(In re: State of Alabama v. Cameron Jamal Burroughs) (2026)

ORDER

The State of Alabama filed this petition for a writ of mandamus or, in the alternative, for a writ of prohibition, requesting that this Court direct Judge David O. Carpenter to set aside his March 30, 2026, order granting a bond of $15,000 for the release of Cameron Jamal Burroughs. Additionally, the State asks this Court to reinstate the initial “no bond” order.

Burroughs was indicted on October 23, 2024, of several crimes, including capital murder, see § 13A-5-40, Ala. Code 1975. On September 4, 2025, a hearing was held regarding a “Motion to Set a Reasonable Bond” at which an oral order was rendered denying bond for Burroughs. On January 20, 2026, a pretrial hearing was held for Burroughs and his codefendants. During the hearing, Burroughs addressed several discovery issues, and the trial court reiterated that persisting discovery issues may result in a bond being reconsidered. According to Burroughs, testimony from a detective at a hearing in April 2023 had indicated that a photo array and cell phone were in the possession of the State but had yet to be produced for Burroughs to review. As a result, the trial court stated:

“You've got testimony more than once that phones were collected and turned over to the Secret Service and now we have -- we're hearing that those don't exist. And now we're learning that a phone that belonged to the victim in this case is gone. You know, that's potential evidence the defense was entitled to, and now it's just gone. All of this makes the likelihood of a conviction in these cases less likely. And if -- if a conviction is less likely then these defendants are entitled to a bond. And we're going to discuss that, not at this hearing today, but we're going to have another hearing before -- again, it's before this March 16th hearing that is currently set, we'll discuss bond.”

(Exhibit 5 to State's Petition, p. 29.)

Another hearing was held on March 30, 2026, during which the trial court decided to award bond. During that hearing, Judge Carpenter stated:

“So there was a two-year delay from the time of the preliminary hearing in this case until the State obtained indictments against these defendants. And last September I informed the State that if there was any delay in discovery, if there was any delay in this going to trial, that I would be giving these defendants a bond. I considered it earlier this year and decided not to, but in light of these new developments I have no option. I will grant the defendants bonds in these cases ․”

(Exhibit A to State's Motion to Supplement the Record and Accept the Same as Timely Filed, pp. 79-80.)

Article I, § 16, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022 provides:

“That all persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless charged with capital murder, as provided in Section 13A-5-40, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; murder, as provided in Section 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; kidnapping in the first degree, as provided in Section 13A-6-43, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; rape in the first degree, as provided in Section 13A-6-61, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; sodomy in the first degree, as provided in Section 13A-6-63, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; sexual torture, as provided in Section 13A-6-65.1, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; domestic violence in the first degree, as provided in Section 13A-6-130, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; human trafficking in the first degree, as provided in Section 13A-6-152, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; burglary in the first degree, as provided in Section 13A-7-5, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; arson in the first degree, as provided in Section 13A-7-41, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; robbery in the first degree, as provided in Section 13A-8-41, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; terrorism, as provided in subdivision (b)(2) of Section 13A-10-152, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; and aggravated child abuse, as provided in subsection (b) of Section 26-15-3.1, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended; and that excessive bail shall not in any case be required.”

Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court has held that a defendant who has been indicted for a capital offense, “is presumed guilty for the purposes of setting bail, and the defendant has the burden to overcome that presumption before he or she is entitled to bail as a matter of right.” State v. Moyers, 214 So. 3d 1147, 1150-51 (Ala. 2014). Additionally, “a safe rule for a trial court to follow is to deny bail if the court could sustain a capital conviction by a jury based on the same evidence taken at the hearing seeking bail.” Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532, 533-34 (Ala. 2003). As noted by the trial court, the absence of evidence used to indict Burroughs would make a conviction less likely.

“A reviewing court ordinarily will not reverse a bail order unless the conclusion below, as apparent from the record, was clearly erroneous or is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. It will interfere with the lower court's discretion in this regard only if it has been abused or exercised in an arbitrary, unjust, or oppressive manner.”

