Alabama Peace Officers’ Standards and Training Commission v. John Tyler Norris (2026)

The Alabama Peace Officers’ Standards and Training Commission (“the Commission”) appeals from a judgment of the Clarke Circuit Court reversing the Commission's order that, in pertinent part, revoked the Commission's prior certification of John Tyler Norris as an Alabama law-enforcement officer. We reverse and remand.

The record reveals the following pertinent facts. On the afternoon of June 30, 2021, an officer employed by the police department of the City of Citronelle attempted to conduct a traffic stop of an automobile; however, the driver of that automobile initially ignored sirens and police-car lights directed at him and discarded illicit drugs from the windows of his automobile while driving at high speeds before stopping his automobile in an empty parking lot, lowering the automobile side window closest to him, placing his head and hands outside the window, and informing nearby police officers that he was unarmed. As other officers were positioning their motor vehicles to block the parking-lot exits, Norris, who had been certified by the Commission for work as a law-enforcement officer and who was then serving as the Citronelle chief of police, drove his vehicle into the front left door of the driver's automobile and caused sufficient damage to prevent police officers from removing the driver via that door. After two police officers had entered the driver's automobile from other doors and had placed the driver's hands behind his back in handcuffs, and despite the driver's compliant status, Norris grabbed the driver by the driver's belt buckle, positioned himself in front of the driver, and administered two blows to the driver's abdomen with his knee, shouting: “Quit resisting me, m____r f____r, quit resisting!” The driver was thereafter placed in a police vehicle for transportation to Citronelle's police headquarters. One of the participating officers subsequently reported Norris's use of force against the driver to Citronelle's mayor, and the circumstances of the arrest were investigated by the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency (“ALEA”).¹

Norris's conduct on June 30, 2021, and his subsequent statements regarding his conduct, resulted in his indictment by grand juries in both the state and federal judicial systems. In March 2022, a Mobile County grand jury indicted Norris on a charge of assault in the third degree, averring that he had, with intent, caused physical injury to the driver by kneeing him about the body and/or head multiple times in violation of Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-6-22. That charge was resolved by way of Norris's stipulation to the existence of a prima facie case as to the indictment and the prosecutors’ agreement to the entry of a nolle prosequi upon Norris's completion of a one-year term of good behavior, which term ended in October 2024.²

Also, in September 2022, a grand jury empaneled by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama indicted Norris on charges of depriving, under color of law, the driver's civil right to be free from the use of unreasonable force causing bodily injury (a felony offense under 18 U.S.C. § 242) and of engaging in misleading conduct toward ALEA agents (i.e., witness tampering, a felony offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3)). Two trials were held in federal court on those charges, each of which failed to result in a unanimous jury verdict on either charge. Thereafter, in June 2023, Norris entered into an agreement with federal prosecutors under which he agreed to plead guilty to the “lesser included offense” of a misdemeanor-level civil-right deprivation as to the driver. In September 2023, Norris was sentenced to a 30-day term of imprisonment and a subsequent 1-year term of supervised release. Following his release from imprisonment, Norris, through counsel, filed a motion in the federal court seeking early termination of his supervised release, averring, among things, that he had “no intention of ever working in law enforcement again”; however, that court denied Norris's motion, and Norris's supervised-release term expired on January 28, 2025.

The Commission was created in 1971 by our legislature; then, as now, one of the Commission's defined functions was “[t]o ․ hold public hearings on ․ and promulgate ․ standards relating to the physical, mental and moral fitness of any applicant for or appointee as a law enforcement officer.” Ala. Acts 1971, Act No. 1981, § 6(c); Ala. Code 1975, § 36-21-45(3). Although this court concluded in 1979 that, under the 1971 statute creating the Commission, it lacked statutory authority to revoke a law-enforcement officer's certification once issued, see State Bd. of Corrs. v. Cousins, 375 So. 2d 1210, 1211-12 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979), the legislature in 1995 enacted an amendment to the Commission's enabling legislation (now codified at Ala. Code 1975, § 36-21-45(7)) making clear that the Commission has the power “[t]o revoke its approval or certification of any person appointed or certified” as a law-enforcement officer “for failure to meet the continuing training or education requirements set forth in the rules of the commission or for failure to meet the requirements of Section 36-21-46,” Ala. Code 1975, which Code section sets forth standards applicable to both law-enforcement-officer applicants and appointees. Subsection (a)(5) of § 36-21-46, in turn, provides that, as to the standard labeled “character,” one “shall be a person of good moral character and reputation” and that, “[i]n making [a] determination” as to character and reputation, the Commission “shall consider convictions for misdemeanors and other factors set forth in its duly adopted and promulgated rules” but that “[n]o person who has been convicted of a felony shall be certified, employed, appointed, or approved by the commission as a law enforcement officer.”

