Lacey Dawn McCutcheon v. Zachary McCutcheon (2026)

On December 14, 2023, Lacey Dawn McCutcheon (“the wife”) filed in the Shelby Circuit Court (“the trial court”) a complaint seeking a divorce from Zachary McCutcheon (“the husband”). The husband filed an answer to the wife's complaint on January 1, 2024. The record indicates that the trial court conducted a trial on the wife's complaint over two days on October 4, 2024, and October 8, 2024. On May 13, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment (“the May 2025 judgment”) divorcing the parties and, among other things, awarding each party the personal property in his or her possession; each party was also made responsible for any debt in his or her sole name. The May 2025 judgment further awarded the husband his automobile and made him responsible for its associated debt. No other automobiles were specifically addressed in the May 2025 judgment. The trial court concluded the May 2025 judgment by denying all other requested relief.

On May 27, 2025, the wife filed a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. App., postjudgment motion requesting, in relevant part, that the trial court amend the May 2025 judgment to address certain specified personal property, including the parties’ “RV Camper” (“the camper”). The husband filed a postjudgment motion on June 10, 2025, in which he also requested that the trial court amend the May 2025 judgment to specifically include the debt associated with the camper in its division of the marital debts. On September 16, 2025, more than 90 days after the filing of the husband's postjudgment motion, see Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. (providing that a postjudgment motion is denied by operation of law if not ruled upon before the expiration of the 90-day period following the filing of that motion), the trial court entered an order (“the September 2025 order”) purporting to amend the May 2025 judgment by, in relevant part, dividing specific personal property other than the camper between the parties. The trial court's September 2025 order also denied all other requested relief.

On October 6, 2025, the wife timely filed in the trial court a notice of appeal directed at the May 2025 judgment, as purportedly amended by the September 2025 order. The wife's appeal was assigned appeal number CL-2025-0851. This court, on the wife's motion, dismissed that appeal on October 22, 2025. The certificate of judgment in appeal number CL-2025-0851 was issued on November 10, 2025.

On March 31, 2026, the wife filed in the trial court a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that the trial court's September 2025 order was void because, she asserted, the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to enter an order ruling on the parties’ postjudgment motions. The trial court denied the wife's Rule 60(b)(4) motion on April 10, 2026. The wife appeals.

Initially, we note that the husband asserts that the trial court's May 2025 judgment is not a final judgment because, he says, it did not specifically address the camper in its division of the marital estate. However,

“[t]he husband's argument assumes that a judgment in a divorce proceeding is not final if the judgment does not dispose of all the parties’ jointly owned property. This assumption is not correct. A final judgment of divorce does not necessarily have to dispose of all the parties’ jointly owned property. See Fitts v. Stokes, 841 So. 2d 229 (Ala. 2002); Garrett v. Garrett, 521 So. 2d 1337 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988); and Hammock v. Hammock, 867 So. 2d 355 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). Rather, when a final judgment of divorce does not reference a specific asset, liability, or piece of personal or real property, jointly owned by the parties, the property remains unaffected by the judgment, and the ownership, along with the benefits and burdens thereof, remains as it was before the entry of the divorce judgment. Radiola v. Radiola, 380 So. 2d 817 (Ala. 1980); Miller v. Miller, 391 So. 2d 119 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); and McGuire v. Horton, 586 So. 2d 9 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991).”

Clements v. Clements, 990 So. 2d 383, 395-96 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). Accordingly, the fact that the trial court's May 2025 judgment does not specifically address the disposition of the parties’ camper does not render the May 2025 judgment nonfinal. Instead, the ownership of the camper remains unaffected by the May 2025 judgment, and the camper is therefore owned by the party or parties who owned it before the entry of that judgment. Any debt associated with the camper is similarly unaffected by the May 2025 judgment.

On appeal, the wife argues that the trial court should have granted her Rule 60(b)(4) motion because, she asserts, the last filed postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on September 8, 2025, 90 days after its filing, pursuant to Rule 59.1. Thus, the wife argues, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the September 2025 order amending the May 2025 judgment. We agree.

“Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a motion under Rule 59[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment must be ruled on within 90 days or else it is automatically denied. ‘If a trial court does not rule on a postjudgment motion within 90 days, it loses jurisdiction to rule on the motion.’ Ex parte Caterpillar, Inc., 708 So. 2d 142, 143 (Ala. 1997); see also Ex parte Chamblee, 899 So. 2d 244, 247 (Ala. 2004) (same).”

Jackson v. Jackson, 308 So. 3d 524, 528 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). In addition,

“[a] judgment that has been rendered void by operation of Rule 59.1[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] may be set aside on a motion filed with the trial court under Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P. See Ex parte R.S.C., 853 So. 2d 228, 233 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). In the event a trial court refuses to vacate a void judgment upon proper motion, an aggrieved party may appeal that denial. See Weaver v. Weaver, 4 So. 3d 1171, 1172 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).”

Sibley v. Sibley, 90 So. 3d 191, 193 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012).

We observe that

“[t]he standard of review on appeal from the denial of relief under Rule 60(b)(4)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is not whether there has been an abuse of discretion. When the grant or denial of relief turns on the validity of the judgment, as under Rule 60(b)(4), discretion has no place. If the judgment is valid, it must stand; if it is void, it must be set aside. A judgment is void only if the court rendering it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.”

Insurance Mgmt. & Admin., Inc. v. Palomar Ins. Corp., 590 So. 2d 209, 212 (Ala. 1991). Further,

“[s]ubsection (4) of Rule 60(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] permits relief from a final judgment when that judgment is void. It is important to note that a judgment is not void simply because it is erroneous, because Rule 60(b) is not intended as a substitute for appeal. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cantley, 717 So. 2d 751 (Ala. 1998). A judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court that rendered the judgment lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. Osborn v. Roche, 813 So. 2d 811 (Ala. 2001). A Rule 60(b) motion does not bring the underlying judgment up for review but presents only the question of the propriety of the judgment denying the Rule 60(b) motion. Sanders v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 368 So. 2d 8 (Ala. 1979).”

Ex parte R.S.C., 853 So. 2d 228, 235-36 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).

The wife's Rule 59 postjudgment motion was filed on May 27, 2025, and the husband's Rule 59 postjudgment motion was filed on June 10, 2025. The trial court's order purporting to grant certain relief requested in the parties’ postjudgment motions was entered on September 16, 2025, 112 days after the wife filed her postjudgment motion and 98 days after the husband filed his postjudgment motion. Thus, the September 2025 order was entered beyond the 90-day period that the trial court had to rule on the parties’ postjudgment motions, and, as the wife correctly argued in her Rule 60(b)(4) motion before the trial court, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the parties’ postjudgment motions; therefore, the September 2025 order is void. Sibley, 90 So. 3d at 193.¹

Having determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the parties’ postjudgment motions, we conclude that the wife's Rule 60(b)(4) motion is due to be granted. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying the wife's Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate the September 2025 order, and we remand the case with instructions that the trial court vacate that void order.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not indicate that the parties expressly consented to extend the time for the trial court to rule on the parties’ postjudgment motions. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.

EDWARDS, Judge.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.