Maxwell “Mike” Blackmon v. Randy Brock (2026)

This appeal stems from an election contest filed by Maxwell “Mike” Blackmon, who was the Republican candidate in the November 2022 general election for the office of Conecuh County sheriff. The Democratic candidate, Randy Brock, was declared the winner of that election by two votes, and the Conecuh Circuit Court denied Blackmon's subsequent election contest. Blackmon appealed, and on original submission this Court held that two improperly marked ballots, which we referred to as the “logo ballots,” should not have been counted as votes for Brock -- thus rendering the election a tie. That decision was based on the Court's holding that it is impossible to determine what those two voters intended by coloring or scribbling over the Democratic Party's “logo” in the straight-party-voting section of the ballot, rather than blackening the oval next to “ALABAMA DEMOCRATIC PARTY,” which would have been the proper manner of casting a straight-party vote for the Democratic Party. I concur in overruling Brock's application for a rehearing because I continue to believe that the Court's decision was correct. I write specially to offer the following thoughts in response to the dissenting opinion.

First, the dissenting opinion claims that this Court's decision “is futile because the election contest took nearly two and one-half years to be brought to trial and the next general election for Conecuh County sheriff will take place on November 3, 2026.” ___ So. 3d at ___. Respectfully, when this Court is presented with a dispute in any type of case, I do not find it to be a futile act to uphold and enforce the law. But this is particularly true in election contests. Our system of government was created by the people and exists solely for their benefit, and it is therefore critical that the only citizens who occupy elected offices are those citizens who are elected by the people (other than in situations where an appointment is necessary to temporarily fill a vacancy). Otherwise, we cease to have a government by the people. Election integrity is therefore foundational to, and is the fundamental safeguard of, our system of government. Indeed, in my view, the integrity of our voting process is sacrosanct because, if we cannot be certain of that integrity, we cannot be certain that the people's choices are being honored. And, if we cannot be certain that the people's choices are being honored, we might as well throw out the electoral process altogether. Thus, in my opinion, if this Court is serious about election integrity, we cannot allow the improperly marked “logo ballots” to stand in this case.

Furthermore, I also respectfully disagree with the only rationale that the dissenting opinion gives for its conclusion that the Court's decision is futile, which is that, because an election for the next Conecuh County sheriff will occur in November 2026, Blackmon will have at most only approximately five months to serve as sheriff (if he ever serves at all) before a new sheriff's term begins in January 2027.¹ However, the impact of the Court's decision extends far beyond this single case because the decision serves to strengthen election integrity in all future elections. Plus, even with respect to this particular case, who are we to say that serving five months as the Conecuh County sheriff would not be meaningful relief to Blackmon? More importantly, if we were to adopt the dissenting opinion's position, where would we draw the line of futility? Would it have been futile if our decision had been issued with seven months left in the term of office? Ten months? A year? Eighteen months? At what point would it not be “futile” to afford Blackmon relief? Whatever line we might draw would without question be completely arbitrary.

To be sure, I agree with the dissenting opinion's position that election contests should be resolved quickly, and so does the Alabama Legislature -- a point that this Court made clear in its decision on original submission. However, as the dissenting opinion acknowledges, the statutes that govern Alabama's election contests currently “do[ ] not impose a direct time limit for courts to dispose of election contests.” ___ So. 3d at ___. Thus, if such a time limit is to be put in place, that is a step for the Legislature to take. This Court's role, on the other hand, is to apply those statutes as they are written, and, as the Court pointed out, currently nothing in those statutes justifies denying Blackmon's election contest based solely on the passage of time. Rather, § 17-16-59, Ala. Code 1975, provides, without any qualifying language, that an election must be vacated if, during the course of an election contest, it is proven that the candidate who was declared the winner of the election was not duly elected.

I also agree with the dissenting opinion's position that a quick resolution to an election contest “ ‘preserve[s] public confidence in the electoral process.’ ” ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting trial court's judgment). That is undoubtedly true. However, in addition to the fact that our statutes do not impose a time limit on when an election contest must be resolved, we cannot ignore the fact that public confidence in the electoral process is also preserved when the people can trust that the only citizens of this state who occupy elected offices are those citizens who actually received the most votes in their elections. Resolving an election contest quickly should certainly be the goal, but it should not come at the cost of undermining that trust. Thus, citizens are entitled not only to the confidence that their proper and valid ballots will be counted but also to the confidence that improper and invalid ballots -- such as the “logo ballots” at issue in this case -- will not be counted. Indeed, one need not flip too far back through the pages of our country's history to see what can happen when its citizens believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that a candidate in an election rode into office on the backs of improper votes.

Finally, I must respectfully disagree with the dissenting opinion's allegation that this Court “reweighed the evidence by reviewing the contested ballots and substituted its judgment for that of the trial court.” ___ So. 3d ___. That is simply incorrect. An appellate court reweighs evidence and substitutes its judgment for that of a trial court when there is conflicting evidence that could support either of two outcomes and the appellate court overrides the decision of the trial court by finding that the evidence the trial court rejected is more convincing than the evidence the trial court accepted. See, e.g., Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (holding that the Court of Civil Appeals had “impermissibly reweighed the evidence” by “adopt[ing] [one party's] arguments without acknowledging the existence of contradictory testimony that supported the trial court's holding”).

That is not what occurred here. The only issue regarding the two “logo ballots” was the intent of the voters who cast those ballots, and there was not conflicting evidence on that issue. Rather, the only evidence from which to make a determination regarding those voters’ intent was the “logo ballots” themselves. Thus, this Court reviewed the “logo ballots” de novo because the trial court was in no better position than this Court to conduct that review, and this Court held as a matter of law that those ballots could not be counted for Brock because it was impossible to determine whether the improper marks on the ballots were intended to constitute a straight-party vote for the Democratic Party.² The dissenters are certainly free to disagree with this Court's decision to reverse the trial court's judgment, but to say that the Court reversed the judgment by reweighing the evidence is not an accurate characterization of what the Court did.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to overrule the application for a rehearing filed by Randy Brock. I would grant the application for a rehearing and issue a substituted opinion affirming the judgment of the Conecuh Circuit Court (“the trial court”). The trial court was in the best position to decide the election contest. By reversing its judgment, the majority essentially reweighed the evidence by reviewing the contested ballots and substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. The majority's decision to overturn the trial court's ruling is futile because the election contest took nearly two and one-half years to be brought to trial and the next general election for Conecuh County sheriff will take place on November 3, 2026. Although Ala. Code 1975, § 17-16-56, does not impose a direct time limit for courts to dispose of election contests, as the trial court noted, based on the language in § 17-16-56, “election contests are meant to be disposed of quickly and expeditiously, in order to preserve public confidence in the electoral process.” It is clear that the legislature did not intend for an election contest to have a two-and-one-half-year delay for which there is no clear justification. That delay is further evidence that the trial court rightfully denied the election contest.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As noted, the result of this Court's decision on original submission is that the November 2022 election for Conecuh County sheriff was a tie, so there is no guarantee that Brock will be removed from office before the term of office ends.

2.   The dissenting opinion contends that “[t]he trial court was in the best position to decide the election contest.” ___ So. 3d at ___. As a general, overarching statement, this is correct, but the trial court was not in any better position than this Court to simply look at the “logo ballots” and make a determination as to the voters’ intent.

McCOOL, Justice.

Stewart, C.J., and Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur. McCool, J., concurs specially, with opinion. Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Mendheim, J., joins. Wise, Cook, and Parker, JJ., recuse themselves.