FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION v. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

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Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW et al., Defendant and Appellant.

No. C010924.

Decided: April 27, 1992

The Office of Administrative Law and Linda Stockdale Brewer (hereafter collectively referred to as the Office) appeal from the trial court's judgment in a declaratory and injunctive relief action brought by the Fair Political Practices Commission (hereafter the Commission). Based upon its interpretation of Government Code section 83112 (hereafter all undesignated section references are to the Government Code), the court found that the Commission was not bound by various post–1974 amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act (hereafter APA). The Office contends that the Commission is bound by all amendments to the APA and that the judgment must be reversed. We shall affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Commission was created when the Political Reform Act (§ 81000 et seq.; hereafter PRA) was adopted by initiative measure approved by the electorate in 1974. (§ 83100.) The PRA attempts to make the political and governmental processes more open and accountable by imposing various restrictions, limitations and disclosure requirements on candidates, office holders and public officials. (See § 81002.)1 The PRA deals with the organization of committees concerned with election matters (§ 84100 et seq.), filing of campaign statements and reports in disclosure of campaign financing (§ 84200 et seq.), limits on campaign contributions (§ 84300 et seq.), registration and reporting of lobbyists (§ 86100 et seq.), conflicts of interest of public officials (§ 87100 et seq.), the content, inspection and printing of ballot pamphlets (§ 88000 et seq.), auditing of lobbyists and candidates (§ 90000 et seq.), enforcement (§ 91000 et seq.), and other more general matters.

The PRA is to be liberally construed and if it is in conflict with any act of the Legislature, the provisions of the PRA are to prevail. (§§ 81003, 81013.) The Legislature's power to amend the PRA is restricted by its terms. Section 81012 provides: “This title may be amended or repealed by the procedures set forth in this section. If any portion of subdivision (a) is declared invalid, then subdivision (b) shall be the exclusive means of amending or repealing this title. [¶] (a) This title may be amended to further its purposes by statute, passed in each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring and signed by the Governor, if at least 12 days prior to passage in each house the bill in its final form has been delivered to the commission for distribution to the news media and to every person who has requested the commission to send copies of such bills to him or her. [¶] (b) This title may be amended or repealed by a statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors.”2

The Commission has primary responsibility for the impartial, effective administration and implementation of the PRA. (§ 83111.) The five members of the Commission serve for fixed four-year terms, are appointed by four different constitutional officers, and no more than three members of the Commission may be members of the same political party. (§§ 83100–83103.)

The Commission is empowered to adopt, amend, and rescind rules and regulations to carry out the purposes and provisions of the PRA. (§ 83112.) According to section 83112, “These rules and regulations shall be adopted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (Government Code, Title 2, Division 3, Part I, Chapter 4.5, Sections 11371 et seq.) and shall be consistent with this title and other applicable law.” (§ 83112.) It is this reference to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA hereafter) in section 83112 that is the crux of this appeal. The Commission contends the reference is to the APA as it existed in 1974 at the time section 83112 and the PRA were enacted, while the Office contends the reference encompasses all subsequent amendments to the APA.

In 1979, the APA was revised by the Legislature, which found there had been an unprecedented growth of unclear and unnecessarily complex administrative regulations and that there was no central office in state government with the power and subd. (c)(1).) Any agency issuing or enforcing guidelines, criteria, bulletins, manuals, instructions, orders, standards of general application or rules meeting the definition of a regulation in section 11342, subdivision (b) was required to adopt such items as regulations pursuant to the APA, and the Office was empowered to issue determinations as to whether the agency's action constituted a regulation which, if not adopted pursuant to the APA, should be invalidated or rendered unenforceable as a result. (§ 11347.5.) The Office was also empowered to repeal an agency's regulation if it believed the regulation lacked supporting statutory authority. (§ 11349.10.)

Chapter 4.5 (§ 11371 et seq.) of the APA, which concerned the procedure for promulgating and adopting administrative regulations, was repealed (Stats.1979, ch. 567 § 2, p. 1793); its provisions were continued in chapter 3.5 (§ 11340 et seq.), which also included the newly added provisions concerning the review of proposed regulations by the Office. (Stats.1979, ch. 567, § 1, pp. 1778–1793 .) The Legislature declared: “Any reference in any statute of this state to Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 11371) of Part 1, Division 3, Title 2 of the Government code shall be deemed to be a reference to Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 11340) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code.” (Stats.1979, ch. 567, § 2, p. 1793, amended by Stats.1980, Ch. 204, § 7, p. 434.)

