YAKO WILLIAM COLLINS v. STATE OF ALASKA (2026)

OPINION

In this appeal, we must decide whether the ex post facto clause of our state constitution prohibits the retrospective application of certain changes that the legislature made to the presumptive sentencing statutes in 2013. In other words, we must decide whether these statutory changes can lawfully be applied to the sentencing of defendants who committed their crimes before the legislature enacted these changes.

For the reasons explained here, we conclude that the ex post facto clause prohibits retrospective application of the legislature's 2013 changes to the presumptive sentencing statutes. Because the defendant in this case committed his crime before the legislature enacted these changes, he must be sentenced under the pre-existing law.

Underlying facts and procedural history of this case

In 2009, Yako William Collins was found guilty of committing a first-degree sexual assault the previous year.  ¹ Because Collins was a first felony offender, he faced a presumptive sentencing range of 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment for this crime.  ² Collins asked the sentencing judge to exercise his authority under AS 12.55.165 and refer Collins's case to the statewide three-judge sentencing panel, so that the three-judge panel might exercise its authority to sentence Collins below the presumptive range.  ³

Collins's sentencing judge denied Collins's request for a referral to the three-judge panel, and Collins was sentenced within the presumptive range. (He received a sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment with 5 years suspended.)  ⁴

Collins appealed — challenging, among other things, the sentencing judge's denial of Collins's request to refer his case to the three-judge panel.

(a) Our first decision in Collins's case

In Collins v. State, 287 P.3d 791 (Alaska App. 2012) (Collins I), a majority of this Court agreed with Collins that he should have another opportunity to pursue his request to have his case referred to the three-judge sentencing panel.

This Court noted that when the legislature enacted significantly higher presumptive sentencing ranges for sexual felonies in 2006, the legislature's action was prompted by two assumptions about sex offenders: that these offenders generally are serial offenders, even though their prior offenses may not have been discovered and prosecuted; and that these offenders generally have significantly worse prospects for rehabilitation than other felony offenders.  ⁵ In light of these legislative assumptions, this Court held (by a two-to-one vote) that defendants who were subject to the higher post-2006 presumptive sentencing ranges were entitled to have their cases referred to the three-judge panel if they showed either (1) that they did not have a history of unprosecuted sexual offenses, or (2) that they had prospects for rehabilitation which, in other offenders, would be considered only “normal” or “good”. Collins I, 287 P.3d at 797. We therefore remanded Collins's case to the superior court so that Collins could renew his request to have his case referred to the three-judge panel. Ibid.

Judge Joel Bolger (who at that time was a member of this Court, before his appointment to the supreme court) dissented from this Court's decision. Judge Bolger argued that the legislative history pertaining to the increased presumptive sentencing ranges for sexual felonies did not support the two mitigating factors identified by this Court. He further argued that these two mitigating factors were inconsistent with the overall structure of the presumptive sentencing statutes.  ⁶

(b) The Alaska legislature's response to our decision

Early the next year, the Alaska legislature took action in response to our decision in Collins I. In a bill that was ultimately enacted as SLA 2013, chapter 43, the legislature declared that this Court had misconstrued the legislature's purposes for increasing the presumptive sentencing ranges for sexual felonies in 2006. The legislature endorsed the position taken by Judge Bolger in his dissent, and the legislature declared that it had never intended to create new or additional means for a defendant convicted of a sexual felony to obtain referral to the three-judge sentencing panel.  ⁷

As part of this same session law, the legislature amended AS 12.55.165 and 175 (the two statutes that govern referrals to the three-judge sentencing panel) so that these statutes explicitly codified the position taken by Judge Bolger in his dissent — barring defendants from seeking referrals to the three-judge sentencing panel on either of the two bases identified by this Court in Collins I.  ⁸

This new session law took effect on July 1, 2013, while the superior court (pursuant to our mandate in Collins I) was reconsidering whether to refer Collins's case to the three-judge sentencing panel.  ⁹ Because of the legislature's amendments to AS 12.55.165 and 175, the superior court concluded that it no longer mattered whether Collins could prove either of the two mitigating factors that this Court identified in Collins I — because, even if Collins proved one or both of these mitigating factors, the three-judge sentencing panel no longer had the authority to reduce Collins's sentence on these bases. The court therefore again denied Collins's request for a referral to the three-judge panel.

(c) Our second decision in Collins's case

Once more, Collins appealed the superior court's decision. Collins pointed out that his crime was committed in 2008 — several years before the legislature enacted the 2013 session law that prohibited the three-judge panel from reducing a sentence based on the two mitigating factors that this Court identified in Collins I. Because of this, Collins argued that it would violate the ex post facto clause if the amended sentencing provisions of the 2013 session law were applied to him. He asserted that when the superior court evaluated his request for referral to the three-judge panel, the superior court was required to apply the law as it was stated in the Collins I majority opinion — and that if the superior court did refer his case to the three-judge sentencing panel, the three-judge panel would likewise be required to apply the law as it was stated in the Collins I majority opinion, before the legislature amended the sentencing statutes in 2013.  ¹⁰

On its face, the resolution of Collins's ex post facto claim might seem straightforward and obvious: Collins committed his crime in 2008, and the legislature did not amend the three-judge panel provisions of AS 12.55.165-175 until five years later, in 2013. But there is a legal doctrine — the doctrine of “clarifying legislation” — that makes this issue significantly more complicated.

The doctrine of clarifying legislation governs situations where a controversy arises concerning the proper interpretation of a statute and, while the controversy is being litigated in the courts (that is, before the judicial branch of government has issued a binding interpretation of the statute), the legislature enacts new legislation which purports merely to clarify the meaning of the pre-existing statute, rather than to change the law in any fashion.

In these situations, if the courts are convinced that the new enactment is indeed merely “clarifying” legislation, then the courts will treat the pre-existing statute as if it had always meant what the later enactment declares its meaning to be.

This doctrine has special significance when, as in the present case, the statute at issue is a penal statute. The ex post facto clause forbids the legislature from enacting or amending a penal statute so as to retroactively criminalize, or retroactively increase the penalty for, acts that have already been committed. But when a new legislative enactment qualifies as “clarifying” legislation, the courts treat the preexisting version of the statute as having always meant what the clarifying enactment now declares it to mean. Thus, there has been no change in the law. And because there has been no change in the law, there is no issue of retroactivity when courts apply the now-clarified statute to criminal cases that arose before the legislature enacted the clarifying legislation.

See our fuller discussion of this doctrine in Collins v. State, 494 P.3d 60, 64–70 (Alaska App. 2021) (Collins II).

In Collins II, this Court concluded that the 2013 session law constituted clarifying legislation — meaning that this 2013 session law did not change Alaska sentencing law, but merely clarified the law that already existed. We therefore held that Collins and other similarly situated offenders (offenders whose crimes were committed after the legislature increased the presumptive terms for sexual felonies in 2006) were not entitled to seek referral of their cases to the three-judge sentencing panel based on the two mitigating factors that we identified in our 2012 Collins opinion, even if their crimes were committed before 2013.  ¹¹

(d) The Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Collins's case

However, our ruling in Collins II was not the end of this matter, because the Alaska Supreme Court granted Collins's petition to review our decision, and the supreme court ultimately concluded that this Court had misapplied the doctrine of clarifying legislation. Collins v. State, 568 P.3d 349, 352, 360–66 (Alaska 2025) (Collins III).

The supreme court noted that, under our tripartite system of government, the judicial branch has the ultimate authority to determine the proper interpretations of statutes.¹² Because of this fundamental principle, a legislature cannot “clarify” a statute after the appellate courts of that jurisdiction have issued a binding interpretation of the statute. Rather, a legislature can only enact clarifying legislation while the meaning of a statute remains unsettled or in doubt. Collins III, 568 P.3d at 356, 361. Thus, while the legislature can enact clarifying legislation in anticipation of litigation surrounding a statute, or in response to litigation that is already taking place in the lower courts, the legislature cannot “clarify” the meaning of a statute in a way that conflicts with a binding interpretation that has already been announced by the judicial branch. If the legislature concludes that the judicial branch has reached the wrong conclusion about a statute, the legislature must amend the statute — i.e., change the law. Ibid.

When this Court decided Collins II, we assumed that this limitation on the doctrine of clarifying legislation applied only when the statute in question had been interpreted by our jurisdiction's highest court — in other words, by the Alaska Supreme Court. We therefore concluded that the Alaska legislature remained empowered to clarify the presumptive sentencing statutes at issue in this case even though this Court had interpreted those statutes in a different fashion.

But in Collins III, the Alaska Supreme Court declared that our handling of this issue was mistaken:

[Alaska has only] one court of appeals whose decisions, by statute, are authoritative statewide and binding on all lower courts unless [they are] superseded on discretionary review. ․ [If] the court of appeals publishes its decision in a case, the statements of law in that case are [binding] precedent ․ unless and until those statements of law are superseded by a decision of the Alaska Supreme Court. ․ [Thus, the court of appeals's decision in] Collins I [constituted a] final and binding judicial interpretation of the 2006 sentencing laws [when] the legislature enacted the 2013 legislation [purporting to clarify] that [2006] law's intent.

Collins III, 568 P.3d at 362.

The Alaska Supreme Court therefore held that the legislature's 2013 amendments of AS 12.55.165 and 175 (the two statutes governing referrals to the three-judge sentencing panel) could not have been clarifying legislation for ex post facto purposes. Rather, the legislature's revision of those two statutes in 2013 necessarily changed the law — and, thus, any retroactive application of those changes would violate the ex post facto clause if the changes were “substantive” (as that term is used in ex post facto jurisprudence). Collins III, 568 P.3d at 365–66.

The supreme court then directed this Court to determine whether the legislature's 2013 changes to AS 12.55.165-175 were “substantive” or merely “procedural” for purposes of the ex post facto clause.

How we interpret the supreme court's mandate in Collins III

Cases involving the ex post facto clause are sometimes a bit of an analytical quagmire. Courts often assert that the ex post facto clause only bars the retrospective application of substantive changes in the law, and that the clause allows procedural changes to be applied retrospectively — but this is an imprecise and potentially misleading generalization.

For example, in Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the ex post facto clause prohibited retrospective application of newly increased sentencing ranges in the federal sentencing guidelines. Even though the Supreme Court repeatedly referred to the sentencing guideline laws as “procedural”, the Court concluded that the practical effect of these increased guideline ranges was to create a substantial risk that defendants would receive longer sentences for their crimes — and, for this reason, the ex post facto clause prohibited retrospective application of these changes. Id., 569 U.S. at 543–45, 133 S.Ct. at 2084.

Similarly, in Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the ex post facto clause prohibited retrospective application of a change in the formula for calculating Florida's presumptive sentencing ranges for various offenses — sentencing ranges which Florida judges were required to follow in the absence of clear and convincing reasons for a departure. After the defendant in Miller committed his crime, the state legislature increased the “primary offense points” assigned to that crime and, as a result, the lower end of Miller's presumptive sentencing range increased by 2 years. Rather than deciding whether this change was “substantive” or “procedural”, the Supreme Court focused on the punitive effect of this change. The Court held that the revised sentencing formula resulted in an increase in the “quantum of punishment” for Miller's offense, and that the ex post facto clause therefore prohibited retrospective application of the revised sentencing formula. Id., 482 U.S. at 433–434, 107 S.Ct. at 2453.

As the Supreme Court explained in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990):

We think the best way to make sense out of ․ the cases is to say that by simply labeling a law “procedural,” a legislature does not thereby immunize it from scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause. ․ Subtle ex post facto violations are no more permissible than overt ones. In Beazell [v. Ohio], we said that the constitutional prohibition is addressed to laws, “whatever their form,” which make innocent acts criminal, alter the nature of the offense, or increase the punishment.

Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 46, 110 S. Ct. at 2721.

Or, as the Third Circuit has remarked, “A review of [the] leading cases reveals that a challenged rule's constitutionality [under the ex post facto clause] hinges on its effect, not its form.” Holmes v. Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 264–65 (3rd Cir. 2021).

Moreover, the question of whether the retrospective application of a new law violates the ex post facto clause — whether the new law impermissibly changes the definitions of crimes or the laws of sentencing — is ultimately a matter of degree. Here is what the Supreme Court said about this point in California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995):

We have long held that the question of [whether] legislative adjustments [to sentencing and post-sentencing procedures] will be held to be of sufficient moment to transgress the [ex post facto] prohibition must be a matter of degree. ․ [What] we must determine [is] whether [the change in the law] produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.

Morales, 514 U.S. at 509, 115 S.Ct. at 1603 (emphasis in the original).

At this point, we must explain the relationship between federal ex post facto jurisprudence and the Alaska Supreme Court's exposition of our own state's ex post facto clause in Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008).

In Doe, our supreme court acknowledged that, in the past, it had construed the Alaska ex post facto clause in conformity with court decisions construing the federal ex post facto clause. But the supreme court explained that its past decisions did not stand for the proposition that the Alaska clause should always be interpreted to mean the same thing as the federal clause, or that litigation of analogous ex post facto cases under the Alaska Constitution should always lead to the same results reached by the federal courts.

The supreme court stated that it had followed analogous federal decisions in the past because there was “no reason to do otherwise” — that is, because the supreme court was convinced that our state's ex post facto clause called for the same analysis and result.  ¹³ But the supreme court firmly rejected the notion that our state's ex post facto clause must uniformly be interpreted in line with the corresponding federal clause. Rather, the court declared that it “[has] the authority and, when necessary, [the] duty to construe the provisions of the Alaska Constitution to provide greater protections than those arising out of the identical federal clauses.”  ¹⁴

The Doe case dealt with a newly legislated requirement that sex offenders register with the Department of Public Safety: the question was whether this mandatory registration represented an increased “punishment” for ex post facto purposes (meaning that the registration requirement could not be applied retrospectively).

In Doe, the supreme court applied the same multi-factor “effects” test that federal courts employ when deciding whether a change in the law represents an increased punishment. But when the supreme court applied this test, it concluded that sex offender registration was indeed a punishment for ex post facto purposes — the opposite conclusion from the one that the United States Supreme Court had reached five years earlier in the analogous case of Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 48, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003).

The supreme court explained that there was no legal incongruity in these disparate results: How Alaska courts apply the multi-factor “effects” test when deciding an ex post facto claim under the Alaska Constitution “is not governed by how the federal courts independently apply the same test under the Federal Constitution, as long as [the Alaska] interpretation is at least as protective as the federal interpretation.”  ¹⁵

Returning, then, to the present case: The supreme court has asked us to decide whether the legislature's 2013 amendments to AS 12.55.165 and AS 12.55.175 are substantive or procedural for ex post facto purposes. The supreme court has the authority to reject federal jurisprudence on this point and to return to the older “substantive” versus “procedural” test that the United States Supreme Court abandoned in Peugh, Miller, and Youngblood. But the wording of the supreme court's decision in Collins III gives no indication that the supreme court intended to depart from current ex post facto jurisprudence — a jurisprudence which, as we have just explained, focuses on the real-world effect of the legislature's changes instead of trying to resolve whether those changes should be labeled “substantive” or “procedural”.

We do, in fact, believe that the legislature's 2013 amendments to the two statutes are more properly categorized as “substantive” — because, in these amendments, the legislature eliminated two of the foundational elements which, up until then, defendants convicted of sexual felonies could plead and prove in order to obtain sentencing relief from the three-judge panel.

But even if the 2013 amendments to AS 12.55.165 and 175 should be characterized as “procedural”, the result in this case would be the same. Retrospective application of the 2013 amendments violates the ex post facto clause because the amendments create a substantial risk that a class of defendants (those convicted of sexual felonies) will receive longer sentences than they would have received under the pre-existing law — that is, under the law as it was stated by this Court in Collins I. The legislature created this risk by restricting the grounds on which these defendants can seek relief from the minimum sentences that are otherwise mandated by our presumptive sentencing laws. We therefore hold that the 2013 amendments cannot be applied retrospectively.

A closer look at how the 2013 session law amended AS 12.55.165 and AS 12.55.175

There is a specified presumptive sentencing range for almost every felony offense codified in Title 11 of the Alaska Statutes — a range that depends on the category of offense, the defendant's prior criminal record, and, in some instances, special circumstances surrounding the crime.

Under AS 12.55.155(a), an individual sentencing judge has a limited authority to impose a sentence below the applicable presumptive range if the defendant proves one or more of the statutory mitigating factors listed in AS 12.55.155(d). But if a defendant wants to rely on a non-statutory mitigating factor (that is, a mitigating factor not listed in AS 12.55.155(d)), the defendant must ask to have their case referred to the statewide three-judge sentencing panel.

One of the two statutes at issue in this case, AS 12.55.165, prescribes the method that a defendant must follow, and the foundational matters that a defendant must prove, if the defendant wants their individual sentencing judge to refer their case to the three-judge sentencing panel because of a non-statutory mitigating factor (such as the two factors that this Court recognized in Collins I). And if the sentencing judge grants the defendant's request for referral to the three-judge panel, the second statute at issue in this case, AS 12.55.175, defines the authority of the three-judge sentencing panel to consider that non-statutory mitigating factor and to impose a sentence outside the normally applicable sentencing range based on the non-statutory mitigator.

More specifically: When a defendant claims that one or more non-statutory mitigating factors would justify the court in sentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment outside the range of sentences that would otherwise be available to the individual sentencing judge, AS 12.55.165 requires the defendant to establish two elements to the satisfaction of the individual sentencing judge. First, the defendant must convince the sentencing judge that the facts of the case do, in fact, establish the existence of one or more non-statutory mitigating factors. And second, the defendant must convince the sentencing judge that “manifest injustice would result from failure to consider [these non-statutory] mitigating factors”.

This “manifest injustice” element means that the defendant must convince the sentencing judge that, because of the non-statutory mitigators, it would be manifestly unjust to fail to make some adjustment, no matter how small, to the range of sentences that would normally apply to the defendant (i.e., the range of sentences available to an individual sentencing judge under the provisions of AS 12.55.155(a)).  ¹⁶

If the individual sentencing judge concludes that the defendant has proved both the “non-statutory mitigator” element and the “manifest injustice” element, then AS 12.55.165 directs the sentencing judge to refer the defendant's case to the three-judge sentencing panel, and the proceedings become governed by AS 12.55.175.

Under subsection (b) of AS 12.55.175, the three-judge panel must independently re-evaluate the sentencing judge's conclusions on these two elements. That is, the defendant must prove these same two elements to the three-judge panel: that one or more non-statutory mitigating factors are present in the defendant's case and that, because of these non-statutory mitigators, it would be manifestly unjust to fail to make some adjustment, no matter how small, to the range of sentences that would otherwise apply to the defendant.

If the three-judge panel concludes that the defendant has established these two elements, then the panel is authorized to impose a sentence outside the normal restrictions of Alaska's presumptive sentencing laws. AS 12.55.175(c), (e)-(g).

So what happened in 2013? The legislature passed a session law that amended AS 12.55.165(c) so that now an individual sentencing judge is barred from referring a case to the three-judge panel on any rationale that rests solely on one or both of the non-statutory mitigating factors that this Court recognized in Collins I.  ¹⁷

Similarly, another provision of the same session law amended AS 12.55.175(f) so that the three-judge sentencing panel can no longer grant sentencing relief to a defendant on any rationale that rests solely on one or both of the Collins non-statutory mitigating factors.  ¹⁸

Why we conclude that the ex post facto clause prohibits retrospective application of the 2013 amendments to AS 12.55.165 and AS 12.55.175

When Collins committed his offense, Alaska's presumptive sentencing law (as construed in Collins I) recognized two non-statutory mitigators that applied specifically to defendants who had been convicted of a sexual felony. These defendants could seek sentencing relief from the three-judge panel if they proved that they did not have a history of unprosecuted sexual offenses or that they had prospects for rehabilitation which, in other offenders, would be considered only “normal” or “good”.

Proof of either or both of these non-statutory mitigators did not guarantee that the defendant would ultimately obtain sentencing relief from the three-judge panel — because, even after proving one or both of these non-statutory mitigators, the defendant still had to prove the second element required by AS 12.55.165 and 175: that, because of the non-statutory mitigator(s), it would be manifestly unjust to fail to adjust the normally applicable sentencing range by some amount, no matter how small.

But proof of either or both of the Collins non-statutory mitigators was legally sufficient to establish the first required element of a request for sentencing relief, and the defendant's proof of this element then required the sentencing court to address and resolve the remaining question under the statute: whether it would be manifestly unjust to fail to adjust the presumptive sentencing range by some amount, even if small, because of the non-statutory mitigating factor(s).

Because the 2013 session law abolished the two non-statutory mitigators that this Court recognized in Collins I, the legislature reduced the range of non-statutory mitigating factors that felony sexual offenders could rely on when asking the three-judge panel for relief — i.e., when asking the three-judge panel to impose a lesser sentence than the minimum sentence otherwise mandated by Alaska's presumptive sentencing statutes.

For defendants like Collins (defendants for whom the two Collins factors are the only non-statutory mitigating factors they can prove), the legislature's action eliminated any possibility that these defendants could obtain a lesser sentence from the three-judge panel. The two Collins factors are now legally insufficient, either singly or in combination, to support an individual judge's decision to refer a defendant's case to the three-judge panel, and they are likewise legally insufficient to support the three-judge panel's decision to grant sentencing relief to a defendant.

In a trilogy of cases — Lindsey v. Washington,  ¹⁹ Weaver v. Graham,  ²⁰ and Miller v. Florida  ²¹ — the United States Supreme Court has held that the ex post facto clause forbids retrospective application of legislation that effectively increases the mandatory minimum sentence for an offense (even if, as a technical matter, the minimum sentence remains unchanged).

The legislature's mechanism for increasing the mandated minimum sentence was different in all three cases. In Lindsey, the legislature effectively converted the pre-existing maximum sentence into a new mandatory sentence, by eliminating a sentencing judge's discretion to impose a lesser sentence.  ²² But in Weaver and Miller, the legislature left the mandatory minimum sentence unchanged; instead, the legislature changed the legal standards for deciding whether defendants would receive or serve the minimum sentence.

In Weaver, the legislature reduced the amount of “gain time” that prisoners earned (what we call “good time” in Alaska), thus effectively increasing the minimum sentence by requiring all defendants to serve a larger portion of their sentences in prison (rather than on supervised parole).  ²³ And in Miller, the legislature altered the formula for calculating the sentencing range for certain sexual offenses by increasing the “primary offense points” assigned to those offenses — thereby putting those offenses in a presumptively higher sentencing range and (all other things being equal) increasing the minimum sentence that might be imposed for those offenses.  ²⁴

When the Supreme Court looked back on the Weaver and Miller decisions in California v. Morales, the Supreme Court summarized those decisions as standing for the rule that the ex post facto clause “forbids the States to enhance the measure of punishment by altering the substantive ‘formula’ used to calculate the applicable sentencing range.” Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505; 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1601; 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995).

Using this same formulation of the rule, the Supreme Court denied relief to the prisoner in Morales because the amended law at issue in that case “left unchanged the substantive formula for securing any reductions to [the applicable] sentencing range.” Morales, 514 U.S. at 507; 115 S. Ct. at 1602.

But in the case before us, the Alaska legislature did change the substantive formula for securing a reduction of the sentencing ranges for sexual felonies. The legislature did this by eliminating two of the pre-existing grounds for seeking a lesser sentence from the three-judge sentencing panel.

We have no doubt that, under existing federal ex post facto jurisprudence, retrospective application of this 2013 session law would be forbidden. But in any event, we hold that retrospective application of the 2013 session law violates the Alaska Constitution's ex post facto clause.

Conclusion

For the reasons explained here, Collins is entitled to file a renewed application for referral of his case to the three-judge sentencing panel — and, in this renewed application, Collins is entitled to rely on the two non-statutory mitigating factors that this Court recognized in Collins I.

We do not retain jurisdiction of this case.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Collins v. State, 287 P.3d 791, 792 (Alaska App. 2012).

2.   AS 12.55.125(i)(1)(A)(ii).

3.   See AS 12.55.175, which establishes a statewide three-judge panel of the superior court and gives this judicial body sole authority to sentence felony defendants outside the limits of the presumptive sentencing range prescribed for their offense.

4.   Collins I, 287 P.3d at 793.

5.   Id. at 796–97.

6.   Id. at 797–99.

7.   SLA 2013, ch. 43, § 1(b)-(c).

8.   SLA 2013, ch. 43, §§ 22–23.

9.   SLA 2013, ch. 43, § 48.

10.   See Collins v. State, 494 P.3d 60, 64 (Alaska App. 2021) (Collins II).

11.   Collins II, 494 P.3d at 70.

12.   Collins III, 568 P.3d at 359; Alaska Public Interest Research Group v. State, 167 P.3d 27, 43 (Alaska 2007); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177; 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

13.   Doe, 189 P.3d at 1004–05.

14.   Id. at 1005.

15.   Doe, 189 P.3d at 1006.

16.   Bossie v. State, 835 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Alaska App. 1992).

17.   SLA 2013, ch. 43, § 22.

18.   SLA 2013, ch. 43, § 23.

19.   301 U.S. 397, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937).

20.   450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981).

21.   482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987).

22.   301 U.S. at 401, 57 S.Ct. at 799.

23.   450 U.S. at 26-27, 31-33; 101 S.Ct. at 962-963, 965-967.

24.   482 U.S. at 433-434, 107 S.Ct. at 2453.

Judge MANNHEIMER.