8 C.J.S. Bail § 102, 111 (2017) (footnotes omitted); see also Roan v. State, 24 Ala. App. 517, 137 So. 320 (1931). Rule 7.4(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides, “If the defendant is in custody, the judge may, for good cause shown, either on the judge's own initiative or on application of either party, modify the conditions of release, after first giving the parties an adequate opportunity to respond to the proposed modification.” On January 20, 2026, the State was given notice that the trial court might modify the bond order if discovery issues persisted; accordingly, the trial court gave the State adequate notice and an opportunity to respond and therefore did not abuse its discretion by awarding Burroughs a bond.¹

“A petition for a writ of mandamus will issue only if the following prerequisites are established: (1) a clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) no adequate remedy at law; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the reviewing court.” Ex parte Jones, 61 So. 3d 1104, 1106-07 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). The State is unable to establish that it has a clear legal right to the relief it seeks or that Judge Carpenter has refused to perform an imperative duty. Accordingly, this petition for a writ of mandamus is due to be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

Death is different. Our precedents, those of the Alabama Supreme Court, and those of the United States Supreme Court are replete with examples of how cases involving the intentional murder of one human being by another are treated differently than other cases. In such cases, we not only protect the rights of those accused of this most serious crime, but also faithfully observe laws meant to ensure that those creditably accused will not be improperly released back into the public. While most criminal offenses are bailable as a matter of right, the people of Alabama, the Alabama Legislature, and the Alabama Governor have determined that the offense of capital murder is not.

Cameron Jamal Burroughs was charged with two counts of capital murder. Nonetheless, the Jefferson Circuit Court granted Burroughs bail in response to what amounts to a discovery dispute. Because I believe that the circuit court lacked a proper basis to do so, I would grant the State's petition.

I. The Standard for Granting Bail in Capital Cases

After the 2019 murder of Aniah Blanchard by a person who was free on bail,

“the Alabama Legislature passed Aniah's Law in 2021, see Act No. 2021-267, Ala. Acts 2021, which served to amend § 15-13-3[, Ala. Code 1975,] upon ratification of an amendment to Section 16 [of the Alabama Constitution]. In 2022, the citizens of Alabama voted to amend Section 16, thus giving life to the current version of § 15-13-3. See Act No. 2021-267, § 3 (‘This act shall become effective immediately upon the ratification of the amendment to [Section 16].’).”

Ex parte Grimes, [Ms. SC-2025-0172, Mar. 13, 2026] ––– So. 3d ––––, –––– (Ala. 2026). Aniah's Law retained Alabama's long-held provision that capital murder was not a bailable-as-of-right offense, but it also “still provide[d] an avenue for obtaining bail in capital cases, just as each of its predecessors had.” Grimes, ––– So. 3d at ––––.

That avenue is a narrow one.

“[W]hen a defendant has been indicted for capital murder, the indictment creates a presumption of guilt -- for purposes of a bail hearing only -- and, to be entitled to bail, the defendant must present evidence that, when weighed against any evidence that the State chooses to present, convinces the trial court that the presumption has been overcome.”

Id. at ––––. To be eligible for bail, a defendant who has been indicted for capital murder must present evidence sufficient to overcome that presumption of guilt. Ex parte Wilding, 41 So. 3d 75, 78 (Ala. 2009); cf. Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532, 534 (Ala. 2003) (“Patel has not yet been indicted; therefore, there is no presumption of her guilt.”).

II. The Circuit Court's Basis for Granting Bail

Having considered the State's petition and Burroughs's answer, it is apparent that the circuit court did not grant bail upon Burroughs's presentation of evidence “directed to ‘overcoming the presumption’ of guilt.” Wilding, 41 So. 3d at 78. Nor did Burroughs attempt to rebut the presumption of guilt. Instead, as Burroughs himself concedes, he presented “defense evidence on the evidentiary issues related to the State's discovery failures,” which, Burroughs contends, “led the circuit court to recognize weakness in the State's case against Mr. Burroughs.” (Burroughs's Answer at 27.)

