James Smith v. Kendall Smith (2026)

James Smith (“the father”) appeals from a judgment entered by the Etowah Circuit Court (“the trial court”) that held him in civil contempt, ordered him to return a utility trailer to Kendall Smith (“the mother”), and ordered him to reimburse the mother for certain expenses.

Procedural Background

The mother and the father were divorced by a judgment entered by the trial court in January 2024. On September 10, 2024, the mother filed a petition in the trial court seeking to hold the father in contempt because, she alleged, the father had violated provisions of the parties’ divorce judgment that required him to cooperate with the mother to refinance a 2022 Honda Odyssey van (“the van”), required him to deliver to the mother a utility trailer that she was awarded in the divorce judgment, and required him to pay a portion of the childcare costs of the parties’ children. The mother's petition also sought to modify the father's child-support obligation and his visitation with the children.

The father filed an answer and a counterclaim on October 15, 2024, which he later amended on January 17, 2025. The father's counterclaim, as amended, sought to modify his financial obligations to the children and his visitation schedule with the children.

On March 4, 2025, the trial court conducted a pendente lite hearing. On March 7, 2025, the trial court entered an order holding that, because the father was permanently disabled and because the children were receiving benefits drawn off the father's Social Security disability benefits, the father's continuing child-support obligation was satisfied by the children's receipt of those benefits.

Following a trial that began on April 10, 2025, and concluded on October 20, 2025, the trial court, on November 12, 2025, entered a final judgment. The judgment provided, in pertinent part:

“FlNDlNGS OF FACT

“1. The [f]inal [j]udgment of [d]ivorce entered on January 30, 2024, awarded the [mother] the [van], the Kubota tractor, and the utility trailer, and required the [father] to cooperate in the refinancing of the [van].

“2. The [father] willfully failed to cooperate with the refinance, resulting in the repossession of the [van]. The evidence shows that the [father] subsequently used the [van] as part of a trade-in transaction at Cooper Chevrolet in Anniston, Alabama.

“3. Documents from Cooper Chevrolet show that the [father] received a trade-in value of $34,581.36 for the [van], which had a remaining lien payoff of $15,101.32, resulting in a net gain of $19,480.04.

“4. The [father] failed to pay his share of [childcare] expenses as ordered. The evidence shows he owes $2,208.75 per child for two children, totaling $4,417.50.

“5. The [father] has continued to refuse to surrender the utility trailer awarded to the [mother] and has falsely claimed that it does not exist or that he purchased it himself. The evidence establishes the trailer was marital property awarded to the [mother] under [p]aragraph 16 of the [f]inal [j]udgment.

“6. The [father] has failed to consistently make the children available for or transport them to their extracurricular activities, depriving the children of participating in sports and other activities.

“7. The [mother] has incurred reasonable attorney fees and court costs in the amount of $2,808.88 in connection with these proceedings.

“8. The [c]ourt finds that the [father's] conduct in each of the above respects was willful and deliberate, and he is therefore in contempt of court.”

Based on the above findings, the trial court held the father in contempt because of his willful violation of the divorce judgment; ordered the father to reimburse the mother $2,308, representing his unpaid portion of the children's daycare expenses; ordered the father to return the utility trailer to the mother within 10 days and awarded the mother a $1,131.97 conditional judgment in the event the father failed to do so; awarded the mother a $19,480.04 judgment “representing the value of the [van] wrongfully traded by the [father]”; ordered the father to “either (a) take the children to their extracurricular activities occurring during his visitation periods, or (b) make the children available to the [mother] for such activities”; awarded the mother the right to claim the children as dependents for state and federal income-tax purposes each year, unless the father exercised his right to claim the children in alternating years; ordered that the father's continuing child-support obligation was satisfied by the children's receiving benefits drawn off of the father's Social Security disability benefits; and provided that, in the event the father failed to satisfy the money judgments awarded to the mother within 30 days, a “writ of arrest for civil contempt” would be issued against the father and that he would be held in the Etowah County Jail until he purged himself of contempt by paying the full amount owed to the mother or by entering into a payment plan approved by the trial court.

