MITCHELL v. BERING STRAIT SCHOOL DISTRICT (2026)

OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

While taking out the trash one Sunday, a teacher in a remote village fell down the stairs of the house he rented from the school district that employed him, injuring himself. The teacher filed a negligence action against the school district and the principal of the school. After being sued, the school district reported the injury to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board and moved to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that workers’ compensation was the teacher's exclusive remedy. The teacher amended his complaint to include other causes of action, and the district sought dismissal of those claims as well. The superior court dismissed the case in its entirety for failure to state a claim.

The main issue on appeal is whether workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for the teacher's injury, or whether he may seek compensation in a negligence action. Workers’ compensation benefits are an employee's exclusive remedy against his employer for most injuries that occur within the course and scope of employment. 1 This exclusive remedy extends to injuries that occur during “employer-sanctioned activities at employer-provided facilities,” but not to “activities of a personal nature away from employer-provided facilities.” 2 In dismissing the teacher's negligence claim, the superior court appears to have accepted the school district's argument that the teacher's fall indisputably happened during the course and scope of his employment. But this determination is heavily fact-dependent. Because it is possible, given the facts alleged in the teacher's complaint, that the injury did not occur in the course and scope of his employment, it was error to dismiss his negligence action for failure to state a claim.

A second issue on appeal is whether it was error to dismiss the teacher's whistleblower, wrongful termination, and defamation claims. The school district defends against these claims largely by pointing to factual assertions in affidavits it submitted to the superior court. But because the court dismissed the teacher's complaint for failure to state a claim, we cannot consider factual assertions outside the pleadings. And the teacher's allegations adequately state viable claims. Therefore, we reverse dismissal of these claims too.

A third issue is whether it was error to dismiss the teacher's intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim based on the school district's delayed report of his injury to the Workers’ Compensation Board. Because the teacher alleged that the school district's handling of his worker's compensation matter was done in bad faith and with intent to injure him, he has adequately pleaded a claim of IIED that falls outside the Workers’ Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision. We therefore reverse dismissal of this claim as well.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Facts

David Mitchell worked for the Bering Strait School District as a teacher in Savoonga during the 2021–2022 school year. 3 He signed a landlord-tenant agreement with the District for housing. At some point, the District removed one of the railings on the stairs of Mitchell's residence. Mitchell complained about the stairs, but the District did not repair or replace the railing. One Sunday in November 2021, Mitchell fell on the stairs while taking out the trash and was injured. When Mitchell told Susan Nedza, the school's principal, about the injuries, she refused to help him, telling him his injuries were no responsibility of the District. According to Mitchell, she would not allow him to get treatment or medical help.

Mitchell had conflicts with Nedza unrelated to the injury. Before Mitchell's fall down the stairs, Nedza had attempted to discipline him, suspending him without pay for three days, but he successfully challenged this action. Nedza told others about Mitchell's alleged policy violations and his three-day suspension even though he had not in fact violated policy. Mitchell complained both to Nedza's supervisors and to the Professional Teaching Practices Commission (PTPC) about her; he sent his initial complaint to the PTPC shortly after his fall. The District decided not to retain Mitchell for the 2022–2023 school year in retaliation for his complaint to the PTPC.

B. Proceedings

In February 2023 Mitchell sued the District in a negligence action for damages related to injuries from the fall. He amended the complaint a short time later to add Nedza as a defendant. About six weeks after the lawsuit was filed, the District reported the injury to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board as an employment-related injury.

Rather than answering Mitchell's first amended complaint, the District moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The District argued that the exclusive remedy for Mitchell's accident was workers’ compensation benefits; the District invoked the remote site doctrine, which authorizes workers’ compensation benefits for injuries that would generally not be considered work-related except that they occurred at a remote job site. 4

Mitchell responded by moving to amend his complaint a second time, seeking to add several new causes of action against the District, Nedza, or both. 5 Mitchell outlined new causes of action he wished to assert: a mix of claims related to the fall and to employment actions taken against him. The new claims included bad faith and malice in claims processing, IIED, workplace safety violations, retaliation and violation of whistleblower laws, wrongful termination, and defamation. The motion to amend also contained arguments to counter the District's dismissal motion.

