MARANA CITIZENS FOR ETHICAL AND TRANSPARENT GOVERNMENT v. TOWN OF MARANA (2026)

OPINION

¶1 In this expedited election appeal, we decide whether two referendum petitions circulated by a coalition of concerned voter groups satisfied the Arizona constitutional and statutory requirements that a “full and correct copy of the title and text of the measure,” along with “a legal description” of the property, be attached and available to electors at the time they sign the petition. Appellants Marana Citizens for Ethical and Transparent Government, Jackie McGuire, Matthew Rohen-Trapp, and Susan Ritz (collectively, MCETG) appeal from the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town of Marana after its Town Clerk refused to transmit the facsimiles of the signature sheets to the Pima County Recorder's Office. Fremont Peak Properties separately appeals from the court's conclusion that the Town Clerk properly refused to accept the withdrawal of the same referendum petitions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of the Town and against Fremont and MCETG.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 The undisputed facts are as follows. On January 6, 2026, the Marana Town Council passed two ordinances—Ordinance Numbers 2026-002 and 2026-003—rezoning parcels of land from residential to “specific plan” zoning. Fremont is under contract to purchase both parcels. The Marana Mayor and Town Clerk signed both ordinances that same day. Intending to file a referendum petition against the ordinances, a representative of a referendum committee—together, Arizonans for Responsible Development, sponsored by Worker Power, and a Marana political action committee—requested copies of the signed ordinances from the Town Clerk, which she provided on January 7. Neither ordinance provided by the Town Clerk to the referendum committee included its Exhibit A.¹

¶3 The referendum committee then submitted applications for official serial numbers as provided by A.R.S. § 19-111. The Town Clerk issued serial numbers for both referendum petitions on January 8. Like the versions of the ordinances provided to the referendum committee, neither ordinance attached to the referenda on January 8 contained its Exhibit A.

¶4 The referendum committee then collected signatures on the two referendum petitions. On January 12, the Town recorded each ordinance, without its Exhibit A, with the Pima County Recorder's Office. By the close of business on January 13, the petitions had been signed by more than 1,360 people—the minimum number required for the petitions to appear on the ballot. On January 15, the Town Clerk submitted to the Pima County Recorder's Office two notices of scrivener's error, each stating the Town Clerk had failed to include “Exhibit A” with the ordinance and providing the missing exhibit.

¶5 On February 4, the referendum committee submitted both referendum petitions, along with the signature sheets and the ordinances. On February 17, the referendum committee attempted to withdraw the petitions and the attached signature sheets, stating that it “no longer support[ed] placing these measures on the ballot.” The Town Clerk denied the request, explaining she did not have statutory authority to withdraw petitions after filing. On February 18, the Town Clerk also rejected both referendum petitions, explaining that “the filed petitions did not include [Exhibit A,] the legal description of the involved properties required for zoning ordinances.” Thereafter, the Town Clerk further explained that the Town had corrected and re-recorded the ordinances on January 15 and had uploaded new copies of the ordinances to the Town's website on January 16.

¶6 MCETG then filed a third-party special-action complaint seeking to compel the Town Clerk to transmit the referendum petition signature sheets to the county recorder's office. See A.R.S. § 19-122(A). Fremont separately filed a mandamus action, seeking to compel the Town Clerk to accept the committee's attempted withdrawal of the petitions. MCETG, Fremont, and the Town of Marana all filed motions for summary judgment. Fremont argued the Town Clerk had improperly denied the request to withdraw the referendum petition. MCETG argued the petitions that had been circulated contained copies of the ordinance identical to those provided to the referendum committee and recorded with the Pima County Recorder's Office and thus, despite the fact that the Town later amended the petitions to include the Exhibits A, the petitions strictly complied with A.R.S. § 19-121. It also argued that, notwithstanding the absence of the Exhibits A, the ordinances attached to the circulated petitions had provided an adequate legal description of the property as required by § 19-121(E). The Town argued the petitions had failed to strictly comply with § 19-121(A)(3) and (E) and thus it did not err in refusing to transmit the signature sheets to the recorder's office. After hearing oral argument on the motions, the superior court entered summary judgment in favor of the Town as to both issues. It reasoned that the Town Clerk had correctly found the signature sheets did not strictly comply with § 19-121 and that the Town Clerk had no discretion to withdraw a submitted referendum petition under A.R.S. §§ 19-113, 19-121.01. This appeal followed.