The Commission took the position that it was not bound by the post–1974 changes to the APA because these amendments in effect amended section 83112 without complying with section 81012, which set forth the exclusive means for amending the PRA. Furthermore, it was the voters' intent that the Commission be politically independent and therefore it should not have its regulations subjected to review by an agency such as the Office that has its director appointed by the governor. (§ 11340.2.) Pursuant to section 81014,3 the Commission promulgated regulation 18312 (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 2, § 18312), which provides in part that the Office shall not review any Commission regulation pursuant to section 11349 or 11349.1 and may not disapprove or repeal any Commission regulation for failure to meet the standards of review set forth in the aforementioned sections.4

According to the Office, it erroneously approved this regulation in 1983. In 1985 it changed its position and began requiring the Commission to comply with the current version of the APA, including compliance with the standards set forth in section 11349.1. (See Cal.Code Regs., tit. 2, § 18312, n. foil.) The Office's position was upheld by the Governor.

On February 23, 1990, the Commission filed its complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Office alleging a dispute existed between the parties concerning the legal validity of California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 18312 and concerning the applicability to the Commission of various post–1974 amendments to the APA. The complaint requested injunctive relief: (1) mandating that the Office comply with title 2, California Code of Regulations, section 18312 in reviewing and processing proposed Commission regulations; (2) preventing the office from complying with section 11347.5 and issuing determinations that any Commission form, manual, instruction, opinion, advice letter or activity is a regulation subject to adoption under the APA; (3) preventing the office from complying with section 11349.10 and repealing any Commission regulation unless the Commission has requested the repeal; and (4) preventing the Office from complying with section 11346.1, subdivision (c) and disapproving any emergency regulations proposed by the Commission on the ground that it had not been adopted unanimously by the Commission.

The trial court found that the reference to the APA in section 83112 was a specific reference and was not intended to include all subsequent amendments to the APA. It ruled that the APA as it existed in 1974 applied to the Commission and enjoined the Office from applying any provision of the APA to the Commission that was inconsistent with the APA as it existed in 1974. It further found, however, that the Commission's regulation 18312 was invalid because it exceeded the Commission's statutory authority due to the regulation's failure to follow the 1974 version of the APA as nearly as possible.

DISCUSSION

The Office contends the trial court erred in construing the reference to the APA in section 83112 to be a specific reference to the version of the APA that existed in 1974 when the PRA was enacted. It contends the Commission is bound by all of the amendments to the rule-making portion of the APA and that to hold otherwise would lead to absurd results.

In interpreting section 83112, we begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task is to determine the lawmakers' intent, and in the case of a provision adopted by the voters, their intent governs. (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798.) The court turns first to the words themselves and if the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the voters. (Ibid .) If possible, significance should be given to every word of an act and a construction that renders a word surplusage should be avoided. (Id. at pp. 798–799.) “ ‘When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear. [Citations.] Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” (Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 659.)

“ ‘Where [statutory language] is susceptible of more than one meaning, it is the duty of the courts to accept that intended by the framers of the legislation, so far as its intention can be ascertained. [Citation.]” (Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 570.) To ascertain the intent of the electorate it is proper to consider the official statements made to the voters in connection with the propositions of law they are requested to approve or reject. (Watson v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1059, 1069.)

The present case involves a reference statute, one that incorporates by reference another statute. “ ‘It is a well established principle of statutory law that, where a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and that the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary. [Citations.] ․ [¶] It also [ ] [must] be noted that there is a cognate rule, recognized as applicable to many cases, to the effect that where the reference is general instead of specific, such as a reference to a system or body of laws or to the general law relating to the subject in hand, the referring statute takes the law or laws referred to not only in their contemporary form, but also as they may be changed from time to time, and ․ as they may be subjected to elimination altogether by repeal. [Citations.]” (Palermo v. Stockton Theaters, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 58–59; Harrington v. Obledo (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 705, 711; 2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed.1992) §§ 51.07–51.08, pp. 189–192.)