What was this “defense evidence”? It consisted of testimony from two detectives that “went to discovery matters” regarding one or more cell phones and a lineup procedure. (Id. at 26-27.) Importantly, however, neither Burroughs's arguments nor the documents included in the appendices to the petition and answer tell us anything about either the strength of the State's case against Burroughs or what evidence Burroughs could rely on to rebut the presumption of guilt.²

This is borne out by the circuit court's order granting bail. In that order, the circuit court clearly set out its rationale for granting bail based on five factors: 1) the time that the case had been pending before the grand jury, 2) the fact that the State had been warned by the circuit court that discovery delays or the inability to be ready for trial “would result in the Defendant being granted a reasonable bond,” 3) that multiple discovery hearings had been held, 4) that the State had “repeatedly delayed in producing discovery,” and 5) that the State had informed the circuit court that it could not be ready for trial on May 4, 2026. (Exhibit 8 to the Petition.) No other basis for granting bond was given in the order or at the bond hearing. (Exhibit A to the Supplement to the Petition.)

While this Court's order credits the circuit court's order as finding that “the absence of evidence used to indict Burroughs would make a conviction less likely,” ––– So. 3d at ––––, I cannot agree that this is an accurate assessment of what happened below for two reasons. First, neither this Court nor the circuit court knows what evidence was used to indict Burroughs. Even if grand jury secrecy laws did not prohibit such disclosures under most circumstances, there was no discussion below of what was presented to the grand jury that indicted Burroughs.³ See § 12-16-214, Ala. Code 1975 (explaining that “it is essential to the fair and impartial administration of justice that all grand jury proceedings be secret and that the secrecy of such proceedings remain inviolate.”). Second, the circuit court did not find that the absence of cellular telephones or lineup evidence would make a conviction less likely in this case; rather, it found that a conviction would be less likely if the jury heard about potential evidence that was missing:

“You had a witness testify that a six-person line-up was presented to witnesses and yet you now tell us that that lineup doesn't exist, or that it hasn't been turned over to the defense. ․ You've got testimony more than once that phones were collected and turned over to the Secret Service and now we have -- we're hearing that those don't exist. And now we're learning that a phone that belonged to the victim in this case is gone. You know, that's potential evidence the defense was entitled to, and now it's just gone. All of this makes the likelihood of a conviction in these cases less likely.”

(Exhibit 5 to the Petition, R. 29 (emphasis added).) Critically, this observation addressed only the State's investigatory process. It did not address either the strength of the evidence against Burroughs or whether “the court could sustain a capital conviction by a jury based on the same evidence taken at the hearing seeking bail.” Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532, 533-34 (Ala. 2003). Instead of evaluating the strength or character of the evidence, the circuit court was -- perhaps accurately -- observing that testimony about problems with the investigation would make a jury less likely to convict. This, in my view, is not the same as evidence that would rebut the presumption of guilt created by the indictment.

My reading of the matters included in the appendices to the petition and answer indicates that the circuit court essentially granted bail to Burroughs to sanction the State for delaying a trial date and for mishandling discovery. While the circuit court's inclination to do so may be understandable, I do not believe such action is countenanced by Alabama law in a capital-murder case. As previously stated, a capital-murder defendant is not entitled to bail unless he or she presents the court with evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of guilt created by the indictment. Again, in seeking bail, Burroughs chose not to travel down this narrow avenue.

As was the case in Wilding, Burroughs's evidence was not “directed to ‘overcoming the presumption’ of guilt that is inherent in the indictment against him.” Wilding, 41 So. 3d at 78. As we did in Wilding, I would grant the petition for the writ of mandamus. For that reason, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This Court takes note that Rule 7.2(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., recommends the minimum bail for capital murder as $50,000. It appears that the trial court erroneously set Burroughs's bond at the minimum amount for a charge of murder instead of capital murder. While trial courts have a great deal of discretion in setting bail, it is possible that the amount set in this case -- $15,000 -- is too low. However, because the State made no argument regarding the bond amount being less than that recommended by the bail schedule in Rule 7.2(b), the issue is not ripe for our consideration.

2.   For instance, there is no indication that the State's prosecution theory depends on a successful search of cellular telephones.

3.   It should be obvious, however, that information from cellular telephones that have not been searched by the State could not have been considered by the grand jury.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum and Cole, JJ., concur. Minor, J., concurs in the result. Anderson, J., dissents, with writing