In carrying out its authority pursuant to § 36-21-46(a)(5), the Commission has adopted certain rules pertaining to the character-and-reputation criterion of fitness of law-enforcement officers who apply for and obtain certification by the Commission. See Ala. Admin. Code (Alabama Peace Officers’ Standards and Training Commission) r. 650-X-2-.05. Subsections (1), (4), and (8) of r. 650-X-2-.05 provide, in pertinent part:

“(1) The applicant shall be a person of good moral character and reputation[.]

“․.

“(4) Conviction of a misdemeanor pursuant to any municipal, state or federal law shall not automatically disqualify a person as a law enforcement officer. Such a conviction may be considered as a factor among several in evaluating fitness as a law enforcement officer, which factors shall include but not be limited to the nature and gravity of the offense or offenses, the time that has passed since the conviction and/or completion of the sentence and the nature of the job held or sought and such other factors as to affect the applicant's character. In the case of a misdemeanor conviction, involving a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, involving force, violence, moral turpitude, perjury, or false statements, notwithstanding suspension of sentence or withholding of adjudication, results of psychological testing shall also be considered as a factor in considering the applicant's fitness as a law enforcement officer.

“․.

“(8) The arrest of any certified law enforcement officer, provisionally appointed law enforcement officer, or applicant, for any felony or misdemeanor offense shall be immediately reported to the commission by the employing agency, arresting agency, and the law enforcement officer. The final disposition, including a copy of the case action summary, shall be immediately provided to the commission by the employing agency, arresting agency, and the law enforcement officer regardless of finding. Any applicant for employment and/or appointment as a law enforcement officer, whether previously certified or non-certified, who has criminal charges pending before any court, is subject to court-ordered probation or is the subject of a protection from abuse order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall not be employed or appointed as a law enforcement officer until any/all criminal charges are adjudicated and the individual is released by the court from any probation orders and/or protection orders. Upon adjudication and/or release as specified herein, a Character Review may be required to determine eligibility for employment/appointment.”

The record reflects that, in October 2022, the Commission was provided with video recordings of the driver's arrest, and an investigative file (Number 22-32) was opened regarding the suspension or revocation of Norris's law-enforcement certification. After Norris had completed his term of imprisonment, he was interviewed in May 2024 by a Commission investigator and provided a written statement describing the incident. Subsequently, Norris contacted the investigator by email in early January 2025 and requested advice regarding reinstatement of his law-enforcement certification after the imminent conclusion of his term of supervised release. The investigator informed him that he was to transmit documentation to the Commission indicating the closing of his federal criminal case and that the Commission would then review Norris's situation. On February 3, 2025, the Commission's executive secretary notified Norris that the Commission would conduct a character-review hearing and indicated that the Commission's investigation had revealed evidence that “reflect[ed] poorly on [his] character and fitness to maintain [his] law enforcement officer certification.” At that hearing, which was held on February 27, 2025, the Commission heard testimony from the Commission investigator, from Norris, and from a character witness Norris called, and it received videographic records of the driver's arrest.

On March 5, 2025, the Commission issued an order summarizing the evidence adduced at the hearing and noting that the Commission had, by unanimous vote, decided to revoke Norris's certification as a law-enforcement officer based, among other things, upon the Commission's “independent review ․ of body cam video of the incident” and its conclusion that Norris had “utilized unnecessary and excessive physical force” upon the driver on June 30, 2021. The Commission stated that its decision was based upon Ala. Code 1975, § 36-21-45(7), and upon subsection (4) of r. 650-X-2-.05, which generally pertains to misdemeanor convictions as bearing upon the fitness of officer applicants. On March 19, 2025, Norris timely requested, pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-17 (a portion of the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act (“the AAPA”), Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-1 et seq.), that the Commission conduct a rehearing, asserting, among other things, that he had not been convicted of a felony, that the Commission had erroneously relied upon its investigator's testimony (which he termed hearsay), and that subsection (4) of r. 650-X-2-.05 was not applicable to certification-revocation procedures. On April 14, 2025, within the 30 days allowed by § 41-22-17(e), the Commission entered an order unanimously overruling Norris's rehearing application and, acting nunc pro tunc, replaced the “mistaken citation” of subsection (4) of r. 650-X-2-.05 with a “correct citation” to subsection (8) of that rule pertaining to character-review procedures following felony or misdemeanor convictions.

Norris, a Clarke County resident, timely filed a notice of appeal from the Commission's decision and subsequently filed a timely petition for judicial review in the circuit court. See Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-20(d). After receiving briefing from the parties, the circuit court entered a judgment on February 23, 2026, that, in pertinent part, reversed the Commission's order and directed that Norris's certification as a law-enforcement officer be reinstated. The Commission timely appealed from that judgment to this court, which has appellate jurisdiction with respect to administrative appeals pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 12-3-10.

Under the AAPA, a reviewing court may reverse an agency's action under strictly limited circumstances:

“The court may reverse or modify the decision or grant other appropriate relief from the agency action, equitable or legal, including declaratory relief, if the court finds that the agency action is due to be set aside or modified under standards set forth in appeal or review statutes applicable to that agency or if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the agency action is any one or more of the following:

“(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

“(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

“(3) In violation of any pertinent agency rule;

“(4) Made upon unlawful procedure;

“(5) Affected by other error of law;

“(6) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

“(7) Unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”

Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-20(k); accord Little Caesar's, Inc. v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 386 So. 2d 224, 225 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (indicating similar judicial-review limits applying at common law), rev'd in part on other grounds, 386 So. 2d 228 (Ala. 1980), and Ex parte Alabama Bd. of Nursing, 835 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Ala. 2001) (same). As this court noted in Alabama State Board of Pharmacy v. Holmes, 925 So. 2d 203, 206 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005):

“ ‘ “ ‘Judicial review of an agency's administrative decision is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, whether the agency's actions were reasonable, and whether its actions were within its statutory and constitutional powers. ․’ ” ’

“․ Further, this court reviews a [circuit] court's judgment without a presumption of correctness because the [circuit] court is in no better position to review an agency's decision than this court.”

(Citations omitted.)

The circuit court, in its judgment reversing the Commission's revocation order, invoked most, if not all, of the grounds for reversal set forth in the seven subdivisions of subsection (k) of § 41-22-20. However, its two predicate substantive determinations were that (1) the Commission lacked the legal authority to revoke Norris's certification as a law-enforcement officer based upon his misdemeanor offense and (2) the Commission's decision was improper as a factual matter. As we detail below, those determinations were erroneous.

Did the Commission have the legal authority to revoke Norris's law-enforcement-officer certification on the basis of his failing to meet good-character-and-reputation requirements? Had Norris been convicted of the felony charges originally brought by the federal grand jury, there would have been no doubt of the Commission's authority to act in the manner it did. See Ala. Code 1975, § 36-21-46(a)(5) (“No person who has been convicted of a felony shall be certified, employed, appointed, or approved by the commission as a law enforcement officer.”) and § 36-21-52(a) (“The certification or authority of any law enforcement officer ․ shall be revoked by the commission when a law enforcement officer is convicted of a felony.”). Although Norris's stipulating to a prima facie case of third-degree assault before disposition of his state criminal case and pleading guilty to a misdemeanor violation of a federal-civil-rights statute placed him outside the per se rule of those statutes, our legislature, by enacting § 36-21-45(7), has nonetheless expressly authorized the Commission to “revoke its ․ certification of any person ․ for failure to meet the requirements of” § 36-21-46. Those requirements mandate that a certified law-enforcement officer “shall be a person of good moral character and reputation” and that the Commission, “[i]n making [such a] determination, ․ shall consider convictions for misdemeanors and other factors set forth in its duly adopted and promulgated rules.” § 36-21-46(a)(5) (emphasis added).

The Commission, like our legislature, has recognized the overarching policy goal that certified law-enforcement officers be “of good moral character and reputation.” R. 650-X-2-.05(1). Unlike a felony conviction, which constitutes an absolute bar to certification, a misdemeanor conviction does not “automatically disqualify a person as a law enforcement officer.” R. 650-X-2-.05(4). However, the Commission, consistent with its authority conferred by our legislature in § 36-21-46(a)(5) does, by rule, treat a misdemeanor conviction as bearing upon the overarching question of good character and reputation, along with “the nature and gravity of the offense or offenses, the time that has passed since the conviction and/or completion of the sentence and the nature of the job held or sought,” among other factors. Id. (emphasis added). Subsection (8) of r. 650-X-2-.05 reflects the Commission's treatment of arrests and convictions of certified law-enforcement officers as serious indeed; that subsection states that an arrest of any certified law-enforcement officer must “be immediately reported to the Commission,” that any “final disposition” of such an arrest must “be immediately provided to the Commission ․ regardless of finding,” that a person with pending criminal charges or under probation “shall not be employed or appointed as a law enforcement officer until any/all criminal charges are adjudicated and the individual is released by the court from any probation orders,” and that, “[u]pon adjudication and/or release ․, a Character Review may be required to determine eligibility for employment/appointment.”

