PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Raymond Dwight JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.*
Defendant and appellant herein was charged by information with the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. By a second count he was charged with a violation of Penal Code, Section 12021, possession of a firearm capable of being concealed upon the person by one who had been previously convicted of a felony. The information also charged two prior felony convictions, one for robbery and one for assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant admitted the priors. The cause was tried to a jury upon appellant's plea of not guilty as to both counts. The jury returned verdicts of guilty as to both counts and after denial of probation appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for the term prescribed by law as to Count I. The court dismissed Count II. Appellant has appealed from the judgment of conviction.
At the request of appellant, this court appointed counsel to represent him herein and after examination of the record counsel so appointed has advised the court that his study has not revealed error. In addition this court has made its own examination of the record and likewise has failed to find error. However, appellant has briefed his appeal to the court in pro. per.
On July 6, 1958, one Jesus Camarillo, and his wife, Cecilia, lived in a trailer on property owned by a Mrs. Carmen Coan. Appellant was living at the Coan residence. During the afternoon of that day Mrs. Coan, the appellant, and Mr. and Mrs. Camarillo had eaten dinner together and the party had consumed a quantity of beer, although it appears that no one was intoxicated. During the afternoon and evening appellant appeared to be in good humor, but after he had been told by Mrs. Coan that her son John was coming home in a few days appellant's attitude and demeanor changed. He became belligerent, and Mrs. Coan refused to sleep in her home. It was then arranged that Camarillo would sleep in his car and his wife and Mrs. Coan would sleep in the trailer. Appellant remained in Mrs. Coan's house.
After Camarillo had gone to sleep in the automobile, appellant approached the car on several occasions and tried to open the doors. He then went over to the trailer, opened the front door, and inquired if Mrs. Coan was there. He appeared angry. Mrs. Camarillo called to her husband who left the automobile and came over to the trailer. An argument ensued, whereupon appellant struck Camarillo over the head with a handkerchief-covered gun which he had in his hand. Camarillo fell against the trailer house. The two continued to fight until they fell backwards off the porch. During the scuffle, appellant dropped the gun. Camarillo succeeded in obtaining a piece of pipe, with which he struck appellant. Appellant ran and Camarillo ran after him, caught him and prevented him from leaving. The police were called and appellant was placed under arrest.
The foregoing recital of facts, under the prevailing rule on appeal, is stated in the light most favorable to the prosecution. In all essentials appellant, who took the stand in his own behalf, contradicted the People's evidence, but it is apparent that the evidence introduced against him is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.
Appellant argues that he was denied due process of law; that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict; that the jury did not follow the instruction that appellant must have been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; that the information was faulty in that it did not specify or describe the deadly weapon with which he was charged with having assaulted Camarillo; that the two prior convictions of felony which he admitted were not sufficiently identified in the information; and that he did not have a fair trial because certain witnesses, notably Mrs. Coan, were not called. It is unnecessary to discuss these assignments of error since it is apparent that the record and the law support none of them.
For the reasons given, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
VAN DYKE, Presiding Justice.
SCHOTTKY and PEEK, JJ., concur.