(In re: Drew Steven Deaton v. LeAnne Wilson Deaton) (2026)

Drew Steven Deaton (“the father”) has filed in this court a petition for the writ of mandamus directed to the Jefferson Circuit Court arising out of a postdivorce action between him and LeAnne Wilson Deaton (“the mother”) that has twice previously been the subject of proceedings before this court.¹ In Deaton v. Deaton, 416 So. 3d 1106 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), among other things, we ordered the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing at which the father could challenge the reasonableness of a nearly $30,000 fee awarded to Clotele Hardy Brantley, who was appointed as the guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the children of the father and the mother; the father had been ordered to pay half of the guardian ad litem fee. In Ex parte Deaton, [Ms. CL-2025-0111, Mar. 28, 2025] ––– So. 3d –––– (Ala. Civ. App 2025), this court granted the father's petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to hold a hearing on the father's motion to compel discovery from Brantley at a reasonable interval before holding the hearing on the reasonableness of Brantley's guardian ad litem fee.

In his motion to compel, the father complained that Brantley had refused to answer several questions posed to her at her deposition and that she had also failed to produce certain documents. Specifically, the motion to compel sought an order requiring Brantley to answer the questions seeking the following information:

“• Her current and previous residence addresses;

“• Her ex-husband's name;

“• Her children's names;

“• The number of children she has;

“• Her responsibilities, role, and compensation for serving in her current occupation as a senior trial referee in Jefferson County family court;

“• Her involvement and testimony in other lawsuits;

“• The type of petition for bankruptcy she previously filed;

“• Whether she sought fees in the previous case involving these parties that was settled;

“• Her cell phone carrier;[2]

“• Other cell phone numbers that she may use;

“• Whether she had any conversations with the trial[-]court [judge] about the instant case or the subject children before or after she was appointed as a guardian ad litem in the case in November 2021;

“• Whether she spoke with [former] Judge [Nakita] Blocton about the previous case;

“• Whether she has the cell phone numbers for the [trial-court judge], Judge Langham, or [former] Judge Blocton in her list of contacts;

“• Whether she agrees or disagrees that complying with the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct is relevant to determining whether she is entitled to fees for her guardian ad litem services;

“• Whether her daughter, Madison Brantley, served as a judicial assistant for [now-retired] Judge [Agnes] Chappell and whether Judge Chappell implemented an ethical wall insulating Madison Brantley from participating in the Deaton case;

“• Her knowledge about Judge Chappell's ethical wall;

“• Whether her daughter, Madison Brantley, was subpoenaed and whether she sought to recover fees for hiring an attorney for her daughter;

“• The details of and basis for statements made in the documents that she prepared in this case for which she seeks to recover fees;

“• Whether she performed legal research in preparing documents that she filed with the [trial c]ourt and whether she has access to a legal research tool;

“• Whether she has texted with [the mother's] counsel about the case;

“• Whether [the mother's] parents have paid her any fees or provided her any benefits (hotel, cash, dinners); and

“• Where she banks.”

The motion also sought to compel Brantley to produce a privilege log, original documents (instead of copies that had been produced) relating to her claim that she maintained contemporaneous billing records, and the attachments to electronic-mail messages that had been produced.

According to the averments in the father's petition for the writ of mandamus, after the issuance of our opinion in Ex parte Deaton, he subpoenaed Brantley's cellular-telephone records as part of his attempt to discover information relating to the reasonableness of Brantley's guardian ad litem fee. The petition avers that a review of those records yielded information indicating that, among other things, Brantley had called or texted a telephone number associated with the trial-court judge numerous times. As a result of that information, the father filed a motion requesting that the trial-court judge recuse herself from the action. In that motion, the father contended that the possibility that the guardian ad litem had engaged in ex parte communications with the trial-court judge supported a conclusion that the trial-court judge should recuse herself based on the appearance of impropriety resulting from the alleged communications. He further contended that the possibility that the trial-court judge might herself be a witness to unprofessional conduct of the guardian ad litem that could impact the determination regarding the reasonableness of the guardian ad litem fee might result in a reasonable person questioning the impartiality of the trial-court judge.

The trial court held a hearing on September 2, 2025, at which the trial-court judge considered the motion to recuse and the motion to compel. After brief arguments by counsel, the trial court denied the motion to recuse in an order entered on September 2, 2025, which stated, in pertinent part:

“A [j]udge must recuse if ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’ The [father] has attached [Brantley's cellular-telephone records] to his Motion [f]or Recusal. [Those records] purport[ ] to indicate that there were calls between the court and the [g]uardian [a]d [l]item beginning in 2018. This case was assigned to this court in 2021. Judges naturally have professional associations with people in the profession that they work in and it's only when the relationship is unusually close that impartiality might be reasonably questioned. Judges may have routine friendships and professional associations with members of the Bar. That alone does not justify recusal by a judge. Here the [father] has not presented sufficient evidence to warrant recusal.

“It is an exceedingly improbable proposition and a stretch of the imagination that general conversations between professionals justif[y] recusal.”

