R.R. v. CALHOUN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES (2026)

R.R. (“the father”) and S.C. (“the mother”) appeal from judgments entered by the Calhoun Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”) terminating their parental rights to J.D.R.-C. (“the older child”), who was born on January 8, 2020, and V.A.R.-C. (“the younger child”), who was born on October 3, 2022. We reverse the juvenile court's judgments.

Issue

The father and the mother make several arguments for reversal of the judgments, but we address only one of those arguments, which we find to be dispositive of these appeals -- the mother's argument that the evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that the Calhoun County Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) used reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with the children.

Standard of Review

A judgment terminating parental rights finding that reasonable efforts were expended to reunite the family must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See W.A. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 211 So. 3d 849, 853 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). Clear and convincing evidence is “ ‘ “[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.” ’ ” C.O. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)).

“ ‘[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to clearly and convincingly ․ establish the fact sought to be proved.’

“KGS Steel[, Inc. v. McInish], 47 So. 3d [749] at 761 [(Ala. Civ. App. 2006)].

“․ [F]or trial courts ruling ․ in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, ‘the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden[,]’ [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also look through a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon the trial court's weighing of the evidence, that would ‘produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm conviction as to each element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.’ § 25-5-81(c)[, Ala. Code 1975].”

Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile court could have found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus evidence, this court presumes their correctness. Id. We review the legal conclusions to be drawn from the evidence without a presumption of correctness. J.W. v. C.B., 68 So. 3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

The Evidence

The evidence pertinent to the issue on appeal is as follows. The father and the mother have never married, but they resided together. On November 22, 2021, they were involved in a domestic-violence incident (“the 2021 incident”). The video taken by the mother during the 2021 incident showed the mother crying and stating that she “just wanted to leave,” the father refusing to let her leave, and the father picking up a handgun while the mother began to wail. The police responded, and the police officers’ body-camera videos showed the mother stating to police officers, among other things, that the father had fired a gun shortly before their arrival, that the argument between her and the father had begun because the father had not believed her when she told him that she was sending text messages to family members, that she did not feel safe and had locked the father out of the house and threatened to stab him with a knife if he entered through the window, and that the father had blocked her from leaving the house. The father was arrested and charged with domestic violence on the date of the 2021 incident.¹

DHR implemented a safety plan placing the child with the mother and requiring her to keep the child away from the father. After the mother violated the safety plan, DHR obtained a pickup order, which law-enforcement officers executed in January 2022. DHR placed the older child in a foster home. In October 2022, two days after the younger child was born, DHR removed the younger child and placed the younger child in the same foster home with the older child.

DHR identified domestic violence as the primary concern for the family, and it provided counseling and other services designed to eliminate that concern. The father and the mother participated in those services. In October 2023, after the father and the mother showed that their home was stable and free from domestic-violence concerns, the children were returned to the mother's custody, and they moved into the house that she shared with the father. Yashika Fomby, a licensed professional counselor, testified that the mother had completed a parenting program with Fomby and that she had met with the mother 12 times, during which, she said, they had addressed, among other things, what needed to happen for the children to be placed back with the mother and the importance of consistency for the children.

After custody was returned to the mother, the juvenile court ordered DHR to supervise the family, and DHR began family-preservation services. Nena Poe, a DHR social worker, testified that DHR provides family-preservation services when there are no safety concerns for the children at issue but there are still issues that need to be addressed and services that need to be provided to ensure the stability of the family. The mother testified that, once the children were returned to her custody, DHR had provided in-home services every one or two weeks. The mother also attended two more counseling sessions with Fomby, but the mother and the father discontinued counseling in December 2023.

Approximately one month after the children were returned to the mother's custody, the mother telephoned Fomby, expressing that she did not feel safe with the father. The mother left the house with the children. In March 2024, DHR discovered that the mother was homeless and living with the children in a motel in Georgia. The mother informed the DHR social worker for the family that she had separated from the father after discovering that he was in a relationship with another woman. According to the DHR social worker, the mother informed her that she planned to relocate with the children to Missouri, where, the mother told her, they would reside with the children's maternal grandmother. When the mother instead returned to Alabama with the children, DHR picked up the children and returned them to foster care. Poe testified that the children had been removed from the mother's custody at that time based on concerns related to the mother's inability to maintain stability with housing and finances.

On March 8, 2024, following the shelter-care hearing for the children, Poe conducted an individualized-service-plan (“ISP”) meeting with the mother. The March 8, 2024, ISP directed, among other things, that the mother obtain and maintain safe and stable housing and gainful employment and that she obtain, maintain, and demonstrate adequate parenting skills and protective capacities. It provided also that the mother “participate in counseling to address parenting skills [and] protective capacities.” Poe testified that she discovered that the father and the mother had not attended counseling since December 2023 and that attending counseling had been another requirement of the March 8, 2024, ISP because Poe had felt it was necessary. Poe testified, however, that she did not inform the mother that she needed to set up a counseling appointment after the March 8, 2024, ISP meeting. Poe also discussed with the mother that she needed to obtain housing and employment fairly quickly because the case had been open for so long.

Yaschika Fisher, another DHR social worker, testified that she was assigned to the family's case in May 2024. Fisher testified that she did not offer counseling to the mother. Fomby testified that, after the children were removed from the mother's custody the second time, DHR never contacted her to provide any services for the mother. When asked if it was odd to her that the mother had not been referred to her for an assessment, Fomby answered in the affirmative. Fomby testified that she did not know why the parents had separated, but she acknowledged that it was possible that the mother was exercising some independence from the father and that she could have needed and possibly benefited from counseling services to explore that newfound independence. Fomby stated that it would help if she had an assessment with the mother and that there could be reasons for the mother's and the father's separation for which she could provide services, but, she said, if the mother continued to be dishonest, another assessment would not do any good.

The juvenile court entered judgments on April 10, 2024, adjudicating the children dependent and directing that reasonable efforts be made to reunite the children and the parents and to restore custody. Fisher testified that the permanency goal was changed from “return to parent” to adoption by the children's foster parents at a June 13, 2024, ISP meeting. That ISP reflects that the concurrent goal at that time remained “return to parent.” On October 23, 2024, the juvenile court entered dispositional review orders in which it again directed that DHR continue to make reasonable efforts to reunite the parents with the children.

Fisher acknowledged that DHR had not been relieved of efforts to reunite the family, but, she stated, she had not looked at the court orders and had not recommended services when she was assigned the family's case. Fisher testified that she did not think that the previous services had worked because the children had been returned to DHR's care. She affirmed, however, that it was her understanding that the majority of the services that had been offered after the first removal of the children from the parents’ custody had addressed domestic violence and that the children had not been returned to DHR's custody on the second occasion because of domestic-violence issues. Fisher testified that DHR's concurrent goal for the family was changed to adoption with no identified resource on April 7, 2025. Fisher acknowledged that DHR's concerns with the mother were her lack of stable housing, employment, and transportation. She affirmed, however, that DHR had not offered any services to assist the mother with attaining any of those goals when she was assigned to the case.

The mother testified that, at the time of the trial, she was residing with a childhood friend in Montgomery, that she had been employed at a hotel for almost three months, and that she had a vehicle and a driver's license. She testified that she had had difficulty obtaining housing because of an eviction that was on her record, but, she said, she had applied for housing in Georgia and was on a waitlist with a maximum waiting period of one month. The mother testified that, since the children were removed from her custody, she had moved several times and had worked different jobs. She stated that the highest level of education she had completed was 11th grade and that she wanted to return to school or get her GED. Fomby testified that a high-school diploma or a GED is very important when it comes to the workforce, and, she said, she had discussed that with the mother.

The father testified that he and the mother had separated because the mother wanted to focus on her goals with the maternal grandmother by her side. The children's guardian ad litem presented as an exhibit an order entered by the Calhoun Circuit Court on December 5, 2024, in the father's criminal case arising out of the 2021 incident, in which that court found that the father had violated the terms and conditions of his supervision and had been removed from the Domestic Violence Court program; it adjudicated the father “guilty of the Class C Felony offense [of] Attempted Domestic Violence 1st Degree.” The father testified that, at the time of the trial, he was residing with his fiancée, with whom he had been in a relationship since August 2024. Fisher testified that DHR's concerns with the father at the time of the trial were limited to his failure to pay the court-ordered fines from his domestic-violence case. She later clarified that DHR had concerns with the father's history of domestic violence, which, she said, impacted his ability to parent the children.

Analysis

In Jefferson County Department of Human Resources v. S.W., 324 So. 3d 1240, 1259-60 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) this court stated, in pertinent part:

“ ‘Once DHR places a child in foster care, it has an immediate duty to use reasonable efforts to reunite the family, absent aggravating circumstances. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-312. That duty requires DHR to identify the circumstances that led to removal of the child, to develop a plan to ameliorate those circumstances, and to use reasonable efforts to achieve that plan. See Montgomery Cty. Dep't of Human Res. v. A.S.N., 206 So. 3d 661, 672 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (citing H.H. v. Baldwin Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 989 So. 2d 1094, 1105 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (opinion on return to remand) (authored by Moore, J., with two judges concurring in the result)).

“ ‘․.

“ ‘․ Rehabilitation efforts succeed when those circumstances that led to the removal of the child have been resolved, [T.B. v. Cullman Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 6 So. 3d 1195, 1199 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)], so that the child can safely be returned to his or her parent's custody. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-301(12) (defining “reasonable efforts” as including “[e]fforts made ․ to make it possible for a child to return safely to his or her home”). Conversely, if DHR has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parent remains unable to adequately care for the child after reasonable efforts have been expended to rehabilitate the parent, the juvenile court may find that those reasonable efforts have failed. T.B., supra.’

“H.B. v. Mobile Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 236 So. 3d 875, 882-83 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). ‘Whether efforts at reunification have been reasonable and whether those efforts have failed or succeeded are questions of fact for the juvenile court to determine.’ R.T.B. v. Calhoun Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 19 So. 3d 198, 204 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).”

The mother asserts that DHR failed to provide her with services tailored toward eliminating the obstacles to family reunification that were identified by DHR in the March 8, 2024, ISP. She cites in support of her argument H.H. v. Baldwin County Department of Human Resources, 989 So. 2d 1094, 1098 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (opinion on return to remand) (per Moore, J., with two Judges concurring in the result), in which this court reversed a judgment terminating the parental rights of H.H. based on a lack of evidence to support a finding that reasonable efforts had been made to reunite H.H. with her child. This court considered that the Baldwin County Department of Human Resources had failed to offer H.H. any services designed to assist her in overcoming her drug problem, in obtaining appropriate housing, or in obtaining employment or steady income. Id. at 1106. We concluded that the services offered to H.H. -- supervised visitation, random drug testing, and bus tickets so that she could attend ISP meetings and drug testing -- hardly constituted a fair and serious attempt to cure the barriers preventing her from reuniting with her child. Id.

In the present case, the children were returned to the mother's custody, albeit with court-ordered supervision by DHR, in October 2023. Fomby expressed that, at the time the children were returned to the mother's custody, the mother had completed the counseling recommended by DHR and had grasped an understanding of the importance of providing a safe and stable home environment for the children; she stated that, although the mother had not attained her independence, the mother had had stability through her relationship with the father at that time.

DHR removed the children from the mother's custody a second time in March 2024, but not because of domestic-violence concerns. In the March 8, 2024, ISP, DHR identified the mother's housing and financial instability as the primary reasons for having removed the children. The juvenile court determined in both of its termination-of-parental-rights judgments, among other things, that, after March 2024, “[DHR] again implemented services in an attempt to reunite the family. [DHR] requested that the mother obtain employment, gain financial stability, and obtain housing. [DHR] was still concerned that the mother was unable to support herself or provide a stable home for the children ․” The juvenile court found that the mother had not been credible regarding the 2021 incident or in denying that domestic violence was a problem between her and the father. It stated further:

“The [c]ourt acknowledges that [DHR] is required to assess the needs of the family and to develop services to remedy the family's needs so that children can be safely returned to the care of their parents; however, when a parent refuses to acknowledge the safety issues that caused the child to enter care it is difficult if not impossible to implement services to safely return the child home and it is unconscionable to expect a child to linger in care for an indefinite period of time waiting on the parent to acknowledge their behaviors and their needs for services.”

In terminating the parental rights of the mother and the father, the juvenile court concluded, among other things, that DHR had made reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the mother and the father and that those efforts had failed.

“In reviewing [the juvenile court's] factual determination, ‘this court has a narrow standard of review that allows us to disturb those findings only when they are so unsupported by the evidence as to be plainly and palpably wrong.’ ” W.A., 211 So. 3d at 853 (quoting M.H. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 42 So. 3d 1291, 1294 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)).

We acknowledge that Fomby testified that continued counseling would likely be ineffective if the mother continued to be dishonest and that the juvenile court made specific findings in its judgments that the mother had been untruthful during her testimony. The juvenile court concluded in its judgments that the failure of a parent to acknowledge safety issues makes the implementation of services difficult. It appears clear, however, that that finding relates to safety and domestic-violence issues that were identified at the outset of DHR's involvement with the family in 2021. According to the evidence presented, the original pickup orders for the children had been based on concerns related to domestic violence and the lack of stability in the relationship between the mother and the father, but that relationship had ended at the time the second pickup orders were entered. Although evidence was presented indicating that, shortly after the children were returned to the mother's custody, the mother had telephoned Fomby regarding safety concerns related to the father, there was no testimony presented indicating that the mother had been involved in a domestic-violence incident from the time the children were removed from her care in March 2024 until the time of the trial. Fisher confirmed that the children had not been returned to DHR's custody based on concerns related to domestic violence, and the evidence is clear that the children were removed the second time based solely on concerns regarding the mother's homelessness and lack of stability outside of her relationship with the father.

DHR was ordered by the juvenile court to provide reasonable efforts to reunite the parents with the children. Fisher testified, however, that DHR had offered no services to the mother at that time aimed at addressing her failure to maintain stable housing, employment, and transportation -- the reasons given for the children's removal. In the March 8, 2024, ISP, DHR requested that the mother participate in counseling to address parenting skills and protective capacities; there was no evidence presented, however, indicating that the mother had been made aware of DHR's referral for counseling after the children were removed the second time. Indeed, Fomby testified that no referral had been made to her for those continued counseling services, and Fisher testified that, at the time she was assigned to the case in May 2024, no services had been offered to the parents. Thus, even assuming that the counseling services discussed in the March 2024 ISP had been authorized, there is no indication that the availability of those services was conveyed to the mother or to the service provider or implemented at any time, or that any services whatsoever had been offered to the mother between May 2024 and the termination-of-parental-rights trial that commenced in April 2025.

In W.A., this court reversed the termination of W.A.’s parental rights because the Calhoun County Department of Human Resources had failed to provide W.A. with transportation assistance, had ceased all efforts to assist W.A. with overcoming his drug-addiction problems six months before the termination trial, and had made no efforts whatsoever to rehabilitate W.A. with respect to his housing and income problems. 211 So. 3d at 853. Like in W.A., the evidence in the present cases indicates that DHR made no efforts to rehabilitate the mother with respect to her housing, employment, and transportation issues, including the lack of any efforts in assisting her to obtain a GED or high-school diploma, and it failed to offer her any services whatsoever in the 11 months preceding the trial based on her changed circumstances, despite continued orders that reasonable efforts be made to reunite her with the children. Accordingly, we reverse the juvenile court's judgments insofar as they terminated the mother's parental rights to the children.

Because we are reversing the juvenile court's judgments insofar as they terminated the mother's parental rights to the children, and, therefore, like in W.A., the mother may prove to be a suitable custodian who could supervise visitation between the father and the children, which would be a viable alternative to termination of the father's parental rights, we also reverse the judgments insofar as they terminated the father's parental rights. The cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See W.A., 211 So. 3d at 853-54.

CL-2025-0438 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.

CL-2025-0439 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.

CL-2025-0454 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.

CL-2025-0455 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At trial, the mother claimed that she had been playing a prank on the father that had escalated into an argument between them. She denied that the father had fired a gun during the argument or that she was afraid during the 2021 incident. The juvenile court did not find that account credible.

MOORE, Presiding Judge.

Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.