COOPER v. CARLESON

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Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Laura COOPER, as Guardian Ad Litem for Henry Cooper, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Robert B. CARLESON, Director, Department of Social Welfare, State of California, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 13593.

Decided: April 11, 1973

Ralph Santiago Abascal, Edmund S. Shaffer, Jay-Allen Eisen, S. F. Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, San Francisco, Eugene Swann, Contra Costa Legal Services, Richmond, for plaintiffs and appellants. Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., by Raymond Momboisse, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for defendant and respondent.

Laura Cooper, as guardian ad litem for her six children, Moiece Palladino, as guardian ad litem for her child, and the California Welfare Rights Organization (‘CWRO’), an unincorporated association, through its president, on behalf of its members and all others similarly situated (hereinafter ‘plaintiffs') filed an action against Robert B. Carleson, Director of the State Department of Social Welfare (hereinafter ‘defendant’), seeking to enjoin defendant from enforcing the department's Eligibility and Assistance Standards (‘EAS') section 44–115.8 which, when applied, results in a reduced amount that is received by those persons eligible under the Aid to Families with Needy Children (‘AFDC’) program who reside with an adult recipient receiving aid under one of the other categorical assistance programs.1 Plaintiffs also sought a declaratory judgment that EAS section 44–115.8 is invalid and a writ of mandate to compel defendant to pay to plaintiffs the money withheld since October 1, 1971, pursuant to EAS section 44–115.8.

The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. It is form this judgment that plaintiffs appeal. It comes to this court upon a stipulated transcript on appeal which reflects that there in no dispute on any factual issue.

Mrs. Cooper, because of physical disability, receives a welfare grant of $138 a month under the Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled program (‘ATD’). Her five minor children reside with her. The actual cost of their monthly housing rent and utilities in $84, which amounts to $14 per person, or $70 as the children's pro rata share. The maximum aid for five eligible needy persons under the AFDC program is $320 per month. However, the application of EAS section 44–115.8 results in the maximum AFDC grant to the Cooper children being reduced by $31 so their monthly cash grant is $289. This result is attained because EAS section 44–115.9 establishes a schedule of ‘in-kind income’ for a family budget unit (‘FBU’) of four or more persons as follows: Housing—$86 per month; utilities—$15 per month; or a total of $101 per month for housing and utilities. This is $31 in excess of the children's actual shared costs of $70; so the amount of this excess is deducted from the maximum aid grant.

Mrs. Palladino, because of physical disability, receives a welfare grant of $140 a month under the ATD program. Her minor son resides with her. The actual cost of their monthly housing rent and utilities is $88, which amounts to $44 for each of them. The maximum aid for one eligible needy person under the AFDC program is $115 per month. However, the application of EAS section 44–115.8 results in the AFDC grant to the Palladino child being reduced by $23 so his monthly cash grant is $92. This result is attained because EAS section 44–115.9 establishes a schedule of ‘in-kind income’ for a FBU of one person as follows: Housing—$55 per month; utilities—$12 per month; or a total of $67 per month for housing and utilities. This is $23 in excess of the child's actual shared costs of $44; so the amount of this excess is deducted from the maximum aid grant.

Plaintiffs challenge the validity of EAS section 44–115.8 on the grounds that it is not in compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act, the federal regulations and the provisions of the State Welfare Reform Act of 1971. Plaintiffs also claim this regulation is violative of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.

There are four major categorical assistance programs established by the Social Security Act of 19352 which are based on the concept of ‘co-operative federalism’ in that they are financed largely by the federal government on a matching-funds basis but are administered by the individual states. (King v. Smith (1968) 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118, 1125; see also Annot., State Welfare Programs—Validity, 25 L.Ed.2d 907, 909; Legal Rights of AFDC Recipients, 21 Am.U.L.Rev. 207.) California participates in all four programs.3

States are not required to participate in the AFDC program; but once a state does elect to participate and take advantage of the substantial federal funds available, the state must comply with the mandatory requirements established by the Social Security Act and the regulations promulgated by HEW to implement the Act. (King v. Smith, supra, 392 U.S. at pp. 316–318, 88 S.Ct. at pp. 2132–2133, 20 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1125–1126; County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 738–739, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953; see also 45 C.F.R., § 233.20, and HEW, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration.4 ) In connection with the AFDC program there are two factors that under federal law must enter into the determination of benefits to be paid. First, standards of need must be established, i. e., guidelines for ascertaining who is eligible for public assistance; and second, the states must then decide how much assistance will in fact be given. (Rosado v. Wyman (1970), 397 U.S. 397, 408, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442, 453; California Welfare Rights Organization v. Carleson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 445, 450, 93 Cal.Rptr. 758, 762, 482 P.2d 670.) ‘On both scores Congress has always left to the States a great deal of discretion.’ (Ibid.; Dandridge v. Williams (1970) 397 U.S. 471, 479, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 498–499.)

Contrary to the claim of plaintiffs, administrative regulation EAS section 44–115.8 is not incompatible with federal statutes and regulations. Prior to this state's adoption of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971, the minimum basic standards of care (the minimum standard of need) were determined by the State Department of Social Welfare.5 (Former Welf. & Inst.Code, § 11452; EAS § 44–212.) Then in conformance to an amendment in 1968 to 42 United States Code, section 602, subdivision (a)(23), which required that ‘by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established,’ the California Legislature amended section 11452 to include an adjusted schedule of minimum basic standards of care.6

Even though 42 United States Code section 602, subdivision (a)(23), required that the states adjust the needs of individuals to reflect fully changes in living costs, the participating state controls the amount of aid paid to recipients. (Rabin, Implementation of the Cost-of-Living Adjustment for AFDC Recipients: A Case Study in Welfare Administration, 118 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1143, 1145.) Thus, diversity among the states exists with respect to the level of benefits that in fact are paid. (Rosado v. Wyman, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 406, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1214, 25 L.Ed.2d at p. 453.) The states have adopted several basic methods for computing maximum benefit levels.7 These maximums establish the upper limit of the amount of public assistance payable to any one individual or family irrespective of how far short the limitation may fall of the theoretical standard of need. (Rosado v. Wyman, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 409, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1216, 25 L.Ed.2d at p. 454.) California in 1971 incorporated the AFDC flat statutory maximum in Welfare and Institutions Code section 11450, subdivision (a).8

Essentially the question raised in this appeal is whether AFDC recipients are entitled to the maximum amount as set forth in section 11450, subdivision (a), or whether the department may reduce these maximum amounts as it has done in EAS section 44–115.8, which provides that where AFDC recipients resides with other categorical aid recipients such as Aid to the Totally Disabled or Aid to the Blind the monthly costs of housing and utilities for the household is prorated, and if the recipient's housing and utilities allowance exceeds his share of the actual cost, the excess shall be considered ‘in-kind’ income and taken into consideration in computing the AFDC grant.

Prior to Jefferson v. Hackney (1972) 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285, support for plaintiffs' position that they are entitled to the full statutory maximum could be found in the amendment of 42 United States Code section 602, subdivision (a)(23), which provided that not only was the standard of need to be adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs, but any maximums that the state imposes on the amount of aid paid to families likewise had to be adjusted. No such adjustment was required on other methods of computing benefits to be paid. (See discussion in May, Supreme Court Approves Maximum Grants, supra, 3 Clearing House Rev. at p. 341 et seq.) The California Supreme Court then in Villa v. Hall (1971) 6 Cal.3d 227, 98 Cal.Rptr. 460, 490 P.2d 1148 at page 235, holding that outside nonexempt income should be deducted from the standard of need (§ 11452) rather than the statutory maximum (§ 11450), stated, inter alia, that to hold otherwise would render the Social Security Act 1968 amendment a “meaningless exercise in bookkeeping.” Accordingly, the court found section 11450, subdivision (a), as amended, was inconsistent with the Social Security Act. (Id., at pp. 236–237, 98 Cal.Rptr. 460, 490 P.2d 1148.)

Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court in Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285, upheld the method Texas used to compute the benefits payable to AFDC recipients even though the system used by Texas eliminated financial incentive and resulted in a lesser amount paid to a recipient than an alternative system used by other states. Id. 406 U.S. at pp. 539–541, 92 S.Ct. at pp. 1728, 1729, 32 L.Ed.2d at pp. 292–293.) The Texas system provided that outside income was to be deducted from the reduced need rather than the standard of need. (Id., 406 U.S. at p. 539, 92 S.Ct. at p. 1728, 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 292, fn. 6.)

