Skip to main content

PEOPLE v. CORONA

Reset A A Font size: Print

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF the COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, Respondent; Juan Vallejo CORONA, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 47216.

Decided: September 15, 1980

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Arthur G. Scotland, J. Robert Jibson, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, H. Ted Hansen, Sutter County Dist. Atty., Ron W. Fahey, Roger W. Pierucci, Sp. Prosecutors, Mark L. Musto, Alameda, for petitioner. Terence K. Hallinan, Michael A. Mendelson, Isaiah B. Roter, San Francisco, Roy J. Van Den Heuvel, Yuba City, for real party in interest.

After the trial court denied and granted in part defendant Corona's motion to suppress certain evidence, both defendant and the People, claiming error, petitioned for relief through mandamus. We denied Corona's petition, but the Supreme Court stayed trial pending hearing on the People's petition. We now deny the People's petition, thus upholding the trial court's findings and permitting the matter to proceed to trial.

Procedural Background. On January 18, 1973, defendant was found guilty and convicted of 25 counts of first degree murder. On May 8, 1978, Division Two of this court set the conviction aside because of inadequate legal representation and conflict of interest on the part of defendant's original trial counsel. (People v. Corona (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 684, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894.) The factual background of the case is fully set forth in that opinion (id., at pp. 693-701, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894), and need not be repeated here. The court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kane, found that “trial counsel in gross neglect of his basic duty, failed to conduct the requisite factual and legal investigation in an effort to develop fundamental defenses available for his client and as a result of his neglect, crucial defenses were withdrawn from the case” (id., at p. 706, 145 Cal.Rptr. at p. 906), thus warranting reversal on the basis of the then-prevailing standard of incompetency (People v. Ibarra (1963) 60 Cal.2d 460, 464, 34 Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487). In addition, and as independent grounds for reversal, the court determined that Corona's trial counsel, by obtaining and exploiting literary and dramatic rights to Corona's life story “created a situation which prevented him from devoting the requisite undivided loyalty and service to his client. From that moment on, trial counsel was devoted to two masters with conflicting interests he was forced to choose between his own pocketbook and the best interests of his client, the accused.” (80 Cal.App.3d at p. 720, 145 Cal.Rptr. at p. 915.) Without deciding whether such a conflict of interest was sufficient in itself to demonstrate denial of the right to effective representation as a matter of law, or whether a showing of actual prejudice was required, the court held that the case met both criteria, and that trial counsel's conduct “constituted not only an outrageous abrogation of the standards which the legal profession has set for itself and upon which clients have a right to rely, but also rendered the trial a farce and mockery calling for reversal of the conviction and requiring a new trial.” (Id., at p. 727, 145 Cal.Rptr. at p. 920.)

The court concluded its opinion by considering several issues relating to the new trial which was to take place. Of these, only one is relevant here. In a proceeding under Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress certain evidence, the trial court had refused to permit defendant's counsel to call witnesses for the purpose of challenging the accuracy of information contained in affidavits supporting various search warrants. Justice Kane's opinion found this to be error under Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 100-101, 104 Cal.Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234, but due to the unavailability of a transcript of the suppression hearing it could not be determined whether the error was prejudicial. The opinion states: “If, on retrial, appellant offers evidence to challenge the factual allegations of the affidavits supporting the search warrants, the court should proceed in accordance with the precepts enunciated in Theodor and as expressed herein.” (80 Cal.App.3d at p. 729, 145 Cal.Rptr. at p. 921.)

On March 28, 1979, Corona's present attorneys noticed a motion to suppress all evidence seized under six search warrants. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain a second Penal Code section 1538.5 motion, but only to hear a Theodor motion as mandated by Justice Kane's opinion. Corona's attorneys countered that certain significant arguments had not been made at the original 1538.5 motion, and that prior counsel's incompetency and conflict of interest had prevented full determination at that time.

Judge Patton, a distinguished and experienced jurist who tried the original case, presided at the new hearings which began April 25, 1979. At first, he expressed doubt about the propriety of hearing the issues sought to be presented by Corona's attorneys, but reserved judgment on that question and insisted on hearing the mandated Theodor aspects first. After doing so, however, he decided that the hearing would encompass all issues raised.

Almost 9 court days were required to hear the matter, in the course of which 25 witnesses were sworn and testified. At the conclusion of the hearing the court issued a 44-page written opinion suppressing part of the evidence seized under the first warrant on the ground that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to search a specific building, and all of the evidence seized under the second warrant on the ground that the warrant was overly broad. The People stipulated that no evidence seized under the third through sixth warrants would be used. Consequently the validity of those warrants was not considered, and is not an issue here.

1. The trial court had jurisdiction to hear Corona's 1538.5 motion on the validity of the search warrants.

Petitioner contends that in view of the earlier (1972) proceedings the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear a full-blown 1538.5 motion on the validity of the warrants. Petitioner relies on People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177, 605 P.2d 1306; Madril v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 73, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33; People v. Williams (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 40, 155 Cal.Rptr. 414; and People v. Superior Court (Green) (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 477, 89 Cal.Rptr. 223.

In Brooks, the court held that a trial court has jurisdiction to hear a second 1538.5 motion on the grounds presented in the first motion but not reached by the trial court when it granted the motion on other grounds. (26 Cal.3d at p. 474, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177, 605 P.2d 1306.) It based its decision on defendant's lack of opportunity for a “full determination” of the merits of his motion as originally made and noticed. In Madril, the court held that section 1538.5 does not confer jurisdiction upon a trial court, having once granted a defendant's suppression motion, to reconsider it prior to trial. (15 Cal.3d at p. 75, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33.) Green was to the same effect, and its reasoning was approved in Madril. (Id., at p. 77, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33.) Brooks distinguished both Madril and Green as presenting situations “in which a party . . . sought review or reconsideration of an adverse ruling rendered after a complete hearing on the search and seizure issues.” (26 Cal.3d at p. 478, 162 Cal.Rptr. at p. 180, 605 P.2d at p. 1309.) In both cases, the court noted, “the second hearings were properly characterized as relitigation of matters that the parties had opportunity to fully air in the first hearings.” (Ibid.)

None of the cases cited by either party involved a trial court's jurisdiction to entertain a second suppression hearing after a conviction is reversed on grounds of constitutional denial of effective counsel. (Cf. People v. Dorsey (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 70, 73, 109 Cal.Rptr. 712 (overruled on other grounds, Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602, 119 Cal.Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086).) It seems obvious, however, that if the ineffectiveness of counsel infected the first suppression hearing, the defendant cannot be said to have had opportunity for “full determination” within the meaning of Brooks.

As Justice Kane's opinion noted (People v. Corona, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 720, 145 Cal.Rptr. at p. 915) the constitutional right to effective counsel “includes the requirement that the services of the attorney be devoted solely to the interest of his client undiminished by conflicting considerations. (Citations.)” And, as that opinion observed, “some cases take the view that a conflict of interest is so inherently conducive to divided loyalties as to amount to a denial of the right to effective representation as a matter of law.” (Ibid.) By that view the conflict of interest found to exist on the part of Corona's original counsel necessarily involved denial of the right to effective representation in all of the original proceedings, not just the trial itself, and by itself would warrant the determination that Corona should be entitled to assert anew his constitutional rights under section 1538.5.

Justice Kane's opinion also noted an alternative view, that the defendant “must affirmatively establish that he has suffered some actual prejudice” resulting from the conflict (ibid.), but refrained from deciding which view was correct. Rather, the opinion stated that the case met both criteria (ibid.), and went on to discuss specific examples of prejudice as demonstrated by the record. While trial counsel's performance at the suppression hearing was not among the examples given, that omission is perhaps explainable by the fact (as the court noted) that no transcript of the suppression hearing was available.

If there is a general requirement that prejudice be shown from conflict in interest, perhaps that requirement ought not to apply in a situation such as this where the defendant is hampered in presenting evidence as to what occurred in the original proceeding by the absence of any transcript thereof. Justice Kane in his opinion makes reference to unsuccessful efforts by the court to acquire “this important transcript,” and to the consequent impossibility of determining whether denial of a hearing on defendant's Theodor motion constituted prejudicial error. (People v. Corona, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at pp. 728-729, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894.) We can only speculate as to the reasons for the absence of such a transcript,1 but whatever the reason the result is defendant is deprived of the best evidence as to what actually occurred.

But assuming that a finding of prejudice is necessary, it was in fact made. Judge Patton expressly determined in the proceedings after remand that Corona's trial counsel “had not fully and adequately represented (Corona) in reference to the search warrants and that the entire matter should be reviewed.” Moreover, the finding was amply supported under all the circumstances. The nature of trial counsel's conflict of interest was such that his economic interests were likely to be served by proceeding to trial with all the lurid evidence that the prosecutor could produce, rather than attempt to exclude legally inadmissible evidence on the basis of “technical” assertions of constitutional right.2 The hearing on the original suppression motion together with hearing on various discovery motions lasted only a total of 4 hours and 35 minutes, and the points and authorities filed by original counsel for Corona did not address themselves to the particular issues which were advanced at the second hearing and which formed the basis for the rulings complained of.3 Judge Patton, of course, was in a position to know what occurred at the first hearing, since he conducted it; and while it would have been preferable from the standpoint of appellate review for the record to reflect more precisely the basis for his determination that Corona's interests were not then fully and adequately represented, the constitutional rights at stake require that we give considerable weight to his view of the matter. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear Corona's 1538.5 motion on the validity of the search warrants due to the effective denial of any meaningful opportunity for a full determination of the merits. We conclude also that Judge Patton did not abuse his discretion in deciding to hear the matter fully, a decision grounded in part upon considerations of fundamental fairness with which we agree.4

2. The trial court did not err in granting Corona's suppression motion as to part of the evidence seized under the first warrant.

The first warrant authorized the search of various premises and vehicles, and the trial court denied the suppression motion as to all of these except for one item, not in dispute here, and evidence seized in the building at the Sullivan Ranch described in the warrant as a “single family residence dwelling located fartherest (sic) to the north in the complex of buildings known as the J. L. Sullivan Ranch.” The trial court found that the affidavits for the warrant were constitutionally inadequate, and we agree.

Probable cause to search is established when an affidavit states facts which make it substantially probable that there is specific property lawfully subject to seizure presently located in the particular place for which the warrant is sought. (People v. Cook (1978) 22 Cal.3d 67, 84, fn. 6, 148 Cal.Rptr. 605, 583 P.2d 130.) In making this determination all of the facts and circumstances of the case must be considered (People v. Superior Court (Kiefer) (1970) 3 Cal.3d 807, 827, 91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449); the affidavit must be interpreted in a nontechnical and commonsense manner (People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 704, 711, 100 Cal.Rptr. 319, 493 P.2d 1183); and marginal cases should be determined by the preference for warrants (ibid.). The magistrate's action in issuing the warrant may be set aside only if the affidavit, as a matter of law, does not establish probable cause. (People v. Superior Court (Bingham) (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 463, 470, 154 Cal.Rptr. 157; Skelton v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 144, 150, 81 Cal.Rptr. 613, 460 P.2d 485.)

Here, the issue is whether Corona's connection with the “mess hall,” as described in the affidavits, was such as to make it probable that he had stored or secreted items named in the search warrant there. (See People v. Superior Court (Brown) (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 160, 167, 122 Cal.Rptr. 459; Frazzini v. Superior Court (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1014, 87 Cal.Rptr. 32; see also LaFave, Search and Seizure (1978) s 3.2, pp. 486-490.) It would serve no useful purpose to summarize in detail all of the facts recited in the various affidavits.5 It is sufficient to observe, as did the trial court, that so far as appeared from the affidavits, Corona's connection to the mess hall building consisted (1) of his status as a labor contractor at Sullivan Ranch, and (2) of the fact that his vehicle was seen parked near the building for 15 minutes on the night of the day that 8 bodies were discovered buried on the ranch property, along the banks of the Feather River. We are cited to no authority finding probable cause on such a flimsy basis. Petitioner claims the magistrate could infer that Corona, as labor contractor, had “access” to the building described in the affidavit (though erroneously) as a single-family residence on the ranch; but that theory is patently overbroad, as it would justify a search of every place (including people's homes) to which Corona inferentially had access during the period the homicides were believed to have been committed. Under applicable principles of review, we are bound to accept such findings when supported by substantial evidence, as here. (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160, 107 Cal.Rptr. 13, 507 P.2d 621.)

3. The trial court did not err in finding that the second search warrant was overbroad.

The trial court found the second search warrant void, on its face, for overbreadth. The second search warrant authorized the seizure of the following property:

a. An adding machine, check stubs, payroll records, adding machine tapes, cancelled checks, bank statements, bank records;

b. Documents bearing the names of Paul Allen (and 33 additionally named persons);

c. Documents showing that Juan Corona hired or had personal or financial dealings with any of the name persons;

d. The body or bodies of any deceased human being or beings:

e. The personal effects of any of the aforementioned persons;

f. Bloodstained clothing, evidence of human blood, or body fragments, bone fragments and hair;

g. Any evidence of the violent death of a human being by cutting, hacking or stabbing.

The return to the second warrant lists the following items:

1. A four-drawer filing cabinet (from the Richland Road address);

2. An adding machine (from the Sullivan Ranch camp dining room (mess hall) office);

3. A receipt holder (from mess hall);

4. An ink pen with six different colored ink fillers (from mess hall);

5. A checkbook binder (from mess hall);

6. A paymaster check protector (from mess hall);

7. A well-worn whetstone (from mess hall);

8. A rent receipt (from P Street address).

The trial court found the warrant overbroad because “a consideration of the totality of the authorization under this warrant readily convinces the court that it is overbroad; it contains no limitation or description of the articles to be seized and is therefore unreasonable under the warrant clause of the United States and California Constitutions. Note, particularly, the first category; it permits the seizure of voluminous financial records without regard to the person with whom the transactions had occurred or the date or dates of the transaction. There is no meaningful description or limitation.”6

Petitioner contends that the warrant was not overbroad, that the requirement of particularity should be relaxed when exigent circumstances are present, and that any invalid portions of the warrant should be excised so as to preserve the permissible seizures.

Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 13 of our state Constitution require that a warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. (Burrows v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 238, 249, 118 Cal.Rptr. 166, 529 P.2d 590.) The requirement of particularity is designed to prevent general exploratory searches which unreasonably interfere with a person's right to privacy. (Marron v. United States (1927) 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231.) The Penal Code demands reasonable particularity (Pen.Code, s 1529), and this requirement is held to be satisfied if the warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized. (People v. Tenney (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 16, 22, 101 Cal.Rptr. 419 (overruled on other grounds, People v. Leib (1976) 16 Cal.3d 869, 875, 129 Cal.Rptr. 433, 548 P.2d 1105); People v. Alvarado, (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 285, 291, 62 Cal.Rptr. 891; People v. Barthel (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 827, 832, 42 Cal.Rptr. 290.)

Whether the description in the warrant is sufficiently definite is a question of law on which the appellate court makes an independent judgment. (People v. Murray (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 305, 308, 143 Cal.Rptr. 502; Thompson v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 101, 108, 138 Cal.Rptr. 603.) A ruling on the warrant's sufficiency must be limited to the four corners of the warrant. (People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 69, 75, 143 Cal.Rptr. 382 (overruled on other grounds, People v. Superior Court (Meyers) (1979) 25 Cal.3d 67, 76-77, fn. 9, 157 Cal.Rptr. 716, 598 P.2d 877); Thompson v. Superior Court, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 112, 138 Cal.Rptr. 603.)

As commentators have recognized, warrants which authorize seizure of instrumentalities and evidence of a crime present the most difficult problems concerning precision in the descriptions. (See LaFave, Search and Seizure, supra, s 4.6(d), pp. 104-109.) To some extent, the nature and complexity of the crime can be considered in deciding whether the warrant was sufficiently precise in its identification of the items to be seized. (Andresen v. Maryland (1976) 427 U.S. 463, 480, fn. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2748, fn. 10, 49 L.Ed.2d 627; People v. Barthel, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at p. 832, 42 Cal.Rptr. 290; People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809, 831-832, 153 Cal.Rptr. 89.)7

Under any standard, it is clear that the first category of items listed above was grossly overboard and placed no limitation whatsoever on the seizure. Items 1-3 and 5-6 were seized pursuant to this category, and were properly suppressed. Of the remaining items, the only one which petitioner claims to have been seized pursuant to the warrant was the whetstone (item 7). But even if it could be described as “evidence of the violent death of a human being by cutting, hacking or stabbing,” it was seized from the mess hall, as to which no probable cause for search existed.

This leaves the rent receipt and the six-color pen. While petitioner argues that the rent receipt was seized pursuant to consent, the trial court found otherwise, and its finding is amply supported by the evidence. The seizing officer testified, and the return to the warrant showed, that it was seized pursuant to the warrant, and the warrant provided no basis for that seizure.

Petitioner seeks to sustain seizure of the six-color pen on the alternative basis of the “plain sight” exception to the warrant requirement (People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 762, 117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1 (overruled on other grounds, People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, fn. 5, 135 Cal.Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872); Skelton v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d 144, 157, 81 Cal.Rptr. 613, 460 P.2d 485), but that exception applies only when the officer is lawfully in a place where he had the right to be (ibid.). Since the pen was seized from the mess hall that exception does not apply. Sternberg v. Superior Court (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 281, 289, 115 Cal.Rptr. 893, upon which petitioner relies, does not provide a means for bypassing that limitation; it held simply that the failure of the magistrate to sign a warrant did not necessarily affect its validity.

We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain defendant's suppression motion de novo ; that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so; and that its decision to suppress the evidence discussed above was in accordance with applicable principles. Accordingly, the peremptory writ will be denied and the alternative writ discharged.

FOOTNOTES

1.  Defendant suggests trial counsel may have sought to conceal his lack of diligence in the matter.

2.  Corona's new counsel made an offer of proof that prior counsel's investigator would testify that prior counsel noted the alleged deficiencies in the warrants but said he would eschew challenging them to avoid the appearance of trying to win on a technicality. Evidence to that effect, however, was not actually introduced. Judge Patton remarked at the time that such evidence would “weigh heavily” when he decided how to proceed, and the People urge us to conclude that he relied improperly upon evidence that was not made a part of the record, but we are not prepared to indulge in that presumption.

3.  Nearly a year after this petition was filed, petitioner requested that we take judicial notice of certain records in Corona's prior appeal and habeas corpus proceeding. (See Evid.Code, ss 452, 459; People v. Preslie (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 486, 493, 138 Cal.Rptr. 828.) We have reviewed those records and find them immaterial to the issues before us.

4.  An alternative basis for jurisdiction, not argued by the parties, is the explicit remand by Division Two of this court for hearing and determination of the Theodor issues. Theodor calls for excision from a warrant affidavit of demonstrably false statements which the affiant had no reasonable basis for believing to be true, and a determination of probable cause based on the remaining, truthful portion. (Theodor v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 100-101, 104 Cal.Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234.) Thus, the trial court necessarily had jurisdiction to redetermine probable cause.

5.  See People v. Corona, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at pp. 693-701, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894, for description of the factual setting.

6.  The court also based its suppression of items seized pursuant to the second warrant on a lack of probable cause to search a residence owned by defendant and occupied by his brother-in-law and wife, and a lack of probable cause to search Sullivan Ranch buildings, a finding that the Sullivan Ranch search was a fruit of the impermissible search pursuant to the first warrant, and overbreadth.

7.  The appellate courts of this state have found the following descriptions of property to be constitutionally defective: “ ‘all books, records, accounts and bank statements and cancelled checks of the receipt and disbursement of money’ ” without regard to the participants in or dates of the transactions (Burrows v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 241, 249-250, 118 Cal.Rptr. at pp. 168, 529 P.2d at p. 592); a listing of numerous documents by general categories, such as “ ‘(c)hecks, check stubs . . . and bank statements' ” followed by “ ‘any and all other records and paraphernalia’ ” connected with the suspect's business (Aday v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 789, 793, 795-796, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415, 417, 419, 362 P.2d 47, 49, 51); “ ‘certain personal property used as a means of committing a public offense, to-wit, attempted grand larceny’ ” (People v. Mayen (1922) 188 Cal. 237, 242, 205 P. 435, 437 (overruled on other grounds, People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905)); “ ‘television sets, power tools, appliances, hand tools, home furniture, clothing, power drill press' ” (People v. Murray, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at pp. 308-309, 143 Cal.Rptr. at p. 503); “ ‘bill and receipts' ” and other named items (People v. Superior Court (Williams), supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at pp. 78-79, 143 Cal.Rptr. 382); “ ‘stolen property’ ” (Thompson v. Superior Court, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 108, 138 Cal.Rptr. 603 (also holding that affidavit may not be used to make warrant's description more certain)); “ ‘Evidences of indebtedness' ” of the suspect, his telephone bills, and “ ‘any papers showing names and addresses' ” of his associates (Griffin v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 672, 692-693, 103 Cal.Rptr. 379, 392); stolen merchandise (Lockridge v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 612, 625, 80 Cal.Rptr. 223); and “ ‘other evidence’ ” (Stern v. Superior Court (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 772, 784, 174 P.2d 34).On the other hand: “ ‘together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this (time) unknown,’ ” when construed as applicable only to one crime (Andresen v. Maryland, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 481, fn. 10, 96 S.Ct. at p. 2748, fn. 10); “ ‘revolutionary material’ ” (People v. Remiro, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d at p. 831, 153 Cal.Rptr. 89 (where exigency present an alternate bases for seizure also held valid)); personal property “ ‘tending to establish the identification of person or persons having dominion or control’ ” (People v. Howard (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 373, 376, 127 Cal.Rptr. 557, 559); “ ‘bookmaking . . . paraphernalia’ ” (People v. Barthel, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at p. 832, 42 Cal.Rptr. 290); and “ ‘illegal deer meat and/or elk meat,’ ” (Dunn v. Municipal Court (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 858, 868, 34 Cal.Rptr. 251, 258), have all been held to be sufficient.

GRODIN, Associate Justice.

RACANELLI, P. J., and NEWSOM, J., concur.

Copied to clipboard