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Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

IN RE: AARON H., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AARON H., Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 42608.

Decided: May 13, 1983

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, and Thomas Stanley, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendant and appellant. John K. Van De Kamp, Atty. Gen., Howard J. Schwab and Beverly K. Falk, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Aaron C.H., a minor, appeals the order continuing his wardship (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602) entered following his admission that he committed second degree burglary (Pen.Code, § 459).   He contends:  “The warrantless arrest of appellant was illegal under People v. Ramey [ (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333] because he did not voluntarily leave his house but merely submitted to the police officer's demand.”

 Before turning to a consideration of the present enigmatic record, we overcome the sense of futility that surrounds such efforts and once again urge all trial courts when proceeding under Welfare & Institutions Code section 700.1 or Penal Code section 1538.5 to require that counsel at least identify the “tangible or intangible things” they seek to suppress and to give some hint how such items could possibly be deemed to be the fruit of some particular official misdeed.  (See People v. Manning (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 586, 601, 109 Cal.Rptr. 531.)   For these purposes the boilerplate “Notice of Motion to Suppress” presently utilized by the Office of the Los Angeles County Public Defender (attached hereto as an exhibit) is utterly useless and should be abandoned.

 For all that appears in our present record, the defense theory both below and on appeal rests upon the assumption that an adult or a minor who has been illegally detained or arrested gains total immunity from criminal prosecution or a wardship proceeding.   Such, of course, is not the law.   In this respect the observations made more than a quarter of a century ago by our Supreme Court in People v. Valenti (1957) 49 Cal.2d 199, 203, 316 P.2d 633, are equally apposite today:

“[W]e know of no decision by any court of appellate jurisdiction in this state which holds or even suggests that when a defendant is illegally arrested for a public offense the illegality of the arrest permeates subsequent proceedings by which he is formally charged with the offense and tried on the formal charge.   This court's holdings as to and discussions of the problems of illegal arrests, searches, and seizures (in the series of cases which began with People v. Cahan (1955), 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905] ․) have been carefully limited to the view that evidence obtained by such unconstitutional means is inadmissible at the trial (People v. Cahan, supra, p. 444 of 44 Cal.2d [282 P.2d 905];  People v. Berger (1955), 44 Cal.2d 459, 462 [282 P.2d 509] ․) and incompetent to support an accusatory pleading (Badillo v. Superior Court (1956), 46 Cal.2d 269, 271 [294 P.2d 23] ․).  If the illegally obtained evidence is received at the trial and effects a miscarriage of justice a judgment of conviction will be reversed on appeal.  (People v. Tarantino (1955), 45 Cal.2d 590, 595, 597 [290 P.2d 505] ․ [judgment of conviction affirmed on count as to which admission of illegally obtained evidence was not prejudicial, reversed on counts as to which admission of such evidence was prejudicial].)  If the illegally obtained evidence is the sole basis of an indictment or information, defendant is held without reasonable or probable cause;  his motion to set aside the accusatory pleading should be granted by the court in which he is arraigned on such pleading;  and if the motion is improperly denied an appellate court will grant prohibition to halt proceedings under the accusatory pleading.  (Badillo v. Superior Court (1956), supra, 46 Cal.2d 269, 271 [294 P.2d 23].)  But a defendant who has been subjected to illegal arrest, search, or seizure should not, by virtue of such illegality, gain immunity from punishment for the offense for which he was arrested or which was disclosed by the search.”  (See also People v. Richards (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 510, 514, 140 Cal.Rptr. 158;  People v. Schindler (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 369, 373, 100 Cal.Rptr. 110.)

 Moreover, even a formal violation of the rule enunciated in People v. Ramey, supra, would not necessarily lead to the suppression of such intangible items as a subsequent confession.  (Cf. In re Reginald B. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 398, 404, 139 Cal.Rptr. 465.)   In sum, absent some knowledge of the objectives of a suppression motion, rational evaluation thereof is virtually impossible.

 On December 4, 1981, Los Angeles Police Officer Curt Wilson was aware that one, Carl D., had admitted that he and appellant had burglarized Pierce College and that appellant's fingerprints had been found at the scene.   He, therefore, drove to appellant's residence and knocked on the door.   When appellant responded, Officer Wilson identified himself and stated, “ ‘I'm here to arrest you for burglary.’ ”  “ ‘Would you prefer to come outside or do you want us to come in?’ ”   Appellant stepped out, shut the door behind him and was formally taken into custody while standing outside.

Under such circumstances appellant's reliance upon Ramey is wholly misplaced.   That decision merely holds that without a search warrant a police officer may not enter a person's home without his consent in order to effect his arrest.   Here there simply was no entry into appellant's home and his arrest outside was entirely proper.

 As the trial court correctly observed, if appellant had “invited” the officers to consummate his arrest within his residence a question might have arisen concerning whether or not any evidence observed and seized therein would have been subject to suppression on the thought that such “invitation” had not been truly voluntary.  (See generally In re Danny E. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 44, 51, 174 Cal.Rptr. 123;  People v. Tillery (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 975, 979–980, 160 Cal.Rptr. 650.)   However, since here no entry was ever made such considerations never arose.   An arrestee's “consent” to his arrest itself is never a necessary prerequisite to its effectuation so long as such action does not require an invasion of a residence.   Furthermore, even if the question were a relevant one, the trier of fact's finding that appellant decided to exit his house voluntarily is adequately supported by the record.

The order continuing wardship is affirmed.

GATES, Associate Justice.

ROTH, P.J., and COMPTON, J., concur.

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