IN RE: the Matter of: Thomas Gene DONOFRIO (2026)

OPINION

¶1 On appeal, father—Thomas Donofrio—asks the court to vacate the superior court's joint legal decision-making “determination, vacate the award of decision-making authority to [m]other, and award [f]ather sole legal decision-making authority.” Father seeks relief on two grounds. First, he argues the superior court violated the statutory definition of “joint legal decision-making” when it specified mother could make the final decision if the parents have a good-faith disagreement about a nonemergency legal decision. It did not. Second, father argues the facts do not support joint legal decision-making at all, saying the superior court abused its discretion because the facts support awarding him sole legal decision-making authority. But evidence in the record supports the superior court's order, and the court will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

¶2 Mother—Sally Glasgow—did not cross-appeal but asks the court to affirm or to remand with directions for the superior court to award her sole legal decision-making. Because mother did not cross-appeal, the court may not expand her rights or diminish father's. See Engel v. Landman, 221 Ariz. 504, 510 ¶ 17 (App. 2009); ARCAP 13(b)(2) (“The appellate court may direct that the judgment be modified to enlarge the rights of the appellee or to lessen the rights of the appellant only if the appellee has cross-appealed seeking such relief.”). The court thus does not reach her arguments.

¶3 The court affirms.

BACKGROUND

¶4 Mother and father share one child (born in March 2021), but never married. In April 2021, just a few weeks after the child's birth, father was arrested for assaulting mother. At that point, the Department of Child Services became involved and filed a dependency against both parents. Both parents participated in services, and the Department agreed to dismiss the dependency about six months later.

¶5 As to father's arrest, he ultimately pled guilty to misdemeanor assault. After he completed unsupervised probation, the superior court set aside his conviction. Based in part on the April 2021 misdemeanor assault, mother secured a 2021 order of protection against father, which she renewed in 2022. In 2023, the superior court denied her request to renew the order of protection.

¶6 In the meantime, around a week after the Department dismissed the dependency—when the child was about six months old—father petitioned to establish paternity, for legal decision-making, and for parenting time. Early on, both parents requested joint legal decision-making.

¶7 After several delays, the court held a trial on the petition in September 2024. At trial, father continued his request for joint legal decision-making authority, but asked the superior court to allow him to make final decisions if he and mother could not agree. Mother sought sole legal decision-making authority.

¶8 Both parents testified at trial about their relationship with each other and the child. Both parents accused the other of committing acts of domestic violence during their relationship. And both parents called mental healthcare professionals to testify about mother's mental health and ability to parent.

¶9 After trial, the superior court issued an order analyzing the relevant factors under A.R.S. §§ 25-403, -403.01, and -403.03. Though the superior court found both parents had committed acts of domestic violence, it found father was the primary aggressor and his acts of domestic violence were more serious than mother's. Accordingly, the court concluded mother “should be slightly more empowered to insulate against the possibility of bullying.” The superior court thus found an award of joint legal decision-making “in the child's best interest” and added these terms:

Specific Terms: Decision-Making Authority—Parental decisions shall be required for major issues in raising the children and in meeting on-going needs. When they arise, each parent shall give good faith considerations to the views of the other and put forth best efforts to reach a consensus decision. If the decision involves medical or schooling issues, the parties may further elect to seek input from treating physicians or educators. Both parents shall be provided with such input.

IT IS ORDERED that if they cannot agree after making a good faith effort to reach an agreement, [mother] shall have the ability to make the final decision.

¶10 The superior court also entered a separate Arizona Supreme Court Form 19, Joint Legal Decision-Making Education Order. In it, the superior court made plain that mother can make final decisions over education matters, including “school selection, enrollment/withdrawal, and special services.” That form order gave guidance to mother, father, and school officials.

¶11 The court has jurisdiction over father's timely appeal under Article VI, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1 and -2101.A.1.

DISCUSSION

¶12 Father argues Arizona law (A.R.S. § 25-401(2)) prevents the superior court from awarding joint legal decision-making authority while also allowing mother to make the final decision when the parties have a good-faith disagreement. Father also argues the evidence supports awarding him sole legal decision-making.

I. The court will not apply waiver to father's arguments.

¶13 Father arguably waived both issues he raises on appeal. First, father never asked the superior court to rule on whether Arizona law allowed for an award of joint legal decision-making with one parent having the ability to make a final decision when the parents have a good-faith disagreement. Instead, father invited such an award. In his pre-trial statement and at trial, father asked the superior court to award him joint legal decision-making but give him (not mother) the ability to make the final decision. Second, though on appeal father seeks an award of sole legal decision-making, at trial, father did not ask the superior court for such an award.