On December 10, 2025, the father filed a postjudgment motion seeking to alter, amend, or vacate the November 12, 2025, judgment or, alternatively, a new trial. The father requested that a hearing be conducted on his motion. Regarding the father's requested timing for the trial court to rule on his postjudgment motion, the postjudgment motion provided:

“1. Realizing that this [c]ourt [j]udge has so much to do ․, the [father] paid for the hearing transcripts, with [e]xhibits, etc., of 4/10/2025 and 10/20/2025.

“2. This [c]ourt's court reporter stated around 12/2/2025 that it would take about three weeks to get the transcripts with trial exhibits ready. This attorney also asked said court reporter for the audio recordings for both hearings just in case that was needed to correct any mistakes, etc.

“3. This attorney is filing this motion to comply with [R]ule 59[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] time limits, and request[s] this [c]ourt not to rule on the [father's] motion until after the transcripts with trial exhibits are ready and can be used to support this [father's] motion, which will be amended, pursuant to [R]ule 15[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] with the hearing transcripts and trial evidence as exhibits with audio recordings if needed so there will be no doubt what the evidence at the hearing was.

“4. The [father] request[s] this [c]ourt to allow this motion to pend pursuant to [R]ule 59.1[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] for the (90) day[ ] period until the aforesaid transcript with trial exhibits and audio recording of said hearing can be finished and will be used as evidence in support of the [father's] amended [R]ule 59[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion, (The [father's] attorney is doing this trying to avoid appeal).”

(Emphasis in original.)

On January 6, 2026, the trial court entered an order indicating that it had been made aware that the father was in possession of the trial transcripts. The order provided that the father had 30 days to file any supplemental postjudgment motion.

On February 8, 2026, the father filed an amended postjudgment motion. That motion included an exhaustive recitation of the trial testimony and argued, in essence, that the trial court's judgment was not supported by the facts presented and was contrary to applicable law. The following day, the trial court scheduled a hearing on the father's postjudgment motion to occur on March 17, 2026; however, the father's postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on March 10, 2026, when the trial court failed to rule on his postjudgment motion within 90 days. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. (providing that “[n]o postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rule[ ] ․ 59[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] shall remain pending in the trial court for more than ninety (90) days, unless with the express consent of all the parties, which consent shall appear of record”). Moreover, because the father's postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on March 10, 2026, the trial court's March 20, 2026, order denying the father's requested postjudgment relief was a nullity. Ex parte Limerick, 66 So. 3d 755 (Ala. 2011). On April 13, 2026, the father filed a timely appeal.

The Evidence

On the first day of the two-day trial, the father testified that, pursuant to the parties’ divorce judgment, the mother was awarded the van, which was financed in his name through LGE Community Credit Union (“LGE”), and that the mother was obligated to take all the steps necessary to refinance the van in her name. After the father received the divorce judgment, he said, he contacted LGE and informed it that the mother had been awarded the van and that she would be contacting LGE to arrange refinancing. The father said that he had also informed the mother that she needed to arrange making payments to LGE. Thereafter, the father said, he began receiving conflicting information from LGE and the mother regarding the van. The mother told the father that she had contacted LGE and that LGE had refused to accept payments from her. According to the father, an LGE employee had confirmed that the mother had contacted LGE, but he said that the employee had also said that the mother had been given the option to either make a payment or to pay off the amount owed on the loan secured by the van. The father testified that the LGE employee had also informed him that the mother had refused both options.

In February 2024, the father received a letter from LGE demanding payment of $15,101.32 or delivery of the van to LGE by noon on March 2, 2024. The father said that he did not forward the demand letter to the mother. No payment was made to LGE by either the father or the mother, which resulted in LGE's repossessing the van.

On March 22, 2024, the father received a second letter from LGE informing him of its intent to sell the van. The father admitted that he also did not forward the March 2024 letter to the mother. After the van was repossessed, the father said, his mother, Wanda Smith, purchased the van from LGE and then gave the van to him. According to the father, he then traded in the van toward the purchase of a Chevrolet Tahoe sport-utility vehicle. The father testified that he was unsure of the van's fair market value, and he was also unable to recall how much he had received for the trade-in.

Wanda confirmed that, after the van had been repossessed, she purchased the van from LGE in April 2024 for $15,377.68. She said that she had become aware of the opportunity to purchase the van when LGE sent the father a letter informing him that the van could be bought back within a certain period after its repossession. According to Wanda, the letter had further stated that, in the event the father opted out of the buyback, the van would be auctioned to the highest bidder and that the father would be responsible for paying any remaining loan balance that was not satisfied by the auction price. Wanda said that the father had worked very hard to establish his credit and that she had purchased the van to ensure that the repossession did not negatively affect his credit rating. She also testified that she had not discussed her intent to purchase the van with the father. According to Wanda, after she purchased the van, she gave the van to the father, who, she said, had subsequently traded it in toward the purchase of a Chevrolet Tahoe. Following the above testimony, the trial court adjourned the matter for the day.

On the second day of the trial, which was conducted on October 20, 2025, the father conceded that he had received $34,581.36 in trade-in value for the van. He, however, reiterated his earlier testimony that the mother had failed to refinance the van as required by the divorce judgment. The father also clarified that the mother had made only a single payment toward the loan that was secured by the van -- in March 2024 -- and had failed to make any further payments. The father said that he had been unable to make the monthly van payments because of his limited disability income. The father denied that he had had anything to do with LGE's repossessing the van. The father also denied that he participated in LGE's selling the van to his mother after it had been repossessed. The father denied that he owed the mother anything for the van.

Regarding the children's daycare costs, the father admitted that the divorce judgment had ordered him to pay one-half of those expenses and that he had failed to pay as ordered. The father was unsure of what he owed for daycare because, he said, he had never been provided with a written bill from the children's daycare provider or from the mother. The father testified that he and his family would gladly care for the children while the mother worked.

Regarding the utility trailer, the father admitted that he had paid $1,131.97 when he purchased the trailer and that the mother had been awarded the trailer in the divorce judgment. The father, however, expressed confusion regarding which utility trailer the mother had been awarded. The father denied that he owned a “Kubota” utility trailer, but he conceded that the receipt for the purchase of a utility trailer in his possession indicated that that utility trailer was purchased from the “Kubota company.” Because he owned several utility trailers, the father requested that the mother provide him with the serial number of the utility trailer that she was requesting be delivered to her.

Regarding the children's extracurricular activities, the father denied that he had failed to allow the parties’ child, L.J.S., to attend the activities in which he was registered or enrolled. According to the father, he had allowed the mother to transport the child to those events. The father objected to the mother's scheduling activities, such as football, during his visitation periods because, he said, those events interfered with his visitation. The father also objected to taking the children to extracurricular activities because, he said, the mother's family members started trouble with him every time he attended an event. For relief, the father requested that the trial court restrain the mother and her family from contacting him at the children's extracurricular activities.

The mother testified that she had incurred $2,208.75 in daycare expenses for the parties’ daughter, El.S., and $2,408.75 for the parties’ other daughter, Em.S. The mother requested that the father be ordered to reimburse her for one-half of those expenses pursuant to the divorce judgment. The mother also requested that the trial court order the father to transport the children to their extracurricular activities when they were in his custody.

Regarding the van, the mother testified that she had done everything within her power to refinance the van, but, she said, the father had failed to cooperate. According to the mother, LGE would not discuss the van with her because it was financed solely in the father's name. The mother said that LGE had informed her that she could not refinance the van without the father's first providing her with the necessary paperwork. LGE further informed her that it would need to physically inspect the van as part of the refinancing process. The mother, however, confirmed the father's testimony indicating that she had made a single payment on the loan secured by the van. The mother said that she had purchased another automobile the day after the van had been repossessed. The mother requested that she be awarded $19,480.04, which represented the difference in the trade-in value of the van and the amount owed on the debt associated with the van at the time of the trade-in.