For example, the following references have been construed as specific references: “as provided in Sections 12250 and 12850” (People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 957, 958, fn. 3), “for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between the government of the United States and the nation or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject” (Palermo v. Stockton Theaters, Inc., supra, 32 Cal.2d at pp. 58–60), “all provisions of Title IX of the Political Code of the State of California in regard to revenue and taxation” (Rancho Santa Anita v. City of Arcadia (1942) 20 Cal.2d 319, 320–322), “as provided in subdivisions (a) through (f) of Section 853, 6 of the Penal Code” (People v. Domagalski (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1380, 1384–1387), “the provisions of Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title I of Part 3 of the Penal Code [article 2.5] shall apply” (In re Oluwa (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 439, 442, 444–446), and “by reason of the provisions of Section 212(a)(2)(C) or (D) of Public Law 93–66, or Section 1611(e)(1)(A),(2), or (3), 1611(f), or 1615(c) of Title XVI of the Social Security Act.” (Harrington v. Obledo, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at pp. 710–712.)

In contrast, the following references have been found to be general references: “all the provisions of law in force regulating elections” (Kirk v. Rhoads (1873) 46 Cal. 398, 402–403), “as provided by law” (State School Bldg. Fin. Com. v. Betts (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 685, 688, 692–693), and “all the provisions of the State Employees' Retirement Law, as now enacted, or as it may hereafter be amended.” (Firemen's Benevolent Assn. v. City Counsel (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 765.)

Reference statutes should not be construed in a manner that would lead to absurd or unreasonable results. (Palermo v. Stockton Theaters, Inc., supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 60; Ramish v. Hartwell (1899) 126 Cal. 443, 446–448; County of Santa Barbara v. Purcell, Inc. (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 169, 175.) A provision which reads as a specific reference may, in context, be construed as a general reference and vice versa. (Ramish v. Hartwell, supra, 126 Cal. at pp. 446–448 [“by proceedings in all respects the same as are provided by law for the collection of delinquent state and county taxes” interpreted as a specific reference]; County of Santa Barbara v. Purcell, Inc., supra, 251 Cal.App.2d at pp. 173–175 [“in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 838 of the Statutes of 1929, relating to zoning” construed as a general reference]; 2B Sutherland, op. cit. supra, § 51.08, p. 193.) “[W]here it is questionable whether only the original language of a statute is to be incorporated or whether the statutory scheme along with subsequent modifications, is to be incorporated, the determining factor will be the legislative intent behind the incorporating statute.” (People v. Domagalski, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 1386.)

Section 83112 provides: “The Commission may adopt, amend and rescind rules and regulations to carry out the purposes and provisions of this title, and to govern procedures of the Commission. These rules and regulations shall be adopted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (Government Code, Title 2, Division 3, Part 1, Chapter 4.5. Sections 11371 et seq. [ ] ) and shall be consistent with this title and other applicable law.” (Emphasis added.)

At the time section 83112 was enacted in 1974, the APA was comprised of chapter 4 (former §§ 11370–11370.5) concerning the Office of Administrative Hearings, chapter 4.5 (§§ 11371–11445) concerning rules and regulations, and chapter 5 (§§ 11500–11528) concerning administrative adjudications. (See former § 11370.)5 The reference to the APA in section 83112 is not to the entire APA, but to a specific chapter and the sections contained therein. This tends to indicate the reference is a specific one. (Rancho Santa Anita, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 322; In re Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 445–446.)

The office contends the reference is a general one because it refers to the general body of law governing the adoption of administrative regulations. It contends this interpretation is further buttressed by section 9 which provides: “Whenever reference is made to any portion of this code or of any other law of this State, the reference applies to all amendments and additions now or hereafter made.” Section 9 was enacted prior to the PRA and the Office relies on the rule that the electorate is deemed to be aware of existing laws prior to the enactment of a measure. (Larson v. Duca (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 324, 329.) However, section 5 indicates that rules of construction such as section 9 may not apply if the context otherwise requires,6 Other portions of the PRA, such as section 81012, indicate the voters did not intend for amendments to statutes referred to in the PRA to affect the PRA. To the extent section 9 conflicts with section 81012, section 81012 must prevail. (§ 81013.)7

