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Estate of EARNEST CHAMBERS, JR., Deceased. _ DARREN WAYNE CHAMBERS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DORVAIL MONEY, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
Darren Wayne Chambers appeals from the probate court order denying his claim of intestate succession to the estate of his late uncle, Earnest Chambers, Jr., and the determination that Dorvail Money qualified as the heir because Chambers held Money out as his natural son. We reject appellant's contention that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence, and therefore affirm the order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Earnest Chambers, Jr. (Chambers), died in January 2007 at the age of 83. Chambers did not leave a will. In December 2007, Darren Wayne Chambers filed a petition with the probate court alleging that under Texas law he was the adopted son of Chambers's deceased brother, entitling him to a determination that he was Chambers's sole heir by intestate succession. Dorvail Money challenged that petition on the ground that he was Chambers's natural son.1 Dorvail, who was born in 1978, claimed he was the product of Chambers's extramarital affair with his mother, Diana Williams. Chambers divorced his first wife and married Williams in 1982. They divorced in 1984.2
Nephew attacked Dorvail's claim by pointing out that William Money, not Earnest Chambers, was named as Dorvail's father on his birth certificate and that the marital dissolution petition filed by Chambers against Williams stated there were no minor children from the marriage. Mother claimed that Chambers's first wife threatened her, and that she did not identify Chambers as the father in order to avoid trouble. According to mother, Dorvail lived with Chambers, and Chambers acknowledged Dorvail as his son, before, during, and after their marriage. By way of both declarations and live testimony, several witnesses who were relatives or close friends of Chambers verified that Dorvail lived with and was raised by Chambers, who publicly acknowledged Dorvail as his son. Dorvail testified that he lived with Chambers most of his life, and that Chambers paid most of his expenses. There was also conflicting evidence that when Chambers applied for an annuity in 1997, he identified Dorvail as his son and named him as the beneficiary.
In July 2008 the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Dorvail was Chambers's heir because Chambers had held him out as his natural son. We reversed that order because the issue is governed by the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, and remanded for a new hearing. (Estate of Chambers (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 891 (Chambers I ).) On remand, after reconsidering the evidence from the first hearing, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Chambers had held out Dorvail as his natural son. It therefore denied nephew's petition, and sustained Dorvail's objections to that petition. Nephew contends there was insufficient evidence to support that finding.
DISCUSSION
At issue in both the trial court and on appeal was whether Dorvail qualified as Chambers's natural son for purposes of intestate succession because there was clear and convincing evidence that Chambers openly held out Dorvail as his own child. (Prob.Code, § 6453, subd. (b)(2).) This requires proof that Chambers acknowledged Dorvail as his own child. A written acknowledgement was not required, and proof by way of a word or act will suffice. (Estate of Burden (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1028-1029 (Burden ).) Proof that Chambers had personal contact with Dorvail, received him into his home, or bought him gifts, is not required. (Id. at p. 1029.)
Paternity under this provision must be established by clear and convincing evidence. (Chambers I, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 896.) Although the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof is higher than the mere preponderance of the evidence standard, the distinctions between the two vanish on appeal. Instead, the usual substantial evidence rule applies, and we resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the trial court's order. (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581.)
Mother testified that she divorced William Money in 1969, met Chambers in 1971, and began an affair with him in 1972. Dorvail was born in 1978, and Chambers was the father. Mother listed her former husband Money as the father because Chambers's then-wife threatened her and mother wanted to avoid any trouble with the wife. Mother and Chambers married in 1982 and divorced in 1984. Dorvail lived with Chambers both before and after Chambers's marriage to mother, and Chambers acknowledged that Dorvail was his son.
Dorvail testified that Chambers was his father, that he lived with Chambers most of his life until he eventually moved out on his own, and that Chambers paid his living expenses. He also received Social Security disability payments through Chambers, although a letter from the Social Security agency referred to him as being Chambers's stepson.
Friends of Chambers backed up this account. Willard Robinson had known Chambers since 1990 and was his best friend. Robinson was at Chambers's home almost daily. Robinson met Dorvail about the same time he met Chambers. Dorvail was living with Chambers. In 1997, Dorvail moved out of Chambers's home and into an apartment in a building Chambers owned. Robinson and Chambers were very close and talked about everything. Although Chambers mentioned a brother who lived in Texas, he never mentioned a nephew who lived there too. Robinson asked Chambers on three or four occasions about his estate plan. Chambers replied, “I don't have but one son. I am going to leave it [to] my son Dorvail.”
