BROWN v. STANDARD ACC INS CO OF DETROIT MICH

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District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

BROWN v. STANDARD ACC. INS. CO. OF DETROIT, MICH.*

Civ. 8472.

Decided: February 18, 1935

Sheridan, Orr, Drapeau & Gardner, of Ventura, for appellant. Paul Nourse, of Los Angeles, for respondent.

By the terms of a policy of insurance plaintiff was insured by the defendant “against loss resulting from bodily injuries effected directly, exclusively and independently of all other causes through accidental means.” At a time when such policy of insurance was in effect, from an automobile accident plaintiff suffered a “bump” that “formed up here on the top of * * * (his) head” which plaintiff claimed resulted in a paralysis as to certain muscles of his body, and on account of which he brought an action to recover damages from the defendant in accordance with the provisions of said insurance policy.

On the trial of the action a doctor, who was called in behalf of plaintiff, testified that in his opinion such “paralysis was due to intercranial hemorrhage” that was caused by “traumatic injury to the head.” Following the close of the introduction of evidence by the respective parties to the action, on motion of the defendant the trial court ordered a directed verdict by the jury. It is from the judgment that ensued from the return of such verdict that the instant appeal is taken.

Although on cross-examination of the doctor who gave the testimony to which reference hereinbefore has been had the doctor somewhat modified his former statement with reference to the cause of plaintiff's disability, and although other evidence adduced on behalf of the defendant in its effect was decidedly in conflict with the testimony given by the said doctor, nevertheless, as is so clearly set forth in Estate of Flood, 217 Cal. 763, 768, 21 P.(2d) 579, 580, “It has become the established law of this state that * * * a directed verdict may be granted ‘only when, disregarding conflicting evidence and giving to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, herein indulging in every legitimate inference which may be drawn from that evidence, the result is a determination that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of plaintiff if such a verdict were given.’ [Citing authorities.] * * *”

It is apparent that, giving due weight to the emphasized part of the declaration of the law quoted from the cited case, the testimony given in behalf of plaintiff was “of sufficient substance to support a verdict.”

The judgment is reversed.

PER CURIAM.

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