T.W. v. C.B. (2026)

T.W. (“the mother”) appeals from the judgment of the Morgan Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”) that terminated her parental rights to A.B. (“the child”), which was entered in a termination-of-parental-rights action brought by the child's father C.B. (“the father”).

The mother presents only two arguments on appeal. First, the mother argues that the juvenile court violated her right to due process when it denied her motion to continue the hearing on the father's termination-of-parental-rights petition. Second, the mother argues that the father failed to prove that there was no viable alternative to terminating her parental rights.

The mother's arguments are without merit. Although the mother preserved her due-process argument for appellate review, the mother failed to demonstrate that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her motions to continue when the mother's attorney was given more than 30 days to prepare for trial. Additionally, maintaining the status quo was not a viable alternative to terminating the mother's parental rights; the mother and child did not have a beneficial relationship and the child's stepmother indicated a desire to adopt the child, which would promote the child's need for stability and permanency.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

Procedural History

On October 22, 2024, the father filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights to the child. The mother filed a pro se answer on November 20, 2024. The juvenile court held a pretrial conference, also on November 20, 2024, that the mother attended. Following that pretrial conference, the juvenile court set the father's termination-of-parental-rights petition for a hearing to be held on February 12, 2025. On February 13, 2025, the juvenile court entered an order indicating that the father's case had been called for trial but that the mother had not appeared, “though she had been served and provided the date.” The juvenile court reset the case for a hearing to be held on March 20, 2025. (C. 22). The juvenile court's February 13, 2025, order provides, in pertinent part:

“The mother was offered appointed counsel at the pretrial hearing and declined the same. The [juvenile court] advised the mother of her right to counsel. If the mother chooses to retain counsel the mother should do so with sufficient time for the attorney to be prepared for trial of the above date [of March 20, 2025].”

(Emphasis in original.)

On March 19, 2025, the juvenile court ordered the sheriff of Morgan County to transport the mother to the courthouse in Morgan County for the hearing on the father's termination-of-parental-rights petition. On March 20, 2025, the juvenile court entered an order indicating that the mother had requested to be appointed counsel. The juvenile court appointed an attorney for the mother and reset the hearing on the father's termination-of-parental-rights petition for April 25, 2025.

A letter from the mother was entered into the record on April 3, 2025. In that letter, the mother indicated that she had been sentenced to serve time in jail for unpaid child support. The mother requested an evidentiary hearing. The juvenile court entered an order in response to the mother's letter that same day. The juvenile court indicated that the matter that had led to the mother's incarceration had arisen in a circuit court before another judge and that “[t]his [c]ourt lacks jurisdiction to rule on the issue raised and should be referred to [the other judge].”

On April 10, 2025, the mother filed a motion to continue the hearing on the father's termination-of-parental-rights petition. In her motion to continue, the mother's counsel requested that the juvenile court issue a continuance of between 60 and 90 days to allow the mother's counsel to “seek out information that could help” the mother and to allow her to review the “extensive past court history” of the case. The mother alleged that the father would not be prejudiced by the delay. The mother did not expressly assert her constitutional right to due process as an argument for granting the motion.

The father filed a response to the motion to continue on April 11, 2025. He alleged that the mother had been representing herself for many months and had “only recently made the effort to acquire appointed counsel.” He asserted that he would be prejudiced by the delay and that any continuance would not be in the best interest of the child. The juvenile court denied the motion to continue on April 14, 2025. The mother did not file a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to continue.

The juvenile court held a hearing on the father's termination-of-parental-rights petition on April 25, 2025. (C. 39). At the outset of that hearing, the mother's counsel again requested a continuance, arguing that she had not had time to file for discovery or to review “the extensive history of this case.” The mother's counsel also requested a continuance later in the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, arguing that she had not had time to review documents that were being offered into evidence. Those motions were denied. The juvenile court issued a judgment terminating the mother's parental rights on May 29, 2025.

In its judgment, the juvenile court made specific findings of fact regarding whether there were viable alternatives to the termination of the mother's parental rights. First, the juvenile court expressly found that there was no viable alternative to the termination of the mother's parental rights. Second, it found that the child's stepmother intended to adopt the child and had a good relationship with the child and that the child “is close to her step-mother and has a strong bond with her stepmother and step-siblings.” The juvenile court noted that “[t]he stepmother testified that she loves the child, has a good relationship with her and wants to establish a parent/child relationship. The child contacted the step-mother when the child felt threatened and afraid.” Third, the juvenile court found that there was not a “healthy relationship between the child and mother,” and the court did not believe that this would “change in the foreseeable future.” The juvenile court noted that the Morgan County Department of Human Resources had investigated allegations that the mother had abused the child, including by cutting the child on the arm with a sharp object and that that investigation had resulted in an “indicated” finding.¹ The juvenile court noted that, in the child's current living situation, the child is “progressing in her education and counseling and appears to be settled, at ease in her father's home and without any anxiousness.”

The mother timely appealed the judgment on June 4, 2025.

Analysis

I. Whether the juvenile court erred by denying the mother's motions to continue

The mother argues that the juvenile court violated her right to due process because, she argues, the juvenile court's failure to continue the termination-of-parental-rights hearing deprived her of the right to effective assistance of counsel. The mother argues that there was an “extensive and rather complex history” between the mother and the father. The mother's brief at 53. She alleges that her counsel did not have sufficient time to prepare for the hearing because, she argues, she received several exhibits for the first time when they were offered into evidence at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing.

A. Whether the mother's due-process argument is preserved

The first issue that we must address is whether the mother preserved her due-process argument for appellate review. A party must preserve a due-process argument for appellate review. J.M.L. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 402 So. 3d 832, 835 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). Although the mother's written motion to continue does not contain the words “due process,” this court is “ ‘committed to the proposition that it will treat a motion (or other pleading) and its assigned grounds according to its substance.’ ” Ex parte Deramus, 882 So. 2d 875, 876 (Ala. 2002)(quoting King Mines Resort, Inc. v. Malachi Mining & Mins., Inc., 518 So. 2d 714, 718 (Ala. 1987)). Furthermore, when the heart of a party's argument in a motion to continue concerns the ability of the party's counsel to prepare for trial, the argument implicates the party's right to effective assistance of counsel and preserves the issue of whether the party had effective assistance of counsel for appellate review. See C.C. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-2024-1022, June 27, 2025] ––– So. 3d –––– (Ala. Civ. App. 2025); V.G.J. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 368 So. 3d 886 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022).

In C.C., a juvenile court appointed Rodney Wells to serve as a father's counsel on the day of a hearing to determine whether to terminate the father's parental rights. That same day, the juvenile court heard testimony from the mother and scheduled the hearing to resume three days later. When the hearing resumed, Wells requested that the hearing be continued

“so that he could prepare for trial and provide his client with adequate representation, explaining that the case involved termination of parental rights; that he had been appointed only three days before; that he had not received or reviewed any exhibits or evidence that DHR might have; and that he had managed to make contact with two relatives of the father ․ but that he was unable to arrange for them to attend the trial in the short span of time between his appointment and trial.”

C.C., ––– So. 3d at ––––. In reversing the juvenile court's judgment terminating the father's parental rights in C.C., this court noted that “the right of an indigent parent to be represented by counsel includes the right that such counsel be effective.” ––– So. 3d at ––––. We further noted that

“[t]he present case is quite similar to V.G.J.[ v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 368 So. 3d 886 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022).] Although V.G.J. involved a request for a continuance so that the attorney for V.G.J. could secure an interpreter for his client so that he could ‘ “have a meaningful dialogue and preparation with him before the case [was] tried,” ’ 368 So. 3d at 892, that difference is quite without distinction. At their heart, both the request for a continuance in V.G.J. and the request for a continuance made by Wells in the present case involve the right of an indigent parent to have counsel who has had the opportunity to reasonably prepare himself or herself for a termination-of-parental-rights trial. The record reflects that Wells lacked that opportunity.”

C.C., ––– So. 3d at ––––.

The substance of the arguments that the mother presented to the juvenile court, like the “heart” of the arguments in C.C. and V.G.J., involved her counsel's ability to prepare for trial and, therefore, the right to effective assistance of counsel. In her written motion to continue, the mother's counsel requested that the juvenile court issue a continuance for a period of between 60 and 90 days to allow the mother's counsel to “seek out information that could help” the mother and to allow the mother's counsel to review the “extensive past court history” of the case. Additionally, at the hearing, the mother's counsel renewed her request for a continuance, asserting that, unlike the mother, the mother's counsel had not had “ample time” to request discovery, to review the documents being admitted into evidence by the father, or to familiarize herself with what she alleged is the extensive history underlying this case. Although the mother did not expressly argue that failing to continue the termination-of-parental-rights hearing violated her right to due process or deprived her of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the substance of the mother's motions to continue involved the ability of her counsel to prepare for the hearing and to defend the mother; therefore, whether the juvenile court deprived the mother of her right to effective assistance of counsel when it denied her motions for a continue is an issue that has been preserved for appellate review.

B. Standard of review applied to order denying motion for continuance

“A juvenile court exercises judicial discretion when ruling on a motion for a continuance, and its decision to deny a motion to continue may be reversed only upon a determination by the appellate court that the juvenile court abused its discretion. See C.O. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 630 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). A court abuses its discretion when ‘ “it has committed a clear or palpable error, without the correction of which manifest injustice will be done.” ’ Clayton v. State, 244 Ala. 10, 12, 13 So. 2d 420, 422 (1942) (quoting 16 C.J. 453).”

V.G.J., 368 So. 3d at 892.

C. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the mother's motions to continue

Whether appointed counsel has had sufficient time to prepare for a client's case is a fact-specific question. But the mother's case, in which her counsel was appointed more than 30 days before the termination-of-parental rights hearing, differs significantly from cases in which we have held that appointed counsel had inadequate time to prepare. See C.C., supra (holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying motion to continue when appointed counsel was granted only three days to prepare for trial); Payne v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 532 So. 2d 1263 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988)(holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance when it allowed counsel only 45 minutes to examine school records that formed the basis of the state's case); J.Q. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-2025-0067, June 27, 2025] ––– So. 3d at –––– (Ala. Civ. App. 2025)(holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to continue when trial court appointed counsel for father and mother only minutes before commencement of trial on petition to terminate their parental rights).

Furthermore, the mother's arguments lack the necessary specificity to demonstrate that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied the motions to continue. The mother alleged that the underlying proceedings were complex, but she did not elaborate on how or why the underlying proceedings were more complex than any other domestic-relations proceeding. The mother also generally alleged that she was not able to serve discovery on the father or receive and review documents from the father's counsel that the father intended to introduce at the hearing. The mother did not explain, however, why she was not able to serve discovery on the father in the 30 days between her counsel's appointment and the scheduled hearing date or whether she had attempted to serve discovery but had been denied or otherwise frustrated in her efforts.

Accordingly, under the facts of this case, the mother has not demonstrated that the juvenile court “ ‘ “committed a clear or palpable error, without the correction of which manifest injustice will be done” ’ ” by denying the mother's motions to continue. V.G.J., 368 So. 3d at 892 (quoting Clayton v. State, 244 Ala. 10, 12, 13 So. 2d 420, 422 (1942), quoting in turn 16 C.J. 453). We therefore affirm the juvenile court's judgment on this issue.

II. Whether the juvenile court erred by finding that there were no viable alternatives to terminating the mother's parental rights

A. Whether the mother preserved her no-viable-alternatives argument for appellate review

The father argues that the mother failed to preserve her argument that the juvenile court erred by finding that there were no viable alternatives to terminating the mother's parental rights

The father, as the party who filed the termination-of-parental-rights petition, bore the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that there was no viable alternative to terminating the mother's parental rights. See R.H. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 383 So. 3d 667, 673 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023)(noting that the Department of Human Resources bore the burden of proving the facts alleged in its termination-of-parental-rights petition). Thus, the issue whether the father met his burden of proof is a sufficiency-of-the-evidence question. And a party does not need to file a postjudgment motion to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of an issue when a trial court makes written findings of fact on that issue. Rule 52, Ala. R. Civ. P.; see also Ex parte Vaughn, 495 So. 2d 83, 87 (Ala. 1986)(explaining that, “when written findings of fact are made, they serve the same useful purpose as does an objection to the trial court's findings, a motion to amend them, a motion for a new trial, and a motion to dismiss under [former] Rule 41(b), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,]” and the written findings “permit the trial judge an opportunity to carefully review the evidence and to perfect the issues for review on appeal”).

In the present case, the juvenile court expressly found that there were no viable alternatives to terminating the mother's parental rights, which is a written finding of fact. See J.A. v. Etowah Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 12 So. 3d 1245, 1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (“The determination of whether a viable alternative to termination exists in a given case is a question of fact” (citing T.V. v. B.S., 7 So. 3d 346, 352 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008))). The juvenile court also made additional written findings that support its finding that there were no viable alternatives to terminating the mother's parental rights, as discussed supra. Accordingly, the issue whether the juvenile court erred by finding that there were no viable alternatives to terminating the mother's parental rights is preserved for appellate review. See R.H., 383 So. 3d at 674 (“[T]he juvenile court, in its judgments, made specific findings of fact regarding whether there was a viable alternative to terminating the parents’ parental rights. Consequently, the sufficiency of the evidence to support those findings was preserved for appellate review.”).

B. Standard of review applied to judgment finding no viable alternative to terminating parental rights

“Our review of a juvenile court's decision on the viability of a particular alternative is governed by the ore tenus rule.” J.A., 12 So. 3d at 1254. With respect to the application of the ore tenus rule in termination-of-parental-rights cases, we have explained:

“ ‘․ [I]n cases involving the termination of parental rights our appellate courts do not apply the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof utilized by trial courts but, instead, use a settled standard of appellate review -- the ore tenus rule. See Ex parte State Dep't of Human Res., 834 So. 2d [117,] 122 [(Ala. 2002)]. Because appellate courts do not weigh evidence, particularly when “the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is involved,” Knight[ v. Beverly Health Care Bay Manor Health Care Ctr.], 820 So. 2d [92,] 102 [(Ala. 2001)], we defer to the trial court's factual findings. “The ore tenus rule reflects this deference; it accords a presumption of correctness to the trial court's findings because of that court's unique ability to observe the demeanor of witnesses.” Id.; see also Fitzgerald v. Jeter, 428 So. 2d 84, 85 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983), and Ex parte Fann, 810 So. 2d 631, 633 (Ala. 2001).’

“J.C. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 986 So. 2d 1172, [1185] (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (footnote[ ] ․ omitted).

“ ‘In ore tenus proceedings, the trial court is the sole judge of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses, and the trial court should accept only that testimony it considers to be worthy of belief. Ostrander v. Ostrander, 517 So. 2d 3 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). Further, in determining the weight to be accorded to the testimony of any witness, the trial court may consider the demeanor of the witness and the witness's apparent candor or evasiveness. Ostrander, supra ․ It is not the province of this court to override the trial court's observations. Brown[ v. Brown, 586 So. 2d 919 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)].’

“Woods v. Woods, 653 So. 2d 312, 314 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994).”

C.J. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 5 So. 3d 1259, 1271 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)(plurality opinion).

C. Whether there was no viable alternative to terminating the mother's parental rights

The mother argues that the father failed to prove that there was no viable alternative to terminating the mother's parental rights. She argues that, “despite the prospect of adoption by the stepmother, the status quo still clearly presents a viable alternative to the termination of the mother's rights where the child's interests in permanency and stability are already met in the current custodial arrangement.” The mother's brief at 48. Relying on R.D. v. G.A.W., 418 So. 3d 604 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), and J.A. v. S.L., 406 So. 3d 129 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), the mother reasons that the current custodial arrangement meets the child's need for permanency and stability because the current custodial relationship protects the child from harm by the mother. See R.D., 418 So. 3d at 613 (“If the juvenile court can secure a child in a permanent custodial arrangement that insulates the child from the threat of parental harm, the juvenile court may not terminate the noncustodial parent's parental rights because a viable alternative exists.”).

Maintaining the status quo is a viable alternative to terminating a parent's parental rights, however, only if it “simultaneously” (1) protects the child from harm and (2) preserves a beneficial aspect of the family relationship. T.D.K. v. L.A.W., 78 So. 3d 1006, 1011 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)(“[I]f some less drastic alternative to termination of parental rights can be used that will simultaneously protect the children from parental harm and preserve the beneficial aspects of the family relationship, then a juvenile court must explore whether that alternative can be successfully employed instead of terminating parental rights.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the status quo must not only protect the child from parental harm, but also preserve beneficial aspects of the family relationship, such that it would be in the child's best interest to continue the relationship. See D.S. v. L.T., 395 So. 3d 111, 116 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023)(“The principle that maintaining the status quo should be considered ‘when the parent and the child enjoy a relationship with some beneficial aspects that should be preserved such that it would be in the child's best interests to continue the relationship,’ S.N.W. [v. M.D.F.H., 127 So. 3d 1225, 1230 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)](emphasis added), is a well-settled one.”); S.N.W. v. M.D.F.H., 127 So. 3d at 1230 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013); T.D.K., 78 So. 3d at 1011 (“[R]emoving the child from the abusive parent's custody but allowing that parent restricted visitation rights can be a viable alternative to termination of parental rights when it appears that a wayward parent cannot be rehabilitated but still shares a deep and beneficial emotional relationship with his or her children.” (emphasis added)).

Additionally, the status quo is not in the best interest of the child if it would prevent the child from accessing benefits available to him or her if the child were allowed to be adopted. C.S. v. J.Z., [Ms. CL-2024-0854, June 27, 2025], ––– So. 3d –––– (Ala. Civ. App. 2025); S.N.W. 127 So. 3d at 1230. The potential benefits of adoption include not only potential future financial benefits, see S.N.W., 127 So. 3d at 1227 (indicating that child would benefit from adoption because stepfather's insurance would cover the child and the child could receive college-tuition assistance), but also the benefit of promoting the child's security, stability, and permanency needs. Cf. C.S., ––– So. 3d at –––– (holding that juvenile court could have determined that “preserving the status quo was not a viable alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights because it would prevent the children from the benefit of having the stepmother adopt them”).

In this case, the juvenile court could have reasonably found that there is no beneficial relationship between the mother and the child such that it would not be in the child's best interest to continue that relationship. The child has been in the sole physical and sole legal custody of the father since the child was approximately five years old. The mother no longer has visitation rights with the child, with all visitation, including phone contact, being initially terminated via a pendente lite order and then terminated by a final judgment on February 12, 2025. Testimony indicated that, after the entry of the pendente lite order suspending the mother's visitation, the child became “happy” and “doesn't worry.” Her grades improved. After the entry of the February 12, 2025, final order, the child has not wanted to speak to the mother, and the mother has not attempted to contact the child or the father. The evidence therefore suggests that the current relationship between the mother and child is nonexistent and that, when there was contact between the mother and the child, the contact was detrimental to the child.

Furthermore, the mother, on appeal, does not argue that there is a beneficial relationship between the mother and the child. The mother therefore has not challenged the juvenile court's finding that there is not a “healthy relationship between the child and the mother.” Additionally, the mother does not dispute that there is a healthy relationship between the child and the stepmother, who wishes to adopt the child. The mother's brief at 48 (“The child testified that she loves the stepmother as a mother figure and is happy that she is her stepmother.”).

Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in finding that there was no viable alternative to terminating the mother's parental rights. The juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that there was no beneficial relationship between the mother and the child worth preserving. Furthermore, the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that allowing the child to be adopted by the stepmother would be in the best interest of the child; specifically, the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that adoption by the stepmother would further promote the child's need for stability and permanency.

Conclusion

The mother has not demonstrated that the juvenile court erred by denying her motions to continue or by terminating her parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “An ‘indicated’ finding is made ‘[w]hen credible evidence and professional judgment substantiates that an alleged perpetrator is responsible for child abuse or neglect.’ ” P.H. v. Alabama Dep't of Hum. Res., 422 So. 3d 1126, 1128 (Ala. Civ. App. 2025)(quoting Ala. Code 1975, § 26-14-8(a)(1)).

BOWDEN, Judge.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.