Wilfred Rouse, another long-time friend of Chambers, knew Dorvail since he was a baby, and Chambers told him that Dorvail was his son. Chambers raised Dorvail in his home and would drive Dorvail to school.
Tommy Crockham met Chambers in 1975 and rented an apartment from Chambers in 1976 or 1977. Crockham believed he met Dorvail when Dorvail was around eight years old. Chambers would sometimes bring Dorvail by Crockham's apartment on Sundays after attending church, and Chambers would prepare a meal for them. Chambers referred to Dorvail as his son, and their relationship was a close one such as a father and son would have.
Constance Cash, who was mother's second cousin, knew Dorvail as the son of Chambers since Dorvail's birth. Chambers referred to Dorvail as being his son, and Dorvail lived with Chambers.3
Nephew contends this evidence was insufficient because: (1) there was no corroborating evidence such as an attempt by Chambers to adopt Dorvail, an attempt by Dorvail to legally change his last name to Chambers, or documentary evidence such as letters, birthday cards, Father's Day cards, tax returns, hospital, bank, or other records that reflect the existence of a father-son relationship; (2) there was no biological evidence to show that Dorvail was Chambers's son; (3) Dorvail and mother gave self-serving testimony and, at the first hearing, the trial court said it found mother was inconsistent and not credible; (4) at the first hearing, the trial court found there was not clear and convincing evidence of an equitable adoption, but it relied on the same evidence as before to find clear and convincing evidence that Chambers held out Dorvail as his natural son; and (5) the evidence that Dorvail was listed as the son of William Money on his birth certificate, and that the divorce petition Chambers filed listed no minor children of the marriage to mother, overcomes all the other evidence. We take each in turn.
As to corroborating evidence, nephew forgets that evidence of Chambers's verbal acknowledgements - his many statements that Dorvail was his son - is sufficient by itself under Probate Code section 6453, subdivision (b)(2). (Burden, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1028-1029.) These statements were corroborated by evidence that Dorvail lived with and was reared by Chambers.4 As to the absence of biological evidence (presumably DNA), as the trial court correctly noted, the issue is not whether Chambers was in fact Dorvail's biological father. Instead, the issue is whether Chambers held out Dorvail as being his natural son. (Id. at pp. 1030-1031.) The third contention concerns the credibility of Dorvail and mother. At the end of the first hearing, the trial court said mother had credibility issues and that it did not believe her. However, that statement was made in regard to mother's testimony that she did not learn of her divorce from Chambers until years later when she looked at the court records. The trial court must have believed mother's testimony that Dorvail was her son by Chambers, and her explanation of why Chambers was not listed as the father on Dorvail's birth certificate. Ultimately, the credibility of the witnesses was an issue for the trial court, and on the essential issues it believed Dorvail's witnesses.5 Whether or not the trial court believed mother's testimony, there was ample testimony from other reliable witnesses that Chambers held out Dorvail as his son.
The fourth contention requires a brief discussion of the doctrine of equitable adoption, which is an alternative way to prove the existence of a parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate succession. (Prob.Code, § 6455; Chambers I, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 894, fn. 3.) It requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that an adult treated someone else's child as his own and tried to adopt him, but for some reason failed to do so. (Ibid.) At the first hearing, the trial court found that there was insufficient evidence that Chambers equitably adopted Dorvail.6 Nephew suggests that the trial court could not possibly conclude that the same evidence was now clear and convincing proof that Chambers held Dorvail out as his son.
Implicit in this contention, we believe, is the notion that the trial court was being result-oriented and somehow used evidence that it once found insufficient to support its findings again under a higher standard of proof. If so, we entirely reject Nephew's point. The elements of equitable adoption are wholly different from those at play here under the holding-out doctrine. There was no evidence, and no contention, that an equitable adoption occurred. Therefore, the trial court's earlier finding that no equitable adoption occurred is fully consistent with the findings now on appeal.
Finally, we examine the effect of evidence that Chambers was not listed as Dorvail's father on the birth certificate and that the divorce petition filed by Chambers said there were no minor children of the marriage. While the birth certificate is certainly evidence that is unfavorable to Dorvail, it does no more than create a conflict that the trial court, as the trier of fact, was free to resolve for itself. Mother explained why Chambers's name was not used, and the trial court may have believed her. In any event, it was not claimed that Chambers had anything to do with mother's decision to name Money as father, and therefore, the birth certificate is not conclusive as to whether Chambers claimed Dorvail as his natural son. As for Chambers's divorce petition, he stated that there were no minor children “of this marriage,” a statement that was true because Dorvail was conceived and born four years before Chambers married mother. In short, he was not a child of the marriage.7 Regardless, Chambers's statement in the 1983 petition did no more than create an evidentiary conflict with all the other evidence concerning his statements about and conduct concerning Dorvail in the years before and after that petition was filed. We therefore hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's order.
DISPOSITION
The probate court order concerning the heirship claims of nephew and Dorvail is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his appellate costs.
WE CONCUR:
FOOTNOTES
FN1. For ease of reference, we will refer to Darren Wayne Chambers as nephew, and to Dorvail Money by his first name. Dorvail had developmental disabilities and was represented by his mother, who had been named his conservator.. FN1. For ease of reference, we will refer to Darren Wayne Chambers as nephew, and to Dorvail Money by his first name. Dorvail had developmental disabilities and was represented by his mother, who had been named his conservator.
FN2. Williams was mother's maiden name. She had married and divorced William Money before her son was born, and appeared in this action as Dorvail's conservator under the name Diana Chambers. In order to avoid confusion over multiple persons with the surname of Chambers, we will refer to her as mother.. FN2. Williams was mother's maiden name. She had married and divorced William Money before her son was born, and appeared in this action as Dorvail's conservator under the name Diana Chambers. In order to avoid confusion over multiple persons with the surname of Chambers, we will refer to her as mother.
FN3. Nephew did not testify, but his petition, declaration, and supporting documentary evidence showed that he was the adopted son of Chambers's deceased brother.. FN3. Nephew did not testify, but his petition, declaration, and supporting documentary evidence showed that he was the adopted son of Chambers's deceased brother.
FN4. Nephew also forgets the annuity application where Dorvail was listed as Chambers's son. Setting aside the conflict in the evidence as to whether that part of the application was forged, there seems to be no dispute that Chambers applied for an annuity and listed Dorvail as his beneficiary.. FN4. Nephew also forgets the annuity application where Dorvail was listed as Chambers's son. Setting aside the conflict in the evidence as to whether that part of the application was forged, there seems to be no dispute that Chambers applied for an annuity and listed Dorvail as his beneficiary.
FN5. Nephew suggests that at the second hearing, the trial court found only one witness credible - Robinson. The minute order states that the court found Robinson “extremely credible” and found Rouse and Dorvail “very credible” even though parts of Rouse's testimony were vague as to dates. Although the trial court did not mention mother, as just discussed, it may have nonetheless believed her testimony that Chambers acknowledged Dorvail as his natural son.. FN5. Nephew suggests that at the second hearing, the trial court found only one witness credible - Robinson. The minute order states that the court found Robinson “extremely credible” and found Rouse and Dorvail “very credible” even though parts of Rouse's testimony were vague as to dates. Although the trial court did not mention mother, as just discussed, it may have nonetheless believed her testimony that Chambers acknowledged Dorvail as his natural son.
FN6. As we pointed out in Chambers I, Dorvail did not contend that an equitable adoption had occurred, and instead relied on the holding-out provision of Probate Code section 6453, subdivision (b)(2). (Id. at pp. 894, fn. 3, 896-897.). FN6. As we pointed out in Chambers I, Dorvail did not contend that an equitable adoption had occurred, and instead relied on the holding-out provision of Probate Code section 6453, subdivision (b)(2). (Id. at pp. 894, fn. 3, 896-897.)
FN7. Counsel for nephew inadvertently demonstrated the plausibility of this interpretation when cross-examining mother about Chambers's divorce petition. In response to mother's claim that she did not learn she and Chambers were divorced until years later when she finally examined the court records, counsel asked whether she saw Chambers's statement that “there were no children from the marriage.” Mother answered yes. Two questions later, she was asked, “When Dorvail was born, you weren't married to Mr. Chambers, were you?” Mother answered “no” to that question.. FN7. Counsel for nephew inadvertently demonstrated the plausibility of this interpretation when cross-examining mother about Chambers's divorce petition. In response to mother's claim that she did not learn she and Chambers were divorced until years later when she finally examined the court records, counsel asked whether she saw Chambers's statement that “there were no children from the marriage.” Mother answered yes. Two questions later, she was asked, “When Dorvail was born, you weren't married to Mr. Chambers, were you?” Mother answered “no” to that question.
FLIER, J. GRIMES, J.
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Docket No: B223492
Decided: March 02, 2011
Court: Court of Appeal, Second District, California.
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