¶14 On these facts, the court could apply waiver and deny father relief without more. See In re E.C., 261 Ariz. 1, 5 ¶ 17 (App. 2025). “But the decision to apply waiver is discretionary. When the best interests of the child are at stake, the court generally will not apply waiver.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶15 The court declines to apply waiver here because the issue involves the child's best interests. See id.

II. A.R.S. § 25-401(2)’s plain language allows the superior court to award the parents joint legal decision-making but also specify that when the parents have a good-faith disagreement about a decision, one parent may make the final decision.

¶16 Father argues the superior court effectively awarded mother sole legal decision-making because the order says the “specified decisions” over which mother has final say include all decisions in which the parties have a good-faith disagreement. He contends this language gives mother “carte blanche authority to make any and all decisions with which the parties disagree, which involves randomness, a lack of any guidance, and unfettered discretion by [m]other.” Mother argues the superior court's order ensures the parents shared legal decision-making authority and engage in good faith discussions about all decisions. Mother argues the superior court limited “specified decisions” over which she would have the ability to make a final decision—but only when the parents have a good-faith disagreement. To resolve the issue, the court must determine the meaning of the term “specified decisions” in A.R.S. § 25-401(2).

¶17 The court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Advantage Pool & Spa Plumbing, Inc. v. Miles, 261 Ariz. 509, 512 ¶ 11 (App. 2026). A statute's plain language guides the court's interpretation. See Ariz. Advoc. Network Found. v. State, 250 Ariz. 109, 114 ¶ 19 (App. 2020). “Generally, if a statute is clear, [the court] ․ assum[es] that the legislature has said what it means.” Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73 ¶ 11 (2002). The court determines “the plain meaning of the words the legislature chose” by viewing those words “in their broader statutory context.” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 5 (2024) (citation omitted). The court must interpret statutes “as they are written” and must not rewrite them. Ariz. Free Enter. Club v. Hobbs, 253 Ariz. 478, 489 ¶ 38 (2022) (recognizing courts “are constrained from rewriting the law under the guise of interpreting it even if we divine a more desirable intended outcome than the text allows”). “A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568 ¶ 11 (2019) (Nicaise II).

¶18 “Absent a statutory definition, courts generally give words their ordinary meaning and may look to dictionary definitions.” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. at 18 ¶ 7; see also A.R.S. § 1-213. In doing so, the court may consult established dictionaries. In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. at 18 ¶ 7.

A. The superior court's order satisfies A.R.S. § 25-401(2)’s plain language because it specified that when the parents have a good-faith disagreement about a decision, mother may make the final decision.

¶19 “In awarding legal decision-making, the [superior] court may order sole legal decision-making or joint legal decision-making.” A.R.S. § 25-403.01.A. Legal decision-making refers to “the legal right and responsibility to make all nonemergency legal decisions for a child including those regarding education, health care, religious training and personal care decisions.” A.R.S. § 25-401(3). Under A.R.S. § 25-401(6), a parent with sole legal decision-making authority “has the legal right and responsibility to make major decisions for a child.” (emphasis added.) In contrast, parents who have joint legal decision-making “share decision-making and neither parent's rights or responsibilities are superior except with respect to specified decisions as set forth by the court or the parents in the final judgment or order.” A.R.S. § 25-401(2) (emphasis added).

¶20 In subsection 25-401(2), “specified” modifies “decisions.” “Specified” is the past participle of “specify,” which means “to name or state explicitly or in detail” or “to include as an item in a specification.” Specify, Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2014); see also Specify, Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001) (defining “specify” as “to mention or name specifically or definitively”). Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “specified,” subsection 25-401(2) requires a court to name, or to state explicitly or in detail, the decisions over which a parent may make the final decision.

¶21 When the court applies that definition to subsection 25-401(2), no words are superfluous because every word in the statute has meaning. Nicaise II, 245 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 11. And the meaning is plain. See id.

¶22 The court's interpretation is consistent with the Arizona Supreme Court's 2019 opinion in Nicaise II. See id. ¶ 13. Nicaise II addressed whether subsection 25-401(2) allowed the superior court to award joint legal decision-making to both parents, but giving father final decision-making over “medical, mental health, dental, and therapy issues” when the parents could not agree. Id. at 567 ¶ 3. Nicaise II said it did: “We interpret § 25-401(2) as meaning that one parent's joint legal decision-making authority is made superior in some circumstances, but the parents retain joint legal decision-making authority; the ‘tie-breaking’ parent is not granted sole legal decision-making authority under subsection (6).” Id. at 568 ¶ 13.

¶23 Nicaise II provides further direction for how the court should interpret subsection 25-401(2) as applied to the order here. Nicaise II consistently referred to the one parent's ability to make “certain” decisions. See, e.g., id. at 569 ¶ 16. Nicaise II’s use of the word “certain” instead of the statutory term “specified” is consistent with the definitions outlined above. Indeed, thesauruses generally identify “certain” as a synonym of “specified.” See, e.g., https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/specified. As above, if the court inserts the word “certain” into subsection (2), the meaning is plain: “[E]xcept with respect to certain decisions as set forth by the court or the parents in the final judgment or order.” And that interpretation is consistent with Nicaise II’s citation with approval to In re Marriage of Friedman & Roels, 244 Ariz. 111 (2018). In Friedman & Roels, as here, the parents shared joint legal decision-making, but one parent had final decision-making when the parents had a good-faith disagreement. See id. at 113 ¶ 5. And Nicaise II cited Friedman & Roels as an example of when subsection 25-401(2) allowed for joint legal decision-making with one parent having “final authority over certain matters.” Nicaise II, 245 Ariz. at 569 ¶ 16.

¶24 As a final point on the meaning of the term “specified decisions” in subsection 25-401(2), the legislature could have required limitations on the scope of the exception. Context matters, and the legislature used “specific limitation[s]” rather than “specified decisions” in a different statute dealing exclusively with sole legal decision-making. See A.R.S. § 25-410.A; see also Paul E. v. Courtney F., 246 Ariz. 388, 393–94 ¶ 20 (2019) (interpreting the term “specific limitations” in subsection 25-410.A). In Paul E., the Arizona Supreme Court said, “Reading the term [‘specific limitations’] in its proper context within § 25-410(A) indicates it creates a narrow exception to the broad authority conferred on the sole legal decision-maker.” 246 Ariz. at 393 ¶ 20. If for joint legal decision-making, the legislature had said, “except with respect to [specific limitations] as set forth by the court or the parents in the final judgment or order,” the court might rule differently. But the legislature did not, so the court cannot.

¶25 Subsection 25-410.A's language makes plain there can be no unrestricted limitation on sole legal decision-making. Id. In contrast, section 25-401(2)’s language does not preclude allowing one parent to exercise final legal decision-making where the parties have “good-faith disagreements.” And no rule of statutory construction warrants reading those two plain phrases (“specified decisions” and “specific limitations”) as having the same meaning because they do not.

¶26 At bottom, the dissent must insert an additional word—substantive—into the statute to reach its chosen outcome. The dissent says the legislature's use of ‘specified decisions’ contemplates that a court will list certain substantive areas on which one party will have final say.” As such, the dissent's interpretation requires it to rewrite the statute, not interpret it as written, which the court may not do. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club, 253 Ariz. at 489 ¶ 38. If the legislature had inserted the word “substantive” into the statute, no doubt the meaning might be different, but the legislature did not. The majority declines the dissent's invitation to insert that word in the legislature's stead. The legislature chose the words of the statute, and those words are “specified decisions”: nothing more, nothing less. And though the legislature is free to change them if it chooses, the court is not.

¶27 The dissent also makes much of the superior court issuing the separate Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure Form 19, Joint Legal Decision-Making Education Order, which the Arizona Supreme Court adopted effective January 1, 2025. At the same time the Arizona Supreme Court adopted Form 19, it adopted Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure Form 20, Sole Legal Decision-Making Education Order. The rule petition explained the purpose of both forms: To provide “further clarity or guidance to schools and parents” about parenting time orders because it is common “for schools to find themselves to be in the middle of parental disputes.” The purpose was not to define or clarify the statutory differences between joint and sole legal decision-making or to help the courts understand or interpret the difference. See R-23-0007 Petition to Amend Rules 44.1(c), 45 (c), 78(g) and 91.3 ARFLP (submitted by the Honorable Bruce R. Cohen as the then Presiding Family Court Judge for Maricopa County Superior Court). The dissent cites no authority for using court rules to interpret a statute's plain language. Form 19 and Form 20 thus do not—and cannot—factor into the court's statutory interpretation.

B. When parents share joint legal decision-making and one parent has the ability to make a final decision when the parents have a good-faith disagreement, the other parent is not denied all rights and responsibilities tied to joint legal decision-making.

¶28 Father maintains the award here was “effectively a sole legal decision-making order.” He argues it gave mother “unfettered discretion” or “carte blanche authority to make any and all decisions with which the parties disagree.”

¶29 The court disagrees. Father's argument breaks down because he would have almost no recourse to dispute mother's decision-making process if mother had sole legal decision-making authority. But here, if mother abuses her final decision-making authority, father can petition the court for contempt, use her abuses as a basis to modify, or ask the superior court to intervene under Paul E., 246 Ariz. at 395 ¶ 26. Father thus has tools to challenge those abuses—tools a parent facing sole legal decision-making does not have. In short, as the following chart demonstrates, father is in a much stronger position than if the superior court had awarded mother sole legal decision-making authority.

¶30 The following compares joint and sole legal decision-making on key points.

¶31 At bottom, father's arguments discount the legal differences between sole legal decision-making and joint legal decision-making with final authority. In doing so, father overstates the effect of the award of joint legal decision-making with mother having the ability to make a final decision specifically just for good-faith disagreements. Under the order here, father retains many more rights and responsibilities than if the superior court had awarded mother sole legal decision-making. The two simply are not interchangeable.

C. The court's interpretation fits within the overall structure of Arizona's legal decision-making framework, and it is good policy.

¶32 In Nicaise II, the Arizona Supreme Court was critical of disallowing awards of joint legal decision-making while vesting one of the parents with final decision-making authority: “The court of appeals’ opinion unnecessarily injects uncertainty into a well-established practice and is inconsistent with the overall structure of § 25-401.” 245 Ariz. at 569 ¶ 16. But that is precisely what father would have the court do. He asks the court to adopt the same analysis the Arizona Supreme Court rejected, and in the process he would have the court inject unnecessary uncertainty into the statutory structure, something the court will not do. As shown by the number of appellate cases listed in paragraphs 33 and 34—all involving a grant of final decision-making specifically for just good-faith disagreements—the uncertainty would be far reaching, affecting countless cases around Arizona, especially at the superior court level.

¶33 The court's conclusion here avoids uncertainty and tracks most of the court's unpublished authority on the issue. The court affirmatively rejected father's argument five times since Nicaise II. See Adkisson v. Keith, 1 CA-CV 20-0193 FC, 2021 WL 248168, at *3–4 (Ariz. App. Jan. 26, 2021); Pickett v. Borg, 1 CA-CV 19-0570 FC, 2020 WL 5834850, at *1–2 (Ariz. App. Oct. 1, 2020); deGuzman v. deGuzman, 1 CA-CV 22-0669 FC, 2024 WL 717238, at *2 (Ariz. App. Feb. 22, 2024); Doctor v. Potter, 1 CA-CV 22-0062 FC, 2022 WL 17261382, at *3 (Ariz. App. Nov. 29, 2022); Shaw v. Bergeron, 1 CA-CV 21-0094 FC, 2021 WL 4963607, at *2 (Ariz. App. Oct. 26, 2021). True, since Nicaise II, one panel said it would reach the result father proposes. In re Marriage of Webber v. Webber, 1 CA-CV 23-0669 FC, 2024 WL 4441659, at *3 (Ariz. App. Oct. 8, 2024). But it was only in dicta. See id.

¶34 Since Nicaise II, the court also consistently has affirmed such final decision-making orders without statutory analysis. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 253 Ariz. 43, 45 ¶ 6 (App. 2022); Garza v. Collinsworth, 1 CA-CV 23-0088 FC, 2023 WL 8226017, at *1 (Ariz. App. Nov. 28, 2023); In re Matter of Swanson v. Swanson, 1 CA-CV 21-0621 FC, 2023 WL 3842658, at *6 (Ariz. App. June 6, 2023); Faries v. Faries, 1 CA-CV 19-0094 FC, 2019 WL 3564170, at *2 (Ariz. App. Aug. 6, 2019); Rector v. Stevenson, 1 CA-CV 21-0164 FC, 2021 WL 6139745, at *1 (Ariz. App. Dec. 30, 2021); Lincoln v. McDaniel, 1 CA-CV 25-0252 FC, 2026 WL 143234, at *3 (Ariz. App. Jan. 20, 2026). Before Nicaise, the court consistently affirmed such final decision-making orders without a statutory analysis. See, e.g., Wulf v. Wulf, 1 CA-CV 16-0525 FC, 2017 WL 5589171, at *2 (Ariz. App. Nov. 21, 2017); Hope v. Greenham, 1 CA-CV 15-0548 FC A, 2016 WL 3773544, at *1 (Ariz. App. July 12, 2016). And as explained below, the court mentions these cases not—as the dissent suggests—to provide a litany of support for the court's statutory analysis but to demonstrate the pervasive level of uncertainty the dissent's interpretation would create.

¶35 Contrary to father's argument, final decision-making just for good-faith disagreements does not give mother “carte blanche authority to make any and all decisions with which the parties disagree.” And it does not inject “randomness, a lack of any guidance, and unfettered discretion by [m]other.” In contrast, father's proposed interpretation would result in confusion about what level of final decision-making is allowed under joint legal decision-making. And as Nicaise II warned, uncertainty would abound. If the court were to adopt father's proposed interpretation, it would create uncertainty for the litigants in the cases listed in paragraphs 33 and 34—cases that recognized awarding final decision-making just for good-faith disagreements provided a pragmatic approach for achieving co-parenting. And that does not consider the number of cases that never came before the court for consideration on appeal.

¶36 Other jurisdictions also have concluded that awarding final decision-making just for good-faith disagreements does not create a hybrid of sole legal decision-making and joint legal decision-making and does not undermine joint legal decision-making. See Santo v. Santo, 141 A.3d 74, 80 (Md. App. 2016); see also Shenk v. Shenk, 860 A.2d 408, 415 (Md. Spec. App. 2004). As Santo explained, an award of final decision-making for just those issues on which the parents cannot agree after making a good-faith effort to reach an agreement does not disrupt the balance of the parents’ decision-making power. 141 A.3d at 81. Rather, it encourages parents with joint legal decision-making to collectively decide—in good faith—matters affecting the child. Id. And it allows for one parent to make a final decision only after both parents reflect on what decision is in the child's best interest but cannot agree on the path forward. Id. at 82. In sum, enabling one parent to make a final decision is a pragmatic solution for when the parents cannot come to an agreement in good faith. Id. And an award of final decision-making falls within a trial court's broad discretion. Id. at 80; see also Shenk, 860 A.2d at 415. As Shenk said, “[t]he accommodation fashioned by the trial court does not transform the arrangement into something other than joint custody.” 860 A.2d at 415.

¶37 Maryland is not alone. Georgia and Maine both recognized their courts’ broad discretion on pragmatically assessing parental rights in joint legal decision-making, which is not tainted by a final decision-making provision. See Rembert v. Rembert, 674 S.E.2d 892, 894 (Ga. 2009) (“[I]t is unlikely that they will agree on these issues; the need to designate a final decision-maker is apparent; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the primary custodial parent.”); Klein v. Klein, 208 A.3d 802, 805 ¶ 8 n.2 (Me. 2019) (“[A] court is authorized to award a combination of shared and allocated parental rights by granting one parent explicit final decision-making authority when necessary for the best interest of a child.”).

¶38 Another policy matter merits discussion. “The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ The liberty interest parents have in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court.” Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 221 Ariz. 229, 234 ¶ 15 (App. 2009) (cleaned up). Though father focuses on limiting the superior court's ability to enter such orders, his proposed interpretation would limit parents’ ability to make that same decision. See A.R.S. § 25-401(2) (applying statutory exception to “specified decisions as set forth by the court or the parents in the final judgment or order”) (emphasis added). Father and the dissent thus would preclude parents from agreeing to such orders. And yes, it happens. See, e.g., Friedman & Roels, 244 Ariz. at 113 ¶ 5; Stevens v. Stevens, 1 CA-CV 21-0726 FC, 2022 WL 4373278, at *1 ¶ 6 (Ariz. App. Sept. 22, 2022). Again, the Arizona Supreme Court cited the parents’ agreement in Friedman & Roels with approval in Nicaise II. 245 Ariz. at 569 ¶ 16.

¶39 In sum, the court's interpretation is consistent with subsection 25-401(2)’s plain language and Nicaise II, provides a pragmatic solution for when parents have a good-faith disagreement, avoids the uncertainty that would arise if the court accepted father's argument, and honors both parents’ fundamental right to parent their child.

¶40 The dissent criticizes the majority for mentioning the policy benefits of interpreting the plain statutory language. No doubt, longstanding precedent makes plain “the matter of determining what is ‘good public policy’ is for the executive and legislative departments[, and] the courts must base their decisions on the law as it appears in the constitution and statutes.” See Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 344 (1948). Indeed, the courts “are constrained from rewriting the law under the guise of interpreting it even if we divine a more desirable intended outcome than the text allows.” Ariz. Free Enter. Club, 253 Ariz. at 489 ¶ 38. Consistent with that precedent, the majority merely notes the policy benefits of the statute as the legislature drafted it, and the majority interprets it. See id. In no way does the majority use the above policy to control its statutory analysis. Id.

¶41 That said, the legislature has spoken on the policy of ensuring both parents are involved in the decision-making process. See A.R.S. § 25-103.B.2. Subsection B.2 says, “[i]t also is the declared public policy of this state and the general purpose of this title that absent evidence to the contrary, it is in a child's best interest: ․ To have both parents participate in decision-making about the child.” Subsection C goes on to say, “[a] court shall apply the provisions of this title in a manner that is consistent with this section.” The majority's interpretation preserves the ability of the superior court and parents to choose joint legal decision-making with final decision-making when the evidence establishes it is in the child's best interests when the parents have a good faith disagreement—as the superior court found the evidence did here. The dissent's interpretation precludes that opportunity when the evidence supports final legal decision-making over good-faith disagreements but not a lesser level of specified final decision-making. The end result forces the superior court to award sole legal decision-making to the parent who otherwise would just have final decision-making authority, significantly hampering the ability of one parent to participate, contrary to the legislature's declared public policy under subsection 25-103.B.2, and the legislature's direction on how to interpret the statutes at issue here under subsection 25-103.C. Once again, the legislature's declared public policy did not control the majority's interpretation, but they are consistent.