Jurisdiction

¶7 We have jurisdiction over MCETG's appeal under A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1), 19-122(A). We grant Fremont's request, made at oral argument, to exercise special-action jurisdiction over its related appeal, which it filed as a request for mandamus relief under Rule 7, Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. See Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 2(c) (“[i]f a party brings an action formerly described as one for ․ mandamus,” that proceeding “is a special action”); Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehab., & Pub. Safety v. Hobbs, 249 Ariz. 396, ¶¶ 18-20, 471 P.3d 607 (2020) (special-action jurisdiction appropriate for mandamus action challenging secretary's refusal to accept electronic initiative petition signatures); Lane v. City of Scottsdale, 258 Ariz. 460, ¶ 1, 559 P.3d 1127 (App. 2024) (accepting special-action jurisdiction over appeal related to referendum petition and brought as expedited election appeal). Because Fremont's petition asks us to resolve a question of statewide importance, the resolution of which may become moot before appeal, special-action jurisdiction is appropriate. See Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(4), (5).

Discussion

I. The Town Clerk Properly Rejected Fremont's Attempt to Withdraw Signature Sheets and Petitions

¶8 Fremont contends the superior court erred by determining the Town Clerk had properly rejected the referendum committee's request to withdraw the signed referendum petitions. Fremont argues that because “the people exercise the referendum through organized committees that file applications,” the court's refusal to allow the referendum committee to withdraw the petitions amounts to a denial of the referendum power guaranteed by the state constitution. Additionally, it notes that no Arizona law expressly limits a referendum petition proponent's right to withdraw a signed petition, suggesting that an implied right exists. Because MCETG's challenge is moot if Fremont prevails on this issue, we address it as a threshold matter.

¶9 We review a superior court's decision on a request for mandamus relief for an abuse of discretion. Arrett v. Bower, 237 Ariz. 74, ¶ 7, 345 P.3d 129 (App. 2015). We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo. Id. When interpreting a statute, we begin with the text. City of Chandler v. Roosevelt Water Conservation Dist., 262 Ariz. 71, ¶ 17, 587 P.3d 1271 (2026). “If a statute's text is clear and unambiguous, it controls unless it results in an absurdity or a constitutional violation.” Id. “We interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” Id. (quoting Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, ¶ 11, 432 P.3d 925 (2019)).

¶10 The Arizona Constitution reserves to the qualified electors of incorporated cities the power of referendum. Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(8). As relevant here, “a person or organization may file a referendum petition against the rezoning of a parcel of property ․” A.R.S. § 19-142(D). “Arizona's public policy strongly favors the initiative and referendum processes.” Ariz. Free Enter. Club v. Hobbs, 253 Ariz. 478, ¶ 7, 515 P.3d 664 (2022). Nevertheless, referendum petitions and procedures “must ‘comply strictly with applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.’ ” Sherrill v. City of Peoria, 189 Ariz. 537, 540, 943 P.2d 1215, 1218 (1997) (quoting W. Devcor, Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 168 Ariz. 426, 429, 814 P.2d 767, 770 (1991)). This strict compliance standard extends to petition circulators and to the municipal officials tasked with facilitating the petition process. See Voice of Surprise v. Hall, 255 Ariz. 510, ¶ 2, 533 P.3d 942 (2023).

¶11 Fremont invites us to construe the constitutional power of referendum as being vested in the circulator of a referendum petition—whether it be a committee or an individual—to the same degree that it is vested in each individual voting citizen or “qualified elector.” Based on this premise, Fremont argues that “[w]ith the power to commence and control a referendum necessarily comes the power to abandon it.” Fremont cites various statutes that regulate how a referendum petition may be publicized on a general election ballot or defended in a legal proceeding to suggest that circulators are vested with final control of a referendum petition's fate. See A.R.S. § 19-124(D) (statement of “the person filing the initiative petition or the person who introduced the measure or constitutional amendment referred” shall be first listed in publicity pamphlet); A.R.S. § 12-921 (“official initiative proponent” has standing to defend legal challenge to initiative already enacted through referendum process).