A month later the United States Supreme Court vacated the opinion in Villa v. Hall, supra, 6 Cal.3d 227, 98 Cal.Rptr. 460, 490 P.2d 1148, and remanded the case to the California Supreme Court for further consideration in light of the holding in Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285. Subsequently, the California Supreme Court filed its second opinion. (Villa v. Hall (1972) 7 Cal.3d 926, 103 Cal.Rptr. 863, 500 P.2d 887.) No direct reference is made to section 11450, subdivision (a), in this context, but inferentially the section as amended in 1971 is not incompatible with federal law as the State Supreme Court originally held. (Ibid.) In light of Jefferson and the later Hall decision, section 11450, subdivision (a), is the authority for EAS section 44–115–8. Support also can be found in upholding the validity of EAS section 44–115.8 in the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Carleson v. Remillard (1972) 406 U.S. 598 at page 604, 92 S.Ct. 1932, at page 1936, 32 L.Ed.2d 352, at page 357, in which he agrees ‘that a State may administratively deduct from its total ‘need payment’ such amount as is being paid to the dependents under the military allotment system,' and then states that ‘It would be curious, indeed, if two ‘pockets' of the same government would be required to make duplicating payments for welfare.

,‘The administrative procedures to give effect to this process may be cumbersome, but the right of the State to avoid overlapping benefits for support should be clearly understood.’ (Italics ours.)

Plaintiffs argue that under federal laws and regulations only income can be employed in computing an AFDC grant, that the ‘excess' is not income and, in fact, is neither received nor available, but, if anything, it is a resource, and that resources are used only to determine eligibility.

There appears to be no precise definition of the term ‘resources,’ but we find nothing in the Social Security Act or the federal regulations that would preclude considering ‘resources' as including shared expenses which would be subject to a reduction in the benefits paid if these shared expenses are on a regular basis.

The Social Security Act and the federal regulations refer to income and resources and require that the states consider all income and resources of recipients in determining the need of the child as well as the amount of the assistance. (42 U.S.C., § 602, subd. (a)(7); 45 C.F.R., § 233.20, subd. (a)(3)(ii)(a); see also 45 C.F.R. 233.20, subd. (a)(4)(i).) The one requirement imposed upon the states is that only income and resources that are available for current use on a regular basis may be considered by the state (HEW Handbook, pt. IV, §§ 3120, 3131.7.)

Although plaintiffs further argue that the ‘in-kind income’ actually is not received, the AFDC recipients enjoy the benefit of the assistance grant to a recipient in another categorical program. To this extent it may will be considered an increment to the AFDC recipient's economic security. Thus where a family has income or resources under federal laws and regulations, such income or resources are to be deducted from the grant. (Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285.)

Plaintiffs contend that EAS section 44–115.8 is inconsistent and in conflict with state statutes and therefore is void. We find to the contrary.

Plaintiffs argue that the language and history of section 11452 of the Welfare and Institutions Code clearly prohibit application of EAS section 44–115.8. Relying on Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 733, 748, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697, which holds, inter alia, that ‘[a]dministrative regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void,’ plaintiffs claim that since the standard of need is now codified, the only function of the Department of Social Welfare is to assure uniform application of its provisions—that the breakdown of component parts to establish the standard of need of recipients is not authorized.

However, it is important to keep in mind that the breakdown of the family budget unit schedules found in EAS section 44–115.9 does not go toward the determination of eligibility; this FBU schedule is to be applied only after a person is found to be eligible for benefits under AFDC. (See EAS, §§ 44–101, 44–111.453, which provide that (with an exception not applicable here) ‘aid shall not be denied or discontinued for an otherwise eligible [AFDC] child who is offered a free home.’)

Plaintiffs take the further position that the ‘excess' defined as ‘in-kind income’ by EAS section 44–115.8 is not ‘income’ within the meaning of its use as contained in Welfare and Institutions Code section 11450, subdivision (a), which provides that ‘For each needy family which includes one or more needy children qualified for aid under this chapter . . . there shall be paid, notwithstanding minimum basic standards of adequate care established . . . under Section 11452, an amount of aid each month which when added to his income, exclusive of any amounts considered exempt . . . is equal to the sums specified in the following table . . ..’ (Italics ours.)

