(In re: Renasant Bank v. Joseph Sanchez) (2026)

WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.

The Court is right to deny Renasant Bank's mandamus petition. Through the petition, the Bank seeks an order enforcing a jury-trial waiver signed by respondent Joseph Sanchez. But to prevail on that request, it was not enough for the Bank merely to establish the enforceability of the waiver. Instead, the Bank also had to overcome the other grounds that might plausibly support the circuit court's unexplained order refusing to strike Sanchez's jury demand. Cf. Norvell v. Norvell, 275 So. 3d 497, 502 (Ala. 2018) (noting that, in the context of an unexplained order, “we presume the circuit court relied on each of the grounds asserted by the [prevailing party]”).

Below, Sanchez argued that the circuit court should refuse to enforce the jury-trial waiver as a sanction for the Bank's failure to produce it during discovery. But the Bank does not meaningfully argue that the circuit court erred by imposing such a sanction. It thus has not demonstrated a “clear legal right ․ to the order sought,” which is an essential prerequisite for mandamus relief. Ex parte Edgar, 543 So. 2d 682, 684 (Ala. 1989) (emphasis added).

In reaching this result, I do not mean to weigh in on the merits of the underlying discovery dispute or the appropriateness of refusing to enforce the jury-trial waiver as a discovery sanction. The point is simply that, in the absence of meaningful argument on these points, the Court is unable to address them via the current mandamus petition.

I respectfully dissent from this Court's order denying Renasant Bank's petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Madison Circuit Court (“the circuit court”) to strike Joseph Sanchez's demand for a jury trial. It is undisputed that Sanchez signed a contractual waiver of his right to a jury trial when he executed a mortgage upon which Renasant Bank (“the bank”) ultimately foreclosed. Nonetheless, he demanded a jury trial in the bank's ejection action stemming from the mortgage foreclosure. The circuit court denied the bank's motion to strike the jury demand without providing any reason, thus depriving us from reviewing or considering the court's rationale. Under Alabama law, “when a competent adult, having the ability to read and understand an instrument, signs a contract, he will be held to be on notice of all the provisions contained in that contract and will be bound thereby.” Power Equip. Co. v. First Alabama Bank, 585 So. 2d 1291, 1296 (Ala. 1991). Thus, absent a showing of fraud, undue influence, or failure of consideration, the contractual jury waiver in this case should be enforced. See, e.g., Ex parte AIG Baker Orange Beach Wharf, L.L.C., 49 So. 3d 1198, 1201 (Ala. 2010) (“Coastal and Corrigan do not challenge the overall validity or enforceability of the contractual [jury] waiver ․, nor do they allege misrepresentation or fraud with regard to the jury-waiver provision itself.”). Moreover, because the mortgage contract was publicly recorded, everyone, including Sanchez, was on notice of its existence. The contractual jury waiver signed by Sanchez is valid and enforceable according to its terms. Thus, I would issue the writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order denying the bank's motion to strike the jury demand and to enter an order granting the bank's motion.

McCOOL, Justice.

Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur. Parker, J., concurs specially, with opinion. Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion. Cook, J., recuses himself.