOMPSON delivered the opinion of the court.

We concur: PULLEN, P.J.; G.S. JONES, Justice pro tem.