LEWIS v. LEWIS (2026)

Jeremiah Marcellus Lewis (“the husband”) filed a complaint for a divorce from Angelia Lewis (“the wife”) in the Mobile Circuit Court. The circuit court issued a judgment divorcing the parties and dividing the marital property. On appeal, the husband argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by inequitably dividing the parties’ real property and by failing to consider the value of the wife's retirement account when dividing the parties’ assets. We dismiss the appeal because it is from a nonfinal judgment.

Procedural History

On January 23, 2024, the husband filed a complaint for a divorce against the wife. On February 6, 2024, the wife filed an answer to the husband's complaint and a counterclaim for a divorce. The circuit court held a trial on December 2, 2024. During the trial, the husband testified that the value of the parties’ marital residence located on Overlook Road was $200,000. The wife testified that the value of the marital residence was $600,000.

After the trial, the circuit court, on December 2, 2024, issued the divorce judgment, which incorporated agreements related to child custody and visitation that the parties had reached before trial. The divorce judgment also awarded sole physical custody of M.L., the parties’ child, to the wife but awarded joint legal custody of M.L. to the parties. Regarding the division of real property owned by the parties, the divorce judgment states, in pertinent part:

“17. The [marital residence] is marital property subject to division by this Court. The [husband] shall have the option to purchase the interest of the [wife], subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter provided. To exercise his option, the [husband] must, within 120 days of this Judgment of Divorce, have the property appraised and buy out the [wife]’s interest as further described hereinbelow, and the [husband] shall assume and be responsible for paying the mortgage owing on said property, promptly as each monthly mortgage payment shall come due.

“If the [husband] intends to buyout the [wife], he shall immediately contact Trey Brewster of Brewster Appraisal ․ to obtain an appraisal on the property. The [husband] shall be responsible for the cost of the appraisal and shall prepay for same. Once the appraisal is complete, to exercise his option, he shall pay the [wife] a sum equal to 40% of the equity (as determined by the appraised value minus the amount then outstanding on the mortgage indebtedness at the time.) Upon receipt of the payment of her interest, the [wife] shall immediately sign a quitclaim deed deeding all her interest in the property to the [husband].

“18. The properties located at ․ Watley Street, ․ Ormond Road, and ․ Duval Street are hereby awarded to the [husband]. Within 30 days of this Judgment of Divorce [wife] shall sign a quitclaim deed transferring her interest in such property over to the [husband]. The [husband] shall pay and be solely responsible for the mortgage indebtedness, property taxes, and insurance related to such property.

“19. The properties located at ․ Colonial Oaks Drive N, ․ Michigan Avenue, ․ Stimrad Road, the lot on Houston Street, and the Westgate timeshare are hereby awarded to the [wife]. Within 30 days of this Judgment of Divorce [husband] shall sign a quitclaim deed transferring his interest in such property over to the [wife]. The [wife] shall pay and be solely responsible for the mortgage indebtedness, property taxes, and insurance related to such property.”

The divorce judgment also states that “[e]ach party is awarded any and all financial accounts in their individual name, including, but not limited to, any retirement accounts, checking accounts, savings accounts, investment accounts, Certificates of Deposit, and the like.” Additionally, the divorce judgment divided personal property, numerous vehicles, and the parties’ businesses, but the division of those items of property is not contested on appeal.

On December 19, 2024, the circuit court entered an amendment to the divorce judgment that provides, in pertinent part:

“34. If the [husband] decides not to buy out the [wife] of [her interest in the martial residence], or if he fails to complete the refinance within 120 days of the Judgment of Divorce, then [the marital residence] shall immediately be listed for sale by a licensed real estate agent to be agreed to by the parties. The list price shall be determined by the realtor based on a competitive market analysis. The list price shall be adjusted thereafter as reasonably recommended by the realtor, to [sell] the [marital residence] for a reasonable price as soon as possible. Upon the close of the sale, the net proceeds of the sale, after payment of any mortgage payoff(s), and other ordinary closing expenses, including real estate commissions, shall be disbursed with the [husband] receiving 60% and the [wife] receiving 40%.”

On January 14, 2025, the husband filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the divorce judgment. In his motion, the husband argued that the circuit court had abused its discretion by inequitably dividing the parties’ real property and by failing to consider the value of the wife's retirement account when dividing the parties’ assets. On January 16, 2025, the wife filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the divorce judgment, also taking issue with the circuit court's division of real property, among other issues. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the parties’ postjudgment motions on February 12, 2025, but it did not accept evidence at that hearing.¹ After the hearing on February 12, 2025, the circuit court entered an order denying the husband's postjudgment motion; however, the circuit court granted the wife's postjudgment motion in part and ordered the parties to schedule a time for the wife to retrieve her personal property from the marital residence, set a new location for the exchanges of M.L. to take place, and set a time frame for the husband to reimburse the wife for a bill for counseling for M.L.

The husband timely appealed on March 13, 2025.

Analysis

The husband argues that the circuit court abused its discretion and made an inequitable division of marital assets in the divorce judgment. Specifically, he argues that the division of the parties’ real property is inequitable and that the circuit court did not properly consider the value of the wife's retirement account when dividing the parties’ assets.

Even though neither party has raised the issue of this court's jurisdiction over this appeal, “jurisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu.” Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987). “The question whether a judgment is final is a jurisdictional question, and the reviewing court, on a determination that the judgment is not final, has a duty to dismiss the case.” Hubbard v. Hubbard, 935 So. 2d 1191, 1192 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).

“A ‘final judgment is a “terminal decision which demonstrates there has been a complete adjudication of all matters in controversy between the litigants.” ’ ” Wilhoite v. Wilhoite, 897 So. 2d 303, 312 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (citations omitted). A ruling is not final if it “relates to fewer than all the parties in a case, or ․ determines fewer than all the claims.” Id. With respect to divorce judgments, “[a]fter determining the property within the marital estate, a trial court must ascertain the value of that property, equitably divide the property, and implement a fair method for distributing the property.” McCarron v. McCarron, 168 So. 3d 68, 75 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (emphasis added).

A judgment that fails to ascertain the value of marital property has not completely adjudicated the issue of the division of the marital property. See Wilhoite, 897 So. 2d at 313 (“[T]he trial court has not completely adjudicated the issue of the division of the martial property. The court has not determined the value of certain assets ․.”); see also Wilson v. Wilson, 93 So. 3d 122, 129 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)(“[W]hen, after reviewing the record and the language of the judgment, this court is unable to determine the precise nature of the factual findings of the trial court as to the classification and value of marital property, thereby inhibiting this court's ability to determine whether a property division is equitable, this court should remand the cause for further clarification from the trial court.”); Kennerly v. Kennerly, 412 So. 3d 680, 681 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)(remanding case because “[t]he judgment does not ․ clearly set forth any determination as to the value of the marital residence”).

During divorce proceedings, a trial court may rely on expert appraisers to assist in its valuation of marital property. However, it is the trial court's role, after receiving that appraisal value, to render a judgment that allows this court to ascertain the value of the property; the determination of the value of the property may not come after the divorce judgment has been entered. Put another way, a trial court does not “ascertain the value” of a marital asset if it relies on a third party to determine the value of a marital asset but does not subsequently incorporate that third party's valuation into the divorce judgment. See Verren v. Verren, 5 So. 3d 611, 614-15 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)(holding that divorce judgment was nonfinal because the trial court relied upon a government agency to ascertain the value of retirement benefits); Turner v. Turner, 331 So. 3d 1174, 1176-77 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021). As we discussed in Verren:

“It is apparent from the pleadings and briefs that the parties were at issue over whether any of the husband's retirement benefits were vested and, if so, the exact amount of those benefits to which the wife was entitled. Rather than conclusively decide those issues, the trial court authorized the ‘appropriate’ governmental agency to make those determinations. In doing so, the trial court failed to adjudicate either issue. As it now stands, there has been no judicial determination as to whether the husband has any vested retirement benefits and, if so, the amount of those vested retirement benefits the wife is entitled to receive.

“Additionally, we note that Alabama law requires an ‘equitable’ distribution of marital property upon termination of the marriage, which may include a division of retirement benefits. See Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 905 So. 2d 1, 9-10 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). The fairness of the property division cannot be properly assessed without knowing the exact amount of the retirement benefits, if any, the wife will receive. Id.”

5 So. 3d at 614-15 (emphasis added).

The divorce judgment identified the marital residence as marital property and provided two methods for its division. In the first scenario, the husband would have the marital residence appraised and buy out the wife's interest, which the circuit court determined, was 40% of the parties’ equity in the home based on the appraised value. Alternatively, should the husband fail to comply with or choose not to pursue the first scenario, the marital residence would be sold at a list price determined by a realtor, and the net proceeds would be divided with 60% going to the husband and 40% going to the wife.

Although the second scenario provides a fair method for dividing the parties’ interest in the marital residence,² it does not replace the first scenario and serves only as an alternative option should the husband fail or choose not to have the residence appraised to facilitate his buying out the wife by paying her portion of the parties’ equity in the residence. As set out above, a divorce judgment is not final if the trial court leaves the valuation of a piece of real property in the hands of a third party without either incorporating the third party's valuation into its judgment or providing some opportunity for the parties to agree or respond to the appraisal and the resulting valuation.

In this case, the “fairness of the property division cannot be properly assessed” without knowing the property valuation for the marital residence. Verren, 5 So. 3d at 615. The parties testified as to their opinions of the value of each piece of real property, and those competing valuations created issues of fact for the circuit court to resolve in the divorce judgment. If we were to reach the merits of the husband's argument and attempt to assess the equity of the property division, our determination of the equity of the awards would vary greatly depending on whose testimony we relied upon. Without resolving the value of the marital residence, the circuit court's division of the parties’ real property is incomplete and speculative.

Because the trial court did not incorporate the appraisal of the marital residence into the final divorce judgment, see note 1, supra, or otherwise rule on the value of the marital residence, it has not entered a final judgment reviewable by this court on appeal. As a result, the husband's appeal is due to be dismissed.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   An appraisal report by “Marcus Brewster” dated January 24, 2025, appears in the record on appeal. In that report, Brewster values the marital residence at $335,000, but there is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial court considered that January 24, 2025, appraisal report when it entered the divorce judgment on December 2, 2024, or when it amended the divorce judgment on December 19, 2024. Additionally, the circuit court's order on the parties’ postjudgment motions indicates that it considered only the argument of counsel during the hearing on the parties’ postjudgment motions. This court is “limited to a review of the record alone, that is, it can consider only the evidence that was before the trial court when it made its ruling.” Cowen v. M.S. Enters., Inc., 642 So. 2d 453, 454 (Ala. 1994). Because the report was not before the circuit court when it entered the divorce judgment, we cannot consider the appraisal report on appeal.

2.   See Todd v. Todd, 407 So. 3d 290, 293 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)(“In order to equitably divide and distribute marital property, a trial court may, among other things, direct that the parties sell the marital residence and split the proceeds pursuant to the percentages as awarded in the judgment, order that one of the parties maintain the marital residence and pay the other party the value of his or her equitable share, or order that one of the parties maintain the marital residence until a future condition is met or a certain amount of time passes to trigger a sale, at which time one party would pay to the other party the value of his or her equitable share.”).

BOWDEN, Judge.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.