III. Substantial evidence in the record supports the superior court's legal decision-making award.

¶42 As a final point, father argues (1) the evidence does not support the superior court's credibility findings, (2) the superior court should not have considered mother's expert evidence, (3) the superior court did not properly weigh evidence in its best interests’ analysis, (4) the superior court should not have “characterized father as ‘generally the aggressor,’ ” and (5) the superior court should have given more weight to mother's patterns of conduct. Father thus asks the court to award him sole legal decision-making.

¶43 The court will affirm a superior court ruling on legal decision-making unless the superior court abused its discretion. See Ertl v. Ertl, 252 Ariz. 308, 315 ¶ 25 (App. 2021). The superior court acts within its discretion if substantial evidence supports its judgment. See Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009). The court reviews de novo the sufficiency of evidence but does not reweigh conflicting evidence or redetermine the preponderance of evidence. See State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562 ¶ 15 (2011); Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16. And because the superior court is in the best position to determine witness credibility and resolve conflicting evidence, the court generally defers to its findings. See Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155 ¶ 18 (App. 2015).

¶44 Father asks the court to look at the evidence through the prism of his arguments, not the prism of deferring to the superior court being “in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting evidence.” See id. And father asks the court to reweigh the evidence, which the court will not do. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16.

¶45 Mother does the same. For her part, mother argues father is incorrect and that if the court does engage in reweighing the evidence, it should conclude the superior court erred in father's favor, not mother's. As a result, mother says if the court grants any relief, it should be to remand to the superior court to award her sole legal decision-making. But because mother did not cross appeal, the court could not grant that relief even if it agreed with her. See Engel, 221 Ariz. at 510 ¶ 17; ARCAP 13(b)(2).

¶46 When the court applies the proper standard of review, the court concludes the superior court did not abuse its discretion because more than sufficient evidence supports its findings, conclusions, and orders.

CONCLUSION

¶47 In sum, the phrase “except with respect to specified decisions as set forth by the court or the parents in the final judgment or order” in A.R.S. § 25-401(2) means the superior court may specify the final decision-making award is just for good-faith disagreements. The superior court need not carve out some further “limitation” for nonemergency legal decision-making “regarding education, health care, religious training and personal care.” A.R.S. § 25-401(3).

¶48 The court thus affirms.

¶49 When a judge awards joint legal decision-making to two parents, those parents “share decision-making and neither parent's rights or responsibilities are superior except with respect to specified decisions as set forth by the court or the parents in the final judgment or order.” A.R.S. § 25-401(2) (emphasis added). In this case, the superior court awarded Mother the right to make a final decision on any “major issue” on which the parties disagree after a good-faith effort to reach an agreement. Because I cannot join the majority's conclusion that this provision sufficiently specifies the decisions for which Mother will have final say, I respectfully dissent.

¶50 To understand the proper meaning of “specified decisions” in § 25-401(2), we must read these words in their statutory context. See J.D. v. Hegyi, 236 Ariz. 39, 41, ¶ 6 (2014) (“Words in statutes, however, cannot be read in isolation from the context in which they are used.”); Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509, ¶ 7 (2017) (“In construing a specific provision, we look to the statute as a whole ․”). Viewing § 25-401(2) in proper context, “specified decisions” functions as an exception to the rule that when parent's share joint legal decision-making, “neither parent's rights or responsibilities are superior.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, as a general rule each parent has equal rights and responsibilities relating to parenting their child, and under appropriate circumstances a court may deviate from that requirement. But in doing so, the court needs to state explicitly, or to make certain, the decisions over which a parent may exercise such authority. Construing the statute in that way: (1) applies the statute as written, (2) protects and enforces the parents’ rights and obligations, (3) accounts for the child's best interests, and (4) lessens the need for future litigation on the scope of an order granting one parent final legal decision-making authority over certain decisions.

¶51 The majority concludes that the requisite specificity is met by limiting final legal decision-making to those instances when parents have failed to agree after good-faith consultation with each other. But that interpretation of § 25-401(2) is unreasonable and fails to account for the application of related statutes. See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, 182, ¶ 26 (App. 2008); Stambaugh, 242 Ariz. at 509, ¶ 7. As explained, parents with joint legal decision-making are meant to share equal rights and responsibilities. See A.R.S. § 25-401(2); see also A.R.S. § 25-401(3) (explaining that the scope of legal decision-making includes all nonemergency legal decisions, including “education, health care, religious training and personal care”).

¶52 Under the order at issue, which appears to embrace a “one size fits all” exception to joint legal decision-making, Mother's decision-making supersedes Father's on a much broader scale than contemplated by the statute. Mother effectively wields veto power over all “major issues” requiring “parental decisions” that may arise in the child's life. Given the complexities of life and depending on how a court might interpret the undefined phrase “major issues,” there could easily be hundreds of such decisions during childhood. At the least, this includes questions relating to areas such as “education, health care, religious training and personal care,” not to mention diverse matters concerning use of technology, social interaction, extracurricular activities, finances, and employment. See A.R.S. § 25-401(3).