In a separate order entered on September 5, 2025, the trial court granted the motion to compel in limited part. That order required that Brantley sit for a second deposition and directed her to

“answer the following questions[,] which may be relevant to the reasonableness of her billing[:]

“• Whether she had any conversations with the [c]ourt about the instant case or the subject children before or after she was appointed as a guardian ad litem in the case in November 2021.

“• Whether she performed legal research in preparing documents that she filed with the [c]ourt and whether she has access to a legal research tool.

“• Whether she has texted with [the mother's] counsel about the case.”

The September 5, 2025, order denied all other requested relief.

On October 14, 2025, the father filed his petition for the writ of mandamus in this court, seeking review of the September 2, 2025, order denying his motion to recuse and of the September 5, 2025, order insofar as it denied much of the relief requested by the father in his motion to compel. We called for answers to the petition. The mother's answer indicated that she was taking no position on the father's petition, and the guardian ad litem did not file an answer.

The trial court's answer reads, in pertinent part:

“A judge should disqualify himself [or herself] in a proceeding in which his [or her] disqualification is required by law or his [or her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) He [or she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. Here there has been no evidence presented that would require recusal. The mere fact that judges and lawyers have telephone numbers of the other is not unusual, as many judges come through the ranks as lawyers and have professional colleagues. This court has already addressed allegations of impropriety and heard arguments and made a ruling ․ on September 2, 2025.

“Attorney Brantley was appointed as [g]uardian [a]d [l]item because she was appointed previously by Judge Blocton [on] August 29, 2019. This [c]ourt did so to save the parties money as she was familiar with the case filings and the parties. The minor children in this cause, who are currently 15, 13 and 10, were familiar with Attorney Brantley. In the court's opinion it would be in the best interest of the children to have someone they were already familiar with and presumably would be comfortable speaking to Attorney Brantley. This [c]ourt appointed Attorney Brantley sua sponte ․ on November 24, 2021.

“The court heard arguments regarding the [father's] Motion To Compel on September 2, 2025. After hearing arguments, the court decided that the information the [father] was seeking was not relevant to this litigation or to her fees. (Ala. R. Civ. P. 26). For example, Judge Blocton made no decisions in this litigation (.03), [Brantley's] salary as a trial court referee is public knowledge, [and Brantley's] previous addresses, ex-husband's name, etc., ha[ve] no bearing on a fee determination or this litigation.”

The trial-court judge concluded her answer by stating:

“[The father's] Petition for [a Writ of] Mandamus is due to be denied as this court can be and is impartial. There is no evidence of ex parte communications or impropriety by the court. Individuals who work in a professional capacity often have each other's phone number and exchange information as it relates to their profession. The minor children have been involved in litigation since 2018[;] therefore, the [a]ppellate [c]ourt may deem it necessary to order recusal so that this cause of action may move forward and there will be an end to litigation for the minor children. The welfare of these minors must take precedence over any further procedural delays.”

The Father's Motion to Recuse

“A petition for the writ of mandamus is the usual method by which to seek review of a trial judge's denial of a recusal motion. See Ex parte Crawford, 686 So. 2d 196, 198 (Ala. 1996) (holding that a trial judge's denial of a recusal motion can be challenged on appeal or in a petition for a writ of mandamus). ‘A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it will be “issued only when there is: (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.” ’ Ex parte P & H Constr. Co., 723 So. 2d 45, 47 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Ex parte United Service Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993)). ‘The burden of proof is on the party seeking recusal.’ Ex parte Cotton, 638 So. 2d 870, 872 (Ala. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford, 686 So. 2d at 198.”

Ex parte Dooley, 741 So. 2d 404, 405 (Ala. 1999).

This court has explained that

“[r]ecusal is required under Canon 3 C(1) of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics when the facts are such that it is reasonable for a party, for members of the public, or for counsel to question the impartiality of a trial judge, but recusal is not required by mere accusations without proof of supporting facts. Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So. 2d 60 (Ala. 1982); Miller v. Miller, 385 So. 2d 54 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980). The test under that canon is: ‘ “Would a person of ordinary prudence in the judge's position knowing all of the facts known to the judge find that there is a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality?” ’ In the Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 356 (Ala. 1984) (citation omitted).”

Bryars v. Bryars, 485 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).

In his motion to recuse, the father stated that he did not “intend to impugn [the trial-court judge's] integrity.” He argued, based on the objective standard governing the determination of whether a judge's impartiality might be questioned, see Bryars, 485 So. 2d at 1189, that the cellular-telephone records raised a question whether the trial-court judge and Brantley may have had ex parte communications relating to the ongoing litigation; that such communications would have caused a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality; and, therefore, that the trial-court judge should recuse herself. Likewise, in his petition for the writ of mandamus, the father contends that the evidence concerning the frequency of telephone contact and text messaging between Brantley and the trial-court judge on certain key dates during the history of the litigation is sufficient to establish an appearance of impropriety such that recusal of the trial-court judge is required.

More specifically, the father argues in petition for the writ of mandamus that the cellular-telephone records revealed communication between Brantley's cellular telephone and the trial-court judge's cellular telephone several times in the days surrounding Brantley's appointment as guardian ad litem in November 2021; several times on a day that the father sought to subpoena Brantley's daughter, who worked for now-retired Judge Chappell, who had been assigned to a divorce action involving the father's current wife and her former husband; and a total of 21 times on June 30, 2022, the date that that the trial court dismissed, as a discovery sanction, the contempt petition brought by the father. See Deaton, 416 So. 3d at 1107 (reciting the procedural history of the action). Because the mother did not file an answer and because the trial-court judge's answer does not challenge the factual assertions that the communications occurred on dates that were significant in the litigation, we consider those assertions to be true. Ex parte Atchley, 951 So. 2d 764, 768 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 134 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Guaranty Funding Corp. v. Bolling, 288 Ala. 319, 327, 260 So. 2d 589, 596 (1972)) (stating that, when the answer to a petition for a writ of mandamus “ ‘ “does not contain a denial of any of the facts stated in the petition for mandamus,” ’ ” the “ ‘ “averments of fact in the petition for mandamus ․ will be taken as true” ’ ”). We conclude that the materials presented in support of the father's mandamus petition support the conclusion that the communications between the trial-court judge and Brantley during the litigation were such that the existence and frequency of those communications raise serious concerns that those communications included ex parte communications related to the postdivorce litigation between the father and the mother.

“As the United States Supreme Court stated in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955):

“ ‘A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. ․ Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 [75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954)].’

“ ‘ “An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society,” and this requires avoiding all appearance of impropriety, even to the point of resolving all reasonable doubt in favor of recusal.’ In re Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 357 (Ala. 1984) (quoting Canon 1, Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics).

“․ ‘The question is not whether the judge was impartial in fact, but whether another person, knowing all of the circumstances, might reasonably question the judge's impartiality -- whether there is an appearance of impropriety.’ [Ex parte] Duncan, 638 So. 2d [1332,] 1334 [(Ala. 1994)].”

Ex parte Atchley, 951 So. 2d at 768-69.

The father did not have to prove that the communications between the trial-court judge and Brantley were, in fact, ex parte communications related to the postdivorce litigation between the father and the mother. He merely had to establish that those communications created an appearance of impropriety. The father presented evidence of the existence of numerous text messages and telephone calls between the trial-court judge and Brantley and, specifically, evidence that communications occurred on key dates during the litigation. Because the evidence is sufficient to raise the question of impropriety, and because we should “ ‘resolv[e] all reasonable doubt in favor of recusal,’ ” id. at 769 (quoting In re Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 357 (Ala. 1984)), we grant the father's mandamus petition insofar as it seeks the recusal of the trial-court judge.

The Father's Motion to Compel

We are aware that, “ ‘[g]enerally, an appeal of a discovery order is an adequate remedy, notwithstanding the fact that that procedure may delay an appellate court's review of a petitioner's grievance or impose on the petitioner additional expense; our judicial system cannot afford immediate mandamus review of every discovery order.’ ” Ex parte Deaton, ––– So. 3d at –––– (quoting Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala. 2003)). We therefore refrain from considering the merits of the father's petition insofar as it requests that we direct the trial court to grant his motion to compel in its entirety. However, in light of the fact that this court has determined that the trial-court judge should have granted the father's motion to recuse and recused herself from this case, we direct the judge to whom this case is reassigned to vacate the September 5, 2025, order entered by the trial-court judge on the father's motion to compel, see Ex parte Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 776 So. 2d 76, 80 (Ala. 2000) (explaining that, “in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety, we hold that after a judge presiding in a particular case has been disqualified from hearing that case, under the Canons of Judicial Ethics, either voluntarily or by objection, he or she can take no further action in that case”), and to consider the father's motion to compel.

Conclusion

Having concluded that the father has presented sufficient evidence that the communications between the trial-court judge and Brantley created an appearance of impropriety requiring recusal, we grant the father's petition insofar as the father has sought an order compelling the trial-court judge to grant his motion to recuse. Although we do not grant the father's petition insofar as it seeks an order requiring the granting of his motion to compel in its entirety, in light of our determination that the trial-court judge must recuse herself, we direct the new judge to whom this case is assigned to set aside the September 5, 2025, order entered on the motion to compel and to reconsider the motion.

PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The procedural history of the underlying action was set out in Deaton v. Deaton, 416 So. 3d 1106 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). The parties were divorced in 2019, and the divorce judgment was modified in May 2021. In June 2021, the father filed the underlying contempt action. The mother later filed a counterclaim to the father's contempt claim, in which she sought a modification of custody.

2.   We presume that Brantley disclosed this information or that the father learned this information from another source, because, as explained, infra, the father appended a copy of what he referred to as Brantley's cellular-telephone records to his motion seeking the recusal of the trial-court judge.

PER CURIAM.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur. Fridy, J., recuses himself.