Issues on Appeal

On appeal, the father contends, albeit in different terms, (1) that the trial court erred when it failed to conduct a timely hearing on his postjudgment motion, (2) that the trial court erred when it modified the property division of the parties’ divorce judgment, (3) that the trial court erred when it declined to hold the mother in contempt of court, and (4) that the trial court erred when it ordered that the father would be incarcerated as a possible contempt sanction.

Discussion

“Rule 59(g), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:

“ ‘Presentation of any post-trial motion to a judge is not required in order to perfect its making, nor is it required that an order continuing any such motions to a date certain be entered. All such motions remain pending until ruled upon by the court (subject to the provisions of Rule 59.1[, Ala. R. Civ. P.]) but shall not be ruled upon until the parties have had opportunity to be heard thereon.’

“(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to Rule 59(g), a party who has requested a hearing on a postjudgment motion has a right to a hearing before it is adjudicated. See Flagstar Enters., Inc. v. Foster, 779 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Ala. 2000). A trial court errs when it allows a postjudgment motion to be denied by operation of law under Rule 59.1 without conducting a requested hearing on the motion. Palmer v. Hall, 680 So. 2d 307, 308 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). That error is reversible if the postjudgment motion has probable merit. See S.L. v. J.L.C., 282 So. 3d 26, 35 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019).”

Hunter Bend Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Grimes, [Ms. CL-2025-0077, Aug. 22, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025). We agree with the father that the trial court erred when it allowed his postjudgment motion to be denied by operation of law without first conducting a hearing. See Palmer v. Hall, 680 So. 2d 307, 308 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). Thus, the issue this court must determine is whether the father's postjudgment motion had probable merit, thus rendering that error reversible. See S.L. v. J.L.C., 282 So. 3d 26, 35 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019).

In his postjudgment motion, the father argued, among other things, that, because the parties’ divorce judgment did not specifically require him to assist the mother in her efforts to refinance the van, the trial court erred when it held him in contempt for his failure to do so. In Williams v. Williams, 323 So. 3d 675 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020), the former husband and the former wife's January 2014 divorce judgment provided:

“ ‘[The former] [w]ife is hereby awarded One Hundred Percent (100%) of the [former] [h]usband's retirement account with the Retirement Systems of Alabama ․ The value of said account shall be as of October 22, 2012, the date this divorce [action] was filed. [The former] [w]ife shall be responsible for preparing a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ․ for the collection of said retirement funds from the [Retirement Systems of Alabama]. This provision shall be non-modifiable. This [c]ourt hereby reserves jurisdiction in this matter for the sole purposes of entering a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ․’ ”

Id. at 676.

A qualified domestic-relations order (“the QDRO”) subsequently entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court provided:

“ ‘This [o]rder assigns to [the former wife] an amount equal to One Hundred Percent (100%) of the [former husband's] total account balance accumulated under the Plan as of the date of employment to October 22, 2012 (or the closest valuation date thereto), plus any interest/investment earnings or losses attributable thereon, for periods subsequent to date of employment to October 22, 2012, until the date of total distribution.’ ”

Id.

The Retirement Systems of Alabama (“RSA”) refused to honor the QDRO, and, instead of paying the former wife, RSA paid the former husband his monthly retirement benefits. The former husband did not forward the monthly retirement benefits that he received from RSA to the former wife. In February 2016, the former wife filed a petition in the Jefferson Circuit Court seeking to hold the former husband in contempt for not transferring the retirement benefits he had improperly received to her. Following a trial, the Jefferson Circuit Court entered a judgment that held the former husband in contempt for “ ‘taking possession of the funds from the [RSA] account that is listed in his name as employee and which was awarded to the [former wife].’ ” 323 So. 3d at 677.

On appeal to this court, the former husband argued that he could not be held in contempt for accepting his retirement benefits or for refusing to pay the former wife the value of his RSA retirement account because, he said, those actions did not violate the divorce judgment. Because a divorce judgment “ ‘ “that by its terms is plain and free from ambiguity must be enforced as written,” ’ ” Williams, 323 So. 3d at 679 (quoting Belcher v. Belcher, 18 So. 3d 946, 948 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), quoting in turn R.G. v. G.G., 771 So. 2d 490, 494 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)), and because the divorce judgment did not order the former husband not to accept his RSA retirement benefits if RSA refused to honor the QDRO, this court determined that the former husband's acceptance of those benefits could not constitute a violation of the divorce judgment and, therefore, could not constitute a basis for holding him in civil contempt. 323 So. 3d at 679. Moreover, this court further determined that, because the divorce judgment did not order the former husband to pay his RSA retirement benefits to the former wife if RSA paid them to him, his failure to pay those benefits to the former wife could not constitute a basis for holding him in contempt. Id. This court concluded:

“Therefore, because, ‘in order to hold a party in contempt under Rule 70A(a)(2)(D), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] the trial court must find that the party willfully failed or refused to comply with a court order,’ Kreitzberg [v. Kreitzberg, 131 So. 3d 612, 628 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)], and because the record does not establish that the former husband willfully failed or refused to comply with a court order, we must reverse the [Jefferson Circuit Court's] April 6, 2018, judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

323 So. 3d at 679.

In his special concurrence, Presiding Judge Moore agreed that the Jefferson Circuit Court had erred when it held the former husband in contempt because, Presiding Judge Moore said, the divorce judgment did not “expressly order” the former husband to redirect his retirement benefits to the former wife. Presiding Judge Moore also recognized the possibility that the divorce judgment at issue in Williams contained an implicit obligation requiring the former husband to directly pay the former wife his retirement benefits in the event RSA refused to honor the QDRO. Presiding Judge Moore surmised:

“Even if it did, an implied order cannot be enforced by contempt.

“ ‘A person may not be held in contempt of a court order that is too indefinite, ambiguous, or vague to be enforced. The very nature of a proceeding in either civil or criminal contempt for an alleged disobedience of a court order requires that the language in the commands be clear and certain. A court's order sufficient to support the sanction of contempt for a violation should inform the person in certain, clear, and definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed or the actions required or forbidden. The mandate alleged to be violated must be clearly expressed rather than implied. It must be unambiguous, precise, and specific. The order must not be subject to dual or multiple reasonable interpretations.’

“17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 140 (2014) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added); see also Jones v. Jones, 320 Ark. 449, 451, 898 S.W.2d 23, 24 (1995) (‘For a person to be held in contempt for violating a court order, that order must be clear and definite as to the duties imposed upon the party, and the directions must be expressed rather than implied.’).”

323 So. 3d at 680.

In the current case, the divorce judgment awarded the mother the van and required her to “take all necessary steps to refinance the vehicle in her name.” As in Williams, the divorce judgment in the current case did not expressly order the father to take any action to effectuate that provision. Considering the entirety of the divorce judgment, it is reasonable to determine that the divorce judgment implicitly directed the parties to undertake certain actions to effectuate the awards therein; however, because the divorce judgment does not expressly order the father to assist with the mother's refinancing efforts regarding the van and because an implied order cannot be enforced by contempt, we are compelled to conclude that the father's postjudgment motion has probable merit on this issue.

Conclusion

Having concluded that at least one of the father's arguments in his postjudgment motion is probably meritorious, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for the trial court to conduct a hearing on the father's entire postjudgment motion. See Hunter Bend Homeowner's Ass'n, supra. Accordingly, we do not address the other issues raised in the father's postjudgment motion. On remand, the trial court is not limited to considering only the contempt issue discussed herein; it may consider all the issues presented in the father's postjudgment motion in deciding whether to alter, amend, or vacate the final judgment or to order a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

EDWARDS, Judge.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.