Unlike Norris and the circuit court, we ascribe no legal significance to the Commission's invocation, in conjunction with the primary legislative authority of § 36-21-45(7), of subsection (4) of r. 650-X-2-.05 in its initial revocation order and of subsection (8) of that rule in its amended order overruling Norris's application for rehearing. Assuming, without deciding, that the Commission's citation of either subsection alone would amount to anything other than harmless error, but see Alabama Bd. of Heating, Air Conditioning, & Refrigeration Contractors v. Blanchard, 406 So. 3d 847, 857 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (deeming state agency's citation of general statute addressing officers, meetings, powers, and duties of that agency in license-revocation order to be harmless error), those regulatory subsections apply to different aspects of procedure and substance with respect to offenses committed either before or after an applicant for certification as a law-enforcement officer has been certified by the Commission. Specifically, subsection (4) indicates the Commission's view of misdemeanor adjudications as a general matter (regardless of their dates), whereas subsection (8) indicates that body's approach to persons who are arrested and/or convicted of offenses after those persons have placed themselves under the Commission's jurisdiction by applying for and/or obtaining certification. Although a felony conviction, whether before or after application, would automatically disqualify a person from certification as a law-enforcement officer (and, we would add, obviate any need for a review hearing to review the good-character-and-reputation criterion), common sense would dictate that a peace officer's postcertification commission of conduct amounting to a misdemeanor, which carries no such automatic-disqualification penalty, would warrant the Commission's investigation, its scheduling of a character-review hearing, its receipt in such a hearing of any and all evidence bearing on the respondent's good character and reputation (including, if applicable, any psychological evaluations undergone by the respondent at any time), and its imposition of the penalty of revocation if warranted. At all times, however, the central issue would remain the existence or nonexistence of “good moral character and reputation,” see § 36-21-46(a)(5), and r. 650-X-2-.05(1). The specific findings of the Commission adverse to Norris as to that issue did not change in the order issued on rehearing.

The circuit court also placed emphasis in its judgment upon the absence of express guidance regarding the “procedure or factors to be considered” during a character-review hearing. However, the AAPA already provides guidelines regarding the conduct of contested-case hearings before administrative agencies such as the Commission. See Ala. Code 1975, §§ 41-22-12 and 41-22-13. And while it is true that statutory and regulatory references to good-character-and-reputation factors refer in certain instances to “applicants” rather than certified officers, our legislature has made clear that the mandatory standards it has adopted apply both “to applicants and appointees as law enforcement officers.” § 36-21-46(a) (emphasis added). Finally, to the extent that subsection (4) of r. 650-X-2-.05 indicates that the Commission is to consider “results of psychological testing” in assessing a respondent's fitness when the respondent has been convicted of a misdemeanor “involving force, violence, moral turpitude, perjury, or false statements,” there is no indication that Norris sought to introduce, or was prevented from introducing, any such testing results into evidence. Norris's own testimony before the Commission indicated his own prior knowledge that any such psychological evaluation in connection with a character-review hearing would have been undertaken only at his initiative and expense. We thus perceive no legal defect in the Commission's exercise of its authority to revoke Norris's certification as a law-enforcement officer.

Because the Commission's decision regarding Norris was not contrary to law under the first five enumerated subdivisions of § 41-22-20(k), pertaining to reversal, we turn next to whether the revocation order was clearly erroneous, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or outside the Commission's discretion under the last two subdivisions thereof. Such an inquiry is consistent with Alabama precedents both before and after the adoption of the AAPA: apart from questions of statutory and constitutional powers, “ ‘[j]udicial review of an agency's administrative decision is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence [and] whether the agency's actions were reasonable’ ” and “ ‘is also limited by the presumption of correctness which attaches to a decision by an administrative agency.’ ” Ex parte Alabama Bd. of Nursing, 835 So. 2d at 1012 (quoting Alabama Medicaid Agency v. Peoples, 549 So. 2d 504, 506 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989)).³

Is the Commission's order revoking Norris's law-enforcement-officer certification, on the stated basis that his behavior in connection with the driver's June 30, 2021, arrest called into question Norris's “good moral character and reputation,” supported by substantial evidence and reasonable so as to be within the discretion of the Commission to exercise its powers conferred in § 36-21-45(7)? Our review of the administrative record compels an affirmative conclusion. Despite Norris's statements that he had initiated a knee strike to the driver simply to gain his attention and compliance and that he had not known that the driver was handcuffed, the Commission's investigator, who testified at the character-review hearing, made clear that the driver's having been subdued and handcuffed was “clearly visible.” The investigator based that opinion upon the entirety of the bodycam footage, which was itself submitted into evidence for evaluation by the Commission (whose seven members, as the Commission pointed out to the circuit court, possessed over two hundred collective years of experience in law enforcement along with the narrative factual stipulation entered into between Norris and federal prosecutors at the time of his guilty plea directed to his federal civil-rights-deprivation charge.

Moreover, the Commission, consistent with r. 650-X-2-.05(4), could properly have taken into consideration, as to character and reputation, the bodycam footage and factual stipulation as it bore upon enumerated factors such as “the nature and gravity of the offense or offenses” (which offenses, the record before the Commission indicated, were committed upon a handcuffed and compliant suspect, prompting extensive media coverage of Norris's two subsequent federal trials); “the time that has passed since the conviction and/or completion of the sentence” (i.e., less than two months had elapsed between the January 28, 2025, expiration of Norris's term of federal supervision and the Commission's March 5, 2025, order); and “the nature of the job held or sought” (Norris was, at the time of his misdemeanor offense, Citronelle's highest-ranking police officer and responsible for the overall operation of the entire municipal police department). Indeed, upon questioning by the Commission's executive director at the character-review hearing, Norris admitted that bad publicity of actions taken by law-enforcement officers outside applicable standards amount to “a black eye” on law enforcement in general, that his actions on June 30, 2021, did not contribute to the betterment of law enforcement, and that he would inform other law-enforcement officers that his conduct “is an example of what not to do.”

Acting through counsel, Norris presented, at his character-review hearing, a witness in support of the proposition that Norris was of good character and reputation such that his certification as a law-enforcement officer should not be revoked. He was also permitted to submit transcribed pages of testimony of one witness from his first federal trial tending to disprove that he had misled ALEA investigators. However, the matter of the weight and credibility of that evidence was for the Commission to determine, not the circuit court and not this court. “In no event is a reviewing court ‘authorized to reweigh the evidence or to substitute its decisions as to the weight and credibility of the evidence for those of the agency.’ ” Alabama Bd. of Nursing v. Williams, 941 So. 2d 990, 999 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Williamson, 907 So. 2d 407, 416-17 (Ala. 2004)). We cannot conclude on this record either that the decision of the Commission was not supported by substantial evidence or that its decision to revoke Norris's certification as a law-enforcement officer was not reasonable under the circumstances.

Based upon the foregoing facts and authorities, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed. The cause is remanded for the entry of a judgment affirming the Commission's March 5, 2025, order (as amended nunc pro tunc on April 14, 2025).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A six-page report prepared by ALEA, as well as a computer-data compilation of (and still images taken from) a videographic record of the arrest, were, with leave of the circuit court, filed under seal in that court and have also been transmitted to this court as part of the appellate record.

2.   The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in Clark v. State, 29 So. 3d 252, 253 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), held that a criminal defendant's “stipulation that the State could prove a prima facie case ․ against him and his agreement to be adjudged guilty and sentenced if he failed to comply with the terms of [a] ‘good behavior’ agreement was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.”

3.   Assuming, without deciding, that Ala. Acts 2026, Act No. 2026-319, which “shall become effective” on October 1, 2026, is remedial in nature and applies retroactively to the Commission's appeal, that act, which deletes the provision of § 41-22-20(k), Ala. Code 1975, providing that, in judicial-review proceedings, “the agency order shall be taken as prima facie just and reasonable and the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact,” does not thereby abrogate the limits on reversal specified in the remaining portions of that Code section. This court, consistent with recent commentary on the origins of and proper scope of that act, does not deem the act as substantially altering traditional judicial review of agency factual findings. See generally Marc J. Ayers, A Quick Look at Alabama Act 319 and the Elimination of Agency Deference in Alabama, 87 Ala. Law. 40, 44-45 (2026).

HANSON, Judge.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.