The District opposed the motion to amend, raising substantive arguments about the new causes of action and attaching affidavits and documentary exhibits to support these arguments.

The court allowed Mitchell to amend his complaint and instructed him to file his second amended complaint by a specific date, and to provide information about whether he had received workers’ compensation. Mitchell did as instructed, 6 filing both his second amended complaint and an addendum with information the court ordered him to provide about workers’ compensation.

The District again moved to dismiss. It asserted some arguments that were similar to those in its opposition to the motion to amend and relied on documents and affidavits it had previously filed with that opposition. The District noted that the court could treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment if it considered matters outside the pleadings.

The District repeated the argument it made in its first dismissal motion about the remote site doctrine. It contended that “everyday activities that are normally considered non-work-related are deemed part of a remote site employee's job for workers’ compensation purposes because the requirement of living at the remote site limits the employee's activity choices.”

In defending against the IIED claim, the District asserted that the only remedy available for its failure to file a report of injury until after it had been sued in tort was provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act. 7 It did not address the allegations of bad faith, which Mitchell tied to the long delay in reporting his injury.

As for Mitchell's retaliation and whistleblower claims, the District argued that there was no connection between Mitchell's non-retention and his PTPC complaint about Nedza primarily because the District disputed the date on which Mitchell filed the complaint. The District also argued that it had legitimate and non-retaliatory reasons for not retaining Mitchell, attaching exhibits to support this argument.

Finally, the District defended against Mitchell's defamation claim by arguing that it was barred by the statute of limitations and failed on the merits because the allegedly defamatory statements were true. Mitchell's response contested many of the District's factual assertions and legal arguments.

The court granted the District's motion to dismiss, signing a one-paragraph proposed order the District had submitted. The order stated that the case was “dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.” The court entered final judgment in May 2024. The District moved for attorney's fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82, and the court awarded the District $5,354.80 in attorney's fees over Mitchell's opposition.

Mitchell appeals.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo.” 8 When we review a dismissal order pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “we liberally construe the complaint and treat all factual allegations in the complaint as true.” 9 “Because motions to dismiss are disfavored, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief.” 10 We construe the pleadings of self-represented litigants liberally. 11

IV. DISCUSSION

A. We Review The Superior Court's Order As A Dismissal Under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6).

Before we can evaluate the merits of the parties’ arguments, we face a threshold procedural question: Did the superior court dismiss Mitchell's claims for failure to state a claim, or did it grant summary judgment against Mitchell? The court's order stated that it dismissed Mitchell's claims under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6). But the parties’ submission of affidavits and documentary evidence about Mitchell's claims and the District's reference to summary judgment present the possibility that the court considered these materials in evaluating Mitchell's claims, effectively treating the District's motion as one seeking summary judgment.

When a superior court considers a motion to dismiss, it must consider only the complaint: A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint's allegations.” 12 “We have consistently held that the superior court must expressly state whether it has excluded or considered matters outside of the pleadings when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” 13 “If the superior court does not exclude materials outside of the pleadings, it is under a mandatory duty to treat the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a summary judgment motion.” 14

When the superior court “converts the motion [to dismiss] to one for summary judgment, it must give opposing parties a ‘reasonable opportunity to present all materials made pertinent.’ ” 15 “The ‘reasonable opportunity’ is particularly important for pro se parties, given that trial judges are obligated to inform pro se litigants of procedural requirements such as ‘the necessity of submitting affidavits to preclude summary judgment.’ ” 16

In this case the superior court did not “expressly state” whether it considered the abundance of materials outside of the pleadings submitted by both parties. There is also no indication that the superior court gave notice to Mitchell that the motion would be treated as one for summary judgment. Moreover, the superior court's order expressly stated that the dismissal was pursuant to Civil Rule 12(b)(6). Therefore, we evaluate the superior court's order as a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). We consider the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and draw reasonable inferences in favor of Mitchell; 17 we do not consider materials outside the pleadings. 18 And because the order provided no explanation for the dismissal, we assume that the court accepted the District's arguments as reasons for dismissing the complaint. 19

B. Mitchell Adequately Briefed Most Issues So As To Preserve Them For Review.

We reject the District's argument that Mitchell's appeal should be dismissed due to inadequate briefing. Mitchell's opening brief argued that the remote site doctrine — which was the basis for the District's motion to dismiss — did not apply, and Mitchell cited cases to support his arguments. He also explicitly argued that the wrongful termination, defamation, and IIED claims were not covered by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which is a clear legal argument that can be evaluated and addressed. We can largely discern the arguments Mitchell raises and deem them adequately briefed. 20

There is one exception. Mitchell's amended complaint described “malice” as a cause of action but also acknowledged that it “may not be in itself a cause of action.” Mitchell does not make any argument about why dismissal of malice as a standalone cause of action was incorrect. Therefore, this particular argument is waived.

C. It Was Error To Dismiss Negligence And Contract Claims Related To The Fall As Barred By The Workers’ Compensation Act.

The superior court dismissed Mitchell's negligence claim, apparently agreeing with the District's argument that the claim fell under the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. 21 Workers’ compensation benefits are a remedy for injuries that “ar[i]se out of and in the course of the employment.” 22 And if an injury qualifies for workers’ compensation benefits, those benefits are the employer's exclusive liability for the injury. 23

To qualify for workers’ compensation benefits, a worker's injury must have sufficient connection to the workplace. 24 Normally, an injury resulting from a worker's personal errand at his private residence would not be considered eligible for compensation, but the District's motion to dismiss invoked the remote site doctrine, a doctrine related to what Larson's treatise on workers’ compensation law calls the bunkhouse rule. 25 The bunkhouse rule expands the concept of work-connectedness for those jobs that require an employee to live on the work premises. 26 The remote site doctrine likewise expands the boundaries of compensability, representing “a particularly expansive view of work-connectedness.” 27 “The crux of this doctrine is that everyday activities that are normally considered non-work-related are deemed a part of a remote site employee's job for workers’ compensation purposes because the requirement of living at the remote site limits the employee's activity choices.” 28

Many years ago we applied the remote site doctrine to injuries that happened during recreational activities 29 and personal errands. 30 In 1982 the legislature amended the Workers’ Compensation Act to address concerns that the remote site doctrine had been applied too broadly. 31 Because the doctrine represented an expansion of work-connectedness, the legislature in 1982 defined for the first time the phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment” in order to clarify what activities might give rise to a compensable injury. 32 The definition includes “employer-sanctioned activities at employer-provided facilities” but excludes “activities of a personal nature away from employer-provided facilities.” 33

In the few cases involving remote job sites where this definition has been dispositive, the employees were living in dormitory-type facilities at some type of work camp at the time of injury. 34 Because there was no dispute over the existence of “employer-provided facilities,” our decisions focused on the activity the employee was engaged in. 35 We have reasoned that “the employee's activity choices must be limited by the remote site and that limitation must play a causal role in the employee's injury” for the remote site doctrine to attach. 36

In this case, both elements of the definition may be relevant to determining whether Mitchell's injury was within the course and scope of his employment. First, Mitchell contended that taking out the trash on a weekend was not an “employer-sanctioned activity,” but was something anyone might do on a weekend. The District did not specifically address this argument, maintaining simply that Mitchell's claims were covered by the remote site doctrine. Whether Mitchell's activity choice in taking out the trash on a Sunday was limited by his living situation and how that limitation played a role in his injury is a fact-specific inquiry that does not easily lend itself to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. It is entirely possible that Mitchell could prove a set of facts that would establish that taking out the trash on a weekend is “an activity that most employees engage in ․ regardless of their location.” 37

Second, Mitchell's case also raises the question of what constitutes an “employer-provided facility.” We have not identified specific factors to be considered when deciding whether any facility, including a residence, is employer-provided. We did, however, affirm a Board decision that found a softball injury compensable when the Board concluded the injury happened at an employer-provided facility. 38 The Board looked at the dictionary definition of “provide,” specifically the meaning “furnish with,” to decide the case. 39 The Board cited the facts that the injury occurred “on a field rented by the [softball] league” and that the employer paid the softball league fee for the company team when finding that the company “made available to its employees a field on which to play softball.” 40 We affirmed because substantial evidence supported the Board's decision. 41

Whether Mitchell's housing was an employer-provided facility is a fact-dependent issue. Mitchell did not reside in dormitory-style housing with other employees, but had a residence that was the subject of a landlord-tenant agreement. 42 Mitchell alleged the District made money from the lease, implying that he was required to pay rent and that the District did not subsidize his housing. Whether this fact could be dispositive is not clear, but it is a factor that should be considered in evaluating whether the rental housing was an employer-provided facility. Other factors that might affect the analysis include whether Mitchell was required to live in District-owned housing under the terms of his employment contract.

We cannot say beyond doubt that Mitchell could prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief on his negligence claim. 43 Mitchell's complaint alleged sufficient facts that could take the negligence claims outside of the Workers’ Compensation Act's exclusivity provisions, so it was error for the superior court to dismiss those claims under Rule 12(b)(6). 44

D. It Was Error To Dismiss Mitchell's Employment Claims.

Mitchell's second amended complaint alleged that adverse employment actions, including the District's decision not to retain him for the 2022-2023 school year, were the result of complaints he made about Nedza to the PTPC and to her supervisors. The complaint alleged that about a month after he reported his fall to Nedza, he reported to the PTPC conduct by Nedza that he considered discriminatory and unethical.

The District moved to dismiss these claims, but its motion was supported by multiple attachments and affidavits. The District did not argue that Mitchell's pleadings themselves were insufficient to state a claim against the District for these causes of action. Instead, the District argued that there was “no connection” between Mitchell's PTPC complaint and his non-retention, resting its arguments on contested facts. It also asserted that it had a legitimate, non-retaliatory “explanation” for Mitchell's non-retention, again relying on disputed facts. The District's appellate arguments are similar; it maintains there was “no causal connection between the alleged protected activity and the adverse employment action.” But disputed facts are not a proper basis to dismiss Mitchell's claims.

“To bring suit under the Whistleblower Act an employee must show that (1) [he] has engaged in protected activity and (2) the activity was a substantial or motivating factor in [his] termination.” 45 Mitchell's complaint adequately alleged these elements: He alleged he had engaged in protected activity by complaining to Nedza's supervisors and the PTPC about Nedza engaging in discrimination. 46 He also alleged that the PTPC complaint was made about a month after his injury, which would have been in December 2021. He further alleged that he was not retained in retaliation in 2022 for making the PTPC complaint. While the District contested the factual allegations in Mitchell's complaint, for purposes of evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we must assume that the allegations in the complaint are true and provable. 47 It was therefore error to dismiss the Whistleblower Act claim. 48

“To prevail on a wrongful termination claim an employee must prove: (1) that the employee was discharged by [his or her] employer and (2) that the employer breached a contract or committed a tort in connection with the employee's termination.” 49 In the second amended complaint Mitchell alleged he had been non-retained, which was equivalent to a discharge, in retaliation for complaining about Nedza. “Retaliatory discharge can create a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in at-will employment contracts.” 50 For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Mitchell adequately pleaded a cause of action for wrongful termination, so it was error to dismiss this claim too.

E. It Was Error To Dismiss The Defamation Claim.

Mitchell's second amended complaint included a defamation claim alleging that Nedza told members of the public false information about a disciplinary action she had taken against Mitchell. Mitchell alleged that the statements were used to discredit him and caused him damage.

The District's motion to dismiss the defamation claim raised two issues. The District contended that the defamation claim was barred by the statute of limitations, relying on a factual assertion about when Nedza imposed specific discipline on Mitchell. The District also asserted that the statements to which Mitchell referred were true. Both of these arguments were based on factual assertions contained in attachments to the District's motions. On appeal the District raises only the statute of limitations argument.

In some cases the statute of limitations can be the basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). 51 For example, we affirmed the superior court's dismissal of three claims in a self-represented litigant's complaint when the complaint was filed in October 2016 and the causes of action accrued in September 2009, November 2012, and February 2013. 52 Because all three causes of action were tort or contract claims and none was filed within three years of accrual, we held that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on statute of limitations grounds was proper. 53

In Mitchell's case, it is not clear when a cause of action for defamation accrued. Neither party stated when Nedza published the information to others. The District presented an affidavit asserting that Nedza disciplined Mitchell in early October 2021, but it said nothing about the alleged publication to others. Because the complaint's allegations do not indicate precisely when Mitchell's defamation claim accrued, and because we do not consider factual assertions outside the pleadings (such as those in the District's affidavit), we cannot say beyond doubt that Mitchell's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 54 Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of this claim.

F. It Was Error To Dismiss The IIED Claim.

Mitchell alleged a number of facts to support a claim that the District and Nedza engaged in bad-faith conduct when dealing with his injury and that this bad-faith conduct caused him mental distress. He pointed out that even though he told the District about his fall shortly after it happened, the District did not file a report of injury with the Division of Workers’ Compensation until 2023, after Mitchell sued the District in court for his injuries and more than a year after the fall. Mitchell alleged that he contacted the District about his injuries shortly after the fall so it “knew that the injuries were serious,” yet the District deliberately denied that it had any obligation to assist him. He alleged that rather than report the injury, Nedza referred to the injuries as his “ailments” and claimed they were “no responsibility of [the District].” Mitchell alleged that the District and Nedza acted “purposely and maliciously” in failing to assist him after the fall and suggested that their actions were part of their ongoing retaliation for his complaints about Nedza to the PTPC.

The District moved to dismiss the IIED claim based on the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The District cited AS 23.30.070, which requires an employer to file an injury report within ten days of the date the employer learned of the injury and imposes penalties for noncompliance, including a duty to pay an additional 20% “of the amounts that were unpaid when due.” 55 The District argued that this surcharge was the exclusive remedy for its alleged conduct, barring Mitchell's IIED claim.

The Act's exclusive remedy provision does not bar all IIED claims based on conduct related to processing workers’ compensation claims. In Stafford v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co. of New York, we held that the Act did not bar an IIED claim related to claims processing when the claimant alleged that the workers’ compensation insurance carrier “did more than delay in making benefit payments” and “intentionally and maliciously misled him about his right to compensation and discouraged him from exercising his rights, resulting in emotional injury.” 56 We rejected the argument that an employee's sole remedy for bad faith claims processing was the Act's statutory penalty provision. 57 We applied this rule to an employer in addition to an insurer in Christensen v. NCH Corp., where an employee alleged that his employer and its compensation carrier had intentionally interfered with his medical treatment for a work-related injury. 58 We wrote that “the wrongful failure to pay [benefits] will not support a cause of action for tort unless the employer's purpose is to injure the claimant.” 59 More recently we held that an employee had adequately pleaded a cause of action for IIED against his employer's compensation carrier and other agents of the employer based on their efforts to terminate his disability benefits. 60

In this case, the District failed to discuss Stafford or Christensen, so we do not know how it might deal with those decisions. But in our view, Mitchell's allegations are sufficient to bring his claim for IIED within the intentional tort exception we have recognized. He does not merely allege delay in handling his workers’ compensation claim, as the District suggests. Rather, he alleges that the delay was a purposeful action that was intended to injure him and was an aspect of the District's retaliation against him.

His allegation that the District's delay in reporting his injury was tied to its retaliation for complaining about Nedza provides another basis for an IIED claim. We have expressly held that emotional distress claims are not barred by the Act's exclusivity when the claims “stem[ ] from a public policy violation.” 61 We have also recognized that wrongful termination in violation of whistleblower statutes is against public policy. 62

Because the superior court dismissed the lawsuit pursuant to Civil Rule 12(b)(6), we must construe the complaint liberally 63 and assume that all factual allegations are true and provable. 64 Using this standard, Mitchell adequately pleaded an IIED claim. It was error to dismiss it. 65

G. Dismissal Of The Claim Related To Workplace Safety Violations Was Proper.

Among Mitchell's causes of action related to the fall at his house, he pleaded a standalone cause of action based on violations of workplace safety rules. In pleading this cause of action, Mitchell referenced the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). It appears that Mitchell was alleging that the District and Nedza had duties to him under workplace safety laws, which they violated by failing to maintain the stairs and also failing to assist him in getting medical help after the fall.

To the extent Mitchell is alleging a negligence claim for workplace safety violations, that claim was properly dismissed. On the one hand, if the fall were an employment-related injury and therefore compensable, then the employer's failure to comply with workplace safety regulations comes within the exclusivity provisions of the Act. 66 On the other hand, if the fall were not related to Mitchell's employment, then workplace safety statutes and regulations would not apply because the injury did not happen at a work site. 67 Finally, Mitchell's allegations related to the District's and Nedza's actions after he was injured do not implicate workplace safety violations.

V. CONCLUSION

We REVERSE the superior court's dismissal of Mitchell's causes of action for negligence and related contract claims stemming from his fall; his whistleblower and wrongful discharge claims; his IIED claim; and his defamation claim. We AFFIRM the dismissal of his workplace safety claim. We VACATE the award of attorney's fees and REMAND for further proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See AS 23.30.010(a), .045, .055.

2.   AS 23.30.395(2).

3.   This appeal is before us after dismissal under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6), so we present the allegations in the complaint as true, with reasonable inferences drawn in favor of Mitchell. Est. of Mickelsen ex rel. Mickelsen v. N.-Wend Foods, Inc., 274 P.3d 1193, 1197 (Alaska 2012).

4.   Doyon Universal Servs. v. Allen, 999 P.2d 764, 768-69 (Alaska 2000); see also Anderson v. Emps. Liab. Assurance Corp., 498 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1972).

5.   By the time Mitchell sought leave to file his second amended complaint, he was representing himself. Although he had initially been represented by an attorney, the superior court granted the attorney leave to withdraw after early settlement negotiations fizzled.

6.   The complaint outlined in the motion to amend was not identical to the second amended complaint Mitchell filed.

7.   Under AS 23.30.070(a), an employer is required to file an injury report with the Board within ten days of the date it knew of the injury. If an employer fails to comply, the limitations periods for workers’ compensation claims are altered and the Board can order an employer to pay an additional 20% “of the amounts that were unpaid when due.” AS 23.30.070(e)-(f).

8.   Patterson v. Walker, 429 P.3d 829, 831 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Bachner Co. v. State, 387 P.3d 16, 20 (Alaska 2016)).

9.   Id. (quoting Bachner, 387 P.3d at 20).

10.   Id. (quoting Bachner, 387 P.3d at 20).

11.   Id.

12.   Dworkin v. First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks, 444 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska 1968).

13.   Phillips v. Gieringer, 108 P.3d 889, 892 (Alaska 2005).

14.   Id.

15.   Pedersen v. Blythe, 292 P.3d 182, 185 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Alaska R. Civ. P. 12(b)).

16.   Id. (quoting Genaro v. Mun. of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844, 846 (Alaska 2003)).

17.   Est. of Mickelsen ex rel. Mickelsen v. N.-Wend Foods, Inc., 274 P.3d 1193, 1197 (Alaska 2012).

18.   Pedersen, 292 P.3d at 184 (“In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we do not consider materials outside the complaint and its attachments.”).

19.   See Alaska Wildlife All. v. State, 74 P.3d 201, 206 (Alaska 2003) (“In most cases involving dismissal ․ the grounds for the superior court's ruling can be discerned from the parties’ motion papers.”).

20.   See Juelfs v. Gough, 41 P.3d 593, 596 (Alaska 2002) (holding that briefing was adequate when argument was implicit but court could understand it and review issue presented).

21.   AS 23.30.055.

22.   AS 23.30.010(a).

23.   AS 23.30.055.

24.   See N. Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845, 846 (Alaska 1966) (“[I]f the accidental injury or death is connected with any of the incidents of one's employment, then the injury or death would both arise out of and be in the course of such employment.”).

25.   2 A. Larson et al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 24.03 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2023); see also Anderson v. Emps. Liab. Assurance Corp., 498 P.2d 288, 290 (Alaska 1972) (citing 1 A. Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation §§ 24.00-24.21 (1968)) (discussing origins of remote site doctrine).

26.   See 2 A. Larson et al., supra note 25, § 24.03[1] (summarizing basic bunkhouse rule and providing examples).

27.   Doyon Universal Servs. v. Allen, 999 P.2d 764, 769 (Alaska 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

28.   Id.

29.   Anderson, 498 P.2d at 292-93 (holding that injuries from recreational activity at remote site were compensable).

30.   M-K Rivers v. Schleifman, 599 P.2d 132, 135-36 (Alaska 1979) (holding that injuries sustained in travel from work camp to town to cash paycheck were compensable).

31.   Section by Section Analysis, H.B. 159, 12th Leg., 2d Sess. at 4, H. Fin. Comm. Bill File for H.B. 159 (1982) (stating intent “to limit the scope of the ‘bunkhouse rule’ or ‘remote site doctrine’ ․ in workers’ compensation law”).

32.   Ch. 93, § 24, SLA 1982 (adding new section to definitions in Act). Because this definition applies to all injuries, we have held that its coverage includes locations that would not have come within the remote site doctrine. See LeSuerJohnson v. Rollins-Burdick Hunter of Alaska, 808 P.2d 266, 267 (Alaska 1991) (per curiam) (“That portion of AS 23.30.[395](2) which pertains to employer-sanctioned activities at employer-provided facilities is not limited to remote job sites as the statute is written.”).

33.   AS 23.30.395(2).

34.   Doyon Universal Servs. v. Allen, 999 P.2d 764, 766 (Alaska 2000) (describing living facilities with “on-site dormitory” at “remote site on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline”); Norcon, Inc. v. Alaska Workers’ Comp. Bd., 880 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Alaska 1994) (noting that employee “resided in a ‘man camp’ ” and had a roommate); Excursion Inlet Packing Co. v. Ugale, 92 P.3d 413, 418 (Alaska 2004) (per curiam) (noting that employee “had a bunk at the XIP facility” but “was scared to stay in the bunkhouse”).

35.   Allen, 999 P.2d at 769 (eating a vegetable that employee never ate at home when employer provided meals); Norcon, Inc., 880 P.2d at 1053 n.1 (dressing for work); Ugale, 92 P.3d at 419-20 (waiting for plane to fly out of camp).

36.   Allen, 999 P.2d at 769 n.22.

37.   Norcon, Inc., 880 P.2d at 1053 n.1 (rejecting application of remote site doctrine when employee suffered sudden cardiac death while dressing at work camp).

38.   LeSuer-Johnson v. Rollins-Burdick Hunter of Alaska, 808 P.2d 266, 267 (Alaska 1991) (per curiam).

39.   Id.

40.   Id. at 266-67.

41.   Id. at 267.

42.   Mitchell argues on appeal, as he did in the superior court, that he can maintain a negligence action against the District as his landlord under the dual-capacity doctrine even if his injury is compensable under workers’ compensation. We disagree. We declined to adopt the dual-capacity doctrine in State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258, 260 (Alaska 1979), and we have never indicated that the doctrine applies in Alaska. We have allowed a co-employee to be sued in tort under a theory “analogous to a ‘dual persona’ theory,” but these suits can only be maintained against co-workers who perform duties for a separate legal entity. Sauve v. Winfree, 907 P.2d 7, 13 (Alaska 1995). Thus, in Sauve, we held that a corporate employee could sue co-workers who owned as a partnership the building where the corporate employee was injured; the partnership was a separate entity from the corporation that employed all three of them. Id. We expressly stated in Sauve that the case was “not an implicit adoption of the dual-capacity doctrine.” Id. at 13 n.3.

43.   Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska v. Does 1-6, 141 P.3d 719, 722 (Alaska 2006) (“A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief.” (citing Guerrero v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 6 P.3d 250, 254 (Alaska 2000))).

44.   In general, when there is a dispute about whether an injury is work related, the Board and the superior court have concurrent jurisdiction. Himschoot v. Shanley, 908 P.2d 1035, 1039-40 (Alaska 1996) (holding that superior court and Board have concurrent jurisdiction even when fact-based jurisdictional questions are present). The record in this case contains scant information about proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board. The few relevant documents in the record show that the District began to pay compensation without an award in 2023 but suspended the compensation for some period of time. See AS 23.30.155(a) (“Compensation under [the Act] shall be paid periodically, promptly, and directly to the person entitled to it, without an award, except where liability to pay compensation is controverted by the employer.”). Because compensation is payable without an award unless the employer controverts benefits, the District could pay workers’ compensation benefits to Mitchell without Mitchell asking the Board for compensation. Employers can first accept the compensability of a claim, pay compensation, and later controvert the benefits. See Lisenbury v. Alaska Mech., Inc., AWCB Dec. No. 08-0102, 2008 WL 2308174, at *1-2 (June 3, 2008).The documents in the record indicate that Mitchell asked the Board to correct an insurance report and that as of August 22, 2023, no written claim had been filed. There is nothing to suggest that either party had raised the work-relatedness of the injury as a contested issue before the Board at the time the superior court was considering the District's motion to dismiss.

45.   Okpik v. City of Barrow, 230 P.3d 672, 678 (Alaska 2010) (quoting Hammond v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 107 P.3d 871, 874 n.5 (Alaska 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

46.   The Whistleblower Act does not require that a complaint actually have been filed. AS 39.90.100(a)(1) prohibits retaliatory actions against an employee who is “about to report to a public body a matter of public concern.”

47.   Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska, 141 P.3d at 722.

48.   Mitchell's second amended complaint asserts, as a single cause of action, “Retaliation and Violation of whistleblower laws.” We have explained that there are different legal standards governing claims of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and claims under the Alaska Whistleblower Act. Roseberry v. N. Slope Borough Sch. Dist., 568 P.3d 338, 343-44 (Alaska 2025) (“While both First Amendment Claims and the Whistleblower Act require that speech must address a matter of public concern to qualify for protection, they employ different definitions of ‘matter of public concern.’ ”). It is not clear to us whether Mitchell intends to assert a First Amendment claim, and we express no opinion on the merits of such a claim. We note only that just as it was error to dismiss the Whistleblower Act claim under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) based on the School District's factual assertions, it would also be error to dismiss any First Amendment claim on that basis as well.

49.   State, Dep't of Fam. & Cmty. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. v. Lane, 542 P.3d 1124, 1132 (Alaska 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Okpik, 230 P.3d at 679) (internal quotation marks omitted).

50.   Lincoln v. Interior Reg'l Hous. Auth., 30 P.3d 582, 586 (Alaska 2001).

51.   Robinson v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 442 P.3d 763, 769 (Alaska 2019).

52.   Id. at 767, 769-70.

53.   Id. at 769-70.

54.   In his motion for reconsideration after the superior court dismissed the lawsuit, Mitchell alleged that this was just one instance of Nedza's defamatory comments toward him. On remand, if Mitchell wishes to include additional allegations, he may seek leave to file an amended complaint. Alaska R. Civ. P. 15.

55.   AS 23.30.070(a), (e)-(f).

56.   526 P.2d 37, 43-44 (Alaska 1974), overruled on other grounds by Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525, 527-28 (Alaska 1976).

57.   Id

58.   956 P.2d 468, 475 (Alaska 1998).

59.   Id. (citing Stafford, 526 P.2d at 43).

60.   Cornelison v. TIG Ins., 376 P.3d 1255, 1278-81 (Alaska 2016).

61.   Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc., 127 P.3d 807, 819-20 (Alaska 2005).

62.   Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, Inc., 93 P.3d 427, 438 (Alaska 2004).

63.   Patterson v. Walker, 429 P.3d 829, 831 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Bachner Co. v. State, 387 P.3d 16, 20 (Alaska 2016)). We also construe the pleadings of self-represented litigants liberally. Robinson v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 442 P.3d 763, 768 (Alaska 2019).

64.   Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska v. Does 1-6, 141 P.3d 719, 722 (Alaska 2006).

65.   Because we are reversing dismissal of most of the causes of action, we vacate the attorney's fees award against Mitchell.

66.   See Burke v. Criterion Gen., Inc., 499 P.3d 319, 321-22, 328 (Alaska 2021) (affirming summary judgment against worker's estate based on exclusivity provisions even though employer was fined for workplace safety violations).

67.   Cf. Jones v. Bowie Indus., Inc., 282 P.3d 316, 332 (Alaska 2012) (holding that supplier of equipment was not employer so that injured worker was not entitled to jury instruction on negligence per se for supplier's failure to comply with OSHA regulation).

BORGHESAN, Justice.