¶12 But the plain language of the Arizona Constitution treats “qualified electors” as distinct from other entities such as organizations, political action committees, or even individual circulators supporting a referendum effort. See Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(7)–(9). Qualified electors are those individuals who may lawfully cast votes in a particular election, a power not enjoyed by any committee or organization. See W. Devcor, Inc., 168 Ariz. at 429-30, 814 P.2d at 770-71 (signed petitions invalid when circulators failed to include affidavits stating circulators believed signers were qualified electors of municipality relevant to petition). Conversely, petition circulators or proponents are not even statutorily required to be Arizona residents, much less qualified voters. See A.R.S. § 19-118(A) (providing registration requirements for “circulators who are not residents of this state”).

¶13 Our election statutes draw similar distinctions. For example, both A.R.S. §§ 19-112(A) and 19-122(A) differentiate between a “person who submitted the petition”—the petition circulator—and those who signed the petition or who may challenge the petition process. See § 19-122(A) (secretary “shall provide the person who submitted the petition” with written explanation for refusal to transmit, upon which “any citizen” may apply for writ of mandamus to compel petition's transmission); § 19-112(A) (explaining process by which circulators must verify and attest to qualified elector status of signatories). In short, it is to the qualified electors, not the circulators or organizations of a referendum petition, that our constitution gives the power of referring a legislative act. Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(3), (8).² Although circulators play a vital role in the process, they are not substitutes for the qualified electors who hold the powers of referendum and initiative.

¶14 It logically follows, then, that qualified electors alone hold the power to withdraw their own signatures in support of a referendum petition. This principle is reflected by the plain text of § 19-113(A), which directs that “[a] person who has signed a petition prescribed by statute for ․ referendum ․ may withdraw the person's signature from the petition not later than 5:00 p.m. on the date the petition containing the person's signature is actually filed.” By contrast to this express statutory method for individual signature withdrawal, no statute or constitutional provision authorizes a referendum committee to withdraw signatures on behalf of a qualified elector. In fact, none of Arizona's referendum statutes provide any mechanism for a town clerk to honor a committee's request to withdraw already signed signature sheets on behalf of the signatories. Because a clerk may “only exercise the authority expressly granted by the constitution and the election statutes,” and because “nothing authorized her to” accept the referendum committee's withdrawal of signature sheets on behalf of the qualified electors, the Town Clerk had no such authority. Voice of Surprise, 255 Ariz. 510, ¶ 2, 533 P.3d 942 (absent express authority otherwise, clerk lacked authority to reject petition sheets due to error in referendum committee's application materials). Upon receipt of the signature sheets and petitions, the Town Clerk was statutorily required to conduct the review prescribed by § 19-121.01 and transmit the eligible petitions and signature sheets to the county recorder as prescribed by that section.

¶15 Fremont argues that § 19-113 is inapplicable because it is a mere “housekeeping” provision and the Town Clerk had “implied authority” to recognize the withdrawal because such recognition does not require affirmative action. But our supreme court dismissed a similar argument in Voice of Surprise, in which a city clerk had rejected signature sheets on the basis that the petition application failed to include a copy of the ordinance, as required by § 19-111(A). See 255 Ariz. 510, ¶¶ 6, 29, 31-35, 533 P.3d 942. In so concluding, the court reasoned that because no statute or constitutional provision expressly authorized the clerk to reject signed petition sheets on the basis of a deficient application for a serial number, the clerk lacked the authority to do so. Id. ¶ 35. Likewise, here, no provision expressly authorizes a clerk to reject signed petition sheets on the basis of a referendum committee's blanket withdrawal. In fact, in the context of initiative petitions, the Arizona Attorney General has reasoned that “only the elector himself can withdraw his signature” and that a petition circulator's refusal to file signature sheets “would, in effect, constitute a unilateral withdrawal of the signatures of qualified electors, contrary to the procedures prescribed by A.R.S. § 19-113.” 1984 Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 55 (1984). We see no reason why the same principle would not apply to referendum petitions.