What constitutes ‘income’ is set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 11008, which states in part: ‘In computing the amount of income determined to be available to support a recipient, the value of currently used resources shall be included, except as provided in Section 11018.'9 This latter section states that ‘Notwithstanding Section 11008, in computing the amount of income available to support a recipient, the first sixty dollars ($60) per quarter of any casual income or income from inconsequential resources which is received infrequently or irregularly shall be exempt.’

As previously indicated, the defendant not only has the authority but he has the duty and responsibility to adopt regulations to implement or interpret the laws administered by him. In effect, the defendant is mandated by statute to establish the value of currently used resources. The method of computing the value of this in-kind income is a question for the defendant as Director of the State Department of Social Welfare.

Plaintiffs argue that such an in-kind income provision duplicates the legislative reduction allegedly already made by the flat-grant AFDC provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code when there is a shared living arrangement between an AFDC recipient and recipients of ‘adult aid’ welfare grants. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that a bill authored by Senator Clair Burgener which provided for reductions in aid where there was duplication of items of need under the different aid programs was rejected by the Legislature. Unpassed bills, however, relating to an act already in effect, have little value as evidence of legislative intent. (Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Suprs. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 41, 57–58, 69 Cal.Rptr. 480.) This is especially true with the passage of the 1971 Welfare Reform Act. (See discussion of history of Senate Bill 796 in 3 Pac.L.J. at 476–480.) Moreover, there is no duplication in fact. The minimum basic standards of adequate care set out in section 11452 were based upon independent living arrangements. Defendant's declaration states that shared housing and utilities were not considered in any fair averaging which may have been done.

Turning to EAS section 44–115.8, the minimum basic standards of care are established by Welfare and Institutions Code section 11452, which does not pertain to the computation of the grant, but which merely spells out the minimum standard of need. Hence, it does not consider the deduction of presently utilized resources which is required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 11450, subdivision (a). It is this latter section which establishes the sum to be actually paid after deducting income. As previously pointed out, income includes the value of currently used resources. In order to determine the amount of FBU income to be deducted, it is necessary to consider EAS section 44–115.8, which relates to the method of calculation. It is necessary to read EAS section 44–115.8 as a part of section 11450, subdivision (a), as well as reading the two code sections as a whole. There is then no conflict between the regulation and the statutes in question. Recipients of aid are thus prevented from receiving amounts in excess of their actual need by treating as income the benefits derived from shared living arrangements. This is not a legally impermissible assumption of income. It assures that a needy child's actual housing and utility needs are met, while at the same time preventing duplicate welfare payments. A contrary interpretation would be most illogical as it would sanction excessive grants to welfare recipients whose needs are satisfied, rather than protecting the welfare program against a wasteful double payment for a single need.

There is no merit to plaintiffs' contention that EAS section 44–115.8 violates both the federal and the state provisions which guarantee the recipient's freedom of choice in spending his assistance grant.

Plaintiffs rely on 42 United States Code section 606, subdivision (b), which defines “aid to families with dependent children” to mean money payments, and 45 Code of Federal Regulations section 234.11, which provides that federal financial participation is available in money payments under a state plan made under the various federal aid programs and that ‘[m]oney payments are payments in cash, checks, or warrants immediately redeemable at par . . . with no restrictions imposed by the agency on the use of funds by the individual.’ (See also HEW, Handbook, pt. IV, § 5120.)

Here plaintiffs have singled out particular provisions to support their contention; instead it is necessary to look to the whole act. (See Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 112, 65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315.) In doing so, these provisions plaintiffs rely on can be reconciled with the requirement that the amount of the grant to an AFDC recipient is to be the maximum statutory standard less non-exempt income and resources or in-kind income. It is this amount that the recipient is to receive in the form of money payments.

Plaintiffs advance the argument that they have the right to determine how they are to spend money allotted in the FBU schedule for housing and utilities, this goes to their principal argument discussed earlier that they are entitled to the full statutory maximum as set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 11450, subdivision (a).

In furtherance of their contention, plaintiffs also rely on Welfare and Institutions Code section 10501 which provides: ‘No person concerned with the administration of a public assistance program shall dictate how any recipient shall expend the aid granted to him.’ The argument is advanced that the effect of EAS section 44–115.8 is to tell the recipients how they shall spend their welfare grants. The law prohibits defendant from either dictating or imposing restrictions on how the grant is to be spent. However, this regulation does not mandate that the grant money be spent in any prescribed manner. The regulation, EAS section 44–115.8, imposes no restriction on the expenditure of the grant; it merely establishes the amount of grant the recipient is entitled to receive because of his need. As such, EAS section 44–115.8 does not violate the money payment principle.

Plaintiffs argue that the state constitutional provision relating to blind recipients and the statute relating to aid to the disabled renders EAS section 44–115.8 invalid. Section 21, subdivision (3), of article XIII of the California Constitution and Welfare and Institutions Code section 11006 provide that the grants to the respective recipients shall not be construed as income to any person other than that recipient of the AB or ATD grant. There is no merit to this contention, because, as previously discussed, the Department of Social Welfare may lawfully establish a breakdown (as it did in EAS section 44–115.9—the FBU schedule) of housing and utility expenses.

There also are department regulations for housing for the ATD and AB recipients. Where an adult (ATD or AB) recipient shares housing and utilities with others, the adult recipient receives the amount he actually pays of the total housing-utility costs or his prorated cost, whichever is less. (EAS, §§ 44–207.233, 44–207.12.) Turning to the two recipient-plaintiffs and applying EAS section 44–115.8, which provides that each AFDC recipient's share of housing and utilities is to be calculated by dividing the total actual cost of housing and utilities by the number of persons residing in the house, Mrs. Palladino shares the total cost of $88 housing and utilities with her one AFDC child—her share is $44. Mrs. Cooper's pro rata share of the total cost of $84 housing and utilities with her five AFDC children is $14. It does not appear that the two plaintiffs would receive more than their pro rata amount. Instead the adult's fair share of housing expenses are attributed to her, just as those of the AFDC recipients are attributed to them. Her expenditure is for her needs, not for those of individuals with whom she shares the premises. Her welfare grant is not involved. Rather her need and use of the premises is recognized and eliminated as a need to be attributed to the other occupants. The AFDC recipients receive and contribute their pro rata amount of the total costs, and any excess of the amount allocated to them in the FBU schedule for housing and utilities is income in kind.

It is evident that the recipients of the two different assistance programs each receives aid only for his share of costs for housing and utilities. (See EAS, § 44–133.12.) In applying the formula, no portion of the adult aid grant goes toward the grant to the AFDC recipient. Rather, the regulation segregates the adult's needs from those of the AFDC recipient's needs, thereby preventing double compensation for the adult's needs. Thus, neither the constitutional nor statutory provision restricting use of the ATD or AB grant is violated by the application of EAS section 44–115.8.

Plaintiffs suggest that if the AFDC recipient's grant is reduced by this purported ‘in-kind income,’ the gap between the need standard and the aid maximums will never be surmounted. Ideally, the aid to the recipient should be 100 percent of his need, but the United States Supreme Court recognizes fiscal and budgetary problems of the states and recognizes that states are at liberty to pay as little or as much as they choose.10 (See Rosado v. Wyman, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 407, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1215, 25 L.Ed.2d at p. 453; Dandridge v. Williams, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 479, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1158, 25 L.Ed.2d at p. 499; Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 543, 92 S.Ct. at p. 1730, 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 294; and see also Rabin, supra, 118 U.Pa.L.Rev. at pp. 1151–1152.)

Plaintiffs lastly contend that application of EAS section 44–115.8 is a denial of equal protection of the law as to them and others in the class they represent. They argue that there is no similar loss of benefits when AFDC recipients live in a home with persons who are not participants in either the ATD or AB aid programs.

The United States Supreme Court in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 485, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 501–502, held that ‘In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ . . . ‘The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific.’ . . . ‘A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’' In Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 546, 92 S.Ct. at p. 1731, 32 L.Ed.2d at p. 296, the United States Supreme Court further stated that ‘A legislature may address a problem ‘one step at a time,’ or even ‘select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.’ [Citation.] So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket. The very complexity of the problems suggests that there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them.'11

Although there may be some discrepancies in the department's regulations regarding the amount AFDC recipients receive, there is a rational basis for EAS section 44–115.8, i. e., to avoid overlapping benefits for housing and utilities to persons sharing a home who are receiving aid under more than one categorical assistance program. Certainly it does not violate equal protection to eliminate duplicate payments for welfare.

The trial judge, in an extensive, thorough and well-reasoned opinion (which was of assistance to this court), concluded that EAS section 44–115.8 is in compliance with the Social Security Act and the federal regulations, that it is valid under the state Welfare Reform Act of 1971, and that it is constitutionally permissible under the equal protection clause. With such conclusion, we concur.

Judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

1.  EAS section 44–115.8 provides that when one or more recipients of AFDC resides in the same household with one or more recipients of adult aids, ‘if the recipient's (Adult Aid or FBU) housing and utilities allowance exceeds his share of the actual cost of housing and utilities (including telephone), the excess shall be considered in-kind income and taken into consideration in computing the grant.‘Each recipient's share shall be calculated by dividing the total actual cost of housing and utilities (including telephone) by the number of persons (adults and minors, needy and nonneedy) residing in the household.’

2.  Old Age Assistance (‘OAA’) (42 U.S.C., § 301 et seq.); Aid to the Blind (‘AB’) (42 U.S.C., § 1201 et seq.); Aid for the Permanently and Totally Disabled (‘ATD’) (42 U.S.C., § 1351 et seq.); and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (‘AFDC’) (42 U.S.C., § 601 et seq.)

3.  Welfare and Institutions Code, division 9, part 3, section 11000 et seq.

4.  The HEW Handbook contains the department's interpretation of the federal regulations.

5.  This was the amount determined by the department to be the minimum monthly allotment required to sustain a family of a given size with adequate housing, food, clothing, and other basic necessities. (Beilenson and Agran, The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, 3 Pac.L.J. 475, 480.)

6.  Section 11452 as amended provides: ‘The schedule of minimum basic standards of adequate care is as follows:C1Number of needy persons in the same familyC2Minimum basic standards of adequate care1$1252210325543145362640874498496954310590plus five dollars ($5) for each additional needy person.'

7.  See Rabin, Welfare Administration, supra, 118 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1143, 1145; see also May, Supreme Court Approves Maximum Grants, 3 Clearing House Rev. 321, 342, fn. 6.

8.  The payment schedule in section 11450, subdivision (a), provides:C1‘Number of eligible needy persons in the same homeC2Maximum aid1․$1152․1903․2354․2805․3206․3607․3958․4309․46510 or more․500

9.  For legislative intent in a related matter see Welfare and Institutions Code section 11306. ‘In formulating the minimum basic standards of adequate care pursuant to Section 11452, the Department of Social Welfare shall establish an assistance payment plan and methods of grant computation that are designed to work in harmony with the employability plan developed by the Department of Human Resources Development in accordance with the work incentive program administered by that department pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 5000) of the Unemployment Insurance Code. It is the intent of the Legislature that income and resources expected to be available to the recipient during the period the employability plan is in effect shall be estimated by the county department at the time the recipient is accepted as a participant under the work incentive program and at six-month intervals thereafter.’ (Italics ours.)

10.  In 1971, during consideration of various proposals resulting in the adoption of the final version of the state's Welfare Reform Act, according to the Legislative Analyst's review of Senate Bill 796, as amended June 7, raising AFDC grants to ‘full need’ would have cost an estimated $25.3 million in state funds. (Beilenson and Agran, Welfare Reform Act of 1971, 3 Pac.L.J. 479, fn. 15.)

11.  The United States Supreme Court in Dandridge and Jefferson has applied the ‘reasonable’ or ‘rational’ basis test which requires a showing of invidious and ‘palpably arbitrary’ classification devoid of any reasonably conceivable rationality, rather than the ‘fundamental interest’ test. (See discussion in Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication, 58 Cal.L.Rev. 555, 591 et seq.; Comment, 9 Duquesne L.Rev. 271, 275 et seq.; Recent Cases, 23 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 1390 et seq.)

MORONY,* Associate Justice. FN* Sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

RICHARDSON, P. J., and JANES, J., concur.