(In re: Cameron Brock Love v. Karen Campmire Love) (2026)

In February 2018, the Etowah Circuit Court (“the trial court”) entered a judgment divorcing Cameron Brock Love (“the former husband”) and Karen Campmire Love (“the former wife”). Among other things, the divorce judgment provided that

“[t]he [former wife] shall receive one-half of the balance of the retirement funds in the name of the [former husband] as of March 7, 2016, the date of the original filing of the complaint for divorce in this matter, which shall be transferred to her pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to be entered by the [c]ourt once prepared. The [former husband], through counsel, shall provide the necessary information to the attorney for the [former wife] for preparation of the QDRO and counsel for the [former husband] shall assist as may be necessary in order for 1/2 of the retirement funds to be transferred to the [former wife].”

On April 20, 2018, after postjudgment practice had concluded, the trial court entered a qualified domestic-relations order (“QDRO”) that had been prepared by the former wife's counsel. On May 14, 2018, the trial court entered an amended QDRO (“the second QDRO”).

At some point in February or March 2026, the former wife submitted to the trial court a proposed QDRO. The former wife did not file a complaint or petition, pay a filing fee, or otherwise institute an action seeking to modify the second QDRO; she simply filed a copy of the proposed QDRO in the trial court. On March 3, 2026, the trial court entered the former wife's proposed QDRO (“the third QDRO”). On March 30, 2026, the former husband filed a motion seeking clarification of the third QDRO, which, he contended, was inconsistent with the divorce judgment because it awarded the former wife “interest, earnings, and/or gains on her awarded portion of the retirement benefits for the period between 2018 and 2026.” The trial court set the former husband's motion for a hearing. The former husband also filed a motion to freeze distribution of the retirement benefits, which the trial court granted.

After a hearing at which both parties testified, the trial court entered an order on June 11, 2026, which stated:

“1. In accordance with the order of divorce entered by this [c]ourt on February 14, 2018[,] and Code of Alabama [1975,] § 30-2-51(d), the [former wife] is entitled to and shall receive one-half of the retirement benefits in the name of the [former husband] as of March 7, 2016, the date of the parties’ original separation, together with any passive increase or decrease associated with her portion of the retirement benefits from the effective date of the award to the date of distribution. No increases or decreases resulting from contributions, withdrawals, or accruals to the retirement benefit from the effective date of the award shall be included in the valuation.

“2. A separate order entitled ‘Qualified Domestic Relations Order’ consistent with this order and that otherwise meets the retirement benefit plan requirements shall follow.”

The former husband filed a motion pursuant to both Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which he argued that the June 11, 2026, order was void because, he asserted, the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to amend the property-division provisions of the 2018 divorce judgment. The trial court denied the former husband's motion. The former husband then filed this petition for the writ of mandamus in this court.

“ ‘Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and will be granted only where there is “(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.” ’

“Ex parte Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991)). Mandamus will lie to direct a trial court to vacate a void judgment or order. Ex parte Chamblee, 899 So. 2d 244, 249 (Ala. 2004).”

Ex parte Sealy, L.L.C., 904 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Ala. 2004).

In his mandamus petition, the former husband first argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the third QDRO and that all orders entered by the trial court after the entry of the third QDRO are void. Relying on Montgomery v. Montgomery, 37 So. 3d 168 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), the former husband contends that the former wife's failure to institute an action to modify the second QDRO and to pay a filing fee associated with her filing of the third QDRO prevented the trial court from acquiring subject-matter jurisdiction over the former wife's attempt to modify the second QDRO.

The facts of Montgomery are similar to those in the present case. The Russell Circuit Court had divorced Clark Daniel Montgomery (“the husband”) and Cynthia C. Montgomery (“the wife”) by a judgment entered in May 1999. In conjunction with the divorce judgment, the Russell Circuit Court had entered a QDRO to effectuate the division of the husband's 401(k) account (“QDRO A”). In May 2005, the wife requested, and the Russell Circuit Court entered, a QDRO relating to the division of the husband's retirement account (“QDRO B”). The wife paid no filing fee at the time she requested the entry of QDRO B. In December 2007, the wife filed a motion requesting that the Russell Circuit Court modify the terms of QDRO B. The wife paid no filing fee with her motion to modify QDRO B. In February 2008, the Russell Circuit Court “set aside” QDRO B and entered an amended QDRO (“QDRO C”). In a postjudgment motion, the husband challenged the jurisdiction of the Russell Circuit Court to enter QDRO B and QDRO C, but the trial court denied his motion.¹ He then appealed, arguing that the wife's failure to pay a filing fee had deprived the Russell Circuit Court of jurisdiction to enter QDRO B and QDRO C.

This court agreed that the Russell Circuit Court had lacked jurisdiction to enter QDRO B and QDRO C. We explained:

“The issue at the heart of this case is whether a trial court retains jurisdiction over a divorce judgment in order to implement or enforce its judgment. This court has held that ‘[a] court rendering a judgment has the inherent power to enforce its judgment and to make such orders as may be necessary to render it effective.’ King v. King, 636 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994); see also Patchett v. Patchett, 469 So. 2d 642 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985). We conclude that a trial court has the inherent power to issue a QDRO subsequent to the entry of a divorce judgment in an effort to implement or enforce the judgment or to render the divorce judgment effective. Cf. Jardine v. Jardine, 918 So. 2d 127, 131-32 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (discussing and quoting Haney v. Haney, 50 Ala. App. 79, 81, 277 So. 2d 356, 357 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973), in which this court held that a trial court had the power to order the sale of a marital residence, even though a provision for the sale of the marital residence was not set forth in the parties’ original agreement or the divorce judgment, because ‘the parties’ original divorce agreement and resulting judgment “was final only under the circumstances existing at the time, but [was] subject to modification for the purpose of implementing” the result intended by that judgment’).

“However, we agree with the husband that the wife should have filed separate actions, paid the appropriate filing fees, and given the husband proper notice of her filings because the wife was seeking to implement or enforce the divorce judgment.4 Cf. Colburn v. Colburn, 14 So. 3d 176, 178 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment of contempt ‘because the parties filed their [contempt] motions after the entry of a final judgment in the case, [and, therefore,] their motions constituted independent proceedings over which the trial court could gain jurisdiction only if the parties paid the filing fees required to commence such proceedings’). Section 12-19-71(a), Ala. Code 1975, sets forth the amount of filing fees to be paid in civil actions, and subsection (7) states the dollar amount required ‘for cases filed in the domestic relations docket of the circuit court seeking to modify or enforce an existing domestic relations order.’

“Because the wife did not pay any filing fees when filing her motion requesting the entry of a QDRO, the [Russell Circuit C]ourt was never vested with jurisdiction to enter QDRO [B], and, therefore, its judgment of May 11, 2005, purporting to enter QDRO [B] is void.5 See Vann v. Cook, 989 So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (holding that ‘[a] judgment entered by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is absolutely void’). We further conclude that the [Russell Circuit C]ourt did not have jurisdiction to enter QDRO [C] for the same reasons that it did not have jurisdiction to enter QDRO [B] and that, therefore, the [Russell Circuit C]ourt's judgment of February 8, 2008, is void as well.6

“_________________________

“4We note that there was some indication that the husband had actual notice of the wife's intent to initiate the proceedings seeking the entry of the QDROs, but the parties do not dispute the fact that the wife did not pay any filing fees.

“5Although the husband did not object to the entry of QDRO [B], subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. See Riley v. Hughes, 17 So. 3d 643, 648 (Ala. 2009) (‘subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the failure to argue it as an issue’).

“6Because we have concluded that the [Russell Circuit C]ourt lacked jurisdiction to enter QDRO [B], the wife's argument that QDRO [C] was entered pursuant to Rule 60(a)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] to correct a clerical error contained in QDRO [B] is without merit. ․”

Montgomery, 37 So. 3d at 172-73.

As we recently explained in Hall v. Mock, [Ms. CL-2025-0417, May 22, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2026), “[i]n 2004, the legislature amended Ala. Code 1975, § 12-19-71, to establish a specific filing fee of $248 ‘for cases filed in the domestic relations docket of the circuit court seeking to modify or enforce an existing domestic relations court order.’ Ala. Acts 2004, Act No. 2004-636, § 1, codified at Ala. Code 1975, § 12-19-71(a)(7).”² Although § 12-19-71(a)(7)b. provides an exception to the requirement that a filing fee be collected, it does so only “for a motion for a qualified domestic relations order which is filed within 120 days of the date of the final order.” The former wife's filing of the proposed third QDRO occurred eight years after the entry of the 2018 divorce judgment and was therefore not exempt from the filing fee imposed by the legislature in § 12-19-71(a)(7)a.

Because the former wife failed to pay a filing fee to institute an action to modify the second QDRO, we agree with the former husband that the trial court never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction regarding the third QDRO and that the third QDRO and all orders entered thereafter are void for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we grant the former husband's petition and direct the trial court to vacate the third QDRO and all orders entered after March 3, 2026. Because we have determined that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the former wife's request to issue the third QDRO based on her failure to pay a filing fee, we pretermit consideration of whether the third QDRO, or the trial court's subsequent orders, were void for any other reason advanced by the former husband in his mandamus petition.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   During the pendency of the husband's postjudgment motion, the wife filed a separate contempt petition, which the Russell Circuit Court denied. The wife filed an appeal from that judgment, and the appeals were consolidated. The issues raised in the wife's appeal from the judgment in the contempt action are not relevant to the issue in this case, and we therefore do not discuss that aspect of the Montgomery opinion.

2.   In her answer to the petition, the former wife argues that this court should reexamine its holding in Hall and other cases holding that a filing fee is a necessary prerequisite to an enforcement action and relies, in part, on the special writing in Hall and the principle that courts retain residual jurisdiction to enforce their judgments. See Hall, ___ So. 3d at ___ (Bowden, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part). In Hall, we adequately explained our rejection of the same argument the former wife makes, and we see no need to reexamine the argument in this opinion. Moreover, the former wife's filing, in essence, sought a modification of an existing QDRO.

EDWARDS, Judge.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.