Dalton D. Banks v. LLC II (2026)

The doctrine of res judicata rests on the simple idea that litigation must eventually end, that final judgments should truly be final. See, e.g., Hughes v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 188, 190 (Ala. 1988). Below, the Cullman Circuit Court dismissed pro se litigant Dalton D. Banks's lawsuit on this basis, reasoning that the Cullman District Court had previously considered and rejected the very same claims. Because Banks has failed to articulate a cogent argument in support of reversal, we affirm the circuit court's judgment of dismissal. Banks also presents arguments concerning his still-pending postjudgment requests for relief from that judgment. See Ala. R. Civ. P. 60(b). So, to that extent, we dismiss his appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

I.

This matter is the latest in a series of legal proceedings involving Banks following his 2022 divorce. About a year after the divorce became final, Banks's ex-wife brought a civil lawsuit against him. A few months after that, Banks and his ex-wife traded accusations of contempt in a separate domestic-relations case. Eventually, law-enforcement officers seized firearms from Banks as part of an involuntary-commitment proceeding against him in the Cullman Probate Court.

Following those events, Banks brought suit in the Cullman District Court against a long list of defendants, including his ex-wife, an insurance agent, and various lawyers who were involved (or allegedly involved) in the events recounted above. Banks alleged that the defendants had made “misrepresentations” and “false statements” against him during his 2022 divorce proceedings. The district court dismissed Banks's complaint for failure to state a valid claim.

Rather than appeal, Banks commenced a new action below using an entirely new complaint. The defendants were slightly different; this time, Banks named only the lawyers as defendants. The court was also different; this time, Banks sued in the Cullman Circuit Court rather than the Cullman District Court. Otherwise, this new action was eerily similar to the previously dismissed district-court case: Banks alleged that the defendants had committed “slander” and various other forms of misconduct during his 2022 divorce matter.

The Cullman Circuit Court dismissed Banks's new complaint just as the Cullman District Court had done before. The circuit court's basis for dismissal was res judicata. According to the circuit court, the district-court's dismissal order constituted an “adjudication on the merits,” which operates to “preclude[ ] subsequent actions involving the same claims and parties.”

Banks thereafter noticed his appeal to this Court. Soon after that, he also filed postjudgment motions seeking a new trial (see Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.) and other relief from the circuit court's judgment dismissing his complaint (see Rule 60, Ala. R. Civ. P.). By now, Banks's Rule 59 motion for a new trial seemingly has been denied by operation of law. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. To our knowledge, however, his Rule 60 motion for relief from the dismissal remains pending before the circuit court.

II.

On appeal, Banks makes various arguments challenging the dismissal of his complaint. But none are persuasive. Indeed, as to the dispositive issues, Banks scarcely makes any argument at all.

Banks primarily challenges the dismissal simply by reasserting the merits of his claims. He also argues that the circuit court should have considered his supplement to his complaint and that the defendants’ motion to dismiss did “not properly dispose of subpoenas or contempt of court.” Banks's brief at 18. The problem with these arguments is that they fail to address the circuit court's basis for dismissal -- that Banks's claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We have long held that an appellant's “failure ․ to discuss in the opening brief an issue on which the trial court might have relied as a basis for its judgment” constitutes appellate waiver resulting in affirmance of the judgment under review. Soutullo v. Mobile Cnty., 58 So. 3d 733, 739 (Ala. 2010). Banks's failure to challenge the circuit court's res judicata analysis amounts to just such a waiver.

Banks also contends that the circuit court violated his due-process rights by “[sitting] on the case for months” and not holding a hearing before entering its judgment. Banks's brief at 16. But Banks fails to cite any applicable law in support of this argument and thus has failed to fulfill his basic duty as an appellant to present “cases, statutes, [or] other authorities” demonstrating error below. Ala. R. App. P. 28(a)(10). In any event, we perceive no defect stemming from any delay or lack of hearing and will not reverse the circuit court's judgment on this point.

Banks finally argues that the district court's order was void because it did not address his motion for sanctions. Of course, the merits of the district court's order are not before this Court in these appeals from the circuit court's judgment. But, to the extent that the validity of the district court's order might conceivably affect the res judicata analysis, we note that the district court's dismissal order expressly dismissed Banks's “claims ․ in their entirety” and “with prejudice.” Because all of Banks's claims were dismissed, Banks's assertion that the motion for sanctions was not addressed is simply inaccurate.

III.

Banks separately argues that he is entitled to relief from both the district court's order and the circuit court's judgment under Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which allows a court to grant relief from a final judgment in limited circumstances, such as when there has been a “mistake,” “inadvertence,” “newly discovered evidence,” or “fraud.” As noted above, however, Banks's Rule 60(b) motion is still pending in the circuit court, and “[a]n appeal concerning a still-pending Rule 60(b) motion must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.” Womble v. Moore, 370 So. 3d 817, 819 (Ala. 2022). We accordingly dismiss Banks's appeals to the extent that they relate to his Rule 60(b) motion.

IV.

Because Banks has failed to properly preserve his primary arguments on appeal, we affirm the judgment dismissing his complaint. To the extent that he challenges a pending request for Rule 60(b) relief, the appeals are dismissed.

SC-2025-0737 -- APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED.

SC-2025-0738 -- APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED.

PARKER, Justice.

Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur.