PEOPLE v. HAINES

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Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Reed Hadley HAINES, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 7029.

Decided: December 05, 1975

Raymond A. Greenberg, Beverly Hills, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant. Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., and Michael E. Lasater, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

OPINION

Defendant was convicted of selling a substance in lieu of a restricted dangerous drug (Health & Safety Code, s 11917, now Health & Safety Code, s 11382).

The sole issue on appeal is whether this violation requires a specific intent to substitute a substance in place of a restricted dangerous drug.1

In an opinion which appeared briefly in the advance sheets, we pointed out the hopeless conflict between the decisions of the Courts of Appeal as to whether this crime requires a specific or a general intent. We held it was a general intent crime.

The Supreme Court granted a hearing and then retransfered the matter to this court ‘for the refiling of its opinion with an appropriate reference to People v. Daniels (1975), 14 Cal.3d 857, 122 Cal.Rptr. 872, 537 P.2d 1232,’ which had come down after the filing of our original opinion. Daniels held that the selling of a restricted dangerous drug is a general and not a specific intent crime.

While Daniels involved Sale of a restricted dangerous drug instead of Sale of a substance In lieu of a restricted dangerous drug, we interpret this action of the Supreme Court to be an oblique holding that the offense of sale of a substance in lieu of a restricted dangerous drug is a general intent crime. We, therefore, adopt the rationale of Daniels and hold that Health & Safety Code, s 11382, does not require a specific intent to substitute a substance in place of a restricted dangerous drug. The offense is complete if there has been an offer of a restricted dangerous drug and there is subsequent delivery of a substance in lieu thereof.

It would thus appear that those cases which hold this offense to be a specific intent offense2 were in error and that cases holding that this is a general intent crime3 correctly state the law. The editors of CALJIC may safely revise CALJIC 12.04 by striking therefrom the phrase ‘with the specific intent to substitute any other substance in place of a controlled substance.’

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.  The issue was presented when the trial judge struck from CALJIC 12.23 (now CALJIC 12.04) the words ‘With the specific intent to substitute a substance in place of a restricted dangerous drug.’

2.  People v. Sweet, 257 Cal.App.2d 167, 65 Cal.Rptr. 31; People v. Contreras, 226 Cal.App.2d 700, 38 Cal.Rptr. 338, and People v. Lopez, 213 Cal.App.2d 668, 28 Cal.Rptr. 912.

3.  People v. Medina, 27 Cal.App.3d 473, 103 Cal.Rptr. 721; People v. House, 268 Cal.App.2d 922, 74 Cal.Rptr. 496; People v. Northern, 256 Cal.App.2d 28, 64 Cal.Rptr. 15, and People v. Hicks, 222 Cal.App.2d 265, 35 Cal.Rptr. 149.

GARDNER, Presiding Justice.

KAUFMAN and McDANIEL, JJ., concur.