¶16 Finally, even if we agreed that the Town Clerk had implied authority to recognize the committee's withdrawal of the signature sheets, its attempt was untimely. The petitions were filed on February 4. The Town Clerk issued a receipt the same day, making February 4 the date of filing under § 19-121(E). The referendum committee did not seek any withdrawal of the petitions or the signature sheets until February 17. But the only election statute that expressly authorizes withdrawal of referendum petition signatures is § 19-113, and, under that section, withdrawal is required by 5 p.m. on the date of filing. Thus, the withdrawal effort failed to comply with the statutory timeline. For this reason alone, the Town Clerk did not err in rejecting the request to withdraw the referendum petition. In sum, the superior court did not err in concluding that the Town Clerk appropriately declined to overstep her statutory authority by allowing the referendum committee to withdraw signatures on behalf of thousands of qualified electors.

II. The Town Clerk Correctly Refused to Transmit the Petitions and Signature Sheets to the Pima County Recorder

¶17 MCETG separately challenges the superior court's conclusion that the referendum petitions failed to strictly comply with the referendum statutes because neither petition included its Exhibit A, which contained additional legal descriptions of the property and which were expressly incorporated by the text of the ordinances. The superior court reasoned that this failure was fatal to the petitions for two reasons: First, the petitions did not contain the full and complete text of the measures being challenged, as required by § 19-121(A)(3); and second, the omission of the exhibits resulted in the ordinances containing inadequate legal descriptions of the properties in question. Although in this instance the defects originated with an error by the Town Clerk rather than by the referendum petition proponent, we agree with the superior court that the petitions failed to strictly comply with the referendum statutes and that the Town Clerk did not err in rejecting them on that basis.

¶18 A person or organization who intends to file a referendum petition against an ordinance may apply for a serial number and must follow the detailed instructions set forth in § 19-111. Upon receiving such application, a town clerk “shall provide” the referendum petition proponent “with a full and correct copy of the ordinance or resolution in the form as finally adopted.” § 19-142(C). Article IV, part 1, § 1(9) of the Arizona Constitution directs that “[e]ach sheet containing petitioners’ signatures shall be attached to a full and correct copy of the title and text of the measure so proposed to be ․ referred to the people ․” Section 19-121(A)(3) likewise requires that referendum petition signature sheets be attached to full and correct copies of the title and text of the measure being challenged. Further, referendum petitions such as these, which challenge zoning measures, “shall also include a legal description of the property and any amendments made to the ordinance by the legislative body.” § 19-121(E); see also Van Riper v. Threadgill, 183 Ariz. 580, 584, 905 P.2d 589, 593 (App. 1995) (§ 19-121(E), not § 19-112(B), “governs what must be attached to the petition when the measure to be referred is enacted by the legislative body of an incorporated town”); Sherrill, 189 Ariz. at 539, 943 P.2d at 1217. Section 19-121(E) “establishes a bright-line rule that specifies three items to be attached to each petition: (1) the adopted ordinance or resolution [signed by the mayor and clerk of the municipality]; (2) a legal description of the property; and (3) amendments, if any, made to the ordinance.” Sherrill, 189 Ariz. at 540, 943 P.2d at 1218.

¶19 As noted, it is well established that referendum petitions and procedures must strictly comply with applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. Id.; Workers for Responsible Dev. v. City of Tempe, 254 Ariz. 505, ¶ 13, 524 P.3d 1161 (App. 2023) (collecting cases showing “strict compliance for referenda ․ has been the standard in Arizona for quite some time”); see also A.R.S. § 19-101.01 (reiterating legislature's intention to require that “persons using the referendum process strictly comply with those constitutional and statutory requirements”). This is because a referendum proceeding “permits a minority to forestall implementation of enacted legislation.” Jones v. Respect the Will of the People, 254 Ariz. 73, ¶ 14, 517 P.3d 1188 (App. 2022) (quoting Maricopa Citizens Protecting Taxpayers v. Price, 244 Ariz. 330, ¶ 8, 418 P.3d 1103 (App. 2017)); Cottonwood Dev. v. Foothills Area Coal. of Tucson, Inc., 134 Ariz. 46, 49, 653 P.2d 694, 697 (1982).