¶53 Of course, § 25-401(2) specifically contemplates allowing the court or parties to make one parent's rights superior to another's, consistent with the children's best interests, for one or more of these decisions. But those exceptions still ensure the other parent, in the remaining decisions, retains rights and responsibilities that are specifically authorized under a joint legal decision-making arrangement. The majority's framework, instead, endorses an exception that swallows the rule because it allows one parent to exercise essentially unchecked power over the other without recognizing the breadth of the definition of joint legal decision-making. If all “major issues” are removed from joint legal decision-making, then it renders the statutory definition—parents will “share decision-making” and “neither parent's rights or responsibilities are superior”—essentially meaningless. See HonorHealth v. Abboud, 261 Ariz. 583, 587–88, ¶ 21 (App. 2026) (recognizing that courts do not interpret related statutory provisions in a manner that renders any portion meaningless).

¶54 Reasonably construed, the legislature's use of “specified decisions” contemplates that a court will list certain substantive areas on which one party will have final say. But the court's order here imposed only a procedural requirement—that the parties must confer in good faith on all major issues affecting the child. That procedural requirement is not a “specified decision.” The “good-faith” consultation requirement is a mechanism to help facilitate effective communication. While an appropriate goal, under a logical reading of the statute that mechanism is not a “decision.” If the legislature had used the phrase “specified decision-making process” or similar wording, then the good-faith requirement would presumably satisfy the statute. But the legislature chose different wording. And while I recognize the importance of the good-faith requirement and the benefit it brings in fostering beneficial parental decision-making, the concept is too amorphous to meaningfully qualify as a specified decision under the text of the statute.

¶55 The separate order issued by the superior court shortly after the ruling on Father's petition, but before the notice of appeal, exemplifies a “specified decision.” Quoting § 25-401(2), the order states that “[i]t furthers the best interests of the minor child(ren) for this Court to enter the following school-specific order ․” The order then makes it clear that for legal decisions relating to school selection, enrollment/withdrawal, and special services, Mother has final authority to make the decision if the parties cannot agree.

¶56 Without question, the education order is a specified decision under § 25-401(2). Cf. Greene v. Hahn, 689 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that a court's allocation of sole decision-making authority to the father concerning the child's school enrollment was specifically authorized by Wis. Stat. § 767.24(6)(b), which allows “one party sole power to make specified decisions, while both parties retain equal rights and responsibilities for other decisions”). The order informs the parties, as well as judges hearing future disputes, that Mother will have final legal decision-making authority over education matters when the parties disagree. Under the majority's view, however, the education order is presumably unnecessary because the good-faith requirement already covers all such education issues.

¶57 The majority concludes that Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566 (2019), supports the order at issue here. In that opinion, our supreme court concluded that § 25-401(2) allows the superior court to make one parent's joint legal decision-making authority superior to another's “in some circumstances,” without giving the tie-breaking parent sole legal decision-making. Id. at 568, ¶ 13. But the order at issue in Nicaise expressly limited the father's tie-breaking power to “medical, mental health, dental, and therapy issues”; it specified the decisions on which one parent would have tie-breaking authority, in accordance with § 25-401(2). Id. at 567, ¶ 3. And throughout Nicaise, our supreme court noted such authority was proper in joint legal decision-making, when a parent had such authority over “certain matters” and in “some circumstances.” Id. at 568–69, ¶¶ 13, 16. Unlike the situation in Nicaise, the order here does not limit Mother's superior rights to certain matters; her rights are superior to Father's anytime the parties cannot reach an agreement on any major issue after conferring in good faith.

¶58 To clarify, I am not saying the court awarded Mother sole legal decision-making or that Father has effectively lost his parental rights. Indeed, the majority goes to great lengths to show that Father still has parental rights. Supra ¶ 30. To the extent Father contends Mother was awarded sole legal decision-making, he is incorrect. But neither that fact, nor that Father “is in a much stronger position than if the superior court had awarded mother sole legal decision-making authority,” supra ¶ 29, means the order properly applied § 25-401(2). Section 25-401(2) requires that under joint legal decision-making, except for specified decisions, “neither parent's rights or responsibilities are superior.” That Mother and Father's parental rights are not as unequal as they could have been does not mean the court awarded a form of legal decision-making cognizable under Arizona law.

¶59 The majority's reliance on a litany of past memorandum decisions from this court likewise is not persuasive, and its framing that these decisions represent a near univocal affirmance of the majority's logic is, at best, misguided.² In most of those decisions, it is not clear that the parties raised the issue presented here; the orders there merely mirror the language used here, and this court affirmed on different grounds. That this court affirmed the orders on issues wholly unrelated to the questions in the instant case means little. And of those few cases addressing the same issue presented here, panels have not always agreed on how to apply the meaning of “specified decisions.” In Pickett v. Borg, 1 CA-CV 19-0570 FC, 2020 WL 5834850, at *2, ¶ 10 (Ariz. App. Oct. 1, 2020) (mem. decision) and Adkisson v. Keith, 1 CA-CV 20-0193 FC, 2021 WL 248168, at *4, ¶ 19 (Ariz. App. Jan. 26, 2021) (mem. decision), each panel affirmed a grant of universal final decision-making. But neither panel relied on the reasoning presented by the majority in this; instead, those panels affirmed such orders under A.R.S. § 25-403(A), which requires courts to determine legal decision-making “in accordance with the best interests of the child.” See Pickett, at *2, ¶ 10; Adkisson, at *4, ¶ 18.

¶60 Nor do I find the reasoning of Pickett and Adkisson persuasive. While it is true that the child's best interests are the paramount consideration in legal decision-making cases, Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102, ¶ 18 (2003), that does not mean we can simply choose which statutory requirements we will follow. Indeed, to the extent § 25-403(A) and § 25-401(2) could be read as conflicting, our task would be to “adopt a construction that reconciles one with the other, giving force and meaning to all statutes involved.” Rueschenberg v. Rueschenberg, 219 Ariz. 249, 252, ¶ 12 (App. 2008) (quoting UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Craig, 200 Ariz. 327, 333, ¶ 28 (2001)). A court could easily determine the specified decisions for which a parent should enjoy tie-breaking authority, considered in the child's best interests. But those interests alone do not allow a court to fashion a legal decision-making arrangement that fails to apply the plain meaning of a related statute.

¶61 Conversely, the panel that decided In re Marriage of Webber v. Webber, 1 CA-CV 23-0669 FC, 2024 WL 4441659, at *3, ¶ 17 (Ariz. App. Oct. 8, 2024) (mem. decision) recognized that § 25-401(2) does not allow a court to “grant presumptive final decision-making authority to one parent for all parental decisions.” Id. at *3, ¶ 17. The panel affirmed the superior court's order based on language different from the order at issue in our case. Id. at ¶¶ 18–19. The decision-making order in that case stated that if the parents “cannot agree after making a good faith effort to reach an agreement, any such major issue Mother shall have ‘presumptive decision-making authority.’ ” Id. at ¶ 18. Because the order had previously referenced “medical and schooling” as the major issues, the Webber court interpreted Mother's final decision-making authority to extend to “decisions involving medical or schooling issues.” Id. at ¶ 19 (emphasis added).

¶62 Finally, I disagree with the majority's reliance on the notion that (1) accepting Father's position here would cause confusion or uncertainty for parents and undermine a significant number of existing legal decision-making orders, and (2) affirming the good-faith requirement the superior court imposed represents good and beneficial policy. I struggle to see how requiring courts to follow the legislature's directive to be specific in their joint legal decision-making orders will create uncertainty. To the contrary, it will ensure that parents have plainly defined legal decision-making authority, a concept entirely consistent with respecting the fundamental right to parent and a child's best interests. I am confident the superior court is quite capable of specifying with certainty the decisions over which parents may have final decision-making authority. The court did so here, in part, when it issued the education order.

¶63 But even more fundamentally, it is not our role to determine whether our interpretation of the statute constitutes good policy; our only task is to determine and apply, in a reasonable manner, the plain meaning of the statutory text. See Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 344 (1948) (“[T]he matter of determining what is ‘good public policy’ is for the executive and legislative departments[;] ․ the courts must base their decisions on the law as it appears in the constitution and statutes.”). If the legislature believes it would be more expedient or beneficial to allow courts to grant final legal decision-making authority to one parent based on certain procedural requirements, such as a good-faith consultation, the legislature is free to amend the statute accordingly.

¶64 The court's order failed to specify, or identify with certainty, the decisions on which Mother would have final legal decision-making, and thus the court failed to apply the statute as written. The majority's analysis stretches too far by concluding that the portion of the decree at issue here—which does not define “major issues” or “good faith” and fails to identify any specific decision—satisfies the legislative requirement that tie-breaking authority applies only to specified decisions. Accordingly, I would vacate that portion of the order and remand to allow the superior court to make any additional “specified decisions” under § 25-401(2) it deems appropriate.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Even if the majority were correct in this regard, it would not matter. Memorandum decisions are not binding authority and are only of persuasive value when no other opinion clearly on point controls. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c). Moreover, none of the memorandum decisions involved an in-depth statutory construction analysis of the meaning of “specified decisions” under A.R.S. § 25-401(2).

GASS, Judge: