IN RE: BYRON SAMARAS THE BYRON SAMARAS FAMILY LIVING TRUST (2026)

OPINION

¶1 Petitioner Nicholas Samaras (“Nico”)² appeals the superior court's denial of his Petition for Formal Probate and Appointment of Personal Representative and the admission of a will his father executed in 2018 (“2018 Will”) to probate. Nico argues the superior court erred in determining that his father possessed testamentary capacity to execute the 2018 Will. This Court reverses the order admitting the 2018 Will to probate and remands for the superior court to evaluate the evidence of testamentary capacity in light of the guidance provided in this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2017, an attorney prepared, and Byron Samaras executed, the Byron Samaras Family Living Trust (“Trust”). The Trust designated Byron's daughter, Christina Samaras, and his son, Nico, as equal beneficiaries. Byron also executed a “pour-over” will (“2017 Will”) which designated Christina as personal representative and transferred the residue of his estate to the Trust upon his death. At the same time, Byron executed two special warranty deeds conveying title to two condominiums into the Trust.

¶3 Almost a year later, Byron executed the 2018 Will, prepared by a different attorney, John Gilbert. The 2018 Will also designated Christina as personal representative but left all of Byron's estate to Christina and provided nothing for Nico, noting that the Trust provided for him.

¶4 Byron died in December 2022. Nico and Christina survived him. After Byron's death, Nico filed a Petition for Formal Probate and Appointment of Personal Representative, asserting “the 2018 Will is an invalid document.” Christina cross-petitioned seeking appointment as personal representative under the 2018 Will and its admission to probate. Nico challenged the 2018 Will as invalid, arguing Byron lacked testamentary capacity when he signed it.

¶5 The court held a four-day bench trial in December 2024. The trial focused on whether Byron possessed testamentary capacity on August 16, 2018, when he executed the 2018 Will. After receiving evidence from both parties on Byron's testamentary capacity, including testimony from multiple witnesses, the court found Nico's evidence

was simply too distant in time from the actual execution of the 2018 Will for the [c]ourt to find it to be enough to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that [Byron] was either of unsound mind or that [Byron], in fact, did not have testamentary capacity [when he signed the 2018 Will].

¶6 The court encouraged Nico to appeal so this Court could clarify the law in this area. Nico timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), (9).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Nico raises three issues on appeal. He argues the court erred by: (1) focusing its analysis on delusion or hallucination, rather than general mental incompetence; (2) considering only evidence of testamentary capacity at execution and excluding important pre-execution evidence that rebutted the presumption in A.R.S. § 14-2712(D) of Byron's presumed testamentary capacity; and (3) finding no evidence Byron lacked testamentary capacity on August 16, 2018. To resolve these issues, this Court focuses its analysis solely on application of the statutory presumption of testamentary capacity and when the superior court may consider evidence of competency from before and after execution.

¶8 A valid will must be executed by “a person who is eighteen years of age or older and who is of sound mind.” A.R.S. § 14-2501. Courts refer to the “sound mind” requirement as “testamentary capacity.” See Matter of Estate of Killen, 188 Ariz. 562, 566 (App. 1996) (equating “mental capacity” to execute a will with “testamentary capacity”). The law presumes that a person executing a will had sufficient mental capacity at the time of execution and the person did so “free from undue influence and duress,” but that presumption is rebuttable. A.R.S. § 14-2712(B) (addressing “governing instruments”); see also A.R.S. § 14-1201(28) (defining “governing instrument” to include wills and trusts). And the “law favors testacy” or the leaving of a will. Killen, 188 Ariz. at 565.

¶9 The proponent of a will “has the burden of establishing prima facie proof of due execution in all cases.” A.R.S. § 14-2712(A). Subject to a few statutory exceptions related to undue influence and duress, a person challenging the validity of the will has the burden of establishing its invalidity “by a preponderance of the evidence.” A.R.S. § 14-2712(D) (identifying subsections (E) and (F) as limited situations when a will is presumed to be the result of undue influence and the process for rebutting that presumption). Nico raised no issues of undue influence or duress so this Court does not address those statutory exceptions. Thus, Nico bore the burden of overcoming the presumption of testamentary capacity under § 14-2712(B) and proving the 2018 Will's invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence. A.R.S. § 14-2712(D).

¶10 This Court reviews “any legal issues raised de novo, and appl[ies] ‘the appropriate legal standard to the facts found’ by the superior court.” In re Estate of Sibley, 246 Ariz. 498, 501, ¶ 13 (App. 2018) (quoting In re Estate of Shumway, 198 Ariz. 323, 326, ¶ 9 (2000)). However, this Court reviews factual findings about whether testamentary capacity existed for clear error. See Matter of Ghostley, 248 Ariz. 112, 115, ¶ 8 (App. 2020) (quoting In re Estate of Zaritsky, 198 Ariz. 599, 601, ¶ 5 (App. 2000)).

¶11 To succeed in his challenge to the 2018 Will, Nico needed to show that Byron lacked the ability (1) “to know the nature and extent of [his] property”; (2) to know his relation to the persons he was leaving his property to and (3) the ability to understand the nature of his execution of the will. In re Walters’ Estate, 77 Ariz. 122, 129 (1954). In analyzing whether these elements of capacity exist, a court must consider whether the incapacity is “of such broad character as to establish mental incompetenc[e] generally” or “some specific and narrower form of [mental incapacity]” resulting in “hallucination or delusion.” In re O'Connor’s Estate, 74 Ariz. 248, 258 (1952) (impliedly overruled on other grounds) (quotation omitted). But no matter what evidence a party presents, it must relate to the capacity of the person “at the time of execution” of the will. Killen, 188 Ariz. at 568 (emphasis added).

¶12 The superior court heard evidence about Byron's testamentary capacity at the time he executed the 2018 Will. Those in attendance the day Byron executed his 2018 Will (Christina, beneficiary of the 2018 Will; John Gilbert, the attorney who drafted the 2018 Will; and Ove Hamstrup, Byron's friend, witness to the 2018 Will and Christina's and Byron's business partner) testified. The superior court found the testimony of all these witnesses “unreliable or lacking credibility” but noted it was the only “direct evidence” of Byron's testamentary capacity on the day he executed the 2018 Will. It also found that attorney Gilbert's testimony “failed to demonstrate that [Byron] had ‘awareness of the kind and character of his property.’ ”

¶13 Conversely, Nico presented evidence of Byron's declining mental health before and after he executed the 2018 Will. Christina reported that in late 2016, Byron's memory issues led to him getting lost while driving near his home. And Nico testified that in February 2017 Byron attempted to employ an estate services company to redraft his will but was unsuccessful because he could not articulate the changes he wanted. By mid-June 2017, a neurologist diagnosed Byron with moderate dementia that worsened over time. By December 2018, Byron was wandering around at night “trying to enter other peoples’ homes.”

¶14 The court found Nico's expert more probative and compelling than Christina's based on the expert's thorough review of evidence, which included medical records and interviews with those close to Byron. Nico's expert testified about multiple events leading up to the execution of the 2018 Will that reflected Byron's struggle with reality. For example, she testified that in February or May of 2018, Byron attempted to gift a car to a longtime friend but the friend refused it because he believed Byron did not understand what he was doing. The friend shared that “he felt he'd be taking advantage because of the quality of [Byron's] functioning at that time.” And when concluding that Byron did not have the ability to know the nature and extent of his assets, the expert pointed to examples of Byron's inability to manage his assets including “simple financial transactions, such as paying for a meal at a restaurant.”

¶15 After receiving all this evidence, and despite finding Nico's witnesses more credible, the superior court nonetheless found Nico failed to establish Byron “was either of unsound mind or that [he] ․ did not have testamentary capacity” when he signed the 2018 Will. In doing so, the court limited its consideration of the evidence to only the moment that the 2018 Will was executed and not whether Byron had the ability to know the nature and extent of his property at the time he executed the 2018 Will. See Walter's Estate, 77 Ariz. at 129.

¶16 Though Christina correctly argues it is “fundamental black-letter law of Arizona will contests” that the superior court must focus on the moment a will is signed, this focus is not so narrow as to exclude other relevant evidence. See O'Connor’s Estate, 74 Ariz. at 258. O'Connor and its progeny allow consideration of evidence of mental condition before and after the execution of a will. Id.; see Killen, 188 Ariz. at 567; see also Rosenberg v. Sanders, 256 Ariz. 359, 364, ¶¶ 27–29 (2023) (discussing evidentiary value of circumstances surrounding the time a testamentary document is executed when reviewing for undue influence). That said, such evidence is important “only in so far as it tends to show mental condition at the time of the execution of the will.” O'Connor’s Estate, 74 Ariz. at 257. Here, the superior court acknowledged Byron's disposition and cognitive abilities were declining but disregarded that information because it was not evidence of capacity “at the time of the execution of the 2018 Will.” The law does not require such a narrow view.

¶17 If the testimony from those who witnessed Byron sign the 2018 Will resulted in a clear answer on Byron's capacity, further analysis was not required. A.R.S. § 14-2712(B) (presumption of capacity); see In re Westfall's Estate, 74 Ariz. 181, 185 (1952) (impliedly overruled on other grounds). But once Nico introduced evidence to rebut the presumption in § 14-2712(B), the court then must consider the evidence to determine validity under § 14-2712(D). In doing so it should consider the totality of the circumstances. See Westfall's Estate, 74 Ariz. at 184 (“There is no rule by which it may be determined, with precision, where (testamentary) capacity ends and incapacity begins[; ] this question should be determined from all the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Slater v. Phipps, 143 P.2d 133, 133, ¶ 2 (Okla. 1943)). Here, the court discounted Nico's expert's opinion on Byron's lack of testamentary capacity around the time he executed the 2018 Will even though the court found it probative and compelling. That evidence was probative as to the validity of the 2018 Will and should have been considered when determining whether Nico met his burden under § 14-2712(D). See Rosenberg, 256 Ariz. at 364, ¶¶ 27–29.

¶18 This Court cannot square the superior court's findings that Christina and other witnesses were unreliable and not credible with its determination that Nico did not meet his burden. This Court thus reverses the superior court's admission of the 2018 Will to probate and remands for the superior court to first determine whether Nico rebutted the presumption of testamentary capacity in § 14-2712(B) and if so, whether the evidence establishes that the 2018 Will was invalid in light of the guidance provided in this opinion.

¶19 On remand, the court may still conclude that the evidence supports Byron's capacity at the time of execution, but such a conclusion must be based on the totality of the circumstances; understanding such evidence is “important only in so far as it tends to show mental condition at the time of the execution of the will.” O'Connor’s Estate, 74 Ariz. at 257 (emphasis added).

¶20 As the prevailing party, this Court awards Nico his costs under A.R.S. § 12-342 upon his compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶21 This Court reverses and remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Because the parties share the same surname, this Court respectfully refers to them by their first names as used in the pleadings.

FOSTER, Judge: