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W.N. v. CULLMAN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
W.N., the paternal grandmother of J.C.L. (“the child”), appeals from a judgment of the Cullman Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”), entered in two separate actions, that denied her petition seeking custody of the child and terminated the parental rights of L.L. and J.L. to the child. Because W.N. did not timely appeal from the judgment entered in case no. JU-17-151.03, we dismiss appeal no. 2171167. See Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. We affirm the judgment entered in case no. JU-17-151.02, appeal no. 2171166, for the reasons expressed below.
Facts and Procedural History
The child was born on March 30, 2017, to L.L. (“the mother”) and J.L. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as “the father”).1 Hospital staff contacted the Cullman County Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) with concerns regarding the parents' inabilities to properly care for the child. The child was initially placed with W.N. (“the grandmother”) on a safety plan. Shortly thereafter, DHR discovered that several allegations of physical abuse and neglect involving J.L., the grandmother's son, had been made against the grandmother and that she had pleaded guilty to child endangerment when J.L. was a baby. On April 3, 2017, after a shelter-care hearing, the child was placed in a foster-care home, where he remained at the time of the trial.
On April 6, 2017, the grandmother filed a petition seeking custody of the child; that petition initiated case no. JU-17-151.02 (“the .02 action”).2 On April 13, 2018, DHR filed a petition seeking to terminate the mother's and the father's parental rights; that petition was assigned case no. JU-17-151.03 (“the .03 action”). In its petition, DHR alleged, among other things, that the parents suffered from intellectual disabilities and that, as a result, neither parent could care for the child.
On August 22, 2018, the juvenile court held a trial on the grandmother's custody petition and DHR's petition seeking to terminate the mother's and the father's parental rights. At the beginning of the trial, the parties stipulated to the mental incapacity of the mother and the father.
Dr. Barry Wood, a clinical psychologist, testified that he had performed psychological evaluations on the mother, the father, the grandmother, and T.N. (“the grandmother's husband”). Dr. Wood testified that he had completed various assessments on the parties. Dr. Wood testified that one assessment in particular had scales within it to help determine whether a person is being truthful. Dr. Wood explained that the grandmother's scale was “overly elevated,” which indicated that she had not been honest. Dr. Wood also testified that the grandmother had an intelligence quotient (“IQ”) within the range of borderline intellectual functioning and had had special education throughout school. Dr. Wood diagnosed the grandmother with specified personality disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and recurrent depression. Dr. Wood opined that the grandmother should be undergoing mental-health treatment because of the “significantly increased probability [she] will have recurrence of depression and said self-injurious behavior[/]suicidal behavior.” Dr. Wood testified that he questioned the grandmother's capability to protect a child, explaining that J.L. had been molested as a child and that the grandmother had been charged with endangering the welfare of J.L. when he was a child. Dr. Wood's psychological report concluded that the grandmother “is unable to parent adequately.”
Dr. Wood testified that he diagnosed the grandmother's husband with mild neurocognitive disorder, which, he explained, could have many different causes. Dr. Wood testified that he was not surprised to learn that the grandmother's husband had been diagnosed as having dementia. He also testified, and the parties stipulated, that the parents were not competent to parent the child.
Patricia Bicknell, a foster-care supervisor with DHR, testified that, in September 2017, after attempts to reunite the child with the parents had failed, DHR began working with the grandmother to attempt to place the child with her. In February 2018, however, the permanency plan changed to adoption because “there wasn't enough progress within the family” and the child and the family had still not bonded at that point.
Leah Miller, a foster-care and resource social worker with DHR, testified that she became involved with the family in April 2018 after the previous worker left her employment with DHR. During her involvement, the grandmother and her husband, and the parents, had supervised visitation with the child twice each week.
Miller testified that she had received approximately four reports that DHR had to investigate regarding the grandmother during the time in which she had had the case. One such report involved allegations that the grandmother had been leaving children unattended with the mother and the father, despite their incapacities, while she was supposed to be caring for those children.
Miller also recounted a history of DHR investigations involving the grandmother. In 1995, the grandmother was “indicated” for leaving the father, who was an infant at that time, in his car seat in the sun. The grandmother had had investigations that were resolved as “not indicated” in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. Miller testified that the grandmother also had a history of involvement with the DHR equivalent in Indiana involving allegations that her daughter had been hospitalized twice for taking medication and that the father had brought “pills” to his school on three separate occasions. It appears, however, that the children were in the care of babysitters or relatives when those incidents occurred.
Miller further testified that the grandmother had exposed her own children to her father, a registered sex offender, and her brother, S.B., who had been indicated by DHR for sexual abuse. In addition, according to Miller, there had been allegations in 2011 that the father had molested a three-year-old girl and, later, his younger sister. Miller explained that the cases were resolved as “not indicated” because neither victim made a disclosure “but there was reason to suspect the abuse happened.”
Miller testified that she made an unannounced visit to the grandmother's home on August 14, 2018, and that, when she first arrived, the father ran inside and told her that he had to put up a dog that was aggressive and bites. Miller testified: “[A]s soon as I walked into the home, it was just like -- I almost passed out from the smell. It was like feces and urine smell with bleach, like -- you know, I could tell they had been cleaning, but they had just cleaned with bleach and it was very strong.”
Miller was shown pictures that the grandmother had allegedly taken on the date of Miller's visit that showed a freezer and cabinets full of food. Miller testified that the pictures did not accurately depict the amount of food she observed in the grandmother's home on that date. Miller testified that she was concerned that, based on the grandmother's and her family's income and expenses, they should have excess monthly income, but, she asserted, the grandmother and the father had mentioned that they attend food banks and that the food in their house had been scarce.
Miller testified that the grandmother and the child had not bonded and that the child did not seem interested in the grandmother. As an example, Miller testified that she had observed a visit behind tempered glass when the parties were unaware that she was watching. Miller testified that the parents and the grandmother were sitting on the couch and were ignoring the child, and she saw that the child was about to put something small into his mouth. Miller testified that she had to knock on the glass in order to get the parents' and the grandmother's attention and that, after the grandmother knew Miller was watching, the grandmother got on the floor and began playing with the child.
America Robinson testified that she had been employed with the Youth Advocate Program (“YAP”) for the past year and had served as an advocate for the child. It is not clear from the record, but it appears that YAP became involved as a service provided to the family by DHR.
Robinson testified that she had supervised the visitations between the child and the parents and the grandmother. Robinson testified that the visitations were initially in the home but that the location of the visitations changed to the YAP office because of a roach infestation in the home. According to Robinson, there is “no obvious bond” between the child and the grandmother or the parents. She explained that the child had typically played on his own and that the grandmother had not interacted with the child unless he came to her. Robinson also testified that the grandmother and the parents had consistently attempted to put the child to sleep an hour into their two-hour visitation.
Robinson testified that, during visitations in the home, she had witnessed the father hitting and throwing a puppy and that she had told him to stop but that the mother and the grandmother did not appear to be concerned with the father's behavior.
Robinson had visited the grandmother's home unannounced on July 30, 2018, and, according to Robinson, when she arrived, the mother would not let her come inside but the grandmother eventually let her inside the home. Robinson testified that there were four dogs in the home and that the home smelled of feces and urine. Robinson also testified that there was clothing thrown all over the kitchen floor and dirty dishes and food all over the kitchen counters. Robinson testified that she had been told that they had just finished eating dinner, but, she opined, it did not appear that the food had been from dinner. Robinson further testified that there was “[h]ardly any food” in the home and that the parents and the grandmother had previously mentioned not having enough food or money. Robinson testified that she returned to the home unannounced on August 10, 2018, and that the home was clean but that there was still not much food in the home.
Candace Lingo, a case manager from the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) program, had been appointed by the juvenile court to serve as an advocate for the child. Lingo testified that she had observed visitations between the parents and the grandmother and the child. Lingo testified that the visits were scheduled between 8:00 and 10:00 a.m. and that at 9:00 or 9:15 the parents and the grandmother had always tried to put the child to sleep, regardless of whether he was ready to sleep. Lingo opined that there is no bond between the child and the parents or the child and the grandmother.
Lingo testified that she had accompanied Robinson to the grandmother's home unannounced on August 10, 2018. According to Lingo, the home was “decently clean,” and, although there was some food in the home, she did not believe it was an adequate amount to last the family more than a few days.
Lingo acknowledged that a December 4, 2017, CASA report had recommended that the child be returned to the parents under the direct supervision of the grandmother with certain conditions, including, among others, that the father and the grandmother obtain and continue mental-health treatment and attend parenting classes. Lingo testified that she had not spoken to the worker who had completed the report to determine whether her recommendation had changed.
The grandmother, who was 44 years old at the time of the trial, acknowledged that she had been convicted of child endangerment in 1995, but, she testified, she never saw a report and did not know the basis for the charge. The grandmother then acknowledged that she had pleaded guilty to leaving J.L. in his car seat in the hot sun when he was a baby, but, she testified, she had not done that. The grandmother was asked: “So if there's documented paperwork ․ where you admitted to that, that would be a lie?” The grandmother responded: “I think -- I mean, it's nothing.”
The grandmother acknowledged that DHR, from Cullman County and other counties, had been to her home several times in the past. In one instance, the grandmother testified, she was investigated because the man she was living with at that time had abused her and J.L. had witnessed it. The grandmother testified that she had also been investigated by the DHR equivalent in Indiana for allegedly giving J.L. and her other child “bedtime medicine through the daytime.” When asked about the circumstances surrounding J.L.'s molestation, she testified that her husband's former wife had been caring for J.L. when the molestation occurred and that, when she picked him up from the former wife's house and discovered that J.L.'s stepbrother had molested him, she immediately reported it to local law enforcement.
The grandmother testified that she had “babysat” other people's children, but she denied that she had ever left a child unattended in the care of the mother and the father. The grandmother also denied a statement contained in the CASA report indicating that she had admitted to an occasion in which she left a child she was babysitting with the mother and the father overnight while she was at the hospital with her father.
The grandmother acknowledged that she had a history of depression that began in late 1990s. The grandmother denied assertions that she had attempted suicide in 2015 by trying to cut her throat and that her husband had had to take a knife out of her hand, but she admitted that she had “thought about” killing herself. The grandmother acknowledged that, as a result of that incident, she was hospitalized, but, she asserted, the hospitalization was because she had been biting herself to relieve anxiety. The grandmother testified that she suffers from panic attacks, and, initially, she testified that she had had to seek treatment from an emergency room twice since DHR had opened its case regarding the child. She later testified that she had not been to an emergency room for panic attacks since the child was born. The grandmother testified that she had not received mental-health treatment for a number of years but that she recently began attending a mental-health center based on DHR's recommendation. She testified that she was currently prescribed four medications to treat her anxiety and depression.
The grandmother testified that she receives a secondary-benefit check in the amount of $618 a month from the Social Security Administration based on her husband's disability. The grandmother's husband receives Social Security disability benefits of $1,237 each month. The grandmother testified that the father and the mother each receive a monthly Social Security disability check in the amount of $563 and that she is the payee on those checks because the parents cannot manage their finances.
The grandmother testified that she, her husband, the father, and the mother had been living in the same three-bedroom mobile home for the past year. The grandmother testified that the mother and the father would continue to live in the home if she was granted custody of the child but that the child would have his own room. The grandmother acknowledged that the parents are not capable of taking care of the child on their own. She further testified that, if the child was placed in her custody and she needed a babysitter, she would rely on her cousin who has no prior involvement with DHR and has her own children in her care.
The grandmother testified that her father, C.L., who she acknowledged is a registered sex offender, lives “two trailers” behind her. The grandmother testified that her stepsister had said that C.L. had “touched her” when she was 12 years old and that C.L. pleaded guilty to that offense, but she indicated that she did not believe that C.L. had done anything inappropriate. The grandmother testified that she did not remember being advised that C.L. could not be around the child and that he had been around the child only at a Christmas visitation when he dressed as Santa Claus. The grandmother later testified that, if the child was in her custody, she would not let the child around C.L. and that she had “cut him out of the circulation” two weeks before the trial.
When asked about the condition of her home, the grandmother testified: “I've always kept a clean house. People say it could be nasty, but not to me.” She acknowledged, however, that visitation with the child had been moved from her home to the YAP office because of “bugs” in her home. The grandmother testified that, since then, she had had a pest-control company treat her home each month.
The grandmother denied the assertions that she did not have food in her home, and, in support, she submitted pictures she alleged were taken on August 14, 2018, that showed a freezer and cabinets filled with food.
When the grandmother was asked what the child's medical needs are, she testified: “I know he's delayed and I know he had surgery for adenoids and tubes.” She also testified that she knows that “he's got some genes missing,” but, she testified, she did not know how the child's condition will affect him in the future. The grandmother asserted that she had taken parenting classes and that she could care for the child.
J.M. (“the foster mother”) testified that the child had been in her care since he was four days old. She testified that he has an extensive list of diagnoses, including microcephaly, developmental delay, tonsillar hypertrophy, acid reflux, and eczema. The foster mother testified that the child has chromosome abnormalities that cause hypertonia and hypotonia, which affect his motor skills and his ability to eat. She explained that the child had difficulty using his tongue and that he lacks the jaw strength necessary to eat most foods. The foster mother testified that the child had been in physical therapy and occupational therapy and that he had learned to walk and crawl. The foster mother testified that the child had just begun speech therapy because he says only “momma, da-da, and nana,” which, she explained, is developmentally behind for a 17-month-old child. The foster mother further explained that the child's “prognosis is what is scary” and that “he could be horribly delayed” and “have severe learning disabilities” but that “it's going to kind of be just a test of time as to how that progresses.” The foster mother asserted that she is proactive with researching the child's condition in an attempt to ensure that he receives the appropriate therapy “to make sure he's growing and developing in the best way possible.” The foster mother testified that she and her husband intended to adopt the child if the parents' parental rights were terminated.
On August 30, 2018, the juvenile court rendered an identical judgment in the .02 action and the .03 action that terminated the parents' parental rights and denied the grandmother's petition seeking custody of the child. The grandmother has appealed from the judgments in both actions.
I. Appeal No. 2171167
We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Nunn v. Baker, 518 So.2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987)(explaining that “jurisdictional matters are of such magnitude that [appellate courts] take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu”).
Pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1)(E), Ala. R. App. P., and Rule 28(C), Ala. R. Juv. P., a notice of appeal from a judgment or order entered by a juvenile court must be filed within 14 days of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Otherwise, this court is required to dismiss the appeal for a lack of jurisdiction. Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.
Rule 58(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., which is made applicable in the juvenile court by Rule 1(A), Ala. R. Juv. P., explains that an “order or a judgment shall be deemed ‘entered’ ․ as of the actual date of the input of the order or judgment into the State Judicial Information System” (“SJIS”). In the .03 action, the judgment that was rendered on August 30, 2018, was entered into the SJIS by the juvenile-court clerk on the same date. Therefore, a notice of appeal had to be filed within 14 days of August 30, 2018. The notice of appeal in the .03 action is stamped by the juvenile-court clerk as filed on September 24, 2018.3 The record does not contain a postjudgment motion filed by the grandmother in the .03 action, which would have suspended the time allotted for the grandmother to file her notice of appeal. See Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P. Accordingly, the grandmother's appeal from the judgment in the .03 action is untimely, and, therefore, we dismiss appeal no. 2171167.4 See Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.5
II. Appeal No. 2171166
With regard to the .02 action, the juvenile court's judgment that was rendered on August 30, 2018, was not input into the SJIS (i.e., entered) until September 10, 2018. See Rule 58(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. The grandmother had filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., seeking to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment in the .02 action on September 7, 2018. Although the grandmother's motion was filed before the entry of the judgment, it “ ‘quickened on the day that judgment was entered.’ ” Jakeman v. Lawrence Grp. Mgmt. Co., 82 So.3d 655, 658 (Ala. 2011)(quoting Miller v. Miller, 10 So.3d 570, 572 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) ). The juvenile court purported to deny the grandmother's postjudgment motion on September 26, 2018; however, the grandmother's postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on September 24, 2018. See Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P. Therefore, the grandmother's notice of appeal was required to be filed within 14 days of September 24, 2018 -- the date that her postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law -- which was October 8, 2018.6 See Rule 28(C), Ala. R. Juv. P. The juvenile-court clerk stamped the grandmother's notice of appeal as filed in the .02 action on September 24, 2018, which was within 14 days of the date the grandmother's motion was denied by operation of law.7 The grandmother's notice of appeal from the judgment in the .02 action was, therefore, timely filed, and we can consider the grandmother's appeal no. 2171166.8
In challenging the juvenile court's decision to not award her custody of the child, the grandmother primarily raises arguments relating to what she asserts was the wrongful termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights. The grandmother, however, cannot challenge the judgment insofar as it terminated the parents' parental rights and cannot raise arguments in this appeal on behalf of the parents. See, e.g., J.S. v. Etowah Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 72 So.3d 1212, 1224 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).
Insofar as the grandmother challenges the juvenile court's denial of her petition seeking custody of the child, we have explained that,
“[w]hen evidence in a child custody case has been presented ore tenus to the trial court, that court's findings of fact based on that evidence are presumed to be correct. The trial court is in the best position to make a custody determination -- it hears the evidence and observes the witnesses. Appellate courts do not sit in judgment of disputed evidence that was presented ore tenus before the trial court in a custody hearing.”
Ex parte Bryowsky, 676 So.2d 1322, 1324 (Ala. 1996). In addition, to the extent the juvenile court did not make specific findings of fact, we must “assume that the [juvenile] court made those findings necessary to support its judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous.” Id.
The grandmother argues that, pursuant to § 12-15-314(a)(3)c., Ala. Code 1975, the juvenile court should have placed the child in her custody because she is a relative. We first note that § 12-15-314(a)(3)c. involves custodial dispositions that a juvenile court may make after finding a child to be dependent. Section 12-15-320(b), Ala. Code 1975, involves custodial dispositions for children whose parents' parental rights have been terminated, and it provides that,
“[a]fter the court has made the determination to terminate the parental rights, it has two alternatives. The court may award permanent legal custody to DHR or other child-placing agency or it may award permanent legal custody to a relative of the child or other individual. Section 26-18-8 [now codified at § 12-15-320(b) ], Ala. Code 1975. Our only inquiry in this case is whether the trial court erred when it denied the [maternal grandparents'] petition for custody and awarded permanent legal custody to DHR.
“The primary consideration in cases pertaining to custody of a child is what would be in the best interests of that child. Melton v. State Department of Pensions & Security, 448 So.2d 392 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984). When determining what would be in the best interests of the child, the court must consider whether an individual seeking custody is physically, financially, and mentally able to care for the child. In the Matter of Von Goyt, 461 So.2d 821 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984).”
Shackelford v. State Dep't of Human Res., 527 So.2d 1329, 1330 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988).
In denying the grandmother's custody petition, the juvenile court stated: “It is specifically found that placement of the child in the home of the paternal grandmother would be harmful to the minor child and not in his best interest.”
The grandmother asserts that she “was familiar with the type of care needed by the minor child,” that “she ․ raised two children with the same type disability,” and that, therefore, it was in the child's best interest to be in her custody. The record does not support the grandmother's assertions. The grandmother was unable to accurately identify the child's medical conditions or his needs. The evidence indicated that the child has chromosomal abnormalities that have resulted in various medical conditions, while the grandmother's children have only low intellectual functioning. The foster mother, on the other hand, was able to give detailed information about the child's condition, his prognosis, and the various therapies necessary to address developmental delays.
Moreover, the juvenile court had before it evidence indicating that the grandmother had a history of involvement with DHR, that she had been convicted of child endangerment, and that she lived in close proximity to her father who was a convicted sex offender. There was also evidence indicating that the grandmother's home, on more than one occasion, had either smelled of feces and urine or bleach. There was evidence indicating that the grandmother had been hospitalized for psychiatric issues, and the grandmother acknowledged that she had a history of depression and anxiety. Further, there was evidence indicating that the grandmother had “ignored” the child during visitations and that there was no bond between her and the child.
Although there was some disputed evidence, we have explained that, “[i]n cases where the evidence conflicts, the trial court is free to choose which evidence it believes and it is up to the [trial] court to resolve the conflicts.” Seifert v. Houlditch, 583 So.2d 274, 275 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991). See also Petrey v. Petrey, 989 So.2d 1128, 1134 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)(“It [i]s the duty of the trial court, as the trier of fact, to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.”).
We also note that the juvenile court had the benefit of observing the grandmother as she testified and that “the ore tenus ‘presumption is based on the trial court's unique position to directly observe the witnesses and to assess their demeanor and credibility. This opportunity to observe witnesses is especially important in child-custody cases.’ ” Sylvester v. Cartee, 279 So. 3d 596, 606 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018)(quoting Ex parte Fann, 810 So.2d 631, 633 (Ala. 2001) ). See also Dunn v. Dunn, 972 So.2d 810, 815 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)(explaining that the trial court is in the best position to evaluate a witness's demeanor and credibility in resolving conflicting evidence).
The evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that “placement of the child in the home of the paternal grandmother would be harmful to the minor child and not in his best interest.” The juvenile court could have also properly found that the grandmother was not able to adequately care for the child and that the child's best interest would best be served by granting permanent custody to DHR, which would allow the child to be adopted by his foster parents. See Shackelford, 527 So.2d at 1330. Accordingly, the judgment in appeal no. 2171166 is affirmed.
1. Although it is not explicitly stated in the record, it appears that the mother and the father were married.
2. The grandmother's petition was initially docketed as case no. JU-17-179.01. On June 1, 2017, the juvenile-court judge transferred the grandmother's petition to the already pending dependency case, case no. JU-17-151, and assigned the action a .02 suffix.
3. We note that the notice of appeal in the .03 action is dated September 25, 2018, and the SJIS indicates that it was filed on September 25, 2018. We need not determine the actual date the notice of appeal was filed, however, because, under either scenario, the notice of appeal is untimely.
4. The grandmother filed an amended notice of appeal in the .03 action. That notice of appeal was also untimely and failed to invoke this court's jurisdiction. See J.W.K. v. Marshall Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 18 So.3d 956, 958 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)(dismissing an appeal when an amended notice of appeal was not filed within the 14 days allowed by Rule 28(C), Ala. R. Juv. P.).
5. Moreover, if the grandmother was not a party to the .03 action, her notice of appeal would not have invoked the jurisdiction of this court even if it had been filed within 14 days from the entry of the judgment. See, e.g., D.M. v. Jefferson Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 232 So.3d 237, 241 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)(explaining that the father in that case was not a party to the underlying action involving a child, and, as a result, his notice of appeal failed to invoke this court's appellate jurisdiction).
6. Because October 8, 2018, was Columbus Day, the grandmother would have had until October 9, 2018, to file her notice of appeal. See Rule 26(a), Ala. R. App. P.
7. As with the notice of appeal filed in the .03 action, although the grandmother's notice of appeal in the .02 action bears a stamped date of September 24, 2018, the date written by the grandmother's attorney and the SJIS indicate that the grandmother's notice of appeal was filed on September 25, 2018. Whether the grandmother's notice of appeal was filed on September 24 or 25 does not affect our analysis because the grandmother's postjudgment motion suspended the time in which to file her notice of appeal, and it would be timely under either scenario.
8. We further note that the grandmother filed an amended notice of appeal on September 28, 2018, to indicate the date the postjudgment motion was denied, to include the case number appealed from, and to designate the type of case. The amendment was not necessary. Rule 3(c), Ala. R. App. P., provides that the “designation of [the] judgment or order [on the notice of appeal] shall not ․ limit the scope of appellate review.” Any error on the grandmother's original notice-of-appeal form would not affect her ability to appeal. See Ex parte Taylor, 157 So.3d 122, 126 (Ala. 2008)(“The only jurisdictional requirement for an appeal is the timely filing of a notice of appeal.”).
Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Edwards, and Hanson, JJ., concur.
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Docket No: 2171166 and 2171167
Decided: March 15, 2019
Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
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