As previously discussed, section 81012 limits the Legislature's power to amend the PRA by setting forth specific procedural requirements. It is unlikely the voters would limit the Legislature's ability to directly amend the PRA, yet intend to embrace without limitation unknown future amendments to other statutes referred to in the PRA which in effect would amend the PRA indirectly. Moreover, we have interpreted section 81012 to mean that amendments to non-PRA statutes that serve to amend the PRA must be amended in conformity with the procedural requirements of section B1012. (Huening v. Eu (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 766, 772–779; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Cory (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 772.) An amendment includes modifications, deletions and additions that affect the application of the original statute. (Huening v. Eu, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 777.) If the post–1974 amendments to the APA are incorporated into section 83112, then the manner in which the Commission is empowered to adopt regulations is changed. At trial, the Office conceded that section 11346.1, subdivision (c)(1)8 of the amended APA should not be applied to the Commission because it operates as an invalid amendment to the PRA. But the same is true of the amended APA's requirement that proposed regulations be submitted to the Office for review and approval. (§§ 11349.1, 11349.3, 11349.6.) Such review of the Commission's regulations was not required by the voters when they endowed the Commission with rule-making authority. No evidence was presented that the Legislature complied with section 81012 when it amended the APA. Hence, the amendments to the APA may not be incorporated into section 83112. (Huening v. Eu, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 778–779; In re Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 445–446.)

Although not determinative since we are concerned with the intent of the voters and not of the Legislature, nevertheless it is interesting to note the Legislature appears to have interpreted all reference statutes referring to the APA in the manner set forth in section 83112 as specific reference statutes, otherwise it would not have been necessary for the Legislature to declare, as it did, that all such references to chapter 4.5 (commencing with § 11371) shall be deemed references to chapter 3.5 (commencing with § 11340). (See Stats.1979, ch. 567, § 2, p. 1793, amended by Stats.1980, ch. 204, § 7, p. 434.) It also appears the Legislature did not find this declaration to be sufficient to amend the reference statutes contained in the PRA, because thereafter it specifically amended section 82002 of the PRA by replacing the reference to chapter 4.5 with a reference to chapter 3.5. (Stats.1991, ch. 491, § 3.)9 Furthermore, it did so in accordance with the procedural requirements of section 81012. (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Senate Bill No. 28 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.).)10 Section 83112 has not been amended similarly.

The Office asserts that since statutes in pari materia must be construed together (Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1988) 46 Cal.3d 736, 744), if section 83112 is construed as a specific reference statute, then Business and Professions Code section 9882, concerning the authority of the chief of the Bureau of Automotive Repair to adopt regulations; Business and Professions Code section 19034.5, concerning the authority of the chief of the Bureau of Home Furnishings to adopt regulations; Corporations Code section 25614 concerning the authority of the commissioner of the Department of Corporations to adopt regulations; Labor Code section 55, concerning the authority of the director of the Department of Industrial Relations to adopt regulations; Vehicle Code section 1651 concerning the authority of the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles to adopt regulations, and Welfare and Institutions Code section 14124.5, subdivision (a), concerning the authority of the director of the Department of Health Services to adopt regulations must also be interpreted as specific reference statutes because they contain similar references to the APA. This would mean that many different agencies, and not just the Commission, would be subject to many different versions of the APA, depending upon the date of enactment of the statutes empowering the agencies to adopt regulations. This would cause much confusion. Hence, section 83112 must be interpreted as a general reference statute to avoid such an absurd and cumbersome result.

The Office's contention, however, overlooks the effect of section 81012, which limits the way in which the PRA may be amended. We have not found in the pertinent portions of the codes cited by the Office any statutes similar to section 81012. Consequently, there is nothing to prevent the previously mentioned legislative declaration from updating the reference statutes that refer to the rule-making portion of the APA under its old chapter number. Furthermore, there is no hindrance to the implementation of Business and Professions Code section 12, Corporations Code section 9, Labor Code section 9, Vehicle Code section 10 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 9, which all contain provisions similar to Government Code section 9 and would thus serve to incorporate the amendments to the APA into the code sections cited by the Office. (See also § 9604 .)11 Under the circumstances, the Office has failed to demonstrate that the interpretation of section 83112 as a specific reference statute would lead to an absurd result by forcing an identical interpretation of all the above noted statutes.

The Office also contends that section 81014 (see fn. 3, ante ), which gives the Commission the authority to promulgate regulations in response to amendments to statutes referred to in the PRA, indicates the voters intended the reference statutes in the PRA, including section 83112, to be general reference statutes. The Office argues that if the reference statutes were specific reference statutes, section 81014 would have no meaning as the amendments would not apply and the Commission would have no need to make regulations to address the changes caused by the amendments.

But this interpretation of section 81014 also demonstrates the voters did not wish the Commission to bound by such amendments, else why would the voters give the Commission the power to make regulations to carry out the intent of the PRA in response to the amendments? Furthermore, the Office overlooks an alternate interpretation of section 81014, which is that if the statutes referred to in the PRA's reference statutes are amended, the Commission is given the authority to make regulations to incorporate the amendments (which would not apply otherwise) to the extent the amendments would further the intent of the PRA.

Our review discloses that section 83112 is a specific reference statute and that the post–1974 amendments to the APA do not, and will not, apply to the Commission absent an amendment of section 83112 in compliance with the procedure set forth in section 81012.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

I concur in the judgment but would resolve the case by application of the provisions of Government Code section 81014.

The majority opinion poses the question as whether “the trial court erred in construing the reference to the APA in [Government Code] section 8 3112 to be a specific reference to the version of the APA that existed in 1974 when the PRA was enacted.” (Typed opn ., at p. 10.) So posed, the opinion looks to the generalized law relating to specific versus general references to statutes. That misses the point of section 81014 pursuant to which the Commission acted in this case.

Section 83112 provides that the Commission's “rules and regulations shall be adopted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act [to wit, Chapter 4.5 thereof] and shall be consistent with this title and other applicable law.” In 1979 Chapter 4.5 was replaced with Chapter 3.5 and the regulation process made subject to the oversight powers of the Office of Administrative Law. Thereafter the Commission adopted a regulation, section 18312, which provides that it comply with all the procedures and requirements of the APA except emergency regulations and except for the provisions empowering the Office of Administrative Law to exercise supervisorial powers over the Commission's regulatory product.

The issue, as set out at page 8 of the opinion, is whether the Commission “erroneously approved this regulation in 1983,” That question subsumes the specific reference question which is made the subject of the majority opinion, but places it within the provisions of section 81014. That section provides that “[w]henever any reference is made in this title to a federal or state statute and that statute has been or is subsequently repealed or amended, the Commission may promulgate regulations to carry out the intent of this title as nearly as possible.” This section explicitly governs the case in which a referenced statute is repealed or amended. The question is not whether some generalized law of specific versus general reference applies but whether the Commission properly exercised its powers under this section in adopting the regulation at issue.

Section 81014 assumes that the baseline is the referenced law as it existed when the CPA was enacted. Why otherwise would there be a need for regulations “to carry out the intent of this title [the PRA] as nearly as possible” in place of the, “subsequently repealed or amended” statute referenced by the CPA. The manifest purpose of section 81014 is to provide a baseline for the referenced statute and an administrative mechanism for dealing with subsequent change. That avoids the problem of freezing the law in some way that makes no sense after repeal or amendment of the referenced law.

The majority opinion places almost exclusive reliance upon section 81012 of the CPA which specifies the method of statutory amendment of the CPA. It cannot do the work it is called upon to perform. If the reference to the APA were general, no amendment of the CPA would be necessary. It would have provided for that eventuality. For that reason the majority opinion assumes the answer to the question it poses.

The better analysis lies along the lines plumbed by section 81014, which addresses the question what is to happen if the referenced statute is repealed or amended. It shortly follows the amendment provisions §§ 81012) upon which the majority opinion relies for its PRA policy. It expressly says that the “Commission may promulgate regulations to carry out the intent of this title as nearly as possible.” The Commission did so and the remaining question is whether what it did carries out the intent of the CPA. I answer that question affirmatively.

FOOTNOTES

1.  Section 81002 states as follows: “The people enact this title to accomplish the following purposes: [¶] (a) Receipts and expenditures in election campaigns should be fully and truthfully disclosed in order that the voters may be fully informed and improper practices may be inhibited. [¶] (b) The activities of lobbyists should be regulated and their finances disclosed in order that improper influences will not be directed at public officials. [¶] (c) Assets and income of public officials which may be materially affected by their official actions should be disclosed and in appropriate circumstances the officials should be disqualified from acting in order that conflicts of interest may be avoided. [¶] (d) The state ballot pamphlet should be converted into a useful document so that voters will not be entirely dependent on paid advertising for information regarding state measures. [¶] (e) Laws and practices unfairly favoring incumbents should be abolished in order that elections may be conducted more fairly. [¶] (f) Adequate enforcement mechanisms should be provided to public officials and private citizens in order that this title will be vigorously enforced.”

2.  Originally, section 81012 contained a 40–day waiting period prior to passage in each house. It was amended in 1976 to reduce the waiting period to 20 days. (Stats.1976, ch. 883, § 1, p.2025.) It was amended again in 1985 to reduce the waiting period to 12 days. (Stats.1985, ch. 1200, § 1, p. 4064.)

3.  Section 81014 of the PRA provides: “Whenever any reference is made in this title to a federal or state statute and that statute has been or is subsequently repealed or amended, the Commission may promulgate regulations to carry out the intent of this title as nearly as possible.”

4.  Title 2, California Code of Regulations, section 18312 provides: “(a) Whenever the Commission adopts any regulation, or adopts an emergency amendment or order of repeal to an existing regulation, it shall comply with all the procedures and requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act except that: [¶] (1) Government Code Sections 11346.1(c) (first paragraph) and (h) shall not apply to the adoption of any emergency regulation, amendment or order of repeal by the Commission; and [¶] (2) The Office of Administrative Law shall not, pursuant to Government code Section 11349.6, review any emergency regulation, amendment or order of repeal adopted by the Commission for compliance with, or order the repeal of or disapprove any such emergency regulation or order of repeal for failure to comply with, the standards set forth in Section 11349.1, or the requirement of Section 11346.1(b) that the emergency regulation or repeal be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety or general welfare. [¶] (b) When the Commission submits a regulation or amendment, including an emergency regulation, or a repeal of a regulation, to the Office of Administrative Law, that office shall file the regulation, amendment or emergency regulation promptly with the Secretary of State if the record shows that the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act have been met. The Office of Administrative Law shall not review any Commission regulation, amendment, or any emergency regulation pursuant to Government Code Section 11349 or the standards of review set forth in Government Code Section 11349.1, and may not disapprove or repeal any Commission regulation or amendment, or any emergency regulation for failure to meet the standards of review set forth in Government Code Sections 11349 or 11349.1.[¶] (c) Government Code Sections 11349.7(g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m) shall not apply to the Commission, [¶] (d) The Commission shall comply with the provisions of Government Code Section 11017.6 for informational purposes only. Failure to include a regulation on the rulemaking calendar shall not preclude the Commission from adopting, amending or repealing the regulation.”

5.  Prior to its amendment in 1981, section 11370 provided: “Chapter 4, Chapter 4.5 and Chapter 5 of this part of the Government Code constitute, and may be cited as, the Administrative Procedure Act. (Stats.1961, ch.2048, § 2, p. 4267.)

6.  Section 5 provides: “Unless the provision or the context otherwise requires, these general provisions, rules of construction, and definitions shall govern the construction of this code.”

7.  Section 81013 provides in part: “If any act of the Legislature conflicts with the provisions of this title, this title shall prevail.”

8.  Section 11346.1, subdivision (c)(1) provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, no board or commission shall have the power to adopt an emergency regulation to interpret, implement, or make specific provisions of the law relating to campaign disclosure except by a unanimous vote of all members of such board or commission present at the proceeding at which such regulation is adopted.”

9.  Prior to its amendment, section 82002 provided: “Administrative action means the proposal, drafting, development, consideration, amendment, enactment or defeat by any state agency of any rule, regulation or other action in any rate-making proceeding or any quasi-legislative proceeding, which shall include any proceeding governed by Chapter 4.5 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code (beginning with Section 11371). (Emphasis added.) The underlined portion was amended to read “Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 11340) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2.”

10.  The Legislative Counsel's Digest of Senate Bill No. 28 states: “The Political Reform Act of 1974, an initiative measure, provides that the Legislature may amend the act to further the act's purposes with a 2/3 vote of each house and compliance with specified procedural requirements. [¶] This bill, which would declare that it furthers the purposes of the act, would therefore require a 2/3 vote,”

11.  Section 9604 provides: “When the provisions of one statute are carried into another statute under circumstances in which they are required to be construed as restatements and continuations and not as new enactments, any reference made by any statute, charter or ordinance to such provisions shall, unless a contrary intent appears, be deemed a reference to the restatements and continuations .”

MARLER, J.

I concur: DAVIS, J.

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