THE PEOPLE v. EDUARDO SANCHEZ (2011)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

INTRODUCTION

Following denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Pen.Code, § 1538.5), defendant Eduardo Sanchez pled guilty to transportation of heroin (Health & Saf.Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) ¹ and admitted a 1999 conviction for the same offense (§§ 11352, subd. (a) & 11370.2, subd. (a)).  The trial court imposed a seven-year sentence.

This appeal challenges the denial of defendant's suppression motion.   He contends that the inventory search of the truck that discovered the heroin was constitutionally defective because it was not conducted pursuant to a standard policy or procedure.   We disagree and therefore affirm the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The Evidence

On November 4, 2009, several members of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department were conducting a narcotics investigation in the 5400 Block of Dobb Street.   At approximately 1:30 p.m., they saw defendant enter a pickup truck and drive away.   The deputies followed him for approximately a mile and a half.   After defendant failed to signal at an intersection before turning (Veh.Code, § 22108), the deputies stopped him.   Defendant exited the truck but when one of the deputies approached him, he began to run away.   Defendant was apprehended a block and a half away.   After determining that defendant did not possess a valid driver's license, the deputies placed him under arrest.   The deputies also determined that defendant was not the truck's registered owner.

Deputy Sheriff John Guerrero testified that he and his colleagues went “to conduct an inventory search of [defendant's] vehicle in order to either impound it or store it” because no one was present to whom the deputies could release it.   Typically, a vehicle is impounded when, as here, its driver is arrested for not possessing a valid driver's license.²  Deputy Guerrero testified that an inventory search is standard procedure “[i]n order to see if [the vehicle's driver] had any personal belongings or anything that shouldn't go with the tow․  We do an inventory of stereos, cassette players, CD's left behind, [and] make sure he has a spare tire.   Just very common articles that usually come with the vehicle.   Sometimes they are missing.”   The inventory search is conducted “[i]n order to justify that those items are either there or not.”

In the course of the inventory search, Deputy Guerrero found “underneath the rear bench seat” of the truck “multiple colored balloons that contained ․ heroin.”   Deputy Guerrero characterized the contraband's exact location as being in a “container for cargo.”   He explained:  “The bench seat actually opens up.   It has like a flap that opens up in case you want to open it up and make room for cargo.   It flips open.   Underneath there is where I found the contraband.”   Before the heroin was found, the deputies were “simply [conducting] an inventory search for impound” but once they found the contraband, they “decided to take the vehicle to [their] forfeiture lot in order to do forfeiture proceedings.” ³  Consequently, the truck was not formally impounded as the deputies had originally intended.   Because the truck was not impounded, the deputies did not complete the CHP 180 form required for inventory searches.⁴

When asked “In conducting your inventory search, is it a policy of how you search the vehicles to check all compartments in that vehicle?”, Deputy Guerrero replied:  “No, there's no policy.”   When asked “How do you know how to search the vehicle?”, Deputy Guerrero, a 20-year veteran of the Sheriff's Department, replied:  “My experience over the years.”   He explained that he searches “all the compartments of a vehicle” because it is “possible people store personal effects and items in those compartments.”   He also testified that “[w]e narcotics officers have the experience of finding items secreted.”

2. The Trial Court's Ruling

The parties argued at length whether the search could be properly characterized as an inventory search.   Defense counsel relied upon the facts that Deputy Guerrero had not testified that there was a standard policy or procedure governing how an inventory search was to be conducted;  that the pickup truck had not eventually been impounded;  and that no inventory form had been completed.   Defense counsel also argued that the claim of an inventory search was pretextual because Deputy Guerrero's real intent was to search the truck for drugs.

The trial court rejected the defense arguments, explaining:

“Ultimately, whether or not a search is reasonable depends on the circumstances of each case․  I think, under these particular circumstances, the search was reasonable.   I think that when the cases talk about the need for specific standards and policies, they were focusing on-many of them were focusing on what officers should do when they find a container within the vehicle, whether a backpack or suitcase, locked or unlocked.   I think that's what is crucial, to have these very specific policies in place and procedures in place and for there to be clear testimony on whether or not these policies exist and whether or not they are being followed.

“Here, on the other hand, the search was of a compartment, not unlike a glove compartment, in it was designed to hold personal effects and store property and could easily be opened without disturbing the integrity of the vehicle.   So I think when the officer had decided that the vehicle needed to be impounded because there was no one there to drive it off, it was appropriate for him to look in those general areas to commence the inventory search that would have to take place either there or at some other location․  In the end, I think, whether he was following a specific policy or written procedure, his search was reasonable under the circumstances because it was done as part of an inventory search process ․  [Deputy Guerrero testified ] that he was doing something that he had been doing for quite a while, and in preparing the vehicle for the impoundment, that, in my view, was reasonable.   Whether he had in mind the particular written policy I don't think is crucial in these particular circumstances given what he looked in․  It was a place that I think is quite reasonable to search prior to a vehicle being impounded ․  Upon doing that pre-inventory search, they found contraband that caused them to go a different route․  Once they found [the heroin], ․ it was no longer an inventory search.   They then have probable cause to search the entire vehicle.   They may not have filled out forms pursuant to the impoundment procedures, but I'm assuming at some point, when they book evidence, they generate a list of the items there.”  (Italics added.)

DISCUSSION

Inventory searches are a “well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”  (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371.)   An inventory search is conducted for three separate reasons:  (1) to protect an owner's property while it is in police custody;  (2) to insure against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property;  and (3) to protect the police from danger.  (Id. at p. 372.)   An inventory search is lawful if conducted pursuant to “standardized criteria ․ or established routine.”  (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4, italics added.)  “Because of the risk that an inventory search will be ‘a ruse for a general rummaging,’ ․ a valid inventory search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice.”  (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 138, italics added.)   This requirement insures that an “individual police officer [is not] allowed so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into ‘a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of a crime.’ ”  (Florida v. Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 4.) However, the “standardized procedure or established routine authorizing the inventory search need not be written.”  (People v. Needham (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 260, 266, italics added.)

In this case, the trial court found that Deputy Guerrero's search of the vehicle was a valid inventory search.   In reviewing this ruling, we are bound by the “factual findings, implied or express, of the trial court if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.  [Citation.]  [Our] task [as an] appellate court is to measure the facts as found by the trial court against the constitutional standard of reasonableness.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Steeley (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 887, 890-891.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Deputy Guerrero conducted a valid inventory search.   The deputies clearly had the authority to impound the vehicle following defendant's arrest for driving without a valid driver's license, a point defendant does not controvert.  (See fn. 2, ante.)   Deputy Guerrero testified that an inventory search is a standard procedure conducted before impounding a vehicle.   He explained that the purpose of the search is to find and itemize any personal property in the vehicle.   Based upon his 20-year experience, he routinely searches all of the vehicle's compartments for personal property.   The search serves several purposes:  to identify the property and thus protect its owner from loss, to protect the sheriff's department from false claims that property had been taken, and to find any items that should be removed from the vehicle prior to its being towed.   This testimony established that Deputy Guerrero conducted a valid inventory search grounded in the rationales for such searches set forth by the United States Supreme Court.   Further, based upon our independent review of the record, we conclude that the inventory search was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment:  the impound of the truck was authorized by law (see fn. 2, ante ), Deputy Guerrero was motivated by legitimate purposes, and the search was limited in scope to legally accessible areas.

Defendant's contrary arguments are not persuasive.   Primarily, defendant relies upon the fact that Deputy Guerrero testified that there was no set policy about how to search the vehicle, including its compartments, and that he relied, instead, upon his experience in conducting an inventory search.   From this, defendant argues that Deputy Guerrero failed to “follow[ ] a formal departmental policy or procedure when conducting [the] inventory search” and “[w]ithout a standard policy, there can be no [valid] warrantless inventory search.”

On this point, People v. Steeley, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d 887 is instructive.   There, the police properly decided to have a vehicle towed for impoundment after citing its driver for driving with a revoked driver's license.  (Id. at pp. 889-890.)   During an inventory search conducted prior to the tow, the police discovered drugs and a loaded revolver.   At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified that it was standard procedure to inventory a vehicle's contents prior to being towed “ ‘to make sure what property is in the vehicle in case it shows up missing from the tow yard.   We have a record of what had left the scene so to speak.’ ”  (Id. at p. 892.)   He explained that in such a circumstance, the arresting officer is required to prepare a written inventory of the property.   Based upon that testimony, the trial court denied the defense motion to suppress the evidence found in the car.

On appeal, the defendant contended the search was invalid because “it was not conducted pursuant to a routine policy governed by standardized criteria.”   (Id. at p. 891.)   The appellate court disagreed.   It explained:  “[Defendant] misconstrues the focus of the inquiry to determine whether the conduct of the police officer is lawful under the Fourth Amendment.   The Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches.  [Citation.]  It is well settled that inventories of impounded vehicles are reasonable where the process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents.  [Citation.]  Such searches are unreasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment when used as a ruse to conduct an investigatory search.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at pp. 891-892.)   Relying upon the officer's testimony about the purpose of the inventory search, the reviewing court upheld the denial of the suppression motion.   It reasoned:  “Inventory searches of the type conducted in this case are recognized across the nation as standard caretaking functions of the police.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 892.)

By a parity of reasoning, Deputy Guerrero conducted a valid inventory search.   He explained that it was standard procedure to inventory a vehicle before it was towed in order to create a record of the items in the car.   His inventory search never exceeded the scope of its protective purposes:  he searched only the areas of the vehicle, including compartments, in which personal property could logically be found.   His reasons for conducting the inventory search paralleled the rationales underlying the policy supporting warrantless inventory searches:  protection of the owner's property and insulation of law enforcement from false claims of loss.   Given all of these circumstances, the fact that Deputy Guerrero carried out the search based upon his 20 years of experience in law enforcement as opposed to a specific policy of the Sheriff's Department did not render the search constitutionally unreasonable.

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in finding a lawful inventory search because, according to him, “this was never just an inventory search.   This was a search for narcotics from the moment [Deputy Guerrero] entered the pickup truck.   He specifically testified that he conducts ‘inventory searches' according to his own experience.   He further testified that he searches all compartments of a vehicle because ‘narcotics officers have the experience of finding items secreted.’   Clearly, the warrantless search in this case was conducted as ‘a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of a crime.’  [Citation.]  [He] searched the pickup for drugs, not to inventory its contents prior to impounding the vehicle.”

We are not persuaded.   Defendant made this argument to the trial court.   In denying the suppression motion, the trial court implicitly credited Deputy Guerrero's testimony that before the heroin was found, the deputies were “simply [conducting] an inventory search for impound.”   It was the trial court's province to evaluate and decide Deputy Guerrero's credibility.   (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160.)   As an appellate court, we are bound by the trial court's credibility finding unless Deputy Guerrero's testimony was inherently improbable.  (People v. Negrete (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 328, 339-340.)   Defendant advances no argument on that point and, indeed, could not based upon this record.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. All undesignated statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code..  FN1. All undesignated statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code.

FN2. Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (h)(1) authorizes removal of a vehicle when a peace officer “arrests a person driving ․ a vehicle for an alleged offense and ․ is ․ required or permitted to take, and does take, the person into custody.”  Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (p) specifically authorizes removal of a vehicle from the highway when an officer “issues the driver of a vehicle a notice to appear” for driving without a valid driver's license (Veh.Code, § 12500, subd. (a)).  And Vehicle Code section 22655.5, subdivision (a) provides that a peace officer may remove a vehicle from the highway “[w]hen ․ a peace officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle was used as the means of committing a public offense.”.  FN2. Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (h)(1) authorizes removal of a vehicle when a peace officer “arrests a person driving ․ a vehicle for an alleged offense and ․ is ․ required or permitted to take, and does take, the person into custody.”  Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (p) specifically authorizes removal of a vehicle from the highway when an officer “issues the driver of a vehicle a notice to appear” for driving without a valid driver's license (Veh.Code, § 12500, subd. (a)).  And Vehicle Code section 22655.5, subdivision (a) provides that a peace officer may remove a vehicle from the highway “[w]hen ․ a peace officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle was used as the means of committing a public offense.”

FN3. We assume that Deputy Guerrero's reference to forfeiture was to subdivision (e) of section 11470 governing forfeitures of vehicles involved in designated drug crimes..  FN3. We assume that Deputy Guerrero's reference to forfeiture was to subdivision (e) of section 11470 governing forfeitures of vehicles involved in designated drug crimes.

FN4. Deputy Guerrero did not testify about the nature of a CHP 180 report, presumably because one was not completed in this case.   However, People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238 sheds some light on the nature of that form.   The opinion explains that in 2007, the California Highway Patrol (CHP) issued a revised manual concerning vehicle removal, impoundment, and seizure practices.  “The CHP manual provides guidelines of standard practices once a car is impounded or stored.   The CHP officer will conduct an inventory of the owner's property to protect the department from claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property.   This inventory of items in legally accessible areas is to be included in the ‘CHP 180 Vehicle Report.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1241, fn. 1, italics added.).  FN4. Deputy Guerrero did not testify about the nature of a CHP 180 report, presumably because one was not completed in this case.   However, People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238 sheds some light on the nature of that form.   The opinion explains that in 2007, the California Highway Patrol (CHP) issued a revised manual concerning vehicle removal, impoundment, and seizure practices.  “The CHP manual provides guidelines of standard practices once a car is impounded or stored.   The CHP officer will conduct an inventory of the owner's property to protect the department from claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property.   This inventory of items in legally accessible areas is to be included in the ‘CHP 180 Vehicle Report.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1241, fn. 1, italics added.)

EPSTEIN, P. J. SUZUKAWA, J.