¶20 Referendum petition proponents must achieve “nearly perfect compliance” with the relevant constitutional provisions and election statutes to meet this standard. See Arrett, 237 Ariz. 74, ¶ 23, 345 P.3d 129 (quoting Comm. for Pres. of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247, ¶ 6, 141 P.3d 422 (App. 2006)). We have thus affirmed the rejection of signature sheets when, like here, their legal inadequacy was caused by a town clerk's affirmative error. See, e.g., Fid. Nat'l Title Co. v. Town of Marana, 220 Ariz. 247, ¶ 14, 204 P.3d 1096 (App. 2009) (town clerk's incorrect advice to referendum petition proponent resulted in late filing). Our supreme court has similarly concluded that a town clerk has no obligation to reveal that a referendum application is fatally insufficient because the clerk “performs a ministerial role in accepting applications and issuing petition serial numbers.” Voice of Surprise, 255 Ariz. 510, ¶ 24, 533 P.3d 942. As we have reasoned, “it is the challenger's responsibility to comply with the statutory requirements for filing a referendum petition, and the receipt of erroneous advice, even from governmental officials responsible for administering the referendum process, does not excuse that responsibility.” Fid. Nat'l Title Co., 220 Ariz. 247, ¶ 14, 204 P.3d 1096.

¶21 Here, the parties do not dispute that the Town Clerk provided the referendum committee with versions of the ordinances that failed to include the Exhibits A. The parties also do not dispute that the Town Clerk represented in an email to the referendum committee that the ordinances she furnished were the “final, corrected ordinances” that had been “approved at the meeting.” The dispositive question, then, is whether the petitions challenging these ordinances, without the Exhibits A, strictly complied with the statutory and constitutional requirements that signature sheets be attached to a full and correct copy of the title and text of the challenged measure.

¶22 Under the specific facts present here, the petitions do not meet the strict compliance standard.³ Both ordinances expressly incorporate Exhibit A by stating that Exhibit A “is hereby referred to, adopted and made part of this ordinance as if fully set out here.” Unlike in Sherrill, where a rezoning ordinance was complete even without attaching supplemental “companion documents” that merely explained the various potential uses allowed under the new zoning designation, 189 Ariz. at 540, 943 P.2d at 1218, here the missing attachments are expressly made part of the ordinances themselves. Further, the missing attachments include relevant information about the limits of the property rights affected by but not otherwise provided in the primary text of the ordinances, specifically with regard to water rights. Under these circumstances, requiring the referendum committee to include Exhibit A for each ordinance does no more than enforce the “bright-line rule that specifies three items to be attached to each petition: (1) the adopted ordinance or resolution; (2) a legal description of the property; and (3) amendments, if any, made to the ordinance.” Sherrill, 189 Ariz. at 540, 943 P.2d at 1218.

¶23 We are unpersuaded by MCETG's argument, relying on Sherrill and Lawrence v. Jones, 199 Ariz. 446, 18 P.3d 1245 (App. 2001), that the requirements of the referendum statutes must be broadly construed, such that we may interpret the ordinances as complete even without their exhibits. As we noted in Jones, “the proposition that we broadly construe the terms in the referendum statutes appears to be no longer good law” after the passage of § 19-101.01. 254 Ariz. 73, ¶ 28, 517 P.3d 1188.

¶24 MCETG makes a non-trivial argument that the signature sheets satisfied § 19-121(A)(3)’s directive because they were attached to exact copies of the ordinances as they were originally signed and recorded by the Town before its January 14 re-recording. Underlying this claim is the undisputed fact that the Town Clerk failed to include the Exhibits A, both when furnishing the ordinances to the referendum committee and when originally recording the ordinances with the Pima County Recorder. This failure is in conflict with the directive of § 19-142(C), which requires that a clerk provide a referendum petition proponent “with a full and correct copy of the ordinance or resolution in the form as finally adopted.” But, as noted above, it is for the referendum petition proponent, not the election official, to ensure that referendum petitions comply with the law. Fid. Nat'l Title Co., 220 Ariz. 247, ¶ 14, 204 P.3d 1096. The Exhibits A were publicly available before and after the ordinances were signed, and they have not changed in form or content.⁴ The ordinances clearly incorporate and adopt the Exhibits A, and those exhibits are expressly part of the ordinances themselves. Under these circumstances, it was the duty of the referendum petition proponent to ensure that the signature sheets included the full and correct copy of the ordinances. See Robson Ranch Mountains, L.L.C. v. Pinal County, 203 Ariz. 120, 130, 51 P.3d 342, 352 (App. 2002) (when ordinances available to general public on date petitions generated, referendum petition proponents responsible for timely attaching ordinances despite election official's mistaken belief that ordinances were unavailable).

¶25 In short, regardless of whose mistake leads to a lack of strict compliance with the referendum petition statutes, a referendum petition may not move forward if its proponent fails to strictly comply with the statutory and constitutional provisions. Failure to include attachments that are expressly incorporated into the ordinances is fatal to the requirement that petitions strictly comply with § 19-121(A)’s directive to include the full text of the ordinance. This is true even when, as here, the Town Clerk has failed to fulfill her statutory duty under § 19-142(C) to provide a referendum petition proponent “with a full and correct copy of the ordinance or resolution in the form as finally adopted.” Because the petitions did not have attached the “full and correct copy” of the text of the challenged ordinances, they failed to strictly comply with § 19-121(A)(3), and the Town Clerk properly rejected them on this ground. The superior court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Town on the issue of the Town Clerk's refusal to transmit the signature sheets to the county recorder.⁵

¶26 MCETG requests its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-348(A)(2) and the private attorney general doctrine, see Ansley v. Banner Health Network, 248 Ariz. 143, ¶ 39, 459 P.3d 55 (2020). Because it is not the prevailing party, we deny this request. Neither Fremont nor the Town have requested attorney fees on appeal.

Disposition

¶27 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town and against MCETG and Fremont.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For Ordinance 2026-002, Exhibit A reads: “All of Section 1, Township 11 South, Range 10 East, Gila and Salt River base and meridian Pima County, Arizona;Except all subterranean percolating waters contained within, underlying and which may be produced as conveyed to Cortaro-Water User's Association by deed recorded in book 314 of deeds, page 445.”For Ordinance 2026-003, Exhibit A reads:The north half of Section 12, Township 11 South, Range 10 East of the Gila and Salt River base and meridian, Pima County Arizona.Except that irrigation well site parcel described in deed dated February 19, 1963, recorded May 16, 1963 recorded in docket 2101, page 131, document no. 35638, in the Office of the Pima County Recorder, Pima County, Arizona and the east 30 feet for roads;Except all subterranean percolating water contained within, underlying, and which may be produced;Except such water as may be used by the owners and inhabitants for domestic and other purposes that may be produced from wells of the capacity of not to exceed fifty gallons per minute, as conveyed by deed recorded in book 314 of deeds, page 445.

2.   Although we do not quibble with Fremont's observation that “no one elector can compel a referendum proponent to do anything” to promote a referendum petition, the question presented here is whether the Town Clerk was compelled to honor the withdrawal of the signed petitions, not whether the referendum petition committee must continue to affirmatively support the referendum.

3.   Whether the requirement of strict compliance is necessary to protect direct democracy, or whether it is ill-advised, is not for this court to determine. Strict compliance is the law, see Sherrill, 189 Ariz. at 540, 943 P.2d at 1218, and we are bound by it, see State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n.4, 86 P.3d 370, n.4 (2004) (“The courts of this state are bound by the decisions of [the Arizona Supreme Court] ․”).

4.   We take judicial notice of the agenda packet, which is publicly available on the website of the Town of Marana. See In re Sabino R., 198 Ariz. 424, ¶ 4, 10 P.3d 1211 (App. 2000).

5.   Because we conclude the petitions did not strictly comply with the statutory requirements, we do not address MCETG's argument that the ordinances contained sufficient legal descriptions even without attaching the Exhibits A.

STARING, Chief Judge: