R.S.F. v. J.D.A. and J.L.F. (2026)

J.D.A. (“the biological father”) commenced an action in the Mobile Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”) against J.L.F. (“the mother”) involving the paternity and custody of S.L.F. (“the child”). R.S.F. (“the former husband”) filed a motion to intervene in that action, which the juvenile court granted. Later, however, the juvenile court entered an interlocutory order finding the former husband in contempt and dismissing him from the action. The former husband appeals from that order. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

Background

The juvenile court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the biological father's motion to hold the former husband in contempt and dismiss him from the action. However, in its order finding the former husband in contempt, it made certain factual findings that it described as undisputed, and which the parties do not dispute on appeal. From those undisputed findings, as well as from the filings on which those findings appear to be based, we glean the following relevant factual background.

The child was born in Texas in September 2013. The former husband was named as the father on the child's birth certificate, but the mother and the former husband were not married at the time. The mother and the former husband married in 2014 or 2015 and divorced in 2017, after the mother told him that he was not the child's biological father. Under Texas law, because the child was younger than eighteen years old, the divorce action, which was filed in the District Court of Collins County, Texas (“the Texas court”), was bifurcated into two actions -- the divorce action and a “Suit Affecting a Parent-Child Relationship” (“the SAPCR action”). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.406(b); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.001 et seq.

On August 11, 2017, an “order adjudicating parentage” was entered by the Texas court in the divorce action and provided, in pertinent part:

“On June 26, 2017, the Court considered the stipulations of the [former husband and the mother] related to parentage in this case and on August 11, 2017, the Court considered [the mother's] Motion to Enter this order.

“․

“The Court, after examining the record and hearing the stipulations, evidence and argument of counsel, finds that it has jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties and that no other court has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of this case․

“The Court finds that admissible results of genetic testing exclude [the former husband] or identify another man as the father of [the child].

“IT IS ORDERED that [the former husband] is not, and he is adjudicated not to be, the father of [the child] ․”

There is no indication in the record before us that the former husband appealed that determination.

The former husband said in an affidavit filed with the juvenile court that, in response to an order entered by the Texas court, the mother identified the biological father. According to the biological father, following the entry of the order adjudicating parentage, the former husband attempted to join the biological father as a respondent to the SAPCR action and requested that the Texas court adjudicate the biological father's paternity of the child and define the legal relationship between the child and the biological father. In a verified special appearance filed in the SAPCR action, a copy of which is contained in the record on appeal, the biological father argued that the Texas court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. In an attached affidavit in support of the special appearance, the biological father said that, among other things, he had neither provided any support for the child before or after the child's birth nor asserted parentage of the child in the paternity registry maintained by the State of Texas.

On March 28, 2018, the Texas court entered a twenty-three page judgment in the SAPCR action (“the SAPCR judgment”), an uncertified copy of which was attached to the former husband's motion to dismiss the biological father's action. In that judgment, which adopted a mediated settlement agreement between the former husband and the mother, the Texas court found that the biological father was not subject to its jurisdiction; however, it said, it had jurisdiction over the SAPCR action, the mother, and the former husband and that “no other court has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of this case.” Although the nomenclature that the Texas court used in the SAPCR judgment is different from that used in Alabama, substantively, it awarded the mother sole physical custody of the child, naming her the “managing conservator” of the child (compare § 30-3-151, Ala. Code 1975, with Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 153.073 and .074; § 153.132 (setting forth rights and duties of managing conservator)), and awarded the former husband visitation rights with the child, naming him a “non-parent conservator” of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.376. The SAPCR judgment specified what “possessory rights” to the child (see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 42.001(2)) would apply until the child reached the age of eighteen years. Additionally, the Texas court awarded both the mother and the former husband certain specific legal rights and duties regarding the child. According to the juvenile court's findings, the mother and the child moved to Mobile before the Texas court entered the SAPCR judgment.

On March 15, 2024, six years after the Texas court entered the SAPCR judgment, the biological father filed in the juvenile court a petition to establish paternity, custody, and child support regarding the child, naming only the mother as a defendant. In the petition, the biological father requested visitation with the child, who was then ten years old, as well as joint legal custody of the child. On April 5, 2024, the mother answered the biological father's petition, questioning the juvenile court's jurisdiction to consider the petition and pointing out the existence of the SAPCR judgment regarding custody of and visitation with the child.

On July 16, 2024, the juvenile court held the first hearing regarding the biological father's action and asked the mother and the biological father whether the Texas court maintained jurisdiction over the action. The biological father argued that his action was “the initial custody case because [the Texas] case does not give custody. It gives conservative -- it gives visitation as conservator, you know, and ․ I would say it's here. [The biological father] lives here. [The child] has lived here since 2017, I believe.” The juvenile court confirmed that the mother and the child had lived in Alabama since December 2017 and determined that it had jurisdiction. The juvenile court also stated during the hearing that it did not appear that the former husband needed to be added to the biological father's action as an indispensable party. On July 26, 2024, the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating the biological father as the child's “legal and natural father” and awarded him visitation in accordance with a temporary agreement between the biological father and the mother.

On September 26, 2024, the former husband filed a motion to intervene in the biological father's paternity and custody action. He also filed a separate motion to dismiss that action, asserting that he was the presumed father of the child who was persisting in his status and that the biological father lacked standing to maintain the action. The former husband also asserted that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the SAPCR judgment. On October 1, 2024, the juvenile court entered an order granting the former husband's motion to intervene.

On October 16, 2024, the former husband filed, in substance, a motion to vacate the juvenile court's July 26, 2024, order adjudicating the biological father's paternity of the child. The former husband argued that the July 26, 2024, order was void because, he said, the former husband had not yet been added as an intervenor when the order was entered and he was an indispensable party to the biological father's action. The biological father opposed the former husband's motion, pointing out that in its August 2017 order regarding parentage the Texas court had determined that, based on the results of genetic testing, the former husband was not the child's father and had ordered the former husband's name removed from the child's birth certificate. He attached an uncertified copy of the Texas court's order adjudicating parentage to his response.¹

On October 18, 2024, the juvenile court ordered the former husband to contact the Texas court to request that “a certified copy of the entire case file be forwarded” to the juvenile court. On October 28, 2024, the former husband filed a brief in support of his motion to dismiss the biological father's action and asked the juvenile court to find that he was the child's legal father. On November 7, 2024, the juvenile court denied the former husband's motion to dismiss the biological father's action as well as his motion to vacate the July 26, 2024, order adjudicating the biological father as the child's legal father. In the November 7, 2024, order, the juvenile court found that the former husband was not an indispensable party in the biological father's action because, it said,

“the Texas Court specially found that he was not the biological father of the child and ordered his name removed from the birth certificate. Once that order was entered, the [former husband] was no longer considered the presumed father. If the [former husband] wanted to persist in his claim of paternity, the time to do such was in Texas before the entry of the order of non-paternity.”

The former husband filed a motion on November 6, 2024, asking the juvenile court to rescind or modify the order directing him to obtain the court file in the SAPCR case because, he said, when he contacted the Texas court, he was informed that the record was sealed and that to have it unsealed would require him, and possibly the mother, to appear before the Texas court to request that it be unsealed. He said that “the most important and material portions of the Texas case had already been provided to this Court by all parties.” The juvenile court denied the former husband's motion, pointing out that the former husband's argument in support of having the order adjudicating the biological father's paternity vacated was based on orders that the Texas court had entered. The juvenile court explained that it had contacted the clerk of the Texas court and was informed that the record in the SAPCR case was sealed pursuant to an “agreed order on motion to seal court records” that the former husband had filed. According to the juvenile court, the order sealing the record in the SAPCR case provided that the documents in the court file could not be opened or released except to the former husband, the mother, or their respective attorneys, or by a court order. The juvenile court concluded that it could not rule on the former husband's motion to dismiss the biological father's action without access to the entire certified file from the Texas court and reaffirmed its order giving the former husband sixty days to deliver to it a complete certified file of the SAPCR case.

On January 29, 2025, the biological father filed a motion asking the juvenile court to hold the former husband in contempt and to sanction him for his failure to provide the juvenile court with the Texas court file within the time allowed. He argued that the former husband's “entire involvement” in the biological father's action was based on his contentions about what had occurred in the SAPCR case and that his failure to provide the certified copy of the Texas court file had delayed the biological father's action. Therefore, the biological father argued, the former husband should be dismissed from the biological father's action.

On April 10, 2025, the juvenile court entered an order once again finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the biological father's action. The juvenile court further found that the former husband was not an indispensable party to the biological father's action because he had been removed from the child's birth certificate and, as a result, his claims did not fall under the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act (“the AUPA”), § 26-17-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. The juvenile court explained that it had allowed the former husband to intervene based on his agreement with the mother regarding his visitation and other rights and that those rights “could be affected by a paternity and custody order entered in this case between the legal parents.”

The juvenile court also found that the biological father's action did not constitute an attempt to modify the SAPCR judgment and that, because the former husband had been excluded as a parent, the Texas court would maintain jurisdiction only if the former husband was a person acting as a parent. It held that the former husband could not be considered a person acting as a parent under Alabama's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“the UCCJEA”), § 30-3B-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, because, it found, he had not been “granted custodial legal rights to the child and did not claim a right to legal custody.” See § 30-3B-102(13), Ala. Code 1975 (defining the phrase “person acting as a parent”).

The juvenile court found the former husband in contempt for failing to provide a certified copy of the Texas court file as it had ordered and dismissed him from the biological father's action. It also denied the former husband's motion to dismiss the biological father's action.

On April 18, 2025, the former husband appealed the juvenile court's April 10, 2025, contempt order to this court.

Appellate Jurisdiction

The biological father contends that this court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal because, he says, the appeal is taken from a nonfinal order. The order from which the former husband appeals is a contempt order, in which the juvenile court found him in contempt and sanctioned him by dismissing him from the action. Contempt orders are final, separately appealable orders, even when they are interlocutory. See Gladden v. Gladden, 942 So. 2d 362, 369 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); Thomas v. Vanhorn, 876 So. 2d 488, 491 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003); and Rule 70A(g)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P. (providing that an adjudication of civil contempt, when person found in contempt is not in custody pursuant to the adjudication of contempt, is reviewable by appeal). Therefore, this court has appellate jurisdiction to review the contempt order, which also includes the juvenile court's legal conclusions regarding its jurisdiction to consider the biological father's action -- an issue that may be raised at any time. See C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 868 So. 2d 451, 453 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).

Analysis

The issues the former husband raises on appeal challenging the contempt order relate to the juvenile court's jurisdiction.² The former husband contends that, under the UCCJEA and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (“the PKPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to consider the biological father's action. He also contends that he is an indispensable party to the biological father's action and that, because the juvenile court dismissed him, any judgment it enters in this matter would be void.

It is well settled that “subject-matter jurisdiction may not be waived; a court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by any party and may even be raised by a court ex mero motu.” C.J.L., 868 So. 2d at 453; see, e.g., Ex parte Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 816 So. 2d 469, 472 (Ala. 2001) (“We are obliged to recognize an absence of subject-matter jurisdiction obvious from a record, petition, or exhibits to a petition before us.”). A judgment entered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void. C.J.L., 868 So. 2d at 454.

Whether a juvenile court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law; therefore, we review the issue de novo. H.T. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 163 So. 3d 1054, 1062 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014). Under Alabama law, “because a juvenile court is a statutory court of limited jurisdiction, see W.B.B. v. H.M.S., 141 So. 3d 1062, 1065 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), we cannot assume its jurisdiction; instead, every fact essential to its jurisdiction must affirmatively appear of record.” H.A.A. v. B.J.J., 368 So. 3d 876, 882 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022).

We turn first to the former husband's arguments that, because he is an indispensable party, the juvenile court's dismissal of him leaves the juvenile court without jurisdiction over the biological father's action and that order it entered in the biological father's action before the former husband was added as a party, particularly the juvenile court's order adjudicating the biological father as the child's legal father, is void. We disagree.

We will assume for purposes of considering the juvenile court's jurisdiction that the former husband is an indispensable party to the biological father's action, although we harbor some doubts in that regard, and we acknowledge our precedents indicating that “ ‘[t]he absence of an indispensable party is a jurisdictional defect that renders the proceeding void,’ ” King v. King, 193 So. 3d 733, 736 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (citation omitted), as well as our precedents applying that principle specifically in the context of paternity adjudications, see A.S. v. M.W., 100 So. 3d 1112, 1114 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (citing Allbritton v. Dawkins, 19 So. 3d 241, 243 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), for the proposition that “[t]he failure to join an indispensable party renders a judgment void”). See Also A.Ho. v. R.J., 347 So. 3d 270, 276-77 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021). However, in Campbell v. Taylor, 159 So. 3d 4, 10 (Ala. 2014), our supreme court held that the failure to join a necessary party does not deprive a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and, in so doing, effectively overruled prior caselaw holding to the contrary.

In Campbell, a group of plaintiffs claiming to be heirs of a testator sought to have a prior judgment distributing property according to the testator's will set aside as void pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Id. at 7. They claimed not to have been named as parties in the prior action and that, as a result, they were not bound by the prior judgment. Id. After the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the plaintiffs appealed. Id. at 8.

On appeal to our supreme court, the plaintiffs argued that they were necessary parties to the prior action but that some of them had not received notice of that action, some had not been served with pleadings in that action, and some were not named as parties in that action. Id. Thus, they contended, the prior judgment was void. Id. In support, they relied on caselaw generally holding that all heirs are necessary and proper parties to an estate action. Our supreme court rejected their argument, writing:

“This Court has long referred to a failure to join a ‘necessary’ or ‘indispensable’ party as a ‘jurisdictional defect.’ ․ This is so, even after the adoption in 1973 of Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P., which addresses the ‘Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication.’ Indeed, Rule 19 wholly fails to speak in terms of jurisdiction, and nothing in that rule indicates that if the court fails to address the necessity or indispensability of a particular party or does address, and errs with regard to the resolution of, Rule 19 concerns, any ensuing judgment is void․

“Other decisions appear to refer to the joinder of necessary or indispensable parties as a statutory requirement for certain actions or as a requirement of ‘due process.’ See ․ A.S. v. M.W., 100 So. 3d 1112, 1114 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (holding that a judgment adjudicating paternity was ‘void for failure to join ․ an indispensable party’ required by Ala. Code 1975, § 26-17-603).

“Other references to the lack of necessary or indispensable parties impacting ‘jurisdiction’ refer to issues of personal jurisdiction. ․

“Despite the language in prior decisions referring to the lack of a necessary or indispensable party as an issue of ‘jurisdiction,’ it is clear that the court in the [prior] circuit court action possessed subject-matter jurisdiction in that case. Specifically, a circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction is derived from the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code. Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536, 538 (Ala. 2006). Here, § 12-11-41[, Ala. Code 1975,] clearly authorizes the circuit court to administer the estate in that case, which was properly removed to the circuit court from the probate court. The inclusion of a necessary or indispensable party is not what provides the court with jurisdiction, although, in some instances, the lack of a necessary or indispensable party may deprive the action, for purposes of justiciability, of the requisite adversity. See Stamps v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 642 So. 2d 941 (Ala. 1994).”

Id. at 9-10. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment refusing to set aside the prior judgment distributing the testator's estate. Id. at 13.

Regarding the present case, Alabama law confers on juvenile courts the power to adjudicate paternity actions under the AUPA. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-115(a)(6) (“A juvenile court shall also exercise original jurisdiction of ․ [p]roceedings to establish parentage of a child pursuant to the [AUPA].”). As a result, pursuant to Campbell, the juvenile court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order adjudicating the biological father as the legal father of the child on the ground that the former husband had not yet been made a party to the action, and the juvenile court will not lack subject matter jurisdiction going forward on the ground that it dismissed the former husband from the action. See Miller v. City of Birmingham, 235 So. 3d 220, 230 (Ala. 2017) (plurality opinion) (“Under Campbell, it is clear that the absence of an indispensable party does not deprive the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction.”). To the extent that our cases suggest otherwise, they are hereby overruled. Thus, we find no merit in the former husband's contention that his original absence from the case deprived the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction to make a paternity adjudication.

Turning to the question of the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and the PKPA, we note that the UCCJEA, which Texas has adopted in a form essentially identical to Alabama's version of the UCCJEA, controls decisions regarding whether a court of this state has jurisdiction to modify another state's child-custody determination. Compare Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.001 et seq., with § 30-3B-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. According to both states’ versions of the UCCJEA, a “child custody proceeding” is a proceeding in a court “in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue,” as well as a proceeding to determine paternity. § 30-3B-102(4), Ala. Code 1975; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.102(4). The UCCJEA defines a “child custody determination” as a “judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child” and “includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order.” § 30-3B-102(3), Ala. Code 1975; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.102(3); see also D.B. v. Coffee Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 26 So. 3d 1239, 1243 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009). The PKPA defines a “custody determination” as “a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3).

The former husband contends that the juvenile court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because, he says, the SAPCR judgment was a custody judgment that the juvenile court can modify only in compliance with § 30-3B-203, Ala. Code 1975. He argues that, although the Texas court used language unfamiliar to cases tried in Alabama, the SAPCR judgment, in substance, awarded custody of the child to the mother and awarded him visitation rights. It also established certain legal rights and duties for the mother and the former husband. Therefore, he argues, modification of the SAPCR judgment is governed by Alabama's version of the UCCJEA.

We agree with the former husband that, although the Texas court used different terms than “sole physical custody,” “legal custody,” and similar phrases that are routinely used in Alabama child-custody cases, in substance, the SAPCR judgment, which awarded the mother physical custody of the child, the former husband visitation rights with the child, and both the mother and the former husband certain legal rights and duties regarding the child, is clearly a child-custody determination resulting from a child-custody proceeding under the UCCJEA and the PKPA. Moreover, we note that Texas applies the UCCJEA to SAPCR actions. See, e.g., In re C.J.S., 702 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App. 2024); In re Meekins, 550 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. App. 2018); and In re T.B., 497 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App. 2016). There is no contention that the Texas court did not have jurisdiction to enter the SAPCR judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that that judgment is a valid child-custody determination subject to the UCCJEA and the PKPA.

The biological father contends, however, that, although the Texas court had jurisdiction over the child in the SAPCR action, it did not have personal jurisdiction over him. Therefore, he says, any custody arrangement that depends on the validity of the SAPCR judgment cannot be enforced in Alabama; in other words, he asserts that the SAPCR judgment has no “extraterritorial effect.” In support of this contention, the biological father relies on Ex parte Dean, 447 So. 2d 733, 735 (Ala. 1984), in which our supreme court held that “[a] child custody determination is an in personam proceeding requiring in personam jurisdiction over the affected parties.” However, Ex parte Dean involved the attempted enforcement of a judgment entered by a Florida court regarding the custody of a child as between the parties to an action when the Florida court had lacked personal jurisdiction over one of those parties. 447 So. 2d at 737; see also Dean v. Dean, 447 So. 2d 728, 730-31 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982), rev'd by Ex parte Dean and overruled by Gilpin Brokerage Co. v. Northwest Acceptance Corp., 465 So. 2d 1161 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (setting forth the facts of the case upon which our supreme court relied in deciding Ex parte Dean).

In the SAPCR judgment, the Texas court acknowledged that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the biological father. Nothing in the SAPCR judgment is applicable to the biological father. The SAPCR judgment, however, is fully enforceable as between the mother and the former husband, that is, the people who were the parties to the SAPCR action, and the fact that the biological father was not a party to that action does not render void the judgment entered in that action.

The issue before us, then, is not whether the SAPCR judgment is enforceable, at least as to the mother and the former husband. Instead, the issue is whether the biological father can obtain a separate custody judgment in Alabama that, he intimates, would take precedence over the SAPCR judgment. This is precisely the kind of issue the UCCJEA is designed to resolve. See Ex parte R.B., 409 So. 3d 620, 624 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (“One of the purposes of the UCCJEA is to facilitate cooperation between courts in different states in issuing custody and visitation orders.”).

The biological father argues that, because the Texas court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, the SAPCR judgment “does not restrict Alabama from subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make a finding of custody and paternity.” Biological father's brief at 33. In making that argument, the biological father relies on D.B. v. M.A., 975 So. 2d 927 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (plurality opinion), which our supreme court affirmed in Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d 940 (Ala. 2007). In D.B., the father of a child who was taken from Nebraska without the father's consent attempted to register and enforce in Alabama a Nebraska court's custody order regarding the child. D.B., 975 So. 2d at 929. D.B. and T.B. (“the adoptive couple”), who had custody of the child, were Alabama residents who wished to adopt the child and commenced an adoption proceeding in Alabama. Id. In addition to registering the Nebraska custody order in Alabama, the father filed a motion to dismiss the Alabama adoption proceeding. Id. at 938.

In both this court and in our supreme court, the adoptive couple contended that, even if the Nebraska court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the initial custody matter, it did not have personal jurisdiction over them. They argued that they should have been given notice of the custody proceeding held in Nebraska. Id. at 937; Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d at 951. Our supreme court agreed, quoting from this court's opinion in D.B. and explaining that,

“ ‘when another state enters a custody order without providing proper notice to a relevant party, or without giving that party a reasonable opportunity to be heard, such an order was not made in accordance with the PKPA. Ex parte Raywood, 549 So. 2d 103, 104 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989). When an order is not made in accordance with the PKPA, it is “not entitled to full faith and credit by the courts of Alabama.” Id. Moreover, our supreme court has observed that “neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, nor any legislation under its authority, entitles a child custody [judgment] entered by a court lacking in personam jurisdiction over affected parties, to extraterritorial effect.” Ex parte Dean, 447 So. 2d 733, 737 (Ala. 1984) (citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. [528,] 543 [73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221] (1953), and Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 91 [98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132] (1978)).’ ”

975 So. 2d at 952-53 (emphasis added).

Our supreme court held that, although Nebraska had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the custody matter, the adoptive couple had not received proper notice and service of process of the custody proceeding; therefore, the court said, the Nebraska judgment could not be enforced against the adoptive parents in Alabama because the Nebraska court entered it without personal jurisdiction over them. Id. at 955. Nonetheless, as this court stressed in its opinion, and as our supreme court agreed, Nebraska had subject matter jurisdiction to determine the child's custody and any substantive proceedings in D.B. were required to be held in Nebraska -- a determination that the biological father fails to consider in discussing that case. D.B., 975 So. 2d at 930; see Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d at 950-51.

Here, it is undisputed that the biological father was named as a respondent in the SAPCR action in Texas to establish a parent-child relationship between him and the child. The biological father does not dispute that he received proper notice of that action. Instead of participating, however, he filed a special appearance and an affidavit to demonstrate that the Texas court did not have personal jurisdiction over him and that he had never lived with the child, that he had never supported the child, that the child had not been conceived in Texas, and that he had not asserted his parentage in the Texas paternity registry. Thus, the record indicates that, when provided with the opportunity to be recognized as the child's father, the biological father chose to distance himself from any rights and responsibilities he had regarding the child.

Ultimately, however, the biological father's refusal to participate in the SAPCR action does not change the fact that the Texas court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine the child's custody as between the mother and the former husband, and it does not mean that the biological father's action in Alabama is not, in effect, seeking to modify the Texas court's custody order. Section 30-3B-102(11) defines “modification” to mean “[a] child custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous determination.” In the underlying action, the biological father requests that the juvenile court make a custody determination after a previous custody determination concerning the same child, the SAPCR judgment. Thus, the underlying action is, as a matter of law, a modification action for the purposes of the UCCJEA.

Under Alabama's version of the UCCJEA, except in the case of temporary emergency jurisdiction, which is not applicable here,

“a court of this state may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under [§] 30-3B-201(a)(1) or (2)[, Ala. Code 1975,] and:

“(1) The court of the other state determines it no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under [§] 30-3B-202[, Ala. Code 1975,] or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum under [§] 30-3B-207[, Ala. Code 1975]; or

“(2) A court of this state or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state.”

§ 30-3B-203, Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added).

There is no evidence indicating that the Texas court has determined that it no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the custody of the child or that Alabama would be a more convenient forum to consider the issue of custody. Therefore, the requirements of subsection (1) have not been met. However, the juvenile court determined that the former husband is not a parent or a person acting as a parent for purposes of the UCCJEA. That determination would cause this case to fall within the requirements of subsection (2), because the child and his only legal parent (the mother) no longer reside in Texas but, instead, reside in Alabama. This would allow the juvenile court to obtain jurisdiction to modify the SAPCR judgment.

The former husband contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that he is not a parent or a person acting as a parent. He argues that, even though he is not the child's biological father, he is the child's presumed father or legal father. The biological father, however, contends that, because the Texas court adjudicated the former husband not to be the child's father and, in the SAPCR judgment, appointed the former husband as the “non-parent conservator” of the child, the former husband is neither the child's parent nor a person “acting as [the child's] parent.”

Under the Uniform Parentage Act, which Texas and Alabama have both adopted, “[u]nless the results of genetic testing are admitted to rebut other results of genetic testing, a man excluded as the father of a child by genetic testing shall be adjudicated as not being the father of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.631(d); see § 26-17-631(4), Ala. Code 1975. In its order of August 11, 2017, titled “Order Adjudicating Parentage,” the Texas court found that the results of genetic testing excluded the former husband as the father of the child and explicitly adjudicated the former husband “not to be the father of the child.” Under Texas precedent, that adjudication defeated any presumption of paternity of the former husband. See Quiroz v. Gray, 441 S.W.3d 588, 597-98 (Tex. App. 2014).³ Nothing in the record before us indicates that the former husband challenged that adjudication by, for example, claiming that the mother was equitably estopped from denying his paternity, see Hausman v. Hausman, 199 S.W.3d 38, 42-43 (Tex. App. 2006), or by seeking a reversal of the adjudication by way of appeal. The United States Constitution requires courts in Alabama to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of every other state. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998). Therefore, based on the Texas court's adjudication of nonpaternity as to the former husband, the juvenile court correctly determined that the former husband is not a parent of the child.

We turn next to whether the former husband could be a “person acting as a parent” for purposes of determining whether the juvenile court could modify the custody judgment of the Texas court. The UCCJEA defines a “person acting as a parent” as

“[a] person, other than a parent, who:

“a. Has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of six consecutive months, including any temporary absence, within one year immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding; and

“b. Has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody under the law of this state.”

§ 30-3B-102(13), Ala. Code 1975; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.102(13) (emphasis added). The PKPA defines “person acting as a parent” as a person, other than a parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by a court or claims a right to custody. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(6). It defines “physical custody” as “actual possession and control of a child.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(7).

The Comment of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to § 202 of the UCCJEA (adopted as § 30-3B-202, Ala. Code 1975, in Alabama and Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.202 in Texas) explains that when a third party such as a grandparent or, in this case, the former husband, who claims a right of visitation continues to reside in the state that issued the original custody judgment, such continued residence “should not suffice to confer exclusive, continuing jurisdiction on the State that made the original custody determination after the departure of the child, the parents and any person acting as a parent.” See also Marler v. Lambrianakos, 371 So. 3d 287, 295-96 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022); Boback v. Pershing, 311 A.3d 1126, 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024) (declining to consider grandparents with “periods of visitation” who lived in a separate state from a child as “persons acting as parents”); Z.G. v. E.S., 69 Misc. 3d 946, 948, 133 N.Y.S.3d 768, 770 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2020) (holding that a grandmother who had been awarded visitation with a child was not a “person acting as a parent” so as to confer continuing jurisdiction in New York under its version of the UCCJEA).

It is undisputed that the mother had sole physical custody of the child for far longer than six consecutive months within a year of the biological father's commencement of his paternity and custody action. Although the former husband, who we have already determined is not a parent by virtue of the Texas court's adjudication that he is not the child's father, had periods of visitation, such visitation is insufficient for him to be considered a person acting as a parent under the UCCJEA. Moreover, under the PKPA, nothing in the record shows that the former husband ever had “actual possession and control” of the child for six consecutive months so that he could be considered a “person acting as a parent” under the PKPA, either.

As mentioned, Alabama would have jurisdiction to modify the Texas court's custody order if the juvenile court determined that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent no longer reside in Texas. It is undisputed that the child and the child's only legal parent (the mother) had lived in Mobile for more than six years when the biological father commenced this action. Because the former husband was neither a parent nor a person acting as a parent, his continued residence in Texas had no bearing on the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the second prong of § 30-3B-203 has been met, and the juvenile court properly determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the biological father's action to modify the Texas court's custody judgment and to determine paternity.

Finally, the former husband contends that the juvenile court erred in dismissing his claim for an attorney fee under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act (“the ALAA”), § 12-19-270 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Specifically, he argues that the biological father brought the custody and paternity action “knowing that the child already had a legal father” and knowing of the existence of a valid custody order. Former husband's brief at 45. Because of that knowledge, the former husband argues, the biological father's claims were brought without substantial justification.

Pursuant to the ALAA, generally, a court can award a reasonable attorney fee against a party or an attorney, or both, who brings a civil action that a court determines to be without substantial justification, either in whole or part. § 12-19-272(a), Ala. Code 1975. “The phrase ‘without substantial justification,’ when used with reference to any action, claim, defense or appeal, including without limitation any motion, means that such action, claim, defense or appeal (including any motion) is frivolous, groundless in fact or in law, or vexatious, or interposed for any improper purpose, including without limitation, to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation, as determined by the court.” § 12-19-271(1), Ala. Code 1975. Here, we have determined that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to modify the Texas court's custody order and that the Texas court had already adjudicated the former husband not to be the child's father. Therefore, we cannot say that the biological father's claims seeking to modify the SAPCR judgment or to determine his paternity are frivolous, groundless in fact or in law, or interposed for any improper purpose, and the juvenile court did not err in dismissing the former husband's ALAA claim when it dismissed him as an intervenor from the biological father's action. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Darling, 947 So. 2d 405, 409-10 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006); Dickerson v. Dickerson, 885 So. 2d 160, 168 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the juvenile court's order dismissing the former husband from the biological father's action as a sanction for contempt and dismissing the former husband's ALAA claim is due to be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that the order adjudicating parentage did not mention the biological father over whom the Texas court did not have personal jurisdiction. The order was still valid and binding on the former husband and the mother. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.604(c)(1) (“If the court lacks jurisdiction over one individual, the court ․ is not precluded from making an adjudication of parentage binding on another individual over whom the court has personal jurisdiction.”); Ala. Code 1975, § 26-17-604(c) (“Lack of jurisdiction over one individual does not preclude the court from making an adjudication of parentage binding on another individual over whom the court has personal jurisdiction.”).

2.   The former husband makes no argument that the juvenile court's decision to dismiss him as an intervenor was an improper sanction for contempt; therefore, that argument is waived. Meigs v. Estate of Mobley, 134 So. 3d 878, 889 n.6 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (“Arguments not raised in the appellant's initial brief are deemed waived.”).

3.   Alabama law also provides that an adjudication of nonpaternity rebuts the presumption of paternity. See Ala. Code 1975, § 26-17-204(b)(1).

FRIDY, Judge.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson and Bowden, JJ., concur. Edwards, J., dissents, without opinion.