MOBILE COUNTY v. RICH (2016)

1130404—AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

I write specially to emphasize that Rule 15(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., has not been asserted as a ground for reversal of the trial court's disallowance of the County's third amended complaint; only Rule 15(b) has been asserted. Because I agree with the main opinion's conclusion that Rule 15(b) is not applicable in this case, I concur. No issue as to whether the trial court otherwise exceeded its discretion or erred in disallowing the County's third amended complaint is before us.

Like the present case, the status of a summary-judgment motion was a consideration in the cases cited in the final paragraph of Part II of the discussion in case no. 1130359 of the main opinion and, in each of them, this Court upheld a trial court's decision disallowing an amendment to a pleading. It also appears the trial courts in those cases considered something more than just the pendency of a summary-judgment motion (e.g., an extended litigation history) that further augured in favor of the trial court's decision. Because those decisions were made under Rule 15(a), any differences or similarities between those cases and the present case need not be addressed further here.

I concur with Parts I, II, IV, V, and VI of the main opinion in its discussion of case no. 1130359. Because I believe that Act No. 88–423, Ala. Acts 1988, nullified the effect of § 14 of Act No. 82–675, Ala. Acts 1982 (“the 82 Act”), however, I dissent from Part III of its discussion of case no. 1130359 and from its discussion of case no. 1130404 insofar as the Court applies § 14 of the 82 Act.

STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, MAIN, WISE, and BRYAN, JJ., concur. MURDOCK, J., concurs specially. MOORE, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.